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Introduction
Looking back upon the operations of 1916, and in anticipation of the battles 
to come, the French prime minister, Aristide Briand, remarked that military 
offensives had become ‘really like a great industrial undertaking. There were 
so many miles of front, so many troops, and so many guns required; all 
had to be calculated to a nicety, and all kinds of preparations made’.1 In the 
wake of 1917’s inconclusive campaigning season, The Times provided a more 
concise observation: ‘Modern war is modern industry, organised for a single 
definite purpose’.2 The years between 1914 and 1918 witnessed the ‘advent of 
a totalising war strategy that pitted industrial nations and their citizenries 
against each other’.3 The conflict’s dimensions made it impracticable for 
all of the belligerents to rely exclusively upon their cadre of professionally 
trained soldiers both for its conduct and its coordination. All turned to 
the manpower of civil society to enhance the size and strengths of their 
martial forces. In Britain, an influx of volunteers and conscripts provided 
the world’s foremost naval power with an army capable of matching the 
vast forces raised in continental Europe. Their presence imbued almost 
every aspect of the British war effort. Examples of their bravery, sacrifices 
and eventual mastery of modern warfare on the industrial battlefield have 
inspired a prodigious literature in the century since the war was fought. 
Yet civilian brain power, as well as muscle power, played a vital role in the 
prosecution of the First World War.
When did the potential utility of civilian expertise find acceptance 
within the higher political and military administration of the British war 
effort? How were the skills and aptitudes possessed by the members of a 
highly industrialized society like pre-war Britain applied to the conduct of 
an industrial war? Was the relevance of non-military experience recognized 
and valued within the War Office and the army’s various theatres of 
operations? This book addresses these questions. It comprises a detailed 
investigation of the roles performed by Britain’s transport experts in support 
of the British army’s military operations during the war. Two things are 
1 TNA, CAB 28/2, papers I.C. 13–32, Secretary’s notes of allied conferences held at the 
Consulta, Rome, 5–7 Jan. 1917, p. 5.
2 ‘An army of labour. Behind the lines in France’, The Times, 26 Dec. 1917, p. 8.
3 T. M. Proctor, Civilians in a World at War, 1914–1918 (New York, 2010), p. 3.
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of particular importance to this study: the contributions made by senior 
employees of the British empire’s transport concerns to the character and 
conduct of the war; and what these individuals’ experiences can tell us 
both about how the First World War was conceptualized as it unfolded 
and about the relationship between soldiers and civilians at the summit of 
an international coalition. Through an examination of civilian specialists at 
war, this book illustrates how the British army leveraged modern business 
methods – developed for the administration of a global trading empire and 
with the aim of improving profitability – and discusses the ways in which 
the business of killing and the intensification of military power were shaped 
by the input of non-military figures during the twentieth century’s first 
great conflagration.
The First World War did not create the phenomenon of civilian 
expertise augmenting the work of the state’s military apparatus in the 
prosecution of war. Following the so-called military revolution of the mid 
sixteenth century, merchants known as sutlers followed the armies of early 
modern Europe and provided soldiers with the opportunity to purchase 
non-military items such as sugar, tobacco and coffee – a practice that 
continued until as recently as the American Civil War.4 Britain’s efforts in 
the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars were supported by a vast 
network of contractors who produced tents, kettles, knapsacks, uniforms, 
boots and sundry other items for the British troops, which provided the 
material foundations for the national war effort against France.5 Following 
the advent of rail travel, the civilian contractors Samuel Morton Peto, 
Edward Betts and Thomas Brassey provided staff and materials for 
the construction of a fourteen-mile-long railway between the port of 
Balaklava and the British lines when the existing transport infrastructure’s 
inadequacies jeopardized the siege of Sevastopol during the Crimean 
War.6 Such activities, undertaken either to sustain the morale or increase 
the fighting abilities of the armies they served, were carried out on a far 
larger scale and with a higher degree of integration during the industrial 
wars of the twentieth century.
After 1914, civilians were drawn into the war in a way that was profoundly 
more immersive than in previous conflicts. The British government found 
work for the employees of railway companies in the construction of railway 
4 M. van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge, 1977), 
pp. 5–8.
5 R. Knight, Britain against Napoleon: the Organization of Victory, 1793–1815 (London, 
2014); J. Uglow, In These Times: Living in Britain Through Napoleon’s Wars, 1793–1815 
(London, 2015), pp. 46–8.
6 T. Coleman, The Railway Navvies (London, 1981), pp. 212–20.
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lines in various theatres, the maintenance and operation of locomotives, 
and the prosecution of duties in the ‘War Office, the Admiralty, the 
Home Office, the Colonial Office, the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
the Ministry of Munitions … the Ministry of Shipping, the Ministry of 
Food, the Wool Transport Office, the Trench Warfare Department, Army 
Canteens, [and] the Petrol Committee’ among others.7 Whereas in the past 
civilians in the proximity of the battlefield remained a distinct entity, the 
First World War cultivated military efforts in which the ‘soldier-civilian 
relationship’ was ‘intermeshed’ to an unprecedented degree.8 In some of the 
cases within this book, Britain’s transport experts assumed military rank and 
acquired recognizable positions within the military chain of command. In 
others, particularly on the home front, they operated on the fringes of the 
army and fulfilled quasi-military, quasi-civilian functions. Throughout the 
war effort, this book argues, their exertions helped to sustain and ultimately 
bring about a successful end to the bloodshed.
The various ways in which civilians navigated the First World War 
have attracted increasing scholarly interest in recent years. Historians 
have addressed the question of why non-military participants in the war 
became involved in the conflict and considered wider questions about ‘the 
variety of meanings of “civilian” in wartime’.9 Laura Ugolini has explored 
the motivations and experiences of middle-class men on the English home 
front, a category applicable to many of the individuals discussed within 
this book. For Ugolini, the war forced middle-class men, particularly those 
who were middle-aged or older, to confront popular understandings of 
manliness and patriotic duty. Those who attempted to emulate the military 
commitments of younger men were ‘often not an object of admiration, but 
of ridicule and contempt’.10 Yet through the direction of their skills and 
expertise into activities deemed valuable to the war effort, men unable to 
fight made contributions that – although not as dangerous as those of their 
sons – provided them with a sense that they had borne their ‘fair share’ 
of the war’s burden. Sir Sam Fay, general manager of the Great Central 
Railway and the director of movements (DOM) at the War Office from 
1917 onwards, provides evidence that reinforces Ugolini’s argument. The 
dedication page of Fay’s memoir, The War Office at War, confirmed the 
7 E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War: Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and 
Achievements (2 vols., London, 1921), i, p. xiii.
8 H. Jones, ‘The Great War: how 1914–18 changed the relationship between war and 
civilians’, RUSI Journal, clix (2014), 84–91, at p. 90.
9 Proctor, Civilians in a World at War, p. 8.
10 L. Ugolini, Civvies: Middle-Class Men on the English Home Front, 1914–18 (Manchester, 
2017), p. 109.
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book’s purpose as a permanent record of what ‘Grandad’ had done during 
the war.11
Tammy Proctor’s work has gone beyond middle-class men to discuss 
civilians’ contributions on a broader scale. However, while recognizing the 
varied roles taken on by non-soldiers between 1914 and 1918, her analysis 
concentrated upon those in care-giving or humanitarian capacities rather 
than those drawn into the conflict for more overtly aggressive purposes. 
Consequently, although Proctor acknowledged that the First World War 
‘spawned the modern phenomenon of “expert” assistance in the management 
and maintenance of war’,12 her examination of civilian influence over the 
conduct of operations was largely restricted to the manufacture of chemical 
weapons. In doing so, Proctor’s work joins a corpus of literature that has 
considered the technical and moral implications of the mobilization of 
scientific knowledge during the conflict.13 This book seeks to draw business 
knowledge and managerial acumen into the same discussions. In an era 
before the establishment of private military contractors able to provide 
states with what Marc Lindemann has referred to as ‘expertise at a price’,14 
during the First World War civilians were deeply embedded in the war 
machine and performed tasks both directly and indirectly related to their 
peacetime specializations. Businessmen were less inhibited by the values of 
internationalism that had served as guiding principles for leading scientists 
in the century prior to 1914,15 but their contributions to the technical and 
organizational aspects of the war had a similarly profound effect on the 
scale and duration of the violence that the opposing armies inflicted upon 
one another. 
The place of civilian expertise within the British war effort merits 
further study, as the subject has been embroiled within one of the conflict’s 
11 S. Fay, The War Office at War (London, 1937). Fay’s eldest son, Samuel Ernest, served on 
the western front with the 111th Railway Company.
12 Proctor, Civilians in a World at War, p. 177.
13 R. MacLeod, ‘The scientists go to war: revisiting precept and practice, 1914–1919’, 
Journal of War and Culture Studies, ii (2009), 37–51; R. M. MacLeod, ‘The “arsenal” in the 
Strand: Australian chemists and the British munitions effort 1916–1919’, Annals of Science, 
xlvi (1989), 45–67; R. MacLeod, ‘The chemists go to war: the mobilization of civilian 
chemists and the British war effort, 1914–1918’, Annals of Science, l (1993), 455–81; D. C. 
Richter, Chemical Soldiers: British Gas Warfare in World War I (London, 1994); P. Doyle, 
Disputed Earth: Geology and Trench Warfare on the Western Front 1914–18 (London, 2017); G. 
Hartcup, The War of Invention: Scientific Developments, 1914–1918 (London, 1988).
14 M. Lindemann, ‘Civilian contractors under military law’, Parameters: US Army War 
College Quarterly, xxxvii (2007), 83–94.
15 E. Crawford, ‘Internationalism in science as a casualty of the First World War: relations 
between German and allied scientists as reflected in nominations for the Nobel prizes in 
physics and chemistry’, Social Science Information, xxvii (1988), 163–201.
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most noxious historiographical legacies. In his War Memoirs, the wartime 
prime minister David Lloyd George asserted that it was only through his 
‘forcing’ of ‘unwanted civilians’ upon the army in the summer of 1916 
that the military reluctantly agreed to engage with the myriad talents 
and abilities prevalent in Britain’s sophisticated industrial economy.16 In 
Lloyd George’s version of events the British army was handicapped in 
its operations by the predominance of insular, incompetent ‘inexperts’ 
within its senior ranks. The army’s high command was incapable of 
understanding the organizational and conceptual implications of modern 
warfare, unable to offer effective solutions to the battlefield challenges it 
faced and unwilling to accept the advice of those who possessed skills and 
experience with demonstrable applicability to the prosecution of a multi-
dimensional and complex war effort.17 In contrast to the image of upper-
class senior officers wedded to an outdated Victorian model of warfare that 
has become a standard trope in the popular memory of the war, Lloyd 
George’s premiership comprised – in the words of his most prominent 
biographer –‘vitality, urgency, [and] improvisation’, and was dominated by 
an ‘astonishing disregard for convention’.18 As prime minister, Lloyd George 
oversaw the creation of a small war cabinet to oversee the higher direction 
of the war, established new government ministries to manage crucial areas 
such as shipping, food, information and reconstruction, and maintained his 
commitment – initially demonstrated at the Ministry of Munitions in 1915 
– to the use of men with ‘first class business experience’ in positions of great 
responsibility.19 He campaigned and won the khaki election of December 
1918 on the platform of having been the man who won the war. Many on 
the other side of the civil–military divide took great issue with that slogan 
between the two world wars.
The so-called battle of the memoirs, fought during the 1920s and 1930s 
between those who had led Britain’s political and military war efforts, 
established the terms of a debate that largely dominated the British military 
history of the war for generations.20 Lloyd George’s stringent criticisms of 
16 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (2 vols., London, 1938), i. 474.
17 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, i, pp. v–vi.
18 J. Grigg, Lloyd George: War Leader, 1916–1918 (London, 2003), p. 11.
19 C. Wrigley, ‘The Ministry of Munitions: an innovatory department’, in War and the 
State: the Transformation of British Government, 1914–1919, ed. K. Burk (London, 1982), 
pp. 32–56; K. Grieves, ‘Improvising the British war effort: Eric Geddes and Lloyd George, 
1915–18’, War & Society, vii (1989), 40–55; D. Crow, A Man of Push and Go: the Life of George 
Macaulay Booth (London, 1965).
20 I. Beckett, ‘Frocks and brasshats’, in The First World War and British Military History, 
ed. B. Bond (Oxford, 1991), pp. 89–112. Key works within the ‘battle of the memoirs’ 
include W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis (6 vols., London, 1923); E. Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 
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the army’s conduct of the war – built upon foundations provided by the 
output of his political colleague Winston Churchill and that other prolific 
wordsmith of the age, Basil Liddell Hart – fixed the terms of discussion 
upon a polarized examination of two men and the decisions they made 
during the war: Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of 
the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) through the Somme, Passchendaele 
and the final year of the war; and Lloyd George, director of Britain’s 
global war effort from December 1916 and a prominent member of the 
cabinet throughout the conflict.21 Whereas Lloyd George embodied drive, 
energy and innovation, and espoused the industrial approach to war, Haig 
came to personify an army command that was reactive, technophobic, 
unimaginative and isolationist. The work of Tim Travers has exemplified a 
historical focus on the latter of these deficiencies. Across a series of books 
and articles, Travers argued that the conservatism that pervaded the BEF’s 
general headquarters (GHQ) produced a concept of warfare that had been 
rendered obsolete by technological developments.22 In addition, Haig’s 
1892–1916 (2 vols., London, 1925); H. H. Asquith, Memories and Reflections (2 vols., London, 
1928); M. Aitken, Politicians and the War, 1914–1916 (2 vols., 1928); R. B. Haldane, Richard 
Burdon Haldane: an Autobiography (London, 1929); D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David 
Lloyd George (6 vols., London, 1933); D. Haig, Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (December 1915–
April 1919), ed. J. H. Boraston (London, 1919); J. D. P. French, 1914 (London, 1919); W. R. 
Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914–1918 (2 vols., London, 1926); H. Gough, The Fifth 
Army (London, 1931).
21 For a range of judgments on Haig, see B. H. Liddell Hart, Reputations, Ten Years After 
(1928); A. Duff Cooper, Haig (2 vols., London, 1935); J. Terraine, Douglas Haig: the Educated 
Soldier (1963); J. Laffin, British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One (Gloucester, 1988); 
G. J. De Groot, Douglas Haig, 1861–1928 (London, 1988); D. Winter, Haig’s Command: a 
Reassessment (1991); W. Reid, Douglas Haig: Architect of Victory (Edinburgh, 2006); J. P. 
Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge, 2008); Haig: a Reappraisal 80 
Years On, ed. B. Bond and N. Cave (Barnsley, 2009); G. Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig 
and the British Army (London, 2011). On Lloyd George’s wartime career, see K. O. Morgan, 
‘Lloyd George’s premiership: a study in “prime ministerial government”’, Hist. Jour., xiii 
(1970), 130–57; R. J. Q. Adams, Arms and the Wizard: Lloyd George and the Ministry of 
Munitions, 1915–1916 (London, 1978); J. Grigg, Lloyd George: From Peace to War, 1912–1916 
(London, 1985); Grigg, War Leader; D. French, The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 
1916–1918 (Oxford, 1995); G. H. Cassar, Lloyd George at War, 1916–1918 (London, 2011).
22 T. Travers, ‘The hidden army: structural problems in the British officer corps, 1900–1918’, 
Jour. Contemp. Hist., xvii (1982), 523–44; T. Travers, ‘A particular style of command: Haig and 
GHQ, 1916–18’, Journal of Strategic Studies, x (1987), 363–76; T. Travers, The Killing Ground: 
the British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900–1918 (London, 
1990); T. Travers, ‘The evolution of British strategy and tactics on the western front in 1918: 
GHQ, manpower, and technology’, Jour. Military Hist., liv (1990), 173–200; T. Travers, ‘Could 
the tanks of 1918 have been war-winners for the British Expeditionary Force?’, Jour. Contemp. 
Hist., xxvii (1992), 389–406; T. Travers, How the War was Won: Command and Technology in the 
British Army on the Western Front, 1917–1918 (London, 1992).
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personality ‘prevented him from easily accepting innovation and change 
… [which] led to his own isolation [and] the isolation of GHQ as a whole 
from the rest of the BEF’.23 
Lloyd George’s ‘forcing’ of an ‘unwanted civilian’ into this cloistered 
environment could be expected to have met a furious backlash from such an 
inflexible and ‘inner-directed’ character.24 However, the unwanted civilian 
in question, Sir Eric Geddes, formed an instant working bond and a lasting 
personal friendship with the taciturn professional soldier. Haig appointed 
Geddes as the BEF’s director-general of transportation (DGT) in October 
1916, sought to retain his services as a transport advisor following Geddes’s 
appointment as controller of the Royal Navy in May 1917, singled him 
out for praise within his wartime and post-war despatches25 and even asked 
Geddes to act as godfather to his son in 1918.26 The depth and warmth of 
the personal relationship between Haig and Geddes was exceptional among 
the soldiers and civilians who were thrust into close proximity between 
1914 and 1918, but this book contends that the portrayal of a hidebound, 
aloof, narrow-minded and deeply jealous officer class cannot be supported 
by an examination of the interactions between the military and Britain’s 
transport experts. While individual examples of animosity on both sides 
of the civil–military divide will be discussed below, no evidence can be 
found to support the concept of institutional insularity that has formed a 
sturdy bedrock for criticisms of Britain’s military approach to the conflict’s 
organizational challenges.
Britain’s military leaders from the period surrounding the First World 
War are not alone in having been traduced in the historical record. In 
1986 Donald Coleman and Christine MacLeod unearthed ‘a mountain 
of apparently damning evidence’ as to the ‘incompetence … ignorance, 
indifference, hostility [to new technology], prejudice and complacency’ of 
British businessmen in the century after 1850.27 Both at the time and in the 
historical analysis of the period that followed, the industrial elite in turn-
of-the-century Britain have been largely denigrated in comparison to their 
counterparts in advanced nations such as the United States and Germany. 
American methods and processes in industries as diverse as railways, shoe 
23 Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 104.
24 For a critical assessment of Haig’s character, see Travers, The Killing Ground, pp. 85–118. 
For a more balanced account, see Sheffield, The Chief.
25 Haig, Despatches, pp. 77, 351.
26 TNA, ADM 116/1807, Sir Eric Geddes – private correspondence, letters from Lady 
Haig to Geddes, 1918.
27 D. C. Coleman and C. Macleod, ‘Attitudes to new techniques: British businessmen, 
1800–1950’, Economic History Review, xxxix (1986), 588–611, at p. 588.
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making, printing and machine tool manufacturing were acknowledged as 
superior to the procedures followed by British companies, while in pre-
war debates over Britain’s economic competitiveness ‘Germany assumed 
the dual role of model and enemy’.28 In his position as commandant of the 
British army’s staff college at Camberley between 1906 and 1910, Brigadier-
General Henry Wilson delivered a series of lectures that implored his 
students to learn from close studies of the German language, people and 
army.29 The outbreak of war did nothing to shift perceptions that Germany 
was ‘the best organised community in the world, the best organised 
whether for war or peace’, and that Britain had ‘been employing too much 
the haphazard, leisurely, go-as-you-please methods, which, believe me, 
would not have enabled us to maintain our place as a nation even in peace 
very much longer’.30 According to Lord Esher, Britain’s principal enemy 
possessed ‘the concentrated, unified and organised capacity, both scientific, 
military, philosophical, etc., of the highest developed nation the world has 
ever known’.31
Examples of a ‘civil servant being ignorant of technology, a businessman 
not investing in a modern machine, or a soldier doubting the efficacy of 
new weapons’, have been used to create an impression of Edwardian Britain 
as ‘congenitally short-sighted’ and incapable of responding effectively to the 
diffusion of new techniques, equipment and working methods that took 
place in the years before the war.32 Admirers of foreign dynamism and critics 
of perceived domestic deficiencies have been held up as beacons of unheeded 
prescience, commentators who foresaw the predictable decline of Britain’s 
status as a great power. Correlli Barnett’s 1986 study, The Audit of War, 
typified such material.33 Barnett’s pre-war Britain comprised a workforce of 
unskilled ‘coolies’, a managerial cadre hostile towards professional education 
28 G. Paish, The British Railway Position (London, 1902); S. B. Saul, ‘The American impact 
on British industry 1895–1914’, Business History, ii (1960), 19–38; G. R. Searle, The Quest for 
National Efficiency: a Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899–1914 (Oxford, 1971), 
pp. 54–57.
29 Imperial War Museum (IWM), private papers of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 
HHW 3/3/7, ‘Intelligence in peace and war: knowledge in power’, 13 Nov. 1907, p. 13.
30 D. Lloyd George, Through Terror to Triumph: Speeches and Pronouncements of the Right 
Hon. David Lloyd George, M.P., since the Beginning of the War, ed. F. L. Stevenson (London, 
1915), p. 104.
31 Quoted in E. Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First 
World War (Cambridge, 2005), p. 29.
32 D. Edgerton, ‘The prophet militant and industrial: the peculiarities of Correlli Barnett’, 
Twentieth Century British History, ii (1991), 360–79, at p. 366.
33 C. Barnett, The Audit of War: the Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation 
(London, 1986).
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and a decadent and irresponsible governing class of ‘romantics’.34 The mass 
rejection of urban volunteers for service in the South African War due to 
their lack of physical fitness embodied the decline of British manpower. The 
low output of graduate scientists and engineers created a ‘crisis’ of British 
industry exemplified by an ongoing dependence on ‘rule-of-thumb’ and 
a rejection of systematic management principles. In comparison to the 
rigorous sponsorship and application of scientific knowledge in Germany, 
and the emergence of standardization and mechanization in the United 
States, British industry appeared to be backward, stagnant and primitive.
Such a pessimistic outlook raises a series of tough questions. If Britain 
was in such a relatively weak position in 1914 – populated by an unfit, 
uneducated, unskilled workforce and directed by an elite more interested 
in cricket and classics than the latest technological advances – how then 
was the country able to organize the largest, most wide-ranging, most total 
war effort in its military history? How were the complexities and scales of 
industrial warfare recognized, comprehended and coordinated with such 
success against Germany, the apparent model of national and military 
efficiency? How was all of this achieved despite the absence of a mass army 
drawn from the entire cross-section of British society in 1914?
That the ethos, workforce and managerial ability capable of meeting 
this challenge existed in Britain has been central to arguments advanced by 
David Edgerton. In the opening decades of the twentieth century, Edgerton 
identified in Britain ‘a military-industrial-scientific complex which was 
… second to none’.35 The absence of a large British army to match those 
put into the field by the other great powers in 1914 was not evidence of 
a liberal aversion to defence. Instead, it was a manifestation of Britain’s 
desire to wage war using its own chosen means: a naval force capable of 
dominating world trade and depriving its enemies of the means to live. 
Britain’s success in both world wars, Edgerton argued, depended on the 
‘pre-war international, modern and capital-intensive orientations of British 
armed force and the British ability to harness the resources not only of the 
nation but of much of the world … The British empire was victorious … 
because it was rich and could and did use its unique position in the world 
to fight wars of steel and gold’.36 Before 1914, no nation on earth either 
imported or exported more than Britain. From 1914 onwards, the trading 
34 The idea of a spread of ‘rural romanticism’ among the British upper classes is developed 
further in M. J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850–1980 
(2nd edn., Cambridge, 2004).
35 D. Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970 (Cambridge, 2006), p. 1.
36 D. Edgerton, The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: a Twentieth-Century History 
(London, 2018), p. 47.
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network that connected the wheat fields and cattle ranches of the Americas 
to Britain, and the British cotton factories and coal fields to the world, was 
redirected to the application of steel and gold to combat.
The existence and maintenance of a global trading empire centred on 
London demonstrates that Britain possessed the human and material 
resources required for the mass transportation that industrial war demanded. 
Over 620,000 employees operated an integrated railway network that 
linked the major urban centres to each other, and joined the great export- 
and import-dependent industries to ports able to handle colossal tonnages 
of goods. At the outbreak of the First World War the London and North-
Western Railway (LNWR) employed around 110,000 people, distributed 
across a network that stretched from London to Carlisle and from Swansea 
to Leeds. The next largest railways – the Great Western, Midland and 
North-Eastern – each employed in excess of 50,000 men across a range 
of specialist occupations. In fields as diverse as locomotive engineering, 
marketing, ticket sales and hospitality, the growth of the railways in the 
nineteenth century had necessitated the establishment of new methods for 
the mobilization, control, supervision and direction of large and intricate 
operating systems.37 By 1911, the national transport system (comprising 
the rail and canal networks) possessed the ability to handle some 1,500 
million passenger journeys and 560 million tons of goods per year.38 This 
book analyses the manner in which the men, materials and methods that 
maintained this colossal peacetime traffic were redeployed and repurposed 
to the task of transporting Britain’s military power during four years of 
conflict.
Transportation provides an ideal lens through which to observe Britain’s 
application of civilian expertise to the demands of the First World War for 
three reasons. First, the popular image of the war in Britain may revolve 
around the static, rigid line of trenches that stretched across Belgium and 
France from the English Channel to the Swiss border, but the fighting 
relied upon movement and transportation to an unprecedented degree. The 
war drew in participants from all continents and consumed raw materials 
sourced from all over the globe. As the BEF expanded in size between 1914 
37 A. D. Chandler, ‘The railroads: pioneers in modern corporate management’, Business 
History Review, xxxix (1965), 16–40; M. Campbell-Kelly, ‘The Railway Clearing House and 
Victorian data processing’, in Information Acumen: the Understanding and Use of Knowledge 
in Modern Business, ed. L. Bud-Frierman (London, 1994), pp. 51–74.
38 L. Shaw-Taylor and X. You, ‘The development of the railway network in Britain 1825–
1911’, The Online Historical Atlas of Transport, Urbanization and Economic Development in 
England and Wales c.1680–1911 (2018), p. 26 <https://www.campop.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/
projects/transport/onlineatlas/railways.pdf> [accessed 19 July 2018].
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and 1917 – and as British troops went into action at Gallipoli, in Italy, 
Macedonia, Palestine and elsewhere – they were entirely dependent upon 
complex production and distribution networks that connected the factories 
of Britain and the world to the front line. The colossal volumes of material 
required to sustain offensive operations – during periods of heavy fighting 
a total of 1,934 tons of supplies (including ammunition, engineering stores 
and food) were required each day for every mile of front held by the BEF 
– could not be sourced locally.39 Therefore, the rail, road and waterway 
networks surrounding the areas where fighting took place were essential 
both to the soldiers’ sustenance and to the evolution of material-intensive 
combat methodologies.
Old methods of transportation based upon the carrying capacities 
of horse and cart – and designed to supply armies unburdened by vast 
quantities of barbed wire, sandbags, duckboards, spare parts for aircraft 
and tanks and myriad other impedimenta – were inadequate to handle the 
demands of modern war.40 In previous eras, except in the case of sieges, 
fighting had been conducted between opposing bodies of men armed with 
weapons they could carry to and from the battlefield. During the First World 
War, the principal combat role was taken by machines that ‘require[d] a 
constant supply of material in the form of shells and cartridges to render 
them of any use’.41 The bald statistics of the war effort can be converted 
into detailed tables and graphs, which chart the belligerents’ capacities to 
devour resources during the conflict. However, numbers and images alone 
cannot convey crucial information about the development of the material 
war. As successive problems of battlefield supply were identified and solved 
between 1914 and 1918, fresh challenges emerged. Viewing the war from 
the perspective of Britain’s transport experts provides a platform from 
which those challenges can be examined, both in terms of their impact 
on the British army’s ability to wage war successfully and in relation to the 
applicability of industrial methods to the industrial battlefield.
Second, by focusing upon a factor of the war that was ubiquitous – 
that is to say that the limitations of the available transport infrastructure 
were an inescapable reality to the military and political leaders of 1914–
18 regardless of their nationality – this book is able to move beyond the 
vituperative, personalized debating chamber occupied by the ‘frocks and 
39 A. M. Henniker, History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western Front, 1914–1918 
(London, 1937), p. 157.
40 J. Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (Oxford, 1991), pp. 40–
41; Van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 141.
41 R. Bonham-Smith, ‘Railway transport arrangements in France’, Royal United Services 
Institution. Journal, lxi (1916), 47–62, at p. 47.
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brass hats’. Instead, it contributes to an ongoing scholarly campaign to shift 
attention away from the great or not-so-great individuals in military history 
and towards a more complete understanding of the vast organizations and 
complex, integrated bureaucratic systems that were constructed for the task 
of winning the war.42 In doing so, it complements studies that have analysed 
Britain’s mobilization of economic and human resources, and have begun 
to identify how civilian expertise and technologies were applied to the 
challenges of the industrial battlefield. This process is particularly advanced 
in terms of the wartime exploitation of advances in communications and 
myriad branches of science.43 According to Martin van Creveld, the allies’ 
victory was significantly influenced by their more efficient management 
and administration of the gigantic organizational systems that underpinned 
the war. During what van Creveld described as ‘the age of systems’, 
technological advances between 1830 and 1945 ‘very largely turned war itself 
into a question of managing complex systems’. This process forced senior 
politicians, military commanders, scientists and business leaders to consider 
warfare through a series of interconnected, delicately balanced organizations 
that were highly responsive to change.44 Throughout the First World War, 
allied leaders were faced with the identification and resolution of a host of 
conceptual, technical and administrative conundrums that could not be 
tackled in isolation. As will be seen, comprehending this truth proved a 
slow process. Until the nations (not just one nation, nor solely the military 
forces created by those nations) engaged in the struggle accurately identified 
the likely scale of effort and organization required to bring about victory, all 
too frequently individuals and institutions attempted to solve Rubik’s cube 
while only able to view one face of the puzzle.
This book catalogues some of the difficulties grappled with by Britain’s 
transport experts over the course of an evolving four-year conflict. It 
augments recent work that has analysed the British army’s ability to learn, 
adapt, implement and innovate between 1914 and 1918. Building upon 
42 An example of this approach, applied to the Second World War, is P. Kennedy, Engineers 
of Victory: the Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War (London, 2013).
43 See the texts listed above in n. 14, and B. N. Hall, ‘The “life-blood” of command? The 
British army, communications and the telephone, 1877–1914’, War & Society, xxvii (2008), 
43–65; B. N. Hall, ‘Technological adaptation in a global conflict: the British army and 
communications beyond the western front, 1914–1918’, Jour. Military Hist., lxxviii (2014), 
37–71; B. N. Hall, Communications and British Operations on the Western Front, 1914–
1918 (Cambridge, 2017); E. Bruton and G. Gooday, ‘Listening in combat – surveillance 
technologies beyond the visual in the First World War’, History and Technology, xxxii (2016), 
213–26.
44 M. van Creveld, Technology and War: from 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York, 1991), p. 
161.
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broadly sympathetic analyses – certainly in comparison to earlier works of 
the ‘lions led by donkeys’ persuasion – of the BEF’s evolution in combat 
tactics and battlefield command published from the 1980s onwards,45 both 
Jonathan Boff and Aimée Fox have demonstrated that learning in the army 
was a multifaceted process. New methods were developed but applied 
neither universally nor consistently across the British military campaigns, 
while knowledge itself was disseminated throughout the organization by a 
combination of formal structures and informal networks.46 Their work has 
added a much-needed layer of sophistication to the hitherto over-simplified 
concept of a learning curve or learning process within the wartime army, 
one that is supplemented by the conclusions drawn in this book.47
Alongside supporting the continued examination of the British army and 
state’s approach to industrial war, this book hopes to provide a framework 
for further studies on the development of the transportation systems in the 
war efforts of Britain’s allies and enemies. Britain fought throughout the 
war in a coalition and against another coalition. The individual elements 
of both coalitions acted independently and in concert; they responded to 
their enemy’s activities and sought to outwit them with carefully guarded 
innovations, such as poison gas and the tank. At no point in the war did 
one national effort exist in isolation from those of other nations: ‘there was 
a continuous dynamic of push and pull, measure and counter-measure, 
between [and within] the two sides’.48 On the allied side alone, French and 
British forces – and at various points, and with varying degrees of influence, 
those of other allied or associated nations – coexisted on the western front 
and required access to sufficient warehouses, trains, railheads, road space 
and vehicles to maintain the fighting efficiency and health of their troops. 
Further afield, the gap between Russian demands for material and financial 
assistance, and the ability (and willingness) of its partners to fulfil them, 
45 See, e.g., S. Bidwell and D. Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of 
War, 1904–1945 (Barnsley, 2004); P. Griffith, Battle Tactics on the Western Front: the British 
Army’s Art of Attack, 1916–18 (New Haven, Conn., 1994); J. B. A. Bailey, The First World 
War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare (Camberley, 1996); G. Sheffield, Forgotten 
Victory. The First World War: Myths and Realities (London, 2001); A. Simpson, Directing 
Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914–18 (Stroud, 2006).
46 J. Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: the British Third Army and the Defeat 
of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge, 2012); A. Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and 
Change in the British Army, 1914–1918 (Cambridge, 2017).
47 For a synthesis of the existing literature and a deconstruction of the learning curve 
thesis’s limitations, see Boff, Winning and Losing, pp. 11–12, 247–9; Hall, Communications 
and British Operations, pp. 3–5.
48 J. Boff, Haig’s Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany’s War on the Western Front 
(Oxford, 2018), p. 5.
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shrank and grew as the war unfolded and assessments of Russian capabilities 
changed.49 The war engaged the allies in a constant process of re-evaluation 
and reconfiguration of the human, material and financial commitments 
required to maintain and improve the coalition’s martial qualities. At the 
same time, national interests and the coalition’s priorities were sometimes 
incompatible – and between 1914 and 1918 inter-allied relations were further 
complicated by a plethora of linguistic and cultural factors.50
Understanding how these crucial issues influenced the relationship 
between coalition partners has been central to relatively few studies of the 
First World War. In recent years William Philpott, Elizabeth Greenhalgh 
and Chris Kempshall have addressed various dimensions of the political, 
military, social and administrative mechanics of the Franco-British (and, 
in Kempshall’s case, the Franco-British-American) coalition.51 Each have 
illustrated how victory was ultimately achieved through coalition but also 
charted the ‘muddled perceptions, stifled communications, disappointed 
expectations, [and] paranoid reactions’ that underscored inter-allied 
relations.52 Britain’s transport experts – men used to operating within the 
competitive atmosphere of a capitalist economy and occupying executive 
positions of great influence – were not always temperamentally suited to an 
environment that demanded conciliation, negotiation and a sympathetic 
approach to harmonize inter-allied disputes. The transport systems that 
developed on the western front and in other theatres populated by coalition 
forces were never the result of British ingenuity and resources alone. 
Therefore, the influence of, in particular, French attitudes towards the 
demands and desires of Britain’s transport experts feature in much of the 
narrative that follows.
Third, comparatively few full-length studies of transportation’s influence 
over the conduct of the war have been published. Transportation, as 
contemporary observers understood, was ‘so interwoven with modern 
commerce and industry’ that it could not be separated from the history 
49 K. Neilson, Strategy and Supply: the Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914–17 (London, 1984).
50 G. Sheffield, ‘“Not the same as friendship”: the British empire and coalition warfare in 
the era of the First World War’, in Entangling Alliances: Coalition Warfare in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. P. Dennis and J. Grey (Canberra, 2005), pp. 38–52.
51 W. Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18 
(Basingstoke, 1996); Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition; C. Kempshall, British, French 
and American Relations on the Western Front, 1914–1918 (London, 2018). On the complexities 
of coalition warfare more broadly, see Coalition Warfare: an Uneasy Accord, ed. K. Neilson 
and R. A. Prete (Waterloo, ON, 1983); S. Bidwell and D. Graham, Coalitions, Politicians and 
Generals: Some Aspects of Command in Two World Wars (London, 1993); Britain and France in 
Two World Wars: Truth, Myth and Memory, ed. R. Tombs and E. Chabal (London, 2013).
52 Richard E. Neustadt, quoted in Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, pp. 1–2.
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of such matters.53 Yet as the experience of the First World War receded, 
the intricacies and minutiae of transport details were eclipsed by more 
glamorous and controversial debates over the British army’s strategic and 
tactical evolution. Two of the most enduring histories of the war, both 
repackaged for new audiences during the centenary, paid scant attention 
to the supply and movement challenges that taxed the military authorities 
between 1914 and 1918.54 Recent scholarship has improved in this direction, 
but analyses of supply issues remain for the most part superficial and 
subordinated to narratives that focus upon combat operations. Paul Harris’s 
account of the western front’s climactic battles – during which time transport 
factors exerted the defining influence over the allies’ ability to pursue the 
retreating German army – exemplifies the trend. Harris acknowledged the 
‘essential’ importance of logistics and military engineering to the BEF’s 
achievements between August and November 1918, but devoted a mere 
handful of pages to discussion of these topics.55 As the railway journalist 
Edwin Pratt lamented while the war was in progress, military historians 
‘have too often disregarded such matters of detail as to how the armies got 
[to the battlefield] and the possible effects of good or defective transport 
conditions, including the maintenance of supplies and communications, 
on the whole course of a campaign’.56
Martin van Creveld’s pioneering work has underlined the importance 
of logistical support as a precursor to successful military operations,57 
but scholars of the First World War have yet to adequately address Pratt’s 
challenge. Van Creveld argued that logistical factors fixed the parameters of 
what an army could or could not achieve on the battlefield, and highlighted 
the dangers to modern armies of both scarcity and superabundance. At 
the most basic level, an army’s failure to provide a steady supply of 3,000 
calories per day meant that men would ‘very soon cease to be of any use as 
soldiers’.58 Conversely, the impedimenta of the modern army – guns, tanks, 
aeroplanes, tractors, road stone, barbed wire, sandbags, duckboards, petrol, 
spare parts, tools and sundry other items – created a situation in which 
gargantuan volumes of material occupied the capacity of road, rail and 
53 C. Travis, ‘The science of railroading: a further plea for the establishment of a transport 
institute’, Great Central Railway Journal, xiii (1917), 40–2, at p. 40.
54 B. H. Liddell Hart, The Real War: 1914–1918 (London, 1930); A. J. P. Taylor, The First 
World War: an Illustrated History (London, 1963).
55 J. P. Harris, Amiens to the Armistice: the BEF in the Hundred Days’ Campaign, 8 August–11 
November 1918 (London, 1998), pp. 54–5, 218.
56 E. A. Pratt, The Rise of Rail Power in War and Conquest, 1833–1914 (London, 1916), p. vii.
57 Van Creveld, Supplying War.
58 Van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 1.
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waterway networks in the vicinity of the troops. Consequently, the armies’ 
abilities to reduce dependency upon their lines of communications were 
severely restricted. In this sense, the global reach and financial superiority 
of the allies over the central powers were less pronounced than the figures 
imply. The allies could, and did, considerably out-spend and out-produce 
their opponents throughout the war. Yet their ability to bring their human, 
territorial and economic advantages to bear upon the central powers (see 
Table 0.1) was constrained by the efficiency with which the transport 
networks in France and Belgium, Russia, Macedonia and elsewhere were 
operated.
As yet, attempts to remedy the historical ignorance of how transportation 
functioned during the First World War have largely focused upon the 
infrastructure behind the western front.59 The most prominent single-
volume treatment of the British experience, by Colonel A. M. Henniker, 
appeared in 1937 as part of the official history of the conflict.60 It remains 
the most thorough overview of the BEF’s evolving challenge and a vital 
source of organizational details. However, according to one reviewer, 
Transportation on the Western Front was ‘not for the casual reader in search 
59 For exceptions to this trend, see L. J. Hall, The Inland Water Transport in Mesopotamia 
(London, 1921); K. Roy, ‘From defeat to victory: logistics of the campaign in Mesopotamia, 
1914–1918’, First World War Studies, i (2010), 35–55; K. C. Ulrichsen, The Logistics and Politics 
of the British Campaigns in the Middle East, 1914–22 (Basingstoke, 2011). Further material, 
albeit of uneven coverage, can be obtained from the relevant sections in R. H. Beadon, 
The Royal Army Service Corps: a History of Transport and Supply in the British Army (2 vols., 
Cambridge, 1931), ii; History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, ed. H. L. Pritchard (11 vols., 
Chatham, 1952), vi; W. J. K. Davies, Light Railways of the First World War: a History of 
Tactical Rail Communications on the British Fronts, 1914–18 (Newton Abbot, 1967).
60 Henniker, History of the Great War.
Table 0.1. Resource and development ratios, allies:central powers.
Population Territory Territory 
per head
Gross domestic product
November 1914 5.2:1 11.5:1 2.2:1 2.9:1
November 1916 5.5:1 12.1:1 2.2:1 3.2:1
November 1918 8.1:1 13.5:1 1.7:1 4.6:1
Note: Figures display the capacities of the allies’ and central powers’ coalitions at various points 
of the war, according to the populations, sizes and incomes of each power within the coalitions 
for the year 1913.
Source: S. Broadberry and M. Harrison, ‘The economics of World War I: an overview’, in The 
Economics of World War I, ed. S. Broadberry and M. Harrison (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 3–40, 
at p. 11.
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of easy entertainment. Its subject is wanting in popular appeal, and its lack 
of the human touch will make it unattractive even to the serious-minded’.61 
Published towards the end of the ‘battle of the memoirs’, Henniker’s text was 
unashamedly coloured by its author’s background and made little impact on 
a public debate framed by Churchill’s and Lloyd George’s livelier accounts. 
Henniker, a career soldier who served in a variety of transportation roles 
between 1914 and 1918, argued that many of the difficulties experienced 
by the BEF were the result of insufficient foresight on the government’s 
part coupled with a lack of faith in the soldiers’ abilities to discharge their 
duties. As summarized by Sir James Edmonds’s acerbic comment in the 
volume’s introduction – a clear rejoinder to Lloyd George’s attacks upon 
the military’s supposed incompetence – the official history’s view was that 
‘what soldiers had been denied was freely accorded to a civilian. Similarly, 
all his ideas for expansion were accepted’.62 Whereas Henniker and his 
colleagues had been forced to make the best of inadequate resources early 
in the war, Lloyd George’s attempts to circumvent the military leadership 
by appointing civilians to senior positions within the British war effort in 
1916 were accompanied by a new willingness to commit manpower and 
materials to the BEF’s rearward organization.
The subject of Edmonds’s statement was Sir Eric Geddes, who occupied 
a central role in the first scholarly assessment of the BEF’s transportation 
services. In British Logistics on the Western Front, Ian M. Brown argued 
that the BEF’s evolution in combat tactics and battlefield command was 
predicated on superb leadership in the fields of administration and logistics.63 
Administrative excellence from mid 1917 onwards, built upon foundations 
established by Geddes, freed the BEF’s senior commanders from having 
to concern themselves with questions of supply. Following Geddes’s 
reorganization of the transport services in France, the material requirements 
of the BEF’s ‘teeth’ were satisfied by an increasingly efficient ‘tail’. Reliable 
logistics were the conduit that permitted the allies to make effective use 
of their resource advantage over the central powers, fostering what Hew 
Strachan has described as ‘prodigality in munitions expenditure’.64
61 W. J. Wilgus, ‘Review of transportation on the western front, 1914–1918. Compiled by 
Colonel A. M. Henniker’, American Historical Review, xliv (1939), 386–8, at p. 386. Wilgus 
was far from an uninterested observer of wartime transportation. He had served on the 
headquarters staff of the American Expeditionary Force’s transportation service in France, 
and authored a volume on America’s transportation effort that ‘bristle[d] with dry and dusty 
figures and statistics’. See W. J. Wilgus, Transporting the A.E.F. in Western Europe, 1917–1919 
(New York, 1931), p. xxv.
62 Edmonds’ introduction in Henniker, History of the Great War, p. xxii.
63 I. M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919 (London, 1998).
64 H. Strachan, The First World War: To Arms (Oxford, 2001), p. 999.
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Brown’s work was the first to thoroughly acknowledge the wide-ranging 
influence that an individual civilian, aside from political leaders, could 
have over the conduct and character of the fighting on the western front. 
However, Brown’s study focused predominantly upon the army’s response 
to the challenge of supplying the industrial battlefield rather than the 
interaction between civilian and military expertise. Consequently, his text 
– which echoed Lloyd George in its accusation that the BEF displayed ‘anti-
civilian’ phobia prior to 1916 – created an impression that Geddes emerged 
that summer from a hitherto undervalued and largely untapped pool of 
talent.65 The narrow terms of Keith Grieves’s 1989 biography of Geddes 
provide little material to alter that conclusion.66 While Grieves emphasized 
the applicability of his subject’s business experience to the many wartime 
roles that Geddes occupied, the constraints of the biography’s structure 
conspired to limit opportunities for Geddes’s wartime endeavours to be 
placed in their proper context. A key aim of this book is to redress this 
shortcoming in the existing literature by looking beyond Geddes and 
considering the contributions of Britain’s transport experts more broadly. 
It does not attempt to minimize Geddes’s impact or suggest that he was 
not a pivotal figure in the history of the war, but rather argues that Geddes 
was far from unique as a manifestation of civil–military cooperation 
in the British war effort. He was not the first senior transport expert to 
work closely with the British army to improve the force’s supply system, 
nor was he the last to occupy a prominent position in the upper echelons 
of the military hierarchy. Instead, Geddes represents a crucial link within 
a chain of civil–military connections between the army, government and 
principal transport enterprises, which was forged long before the outbreak 
of hostilities in August 1914.
Charting the existence of the longstanding professional relationship 
between some of Britain’s largest private companies and the state – in both 
its political and military forms – in the decades before the First World War 
is the central focus of this book’s first part. In chapter one the image of the 
pre-war British army as an insular, conservative institution, unreceptive to 
outside influences, is challenged. Professional soldiers and civilian experts 
participated in a mutually beneficial exchange of knowledge and experience, 
which produced officers proficient in the skills necessary for the operation 
of a modern army’s lines of communications and a cadre of transport 
professionals cognizant of an industrial army’s logistics requirements. 
65 Brown, British Logistics, p. 89.
66 K. Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace (Manchester, 
1989).
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Chapter two considers the implications of this working relationship for the 
army’s mobility in wartime. The ‘with France’ (WF) scheme, which placed 
the BEF on what became the western front in 1914, incorporated within 
its preparations the most thorough example of civil–military cooperation 
in peacetime British military history. Working in conjunction with the 
army, navy and each other, Britain’s privately owned, competitive railway 
companies propelled the BEF to the continental mainland in time to help 
stem the tide of the German invasion. 
Part two of the book covers the war before October 1916, and charts the 
remarkable and unplanned expansion of the British war effort. The creation 
and maintenance of a mass army – to supplement and rival the conscripted 
forces of France and Germany respectively – coupled with the spread of 
hostilities far beyond the fields of France and Flanders, presented the British 
authorities with a series of colossal organizational challenges. Chapter three 
examines the multifarious contributions made to the prosecution of an 
increasingly global war by Britain’s transport experts. It emphasizes the 
depth and breadth of the civilian talents available to an imperial power 
like Britain, and demonstrates the restrictions placed upon British freedom 
of action by the priorities and requirements of its coalition partners. The 
latter theme recurs in chapters four and five, which comprise two case 
studies that demonstrate both the extent to which the army recognized 
and appreciated civilian expertise – prior to Lloyd George’s ‘forcing’ of Eric 
Geddes upon them – and the limited extent to which the complexity and 
interconnectedness of wartime transportation was understood within the 
British war effort ahead of the battle of the Somme. Chapter six outlines 
both the BEF’s underdeveloped conceptual awareness of transport’s 
function in military operations and the existence of professional suspicion 
towards ‘outsiders’ within GHQ during the Somme. It argues that Geddes’s 
transportation mission played a pivotal role in ‘show[ing] what transportation 
meant, and how each variation in one process of movement must inevitably 
have its effects on the others’.67 The Geddes mission, and Sir Douglas Haig’s 
response to it, established the platform upon which the material-intensive 
warfare of 1917 and 1918 was fought.
The third and final part of this book discusses the implications of 
Haig’s decision to appoint Geddes as DGT and investigates the manner 
in which Britain’s transport experts directly and indirectly contributed to 
the prosecution of a war effort of unprecedented ferocity. In successive 
chapters it analyses: the material and methodological implications of the 
67 M. G. Taylor, ‘Land transportation in the late war’, Royal United Services Institution. 
Journal, lxvi (1921), 699–722, at p. 705. Emphasis in original.
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‘civilianization’ of Britain’s war effort; the global diffusion of British expertise 
and the pursuit of a more harmonic, inter-allied approach to the conflict; 
and the impact of civilian specialists upon the industrial battlefield. These 
chapters argue that civilian intervention was not a panacea to the complex 
organizational problems posed by the First World War. Disagreements and 
disputes over the application of Britain’s human and material resources 
continued to permeate the civilian and military leadership of the war effort, 
but by the late summer of 1918 the transportation services behind Britain’s 
armed forces were ‘good enough’ to ensure the allies’ advantages could be 
brought to bear upon the exhausted Germans. Overall, this book contends 
that Britain’s ultimately successful war effort was the result of a synthesis 
between civilian and military expertise, which had been gathered and 
applied to the challenges involved in the acquisition and maintenance of a 
global empire during the previous century.
The civilians who operated the transport network that connected Britain 
to the world in peacetime became a central pillar of the British response 
to the conundrum of an industrial war. They joined their colleagues 
from the political, military, industrial and scientific communities in the 
task of seeking a pathway to victory on the western front and beyond. In 
documenting their contributions, this book addresses just a few of the 
myriad ways in which the ‘existing structures, organizations and modes of 
thinking’ in pre-war Britain influenced the direction and administration 
of warfare in the early twentieth century.68 It is those existing structures, 
assembled collaboratively by Britain’s transport experts, the government 
and the military, which will be considered first.
68 A. S. Fell and J. Meyer, ‘Introduction: untold legacies of the First World War in Britain’, 
War & Society, xxxiv (2015), 85–9, at p. 87.
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23
‘Forging a relationship: the army, the government and Britain’s transport experts, 1825–14’, in C. 
Phillips, Civilian Specialists at War: Britain’s Transport Experts and the First World War (London, 2020), 
pp. 23–61. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0.
1. Forging a relationship: the army, the government 
and Britain’s transport experts, 1825–1914
On 18 February 1915 the Liberal member of parliament for Glasgow 
College, Henry Watt, asked the Board of Agriculture if farmers in England’s 
southern counties had raised concerns about the availability of Scottish 
seed potatoes for the coming crop. Four days later his colleague, James 
Hogge of Edinburgh East, questioned the president of the Board of Trade, 
Walter Runciman, over the availability of the ‘usual railway facilities’ for the 
upcoming flat-racing season on account of the ongoing war. On 4 May the 
Unionist member for Armagh North, William Moore, directed Runciman’s 
attention to complaints that bleaching, finishing and dyeing firms in Ulster 
were on the verge of closure thanks to restrictions on the amount of cotton 
allowed to leave Manchester. Moore implored Runciman to do whatever 
was required to avoid ‘unemployment and distress among the workers’ of 
his constituency.1 In each of the above cases, and many more besides – 
despite the seemingly disparate nature of the enquiries – the government 
either referred to information already received from the Railway Executive 
Committee (REC) or assured the questioner that the matter would shortly 
receive the REC’s attention.
The REC was formally established less than two years before the outbreak 
of the First World War, but it embodied a longstanding professional link 
between the British state, its army and the principal means of transport 
available for the movement of the army on both home and foreign soil. 
Composed ultimately of twelve general managers, drawn from the nation’s 
most prominent railway companies, its existence helped ensure that 
political, military, economic and social questions with the potential to 
affect transportation in Britain received the consideration of technically 
proficient industrial specialists. By the summer of 1915 the REC had become 
an integral component of the nation’s ongoing organizational response to 
the emerging conflict, a position it retained for the duration of the war.
This chapter examines the interactions between the British army and the 
emerging railway companies at the organizational and operational levels 
1 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., lxix (18 Feb. 1915), col. 1313; lxx (22 Feb. 1915), 
cols. 7–8; lxxi (4 May 1915), cols. 976–7.
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before the First World War, contacts that emphasize the army’s willingness 
to seek out and exploit expertise from civilian sources. The partnership 
that emerged between the army and the railways was a component of a 
wider practice of knowledge exchange – particularly prevalent across the 
engineering profession – that was of mutual benefit to the civilian and 
military spheres. Members of the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) were 
frequent speakers at the school of military engineering in Chatham and 
the authors of articles in the Royal Engineers Journal, while their military 
counterparts were regular lecturers at ICE’s headquarters in London.2 
Both parties were beneficiaries of the close links established between the 
railways and the army, although recent research has raised questions about 
the prevalence of former soldiers within senior roles in the early railway 
companies.3 As Di Drummond has observed, ‘the military element’ 
exemplified early railway management, while the idea of a ‘railway servant’ 
inspired by the concept of service in the armed forces remained popular 
across the industry before the war.4 Even as the railways matured, the bonds 
between the army and the railway companies did not break. British and 
imperial railways provided opportunities for soldiers to obtain practical 
experience in the repair, maintenance and operation of lines, and across 
the empire British railwaymen worked alongside the military to protect 
and project London’s power. British soldiers actively sought out and 
engaged with the experience and expertise that railway managers and their 
workforces possessed. Together, they contributed to the creation of an army 
proficient in the skills required to work ‘a vast business organization’ under 
the most intense pressure.5
A cooperative endeavour: the government, the army and the railways
A connection between the government, the army and the railways of 
Britain was established as early as 15 September 1830 at the opening of the 
Liverpool and Manchester Railway. The duke of Wellington, Sir Robert 
2 A. Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914–1918 
(Cambridge, 2017), p. 165.
3 D. Turner, ‘Unlocking the early railway manager – a project to follow’, Turnip Rail, 
2011 <http://turniprail.blogspot.com/2011/04/unlocking-early-railway-manager-project.
html> [accessed 11 Sept. 2018].
4 D. K. Drummond, Crewe: Railway Town, Company, and People, 1840–1914 (Aldershot, 
1995), pp. 59–60; F. McKenna, The Railway Workers, 1840–1970 (London, 1980), pp. 30–4; 
TNA, ZLIB 29/691, ‘Education and advancement of the railway clerk’ by E. C. Geddes, 
1910, p. 1.
5 H. A. Young, ‘Practical economy in the army’, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 
l (1906), 1281–5, at p. 1282.
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Peel and the Liverpool MP William Huskisson were among the dignitaries 
in attendance. The new method of conveyance got off to an inauspicious 
start. Huskisson was fatally injured by a passing train, while Wellington was 
subjected to ‘hooting, cat-calling and shouting’ from a hostile Manchester 
crowd.6 The day’s events ‘prejudiced the Duke for ever against railways’, 
but their ‘practical utility’ for the carriage of troops was clear to the hero 
of Waterloo. Shortly after its infamous opening day the Liverpool and 
Manchester became the first railway line in the world to carry soldiers on 
active service, when newly arrived soldiers from Ireland were sent inland 
by rail on 10 July 1832. The 91st (Argyllshire) Regiment were saved a two-
day march on the reverse journey before their embarkation to Dublin on 
two steamers.7 From these small beginnings, over the next eighty years ‘the 
potential of the railways … captured the imagination of many soldiers, not 
merely Royal Engineers but also senior commanders both at home and 
overseas’.8 In the decades prior to 1914, soldiers of the British army and 
servants of the country’s largest railway companies participated in a range of 
civil–military ventures designed both to improve the nation’s security and 
increase the army’s understanding of a novel and complex industrial tool.
The influence of soldiers over the development of railways in Britain 
and beyond was considerable. Across Europe, the presence of uncertain 
land frontiers between emerging nation states and the collective memory 
of the Napoleonic Wars fuelled military and political interest in the 
strategic potential of railways. From the 1830s until the eve of war railway 
construction on either side of the French-German frontier was eyed with 
deep suspicion, as the laying of more lines and the expansion of railway 
capacities near the border provided the foundations for the deployment 
of ever larger forces at the outset of a major war.9 Pamphlets and treatises 
written in France and Germany prophesied the sudden appearance of 
hostile forces, or championed the railways’ potential as a defensive resource 
even before widespread construction of lines had taken place.10 Shortly 
before his death, General Lamarque declared to the French chamber of 
deputies that the strategic use of railways would lead to a ‘revolution in 
military science as great as that which had been brought about by the 
6 McKenna, The Railway Workers, pp. 22–3.
7 E. M. Spiers, Engines for Empire: the Victorian Army and its use of Railways (Manchester, 
2015), p. 6; J. N. Westwood, Railways at War (London, 1980), p. 6.
8 Spiers, Engines for Empire, p. 149.
9 D. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904–1914 (Oxford, 1996), p. 
15.
10 For a brief discussion of the literature produced during this period, see E. A. Pratt, The 
Rise of Rail Power in War and Conquest, 1833–1914 (London, 1916), pp. 2–8.
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use of gunpowder’.11 In Die Eisenbahnen als militärische Operationslinien 
betrachtet und durch Beispiele erläutert, published under the sobriquet of 
‘Pz.’ in 1842 by Captain Karl Eduard Pönitz – like Lamarque a veteran of 
the 1813–15 campaigns – the author argued in favour of the employment of 
railways for military purposes before he elaborated upon a scheme for the 
construction of a network of strategic lines to serve the whole of Germany. 
The protection of Germany’s frontiers from French or Russian attack was 
the central motivation behind Pönitz’s proposal, and an examination of 
traffic and equipment within Germany and its neighbours was undertaken 
by the general staff in Berlin before 1850. However, as Denis Showalter 
observed, the advocacy of authors such as Pönitz and the relatively puny 
capabilities of early railways stymied the wholesale embrace of the medium 
within Germany until Prussian troops demonstrated the practical utility 
of railways during the counter-revolution of 1848–9. The Prussian forces 
‘crisscrossed Germany by rail despite the network’s shortcomings’ and the 
railways were integrated into the state’s mobilization plans shortly after.12
Britain’s situation as an island power afforded its railway promoters a 
degree of insulation from the strategic considerations that exercised French 
and German leaders, which reduced the efficiency of the British railway 
network from the point of view of national defence. Whereas the 1871 
German constitution gave the military a standing right to supervise railway 
construction through the Imperial Railway Office, British soldiers lacked 
similar influence over – and their naval colleagues sufficient interest in – 
the provision of lines for principally strategic rather than economic roles. 
Concerns over a potential French invasion in the 1840s inspired a range 
of proposals for new railways to improve Britain’s defences on the south 
coast. However, although the inspector-general of fortifications, Sir John 
Fox Burgoyne, affirmed in evidence to a royal commission that ‘the whole 
safety of the kingdom’ depended upon the nation’s ability to concentrate 
men swiftly – and his stance was bolstered by Wellington’s endorsement – 
the government declined to act.13 At the opposite end of the country, Lord 
Fisher’s decision to move the Grand Fleet to Scapa Flow in the 1910s was 
taken without consideration of the railway requirements of a modern navy. 
While Moltke the elder implored his countrymen to build railways rather 
than fortresses, ‘[n]othing whatever was done by the State to improve the 
land approaches to Scapa Flow’ in the decade before the First World War.14 
11 Quoted in Pratt, Rise of Rail Power, pp. 6–7.
12 D. E. Showalter, ‘Soldiers and steam: railways and the military in Prussia, 1832 to 1848’, 
Historian, xxxiv (1972), 242–59.
13 Spiers, Engines for Empire, pp. 24–7.
14 E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War: Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and 
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The Highland Railway, an unavoidable link between the Grand Fleet and 
London, remained single-tracked for more than three-quarters of its length; 
it also lacked sufficient siding space and employees to discharge the extra 
burdens thrown upon it by the flows of wartime traffic.15
Yet despite their failure to influence the composition of the British 
railway network, military experts played a considerable role in the industry’s 
governance prior to the First World War. The unexpected popularity of the 
Liverpool and Manchester line among passengers prompted the spread of 
railways across the country. Between 1835 and 1837, parliamentary acts for 
the creation of fifty new lines – comprising 1,600 miles of track – were 
passed in the nineteenth century’s first railway mania. By 1848 Britain 
possessed more than 13,000 miles of track, over which passed some £10 
million worth of traffic.16 As the network expanded the government began 
to take a more active role in its administration. The railways had, according 
to the vice president of the Board of Trade, Henry Labouchere, ‘bound the 
country in chains of iron’.17 However, the subject of government supervision 
of the railways divided opinion among the talents of the emerging industry. 
On the one hand, Isambard Kingdom Brunel warned that ‘Government 
inspectors would receive no cooperation from railwaymen [who understood 
very well] … how to look after the public safety’. On the other hand, George 
Stephenson advised Labouchere to establish a railway department for which 
‘supervision without interference’ could provide a guiding principle.18 The 
1840 Railway Regulation Act followed Stephenson’s advice and authorized 
the Board of Trade to ‘appoint any proper person or persons to inspect a 
railway’. To guard against potential abuse from those with vested interests 
the act disqualified anyone who had been a director of, or ‘held any office of 
trust or profit’ in, a railway company from being appointed as an inspector 
of railways.19 Such stringent requirements rendered the vast majority of 
the small number of railway engineers in Britain ineligible for service with 
the railway inspectorate. Consequently, the Board of Trade turned to the 
Achievements (2 vols., London, 1921), ii. 958–60; D. Stevenson, ‘War by timetable? The 
railway race before 1914’, Past & Present, clxii (1999), 163–94, at pp. 171–2.
15 H. A. Vallance, The Highland Railway: the History of the Railways of the Scottish 
Highlands (5 vols., Newton Abbot, 1969), ii. 102–6.
16 P. S. Bagwell and P. J. Lyth, Transport in Britain: from Canal Lock to Gridlock (London, 
2006), p. 54; W. C. Lubenow, The Politics of Government Growth: Early Victorian Attitudes 
toward State Intervention, 1833–1848 (Newton Abbot, 1971), pp. 108–9.
17 Quoted in H. Parris, Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century Britain 
(London, 1965), p. 26.
18 L. T. C. Rolt, Red for Danger: a History of Railway Accidents and Railway Safety (4th 
edn., Newton Abbot, 1982), pp. 17–18.
19 An Act for Regulating Railways (Parl. Papers 1840 [97], xcvii).
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Royal Engineers to supervise the expansion of Britain’s railway network 
across the country and to investigate the causes of accidents on parliament’s 
behalf. Beginning with Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Frederick Smith in 1840, 
from the 1840s until the 1960s every chief inspector of railways possessed 
a background in the Royal Engineers. Their relationship with the nascent 
industry was, in the words of one historian, ‘characterised less by hostility 
than by signs of partnership’.20
Alongside the government, the railway companies themselves provided 
opportunities for ex-servicemen in the industry’s first twenty years. Several of 
the early railways in Britain benefited from former military and naval officers’ 
experiences in accounts, bookkeeping and the coordination of large bodies 
of men. Captain Mark Huish, who became the LNWR’s general manager in 
1846, was not an isolated case. The Manchester and Birmingham, London 
and Birmingham, Great North of England, Caledonian and Manchester 
and Leeds all claimed former captains and lieutenants among their senior 
staff prior to the era of the ‘railway professional’. Huish’s experience typified 
the transition. His tendency towards micro-management provided him with 
a remarkable knowledge of the growing industry, but produced friction 
that isolated him from his subordinate officers and the LNWR’s directors.21 
George Neele, the LNWR’s former superintendent, recalled in 1904 that 
managers with military backgrounds demanded ‘quarter deck discipline 
… which compared unfavourably in public estimation with the business 
capabilities of the more practical and less pretentious Carrier’.22 After twelve 
years at the company’s helm Huish was replaced by William Cawkwell, a 
man who had begun his career as a clerk at Brighouse station in 1840 and 
risen through the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway before moving to the 
LNWR in 1858.23
As the railway companies gradually erased their connections to individual 
soldiers, significant developments across the English Channel provided a 
catalyst that drew the railway industry and the army into closer contact. In 
1858, a new rail link between Paris and Cherbourg opened, accompanied 
by a significant enlargement of the latter’s capacity as a port. The provision 
of ‘cannons, cannons, cannons, wherever you turned’ at Cherbourg – in 
conjunction with the increased capacity of the line from Paris to the coast 
20 Lubenow, The Politics of Government Growth, p. 108.
21 T. R. Gourvish, Mark Huish and the London & North Western Railway: a Study of 
Management (Leicester, 1972).
22 G. P. Neele, Railway Reminiscences (London, 1904), p. 8.
23 Gourvish, Mark Huish, pp. 54–5, 177–8, 259–60; ‘Obituary: William Cawkwell, 1807–
1897’, Minutes of the Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, cxxix (1897), 398–400.
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– inspired a reassessment of the national defences across the Channel.24 
In August 1859, a royal commission under General Sir Harry Jones was 
appointed by Palmerstone’s new Liberal government to consider Britain’s 
defences, in view both of recent improvements in naval technology and 
the global distribution of the Royal Navy’s assets.25 The commission’s report 
opened with the stark admission that the navy’s resources were ‘insufficient’ 
and ‘could not … be entirely relied upon’ to maintain naval superiority and 
eliminate the threat of foreign invasion. The commission considered the 
coastline from the Humber to Penzance to be at risk, and recommended 
that fortifications with an estimated cost of £11,850,000 be constructed 
across southern England and Wales to protect Britain’s most important 
dockyards and arsenals.26
The challenges of national defence – coupled with the government’s 
authorization of the formation of volunteer rifle corps for the first time 
since the threat of invasion had passed in 1814 – caught the attentions of 
the ICE. Recruitment for the Volunteer Force had been swift, despite the 
requirement that all members had to pay a subscription fee to enlist. Whereas 
the Volunteers of the Napoleonic Wars had no option but to march across 
country, the British railway network of the 1860s comprised thousands of 
miles of track upon which men, horses and equipment could be moved 
to any point of danger.27 However, that track was owned and operated by 
a byzantine configuration of large and small companies, many with their 
own locomotives and rolling stock, rather than a single corporate entity. In 
anticipation of the complications likely to be encountered in the event that 
a large-scale movement of the Volunteers was required, the ICE’s honorary 
secretary, Sir Charles Manby, wrote to the institution’s council on 2 July 
1860 to suggest the formation of a ‘Volunteer Engineering Staff Corps for 
the Arrangement of the Transport of Troops and Stores, the Construction 
of defensive works and the destruction of other works, in case of Invasion’. 
A month later Manby proposed a new ‘Volunteer Corps of Engineers’, 
which could organize the railways when war threatened. The corps’ officers, 
Manby suggested, could be drawn from the railways and would serve 
24 G. B. Sinclair, The Staff Corps: the History of the Engineer and Logistic Staff Corps RE 
(Chatham, 2001), p. 11.
25 Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Consider the Defences of the United Kingdom, 
(Parl. Papers 1860 [2682], xxiii), p. x. On the Anglo-French rivalry in naval innovation 
during the 19th century, see B. Wilson, Empire of the Deep: the Rise and Fall of the British 
Navy (2014), pp. 483–93.
26 Defences of the United Kingdom, pp. ix–x, xviii.
27 C. E. C. Townsend, All Rank and No File: a History of the Engineer and Railway Staff 
Corps RE, 1865–1965 (London, 1969), p. 2.
30
Civilian Specialists at War: Britain’s Transport Experts and the First World War
under the command of a member of the ICE’s council. Sidney Herbert, 
the secretary of state for war, responded to Manby’s proposal warmly and 
‘asked that a small committee of members of the Institution’s Council and 
officers from the War Office be formed to consider the proposal fully’.28
Surprisingly, given the prevailing image of the Victorian army under 
the duke of Cambridge as a stagnant and conservative organization, 
the most difficult obstacles to the establishment of the new corps came 
from civilian rather than military figures. Some opposition to Manby’s 
proposal came from members of the ICE’s council while, despite the War 
Office’s encouragement, ‘the Railway Companies could not be brought to 
understand the necessity for, or the advantages of, the proposed system’.29 
A full four years elapsed before Manby acquired the names of twenty men 
who were willing to join him in the new corps, and a list of twelve civil 
engineers and nine general managers of railway companies was submitted 
to the War Office in November 1864. The Engineer and Railway Staff Corps 
(ERSC) was eventually formed the following January, and all twenty-one 
men were commissioned as lieutenant-colonels in the new corps. The 
ERSC’s role was to:
Secure unity and action throughout the Railway system of the United Kingdom 
in time of invasion to the end that troops and material may be transported 
in any required direction with certainty and the utmost rapidity … [and to 
ensure] that works of construction and destruction in connection with railway 
communications which the exigencies of war may render necessary should be 
carried out with equal certainty and rapidity.30
The ERSC was thus conceived in 1865 in purely defensive terms, as a bulwark 
against invasion – a position it retained for the rest of the nineteenth century.
The absence of an invasion did not equate to a paucity of work for the 
new corps. In the twenty years that followed its formation the ERSC was 
presented with a range of scenarios by the War Office, and directed to 
prepare timetables for the transportation of varying numbers of troops to 
different locations around Britain. The specificity and scale of the exercises 
emphasized the recognized importance of the railway network both to the 
mass transportation of large bodies of troops and the sustenance of the 
national economy. For the ERSC’s first exercise, presented to the corps 
on 3 April 1865, the scenario called for a swift movement of 280,000 men 
– drawn from across the country – to forestall an invasion between the 
Thames and the Wash. Alongside ensuring the movement of the troops 
28 Sinclair, The Staff Corps, p. 14.
29 Townsend, All Rank and No File, p. 4.
30 Sinclair, The Staff Corps, p. 15.
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‘with the utmost rapidity and certainty’, the general managers of the railway 
companies were asked to ‘give special consideration’ to the maintenance 
of food supplies to London and other large towns ‘which were wholly 
dependent on the railways for their daily supply’.31 The complexity of the 
movements required to concentrate a force in East Anglia took over a year 
to disentangle, and when printed by the London, Chatham and Dover 
Railway the timetable linked to the exercise ran to 311 pages. Over a period 
of just eighty hours following the companies’ receipt of an order to begin 
the move, the timetable called for the movement of 962 trains – more than 
double the number required for the BEF’s embarkation in August 1914.
The ERSC’s response to the War Office’s hypothetical scenarios was time-
consuming and expensive. The surviving documents make it impossible to 
accurately identify the number of man-hours employed in the creation of 
the timetables, but the costly nature of the activities undertaken by the 
ERSC was noted by Sir John Burgoyne shortly after the first exercise was 
complete. ‘It is evident’, Burgoyne wrote, ‘that every Memoir and Paper 
… must have required much labour not only from the officer himself but 
his assistants – draughtsmen, clerks, etc., and that many were also the 
occasion for considerable other expense, such as for Travelling, Books, 
Maps and other matters’.32 Burgoyne’s comments demonstrate that even 
when movements were confined to internal distribution – and, therefore, 
did not involve the coordination of land and sea transport or consideration 
of many of the accoutrements that accompanied the BEF in 1914 – the 
military machine’s requirements for transportation demanded an industrial 
response that could not be restricted to a tiny cadre of trusted individuals.
Changes in the international situation greatly affected both the nature 
of the scenarios that the ERSC was asked to consider and the urgency with 
which their responses were developed. The threat of a French invasion, 
which inspired the first three exercises issued to the corps between 1865 
and 1870, receded in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War. Consequently, 
according to one author, the inspiration for the fourth exercise was the 
invasion of Britain by a German-speaking enemy as depicted in George 
Chesney’s contemporaneous novella The Battle of Dorking. The scenario 
called for the concentration of over 100,000 fewer troops than had been the 
case in 1865, but discussions on the fourth exercise meandered on for four 
years before a timetable was produced.33 A fifth and final exercise appeared 
in June 1882, after which the reduced threat of invasion eroded the principal 
31 Townsend, All Rank and No File, p. 7.
32 Townsend, All Rank and No File, p. 8.
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reason for the ERSC’s existence. The corps was reduced to an establishment 
of sixty officers in August 1907 – the initial complement of twenty-one 
having ballooned after 1865 to over one hundred as entry to the corps was 
extended to new professions and more railway companies – and by 1910 
the corps existed largely on paper rather than as a vibrant civil–military 
exchange.34 According to Sir Sam Fay, an officer in the corps from June 1902 
onwards, by the time war was declared in August 1914 the only function for 
which the ERSC met was an annual dinner at the War Office.35
One of its members may have perceived the corps to have been moribund 
by 1914, but the continuation of the annual dinner at the War Office 
emphasizes both the army’s desire to maintain links with highly qualified 
civilian specialists and the social status ascribed to voluntary military service 
by the senior executives of the private firms. (The modern-day Engineer and 
Logistics Staff Corps retains the same voluntary ethos.)36 Furthermore, the 
reduced workload assigned to the ERSC did not mean that the professional 
link between the War Office and Britain’s transport experts was severed 
after the final timetable was submitted in March 1885. Instead, the working 
relationship between the military and the railways migrated to a specialized 
forum that – like the ERSC before it – owed its birth to the formation of 
war clouds over Europe.
The REC, eventually formed in the wake of the Agadir crisis of 1911, 
underwent a long gestation. The ERSC’s first call for a ‘central and 
responsible authority’ to be created for the purpose of coordinating the 
military’s railway needs was made in 1870, and repeated in response to the 
fourth mobilization exercise in 1876.37 However, the reduced frequency with 
which the corps met after the Franco-Prussian War meant that the question 
lapsed for more than a decade until it was rekindled by the War Office in 
July 1888. An initial memorandum on the subject of railway coordination 
in the event of a national emergency was produced the following year by 
Sir George Findlay, the LNWR’s general manager and a lieutenant-colonel 
in the ERSC. Findlay’s paper opened with a clear statement in support 
of the corps’ involvement in railway operations in the event of a war, and 
emphasized that a portion of the ERSC’s council should sit en permanence 
at the War Office.38 The pace of change was slow. Eight years passed before 
a civil–military committee composed of Frederick Harrison, Sir Henry 
34 TNA, WO 114/114, territorial force: establishment and strengths, 1908–1914.
35 S. Fay, The War Office at War (London, 1937), p. 39.
36 M. Stancombe, ‘The Staff Corps: a civilian resource for the military’, ICE Proceedings, 
clvii (2004), 22–6.
37 Townsend, All Rank and No File, p. 17.
38 Sinclair, The Staff Corps, p. 28.
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Oakley, George Henry Turner and Sir Charles Scooter – general managers 
of the LNWR (Findlay died in March 1893), Great Northern, Midland and 
London and South-Western (LSWR) railways respectively – was established 
to advise the secretary of state for war on railway matters in the event of 
a national emergency.39 All four were lieutenant-colonels in the ERSC 
and advocated that their role, alongside providing a permanent council 
to examine railway matters on the secretary of state’s behalf, should be to 
draw up ‘a detailed scheme for the movement of the different troops on 
mobilization on [sic] data supplied to them by the War Office’.40
The Permanent Railway Council, later known as the Army Railway 
Council and subsequently the War Railway Council, met in full just 
four times between 1897 and 1910. However, it established the principles 
upon which the British army and the railway companies interacted 
before the First World War and undertook voluminous quantities of 
statistical work on the War Office’s behalf.41 From the council’s inception 
all communications between it and the army were directed through the 
Quartermaster-general’s (QMG) office to avoid duplication of effort, and 
until 1903 the council’s railway representatives were drawn solely from 
among the companies with headquarters located in London.42 In 1903 the 
comparative insularity of the council was rectified, and membership was 
widened to acknowledge both the Royal Navy’s mobilization requirements 
(which necessitated the name change from Army Railway Council to War 
Railway Council) and the presence of important railways based outside 
the capital. The North-Eastern Railway, whose head office overlooked 
York station, and the Manchester-based Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway 
both employed huge workforces and operated large shipping fleets in 
addition to their railway interests. Yet neither had been represented on 
the Army Railway Council. The railways of Scotland and Ireland, both 
crucial to the mobilization procedures of the army and navy, were similarly 
notable absentees. The War Railway Council’s expansion amended these 
deficiencies: the North-Eastern and Lancashire and Yorkshire railways 
were added to the English contingent, while Robert Millar and Henry 
Plews – general managers of the Caledonian and Great Northern Railway 
39 TNA, WO 33/56, War Office: reports, memoranda and papers (O and A series), report 
of committee assembled to consider working of railways of Great Britain and Ireland in the 
event of general mobilisation, 22 May 1896.
40 TNA, WO 33/56, report of committee assembled to consider working of railways of 
Great Britain and Ireland, p. 2.
41 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, i. 13.
42 TNA, WO 32/9184, formation of permanent council to advise on railway matters, 
Wood to Brodrick, 15 Apr. 1897.
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(Ireland) respectively – were appointed to represent the Scottish and Irish 
railways.43
Alongside expanding the council’s membership, the 1903 reorganization 
extended the scope of its deliberations. For the first time the naval, military 
and railway elements of the mobilization process could be coordinated, 
although considerations of national security demanded that only the railway 
companies directly affected by any contemplated manoeuvres were invited to 
attend council meetings. Each of the companies represented on the council 
nominated employees to coordinate the technical work involved in the 
creation of railway timetables and to liaise with the other companies concerned 
with the movements of individual trains. Through these methods, timetables 
for home defence that identified the numbers of troops, horses, vehicles and 
stores to be moved, the departure and arrival locations for each train involved 
and the date after mobilization upon which the movement was to take place 
were compiled and submitted to the War Office within two years of the War 
Railway Council’s establishment. Following a process of consultation and 
amendment between the War Office and the railways – one that was mirrored 
after 1911 in the production and revision of the BEF’s mobilization scheme 
– by 1909 the railway companies were able to prepare what they regarded as 
‘mobilization timetables proper’ for the national defence.44
In addition to providing the environment in which a comprehensive 
mobilization scheme could be devised, the War Railway Council’s expansion 
presented opportunities for a forensic examination of the possible effects of 
modern warfare upon Britain’s economic prosperity. As the world’s largest 
exporter and importer, pre-war Britain lay at the heart of a vast maritime 
communications network. Britain’s ports played a central role both in the 
delivery of British products to the globe and the world’s foodstuffs to Britain. 
Any dislocation to the traffic flows in and out of the country had potentially 
profound implications for the flows of traffic around the British transport 
network. On 19 January 1909 the ship owner and Lloyd’s chairman, Sir 
Frederic Bolton, wrote to the prime minister about Britain’s food security 
in the event of war with Germany. Bolton warned Herbert Asquith that 
‘a suspension of imports [from ports on the North Sea or Channel coast] 
would divert trade to ports farther from the danger zone, which are not 
used or adapted to handling import trade. A difficulty would therefore arise 
in supplying the area normally dependent on the port into which trade had 
temporarily ceased to flow’.45
43 TNA, WO 32/9185, reorganisation of council, Lake to Nicholson, 21 Oct. 1902; Clarke 
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Bolton’s letter to the prime minister did not represent a serendipitous 
alignment between the state and private enterprise. Instead, it emerged 
from another example of the professional union between the armed forces 
and Britain’s transport experts. As chairman of Lloyd’s, Bolton had been 
part of a special committee of prominent figures in the shipping industry 
that assisted with the organization of the Admiralty’s naval manoeuvres 
in 1906. The manoeuvres had been designed ‘with a view to studying the 
important question of the Attack and Defence of Commerce’ at sea, and 
called for the participation of privately owned vessels alongside the Royal 
Navy’s forces. Between December 1905 and June 1906 Bolton worked out 
many of the details required in relation to the insurance of the commercial 
vessels, presented ship owners with an indemnity package to cover their 
involvement and helped to ‘weed out’ unfit vessels within those offered to 
the Admiralty for use in the manoeuvres. His work for the committee earned 
him a knighthood and sparked an interest in the potential dislocation of 
shipping that inspired his 1909 letter to Asquith.46
Bolton’s observations were sufficiently concerning to compel the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) to investigate further, and Bolton 
joined representatives of the Admiralty in an examination of the challenges 
involved in the distribution of food supplies and raw materials around Britain 
in the event of war with another maritime power. The conclusions of their 
interim report, issued by the CID in December 1909, were pessimistic. ‘The 
problems involved’ in an investigation of such magnitude and complexity, 
Bolton began, were ‘many and far reaching’:
The range of the influence of the principal ports must be determined, both in 
general and in particular; the population dependent on the ports for supplies; 
the interchange of both home and foreign produce between different parts of the 
Kingdom by land and water, especially the latter; the quantity of imports and 
exports for each port, in weight and cubic measurement; the possibility of securing 
the needed supplies from fresh directions; the ability of the railway companies to 
provide the rolling stock that would be required; the capacity of the lines to take 
the large increase of traffic that would be thrown upon them; the arrangements 
that would be necessary as regards labour; the difficulties of distribution within 
the area itself under entirely new conditions; and many other points, fresh ones 
constantly presenting themselves as the investigation proceeds.47
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The movement of coal provided just one example of the difficulties that 
might have to be addressed in the event of wartime interference with 
Britain’s maritime traffic. In 1908 Greater London had received 8.1 million 
tons of coal by rail. Over the same period just over eight million tons arrived 
in the capital by ship, the majority of which was despatched from ports on 
the north-east coast.48 In the event of a prolonged closure to traffic of the 
North Sea, Britain’s railways would be required to provide a vast quantity 
of rolling stock to undertake journeys far in excess of the distances typically 
covered by goods trains on the British railway network. As John Armstrong’s 
analysis of freight traffic in 1910 has demonstrated, the average distance of a 
goods haul on the railway network was less than fifty miles. South Shields, 
the port of origin for roughly one-quarter of London’s coal in the same year, 
was almost three hundred miles away from the capital.49 Bolton remarked 
in his preliminary report that Britain’s strategic planners had hitherto given 
‘no thought’ to the requirements of the civil population, and stressed that 
the naval, military and civilian interests of the nation had to be dealt with in 
concert.50 At the end of his year-long investigation, Bolton expressed doubts 
as to whether the railway companies could ‘cope with the extra strain that 
would be thrown on them in time of war’.51 In response, a further CID sub-
committee was established to ascertain whether – given the scenario that all 
ports from Hull in the north-east, past the Thames estuary, and as far along 
the south coast as Portsmouth were closed to traffic – the railways of Britain 
could adapt sufficiently to ensure the delivery of adequate supplies of food 
and raw materials to the nation’s urban centres.
Such a detailed and complex investigation demanded expert 
contributions. The railway companies provided them. In January 1911, 
the general managers of companies involved in the supply of London and 
report by Sir Frederic Bolton on an investigation into some of the conditions of supplies of 
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48 See Table 1 and explanatory notes in J. Armstrong, ‘The role of coastal shipping in 
UK transport: an estimate of comparative traffic movements in 1910’, Journal of Transport 
History, viii (1987), 164–78, at pp. 167–8; NCL, Mottistone papers, Mottistone 11/7, interim 
report of the sub-committee (CID) on the local transportation and distribution of supplies 
in time of war, 24 Jan. 1911, p. 6.
49 Armstrong, ‘The role of coastal shipping in UK transport’, pp. 166–8.
50 NCL, Mottistone papers, Mottistone 11/6, sub-committee, Appendix 2: preliminary 
report by Sir Frederic Bolton, p. 12.
51 NCL, Mottistone papers, Mottistone 11/6, sub-committee, Report of the sub-
committee, 22 March 1910, p. 3.
37
Forging a relationship
the transport of goods to and from Britain’s major commercial ports were 
instructed to consider how best the railways could address the hypothetical 
challenge placed before them. The sub-committee presented its findings 
eight months later, during a summer in which Franco-German disputes 
over Morocco illustrated the fragility of European peace and a railway strike 
at home emphasized the industry’s importance to British economic life.52 
Fay, the Great Central’s general manager and one of the sub-committee’s 
participants, recalled that:
We had to take into consideration the fact that the closing of the ports on 
the eastern coast would greatly increase the demands on the Liverpool and 
Manchester Docks in dealing with foodstuffs normally supplied through 
Hull and Grimsby to the populous districts of the North-East of England. 
We calculated that the situation could be met by the terminal facilities of 
Southampton, Bristol, Liverpool, Birkenhead and Manchester, but pointed 
out that if large movements of troops and material took place concurrently 
with the demand for the conveyance of increased provisions to London [as 
would inevitably be the case were the BEF to be despatched to the continent], 
congestion would occur.53
The sub-committee’s report contained a stark conclusion: if no effective 
arrangements were in place to connect London by rail to the ports on the 
southern and western coasts, then ‘famine prices would soon be reached’ 
in the capital due to lack of supplies. To minimize the risks of dislocation 
and congestion on the railway network – and to ensure that London’s shops 
remained stocked and its factories fuelled – the sub-committee recommended 
that ‘the General Managers who have already been consulted be formed 
into a Permanent Committee with power to add to their number’. This 
committee, it continued, should be authorised to control movement over 
the railway network as a whole in the event of an emergency – to ensure 
that government priorities received the immediate attention of the railway 
companies. Fay and his colleagues stressed the importance of ensuring that 
the ‘controlling body should be in close touch with the military and naval 
authorities in order that military movements by railway should not clash 
with special working for provisioning London, and that the same carts and 
horses should not be requisitioned by both bodies’.54
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The report’s final observation revisited a familiar theme, as it diverged 
little from the request first made some forty years earlier by the ERSC:
During the course of this enquiry we have been impressed by the desirability 
of having some central body at which matters from time to time referred to 
railway companies by various government departments may be considered as 
a whole. At present it frequently happens that some question is referred to the 
railway companies by, e.g., the War Office, and when this has been dealt with, 
some other question is referred by some other department which alters the 
standpoint from which the first question should be considered.55
The contents of the statements made by Britain’s transport experts in the 
1870s and 1910s may have been similar, but the contexts in which they were 
made differed profoundly. France’s humiliation in 1871 had reduced the 
imminent threat of invasion in the minds of Britain’s military authorities. 
The entente cordiale of 1904 had removed the French invasion threat 
entirely, and set in motion a concerted effort between the militaries of 
France and Britain to understand each other’s working practices. The 
Agadir crisis in 1911 provided the catalyst for a reinforcement of Britain’s 
military commitment to the French army – solidified by the Wilson–Dubail 
memorandum on 21 July, which stated that six British infantry divisions, 
one cavalry division and two mounted brigades would be deployed on the 
left flank of the French army by the fifteenth day of mobilization.56 The 
potential for the railways to be called upon to effect the swift movement 
of 150,000 men and 67,000 horses to the coast, the provision of adequate 
stocks of coal for the nation’s fleet and factories, and the preservation of 
goods and commuter services across the country simultaneously offered 
compelling reasons for the establishment of a permanent link between the 
government, the armed forces and Britain’s transport experts.
The REC as eventually formed in November 1912 reflected the 
government’s acknowledgement of the unique skills possessed by Britain’s 
transport experts. Stanley Baldwin, the president of the Board of Trade, 
was named the committee’s nominal chairman, but responsibility for the 
operation of the railways in the event of war was unambiguously left in the 
hands of the professionals. At the REC’s first meeting Baldwin emphasised 
that the government ‘had no idea of running the railways themselves. All 
they wanted was to place the State in such a position that it would be able 
to give binding instructions and to require separate railways to cooperate as 
part of a single system … The control of the system would be vested in the 
55 NCL, Mottistone papers, Mottistone 11/175, report from the general managers, p. 3.
56 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, p. 213.
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… Executive Committee’.57 In addition, the establishment of a permanent 
body comprising the general managers of the country’s most prominent 
railways afforded the War Office and Admiralty with the opportunity to 
educate the companies ‘in matters relating to naval and military transport 
before any emergency arose’.58 To prevent confusion and duplication of 
effort the War Railway Council was disbanded in February 1913, and a 
communications board was established to coordinate the activities of each 
party in the REC.59
The composition of the communications board illustrated the importance 
of the railways to an industrial nation on a war footing. The railwaymen 
– in the first instance comprising the general managers or nominated 
representatives of the LNWR, Midland, Great Western, North-Eastern, 
Lancashire and Yorkshire, Great Central, Great Northern, LSWR and 
Caledonian railways – were joined on the board by prominent individuals 
with executive responsibilities in their respective departments of state. The 
QMG, Sir John Cowans, was chairman, and other members of the board 
included: Sir Edward Troup, the permanent under-secretary of state at the 
Home Office; Rear Admiral Alexander Duff, the director of the Admiralty 
war staff’s mobilization division; Brigadier-General D. Henderson, the 
director of military transport; and William Marwood, assistant secretary 
of the Board of Trade’s railway department.60 The board’s members were 
officials ‘of such high standing that … they were able to decide on their 
own authority, most of the matters that the Railway Executive Committee 
… brought up for consideration. In this way a large number of questions, 
including many of the highest importance, were settled in advance’.61
The fitting out of the REC’s offices provides an example of the small 
but important details that the board grappled with in the final months 
of peace. Sir Frank Ree, general manager of the LNWR and the REC’s 
first acting chairman, argued at the board’s first meeting that ‘ample offices’ 
were required for the REC and its staff to coordinate the programme of 
movements required on the declaration of a general mobilization. The 
offices, he suggested, needed to be ‘connected by telephone directly to the 
government departments concerned and with each railway’. The board 
concurred, and Marwood ‘undertook to bring the matter before the 
57 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, i. 41–2.
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Board of Trade’.62 Two months later Marwood reported that the General 
Post Office was ‘preparing an estimate for the installation of the suggested 
telephone connection’ with the LNWR, whose Westminster office had been 
identified as the most suitable location for the REC’s headquarters.63 By 
November 1913 the work was ‘practically complete’, ensuring that the REC 
entered the mobilization period before the First World War with a direct 
connection both to the latest requirements of the state and the situation 
across the British railway network.64
By drawing together Britain’s transport experts, the armed forces and 
key government departments, the REC’s communications board provided 
an opportunity for each group to gain valuable insights into the others’ 
concerns and requirements. Close and frequent access to senior naval and 
military authorities ensured that senior figures in the railway industry were 
kept informed of the armed forces’ evolving transport requirements, while 
contact with the railway companies’ senior executives allowed government 
and military officials to develop a clearer understanding of the national 
network’s possibilities and limitations. Yet in the decade prior to the First 
World War these cross-sectoral exchanges of knowledge were restricted 
neither to those at the pinnacle of their chosen professions, nor solely to the 
development of plans for national defence. The railway industry played an 
active role both in the reform of British government and the education of 
Britain’s military transport authorities.
The transmission of transport expertise
In a 1973 article, Terry Gourvish analysed the origins, careers and social 
statuses of the chief executives of Britain’s fifteen leading railway companies 
between 1850 and 1922. His study revealed that ‘the economic position 
of the chief executives … showed a steady improvement as the industry 
developed, and this improvement was in time reflected in a higher social 
status’. By 1900 the senior managerial figures who went on to populate the 
REC had already broken down the barriers that separated the ‘paid official 
from the big business capitalist’, a process that created opportunities for the 
ambitious railway manager to ‘involve himself in a wide range of industrial, 
62 TNA, WO 32/9188, re-constitution of council, notes of proceedings of the first meeting 
held at the Board of Trade at 11:30 a.m., 30 May 1913, p. 3.
63 TNA, WO 32/9188, re-constitution of council, notes of proceedings of the second 
meeting held at the Board of Trade at 3:30 p.m., 22 July 1913, p. 2; J. A. B. Hamilton, 
Britain’s Railways in World War I (London, 1947), p. 24.
64 TNA, WO 32/9188, re-constitution of council, notes of proceedings of the third 
meeting held at the Board of Trade at 3 p.m., 4 Nov. 1913, p. 2.
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commercial, and even governmental activities’.65
Sir George Gibb exemplified the latter of these endeavours. As general 
manager of the North-Eastern Railway and then managing director of 
the Underground Electric Railways Company of London, Gibb received 
his knighthood in acknowledgement of his contributions to two royal 
commissions in the first decade of the twentieth century. In the first, Gibb 
sat alongside prominent figures from the political and military spheres, and 
examined the organization of the War Office following the army’s bleak 
performance at the beginning of the South African War. In addition to 
hearing evidence from senior military and political figures with obvious 
links to the War Office’s operations, the committee obtained information 
from the Admiralty – about the working practices of the Royal Navy – from 
‘railway companies, from important manufacturing companies, and from 
large cooperative societies with reference to their business procedures’.66 
In the second, Gibb joined a panel of parliamentarians, civil servants and 
selected experts – including his compatriot on the ERSC, the civil engineer 
Sir John Wolfe Barry – to investigate potential improvements to London’s 
transport network.67 Over the course of two years the committee held 
112 meetings, interviewed 134 witnesses and visited the United States and 
‘various continental cities’ to observe measures taken elsewhere to deal with 
the rapid growth in demand for urban transportation.68
Gibb’s inclusion on such committees guaranteed that their deliberations 
received the input of a man with considerable experience in an industry 
that had faced the administrative challenges of large-scale organization – 
which had graphically taxed the extant military bureaucracy in their struggle 
against the Boers – and one that had ‘led the way in developing relatively 
advanced techniques in business management’.69 Yet Gibb’s contribution to 
the enhancement of Britain’s military administration was far from unique 
among his peers in the railway industry. At both an organizational and a 
65 T. R. Gourvish, ‘A British business elite: the chief executive managers of the railway 
industry, 1850–1922’, Business History Review, xlvii (1973), 289–316, at pp. 315–16.
66 Report of the Committee Appointed to Enquire into War Office Organisation (Parl. Papers 
1901 [Cd. 580], xl), p. 1. The companies consulted were the Army and Navy Co-operative 
Society; the Civil Service Co-operative Society; Armstrong, Whitworth and Company; the 
Midland Railway; the London and North-Western Railway; Vickers, Sons and Maxim; 
Rylands and Sons; the Great Northern Railway; and the Co-operative Wholesale Society. 
See Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Committee Appointed to Inquire into War Office 
Organisation, Together with Appendices, Digest, and Index (Parl. Papers 1901 [Cd. 581], xl), pp. 
443–9.
67 Royal Commission on London Traffic (8 vols., London, 1905–6).
68 ‘Royal commission on London traffic’, Commercial Motor, 20 July 1905, p. 12.
69 Gourvish, ‘A British business elite’, p. 290.
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technical level, Britain’s transport experts engaged in activities designed to 
improve the army’s ability to operate efficiently in the years preceding the 
First World War. These links were particularly valuable in Britain as, unlike 
those of other European powers, the pre-war British army relied upon 
voluntary enlistment for its supply of officers and other ranks. The abolition 
of the purchase system in 1871 had been partly conceived to encourage men 
from middle-class backgrounds, ‘by whose energy the industrial system’ was 
maintained, to consider the army as a suitable profession.70 However, the 
expanding influence and growing number of learned professions offered 
more attractive career prospects for the most talented public school and 
university graduates in the latter part of the nineteenth century. As the 
twentieth century began, the regular army remained dependent upon what 
Bidwell and Graham dubbed the ‘left overs’ of the landed classes for its 
supply of officers and unable to compel trained railwaymen to enlist in 
the ranks.71 Consequently, while the continental armies enjoyed largely 
unfettered access to men with relevant technical and administrative skills 
– and could direct them into positions where their experience could be 
exploited most effectively – Britain’s industrious and innovative young men 
were not drawn to the military life.
The effective use of military railways depended upon the planning of 
train schedules, an understanding of speeds and carrying capacities, the 
arrangement of loading and unloading facilities, the coordination of 
movements with the civil railway authorities and the knowledge of myriad 
technical details regarding locomotives, rolling stock and the infrastructure 
that comprised a railway.72 To acquire the necessary expertise to handle 
such demands the Prussian army established a specialist section of railway 
troops in 1886, which comprised over 4,500 troops by 1900 and provided a 
cadre for the rapid (and vast) expansion of the railway section through the 
enlistment of civilian railwaymen upon the outbreak of war.73 Following 
the shock of the Franco-Prussian War the French had comprehensively 
reorganized their railway administration. They created joint commissions 
of military and technical officers able to coordinate the national network 
70 Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the System of Purchase and Sale of 
Commissions in the Army (Parl. Papers 1857 [2267], xviii), p. 293.
71 S. Bidwell and D. Graham, Coalitions, Politicians and Generals: Some Aspects of 
Command in Two World Wars (London, 1993), p. 14.
72 G. L. Herrera, ‘Inventing the railroad and rifle revolution: information, military 
innovation and the rise of Germany’, Journal of Strategic Studies, xxvii (2004), 243–71, at p. 
253.
73 M. Peschaud, Politique et fonctionnement des transports par chemin de fer pendant la 
guerre (Paris, 1926), pp. 37–41.
43
Forging a relationship
in the event of war, and drew their dedicated railway troops from among 
new recruits with experience on the railways, existing soldiers who wished 
to train in railway duties and from lists of employees supplied by the six 
largest railway companies in France.74 The British army did not possess a 
regular force of railway troops until the formation of the 8th Company 
Royal Engineers in 1882, but did receive substantial voluntary support from 
the nation’s largest railway company five years later. In 1887 the LNWR’s 
locomotive works in Crewe provided 6,000 officers and other ranks for the 
2nd Cheshire (Railway) Engineer Volunteers, the majority of whom were 
‘engine drivers, firemen, cleaners, boilermakers, riveters, fitters, smiths, 
platelayers, shunters, and pointsmen’.75 Like all volunteers the railwaymen 
were only liable to be called out in case of invasion. Yet in addition to 
their ordinary infantry drill, the Crewe volunteers underwent a course of 
instruction in military engineering and – in recognition of their potential 
value to an army on campaign abroad – each man was encouraged to enlist 
in the Royal Engineers for a day before being placed on the army reserve for 
six years. As reservists the men received pay and made themselves available 
for service ‘in case of need either at home or abroad’. By 1890 a ‘considerable 
number of men’ had taken advantage of the offer, and the Crewe volunteers 
served with distinction in South Africa between 1899 and 1902.76
However, the recruitment of volunteers did not provide the British army 
with a large, permanent pool of technically proficient railway personnel. 
Therefore, in addition to encouraging the enlistment of their men on the 
reserve list, the railway companies contributed to the practical education 
offered to regular soldiers. The Midland Railway provided both opportunities 
for officers to gain experience of the engineering work undertaken by one 
of Britain’s largest private enterprises and the blueprint for a self-contained 
course organized by the Royal Engineers at the Chatham Dockyards.77 At 
the Midland’s gigantic locomotive works in Derby a voluntary course of 
74 Herrera, ‘Inventing the railroad and rifle revolution’; F. P. Jacqmin, Les chemins de fer 
pendant la guerre de 1870–1871: leçons faites en 1872 à l’École des Ponts-et-Chaussées, (2nd. edn., 
Paris, 1874); Pratt, Rise of Rail Power, pp. 122–3, 154–5; V. Murray, ‘Transportation in war’, 
Royal Engineers Journal, lvi (1942), 202–32, at pp. 204–7.
75 W. H. Chaloner, The Social and Economic Development of Crewe, 1780–1923 (Manchester, 
1950), p. 273.
76 G. Findlay, The Working and Management of an English Railway (London, 1889), pp. 
287–8; G. R. S. Darroch, Deeds of a Great Railway: a Record of the Enterprise and Achievements 
of the London and North-Western Railway Company during the Great War (London, 1920), 
pp. 22–3.
77 TNA, WO 32/6164, instructions for officers while undergoing training in mechanical 
engineering at Chatham, instructions for officers while undergoing a course of instruction 
in mechanical engineering at H.M. dockyard, Chatham, May 1901.
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instruction in mechanical engineering was offered to men who wished 
to enhance their knowledge of the machines deployed in support of 
a campaigning army. The course’s existence demonstrated a growing 
awareness within the military of the importance of mechanical appliances 
to the fighting troops and the increasing complexity of the machines an 
army depended upon. The instructions issued to officers who took the 
course explained that it had been designed to give each man ‘a thorough 
practical knowledge of machine design, the fitting, erection, and repair of 
machinery, and the care and working of boilers, such as will enable him 
to superintend work of these descriptions, and distinguish between good 
and bad material, workmanship, and design’.78 Following completion of the 
course officers were employed ‘upon machinery in the course of erection 
by the War Department’ so that the army could make the best use of their 
newly acquired skills.79
In the case of Ralph Micklem, the Midland Railway provided the 
foundations upon which he constructed a successful military career. After 
eighteen months at the Royal Engineers’ school of military engineering in 
Chatham, Micklem applied to specialize in the corps’ railway section for 
‘no particular reason’ in September 1904. Writing later in life, Micklem 
reasoned that his cousin Henry had ‘gravitated towards the railway side in 
Sudan and South Africa and had done well in both countries’.80 Micklem’s 
initial experiences were less exotic than his cousin’s, as his training with the 
Midland began with a ‘fortnight at Brecon on a single line, then two or 
three months in London on goods working, then to Derby, where I did a 
month as a fireman, and then to various other places on civil engineering 
jobs. Altogether’, he summarized, ‘it was an enjoyable year’. Following a 
brief spell on the Royal Engineers’ new instructional railway at Longmoor 
– opened in 1905 to provide soldiers with the opportunity to construct 
and operate railway lines in peacetime – Micklem followed in his cousin’s 
footsteps and departed for Africa, where he joined the Egyptian army and 
participated in the survey of a possible line to link the Nile and Congo rivers. 
The railway was never built, but Micklem was involved in the construction 
of the Atbara to Port Sudan line in 1911 before he spent a ‘pleasant’ three 
78 TNA, WO 32/6164, instructions for officers, instructions for officers joining the 
Midland Railway Company’s locomotive works for a course in mechanical engineering, 24 
Aug. 1894, p. 1.
79 TNA, WO 32/6164, instructions for officers, instructions for officers joining the 
Midland Railway Company’s locomotive works, p. 2.
80 IWM, private papers of Brigadier R. Micklem, 87/8/1, Ralph Micklem – an 
autobiography. Unless otherwise stated, all quotations in this passage are taken from this 
source.
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years as assistant to the general manager at Atbara. In 1915 Micklem took 
charge of a company of the Egyptian Railway Battalion and was wounded 
at Cape Helles. Following recuperation in London he was passed fit for 
light duties and, thanks to his previous experience, was ‘snapped up’ by 
the movements directorate at the War Office. He spent the remainder of 
the war in London, where he was engaged in ‘very technical work with the 
home railway companies’. The outcome of Micklem’s seemingly impulsive 
decision to attend the Midland’s training course in 1904 was that he became 
responsible for the railway arrangements connected to the defence of 
Britain and, despite having reached the compulsory retirement age of fifty-
five in 1939, he played a prominent role in the directorate of transportation 
throughout the Second World War.81
The on-site vocational training offered by the Midland Railway, and 
later by the Royal Engineers themselves at Longmoor, were not the only 
examples of professional development available to military personnel who 
wanted to better understand the complexities of railway operations prior 
to the First World War. Alongside the practical experience delivered by a 
combination of civilian and military practitioners, the advent of the Liberal 
government in 1906 inspired the creation of an academic course that 
provided its students with a wider appreciation of the business methods that 
underpinned the railway industry. The incoming secretary of state for war, 
Richard Haldane, entered the War Office with the twin aims of promoting 
‘military efficiency’ and reducing defence spending foremost in his mind.82 
A trip to Berlin during his first year in office gave him a chance to study 
the German general staff’s organization in detail, and exposed him to an 
army that he considered to be ‘as near perfection as possible, and at a cost 
proportionately much less than ours’.83 Haldane’s admiration for the German 
army remained high and was expressed once again in the infamous CID 
meeting of 23 August 1911, when the army and navy presented their plans 
for British intervention in the event of a European war. On that occasion 
he referred to the German military as ‘a perfect machine’.84 Haldane was 
81 Micklem was joined at the War Office in 1917 by his cousin Henry, who was responsible 
for ‘the supply of material for railways, light railways and roads including the supply of 
special road-making, maintenance and repairing equipment, plant and materials’. According 
to their boss, Sir Sam Fay, Henry’s workload was ‘A heavy business!’ See Fay, The War Office 
at War, pp. 46, 146.
82 E. M. Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer (Edinburgh, 1980).
83 Haldane’s own account of this trip is given in R. B. Haldane, Richard Burdon Haldane: 
an Autobiography (London, 1929), pp. 200–9. Unless otherwise stated, all quotes in this 
passage are taken from this source.
84 TNA, CAB 2/2, nos. 83–119, action to be taken in the event of intervention in a 
European war, 23 Aug. 1911, p. 7.
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particularly struck by the degree of specialization in the German army. The 
general staff took no part in the administration and supply of the forces, 
a separation that left ‘the army in the field free from the embarrassment 
of having to look after its transport and supplies’. The new secretary of 
state wished to implement the same partition within the British army, and 
envisaged a thorough reformation of the administrative staff tasked with 
providing logistical support to the fighting troops. As Hew Strachan noted, 
such an organization was particularly relevant to the British army due to 
the nature of Britain’s imperial responsibilities – the planning for which 
predominantly required the fulfilment of tasks that were ‘administrative 
and logistical’ rather than the outcome of operational thought.85
To assist him in his goal of building an administrative organization 
composed of highly skilled experts – a ‘thinking school’ of officers – 
Haldane drew upon the knowledge and expertise of men from inside and 
outside the military profession. In January 1907, just a year after Haldane 
had become secretary of state for war, the first cohort of students enrolled 
on a course for the training of officers for the higher appointments in 
the administrative staff of the army at the London School of Economics 
(LSE).86 The importance attached to such a training course is evident in 
the speed with which it was established, and owed much to the work of 
two men: Sir Edward Ward, the permanent under-secretary at the War 
Office and a former colonel in the Army Service Corps (ASC); and Halford 
Mackinder, the LSE’s director.87 The goal of the course they devised was 
the creation of a pool of officers who possessed a thorough knowledge of 
the principles required to run what Mackinder termed the ‘greatest single 
business concern in the country’.88 In time, as the officers who passed the 
course obtained promotions to senior positions within the logistics and 
supply departments of the army, Mackinder hoped that the course would 
85 Spiers, Haldane, p. 151; H. Strachan, ‘The British army, its general staff and the 
continental commitment, 1904–1914’, in The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 
c.1890–1939, ed. D. French and B. Holden Reid (London, 2002), pp. 75–94, at p. 87.
86 G. Sloan, ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarten: a radical experiment in British military 
education?’, War in History, ixx (2012), 322–52, at p. 328.
87 P. Grant, ‘Edward Ward, Halford Mackinder and the army administration course at 
the London School of Economics, 1907–1914’, in A Military Transformed? Adaptation and 
Innovation in the British Military, 1792–1945, ed. M. LoCicero, R. Mahoney and S. Mitchell 
(Solihull, 2014), pp. 97–109.
88 Army. Report of the advisory board, LSE, on the first course at the LSE, January to July, 
1907, for the training of officers for the higher appointments on the administrative staff of the 
army and for the charge of developmental services (Parl. Papers 1907 [Cd. 3696], xlix), p. 11; 
S. Pelizza, ‘Geopolitics, education, and empire: the political life of Sir Halford Mackinder, 
1895–1925’ (unpublished University of Leeds PhD thesis, 2013), pp. 117–18.
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develop a tradition of its own – one that placed its graduates on a similar 
footing to those who passed through the staff college at Camberley. To 
ensure that the army accrued a long-term benefit from the material studied 
at the LSE, the age limit for entrants to the course was set at thirty-seven.89
The LSE course was designed to teach a new generation of officers the 
skills required to manage and operate a large-scale, data-intensive, complex 
organization. The first cohort of students studied subjects that disseminated 
lessons learned in the ‘practical experience of recent campaigns, which had 
demonstrated the need for specialised administrative officers whose training 
should include financial, commercial and legal qualifications’.90 The breadth 
of knowledge considered of importance to the British army’s administrators 
can be deduced from the course’s syllabus. Instruction was delivered in 
the following topics: accounting and business methods; commercial law; 
carriage by sea and land; economic theory; economic geography; and 
statistical method, and each class was taught by prominent academics or 
men with significant practical experience. Staff who contributed to the 
delivery of modules before the First World War included the statistician 
Arthur Bowley; the University of Birmingham’s former professor of 
accounting, Lawrence Dicksee (who provided a colossal sixty lectures in the 
first year of the course’s existence); the Allied Marine Assurance’s Douglas 
Owen; and the railway expert and former North-Eastern Railway employee, 
Wilfred Tetley-Stephenson.91 The teaching programme was supplemented 
by a sequence of informal after dinner ‘smoking meetings’, which included 
lectures provided by specially invited business leaders – referred to as 
‘practical men’. The guest lecturers in 1907 included Sidney Webb, who 
discussed the organization of trade unions; Thomas Brassey, who spoke 
about his role as the managing director of ‘a group of distant mining and 
smelting works’; and T. H. Beckett, who explained the organizational 
systems that underpinned the Railway Clearing House. Mackinder reported 
in his survey of the course that their lectures had been ‘greatly appreciated 
by the class’, and in subsequent years the lectures were augmented with 
field trips to locations including the Railway Clearing House, the Great 
Western Railway’s signalling school and Surrey Docks.92 Emphasizing the 
89 C. W. Gwynn, ‘The administrative course at the London School of Economics’, Royal 
Engineers Journal, vi (1907), 229–35, at p. 229.
90 W. Funnell, ‘National efficiency, military accounting and the business of war’, Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, xvii (2006), 719–51, at p. 734.
91 Gwynn, The administrative course’, p. 231.
92 Sloan, ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarten’, p. 335; Report of the advisory board, first course, p. 
5; Army. Report of the advisory board, LSE, on the fourth course at the LSE, October, 1909, to 
March, 1910, for the training of officers for the higher appointments on the administrative staff of 
48
Civilian Specialists at War: Britain’s Transport Experts and the First World War
interaction of civilian and military figures prior to the war, the students 
on these observational visits were encouraged to ask questions and discuss 
matters with the academic staff to ensure that the course taught material of 
‘direct utility’ to the forces.93
The syllabus taught at the LSE was not designed for men whose future 
career was expected to involve the administration of a so-called colonial 
gendarmerie. As Bertram Wilson, the leader of the business organization 
module explained, ‘special attention [was] paid to the manufacturing 
industries, chiefly with regard to factory and office organization, 
arrangement of factory [sic] into departments for efficient control, methods 
to secure internal economy, storekeeping and checks on waste, systems 
of costkeeping, [and] systems of wage calculation’.94 These were lessons 
that reflected Haldane’s and Mackinder’s shared belief in the coincidental 
intent of both military and civilian ‘business’, while the advisory board 
established to oversee the content and delivery of the course emphasized the 
complementary nature of the expertise possessed by those within the army 
and the private sector. Alongside Mackinder and Ward (who chaired the 
board), the LSE course was overseen by: the director of supplies, Brigadier-
General Frederick Clayton; the director of staff duties, Lieutenant-General 
H. D. Hutchinson; the QMG, Major-General Herbert Miles; the director of 
fortifications and works, Brigadier-General R. M. Ruck; the commandant of 
the ordnance college, Woolwich, Colonel G. R. Townshend; the chairman 
of the institute of bankers, Sir Felix Schuster; and, in his position as the 
LSE’s governor, by Sidney Webb. In his capacity as director of staff duties 
at the War Office, Sir Douglas Haig sat on the advisory board in 1908 and 
1909. Unsurprisingly, given their size, the complexity of their operations 
and their pre-existing working relationships with the government and the 
army, the railway industry was also represented on the advisory board. Sir 
Hugh Bell, a North-Eastern director, sat on the board throughout the pre-
war period, while Sir Frederick Harrison, the LNWR’s general manager, 
contributed to the board’s deliberations in 1907.95
The advisory board’s conclusions on the course’s first year were 
encouraging. They stated that: 
We desire to say that we are convinced that the results which have been 
achieved by this first class fully warrant the continuance of this experiment. 
the army and for the charge of departmental services (Parl. Papers 1910 [Cd. 5213], ix), p. 5.
93 Grant, ‘Edward Ward, Halford Mackinder’, p. 107; Sloan, ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarten’, 
pp. 334–5.
94 Report of the advisory board, fourth course, p. 5.
95 Report of the advisory board, first course, p. 2.
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The experience which has now been gained does not make it necessary to 
reorganise the scheme in any essential respects, but some minor changes and 
modifications in the original syllabus will be made.96 
These modifications included the replacement of material on banking 
statistics, public administration and geography – perceived as being of 
‘less immediate practical bearing’ – with lectures from Wilson on ‘business 
organization’.97 By 1909 the symbiotic process of military feedback and 
academic response had conceived a syllabus adjudged by the advisory board 
to be of such value to the army that they ‘strongly recommend[ed] that 
the course be made a permanent annual institution, in order gradually to 
create a body of officers well fitted to undertake the varied administrative 
duties that may fall upon them’.98 The only significant change to take place 
after 1909 saw an increased stress placed on Wilson’s business organization 
module, which ‘emphasised the importance of process and the elimination of 
waste’ and incorporated the study of Frederick Winslow Taylor’s pioneering 
Principles of Scientific Management following its publication in 1911.99
The so-called ‘Mackindergarten’ at the LSE created a forum for the 
dissemination of business knowledge that was otherwise absent from the 
professional training available to soldiers destined for administrative roles 
in the army. The advisory board recognized that the needs of a modern army 
reflected those of a supply-intensive industrial business, while the army 
acknowledged that the technical specialists responsible for maintaining 
a successful global trading empire could be tapped to improve its own 
knowledge base. However, it is important not to overstate the influence of 
the course’s existence over the efficiency of the army’s supply organization 
during the First World War. The conflict intervened before a substantial 
number of officers had participated in the course. Over the period 1907–14 
only 243 officers successfully completed the course (see Table 1.1). In view 
of the army’s administrative manpower requirements during the war such 
a small number of graduates meant that, by necessity, only a tiny minority 
of the army’s supply duties were handled by men who had benefited from 
attendance at the LSE. Furthermore, the seven years between the course’s 
inauguration and the outbreak of the war left insufficient time for the 
comparatively junior officers who attended the course to attain positions 
96 Report of the advisory board, first course, p. 6.
97 Report of the advisory board, fourth course, p. 3.
98 Report of the advisory board, LSE, on the third course at the LSE, October, 1908, to March, 
1909, for the training of officers for the higher appointments on the administrative staff of the 
army and for the charge of departmental services (Parl. Papers 1909 [Cd. 4610], x), p. 3.
99 Grant, ‘Edward Ward, Halford Mackinder’, p. 106; F. W. Taylor, The Principles of 
Scientific Management (New York, 1911).
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of real influence at the army’s highest levels of authority. Mackinder’s vision 
for the long-term evolution of an ‘administrative tradition’, which reached 
to the highest positions of the supply branches of the army, was abruptly 
curtailed by the events of August 1914.100
Mackindergarten graduates were destined for roles that demanded 
proficiency in the execution of largely routine tasks, not those that involved 
planning the intricate network of inter-connected systems required to 
maintain the modern army in the field. At the outbreak of the war they 
were not in positions of sufficient seniority to influence the constitution 
of the arteries that directed the BEF’s blood to its vital organs. None of 
the officers to occupy the principal supply positions of QMG, inspector-
general of communications (IGC) or DGT on the western front during 
the First World War had attended the Mackindergarten. Only Frederick 
Clayton, a member of the advisory board, possessed any connection 
to the administrative course at the LSE whatsoever. Instead, in August 
1914 the graduates maintained the blood flow around the body in junior 
management roles. Most of them remained in comparatively minor 
positions, where they followed orders rather than made policy decisions, for 
the duration of the war. However, the multitude of new vacancies created 
by the rapid expansion of the British army during the conflict did provide 
opportunities for a number of officers to apply the skills they had acquired 
100 Report of the advisory board, first course, p. 14.
Table 1.1. Number of officers to pass the administrative training 
course at the London School of Economics, 1907–14.
Course Dates run Number of graduates
1 January–June 1907 31
2 October 1907–March 1908 30
3 October 1908–March 1909 31
4 October 1909–March 1910 29
5 October 1910–March 1911 31
6 October 1911–March 1912 30
7 October 1912–March 1913 29
8 October 1913–March 1914 32
Total 243
Note: Number of officers from each rank to complete the course: 12 lieutenants; 162 captains; 
64 majors; 4 lieutenant-colonels; 1 colonel.
Source: Various reports of the advisory board, 1907–14. For full details, see the bibliography.
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at the LSE in positions of considerable influence. The appointment of 
Colonel E. E. Carter as director of supplies at GHQ in 1915 represented the 
pinnacle of achievement for a Mackindergarten graduate within the BEF’s 
administrative hierarchy, and those who served in other theatres attained 
roles of similar responsibility. After a period at the base in Rouen, Major 
P. O. Hazelton – part of the first cohort to graduate in 1907 – became 
director of supplies and transport in East Africa in January 1916. Captain G. 
F. Davies and Major Wilfred Swabey, both from the class of 1908, occupied 
the same role in Egypt and Italy respectively. Two successive directors of 
supplies and transport for the British Salonika Force (BSF), Captain Oscar 
Streidinger and Major Philip Scott, graduated in 1909.
The syllabus developed by Ward and Mackinder represented an attempt 
to infuse mostly junior officers with business methods and mentalities, 
which were largely absent from the upbringings of such men. As noted 
above, the British army relied upon the landed classes – for whom the 
‘bourgeois ethic of business was anathema’ – for its supply of officers 
throughout the pre-war period.101 Such men did not typically arrive at the 
LSE with any grounding in the complex world of railway operations, and 
were almost entirely dependent upon Wilfred Tetley-Stephenson’s module 
to provide them with an understanding of ‘the conditions of railway work 
in relation to the army in times of peace and war’.102 Their completion of 
the administrative course at the LSE provides a further example of the 
connections forged between Britain’s civilian experts and military officers 
in the final years of peace. Yet these links were not restricted merely to 
lecture theatres, site visits and meeting rooms at Whitehall. As one young 
but precocious railway manager’s early life demonstrated, the professional 
relationships between the army and the railways stretched far beyond British 
shores. For Eric Geddes, the permeability of civilian and soldier within the 
crucible of the empire proved invaluable in the conflict that followed.
The early career of Eric Geddes
Eric Geddes was not the most senior executive of a railway company in 
August 1914. Nor was he in the summer of 1916 when, as the battle of 
the Somme’s voracious appetite threatened to paralyse northern France’s 
transport network, he was despatched to the western front by Lloyd George 
to examine the BEF’s supply organization. Rather than approach Geddes’s 
superior, Alexander Kaye Butterworth, or the general manager of Britain’s 
largest railway company, the LNWR’s Guy Calthrop, the then secretary 
101 Funnell, ‘National efficiency’, p. 727.
102 Report of the advisory board, first course, p. 9.
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of state for war turned to the thirty-nine-year-old Geddes to conduct the 
investigation. The reasons behind Lloyd George’s decision to send Geddes 
to GHQ in late August 1916 can be discerned from a study of the latter’s 
early career, which demonstrates how Britain’s senior transport experts were 
‘well known’ within the walls of the War Office and Westminster ahead of 
the First World War.103 Geddes’s formative experiences reveal a ‘remarkable 
man’ on an unequivocal ascent to the peak of his profession,104 and further 
entwines the strands of military, political and civilian expertise that have 
run throughout this chapter – and which underpinned the British response 
to events after 1914.
Born at Agra, India, on 26 September 1875, Eric Campbell Geddes 
was the eldest son of a Scottish civil engineer. Auckland Geddes had 
originally set sail for the east in 1857, and had established a private practice 
after undertaking railway survey and construction work on behalf of the 
Indian government – a clear example of the so-called ‘diaspora of British 
engineering’ in the nineteenth century.105 The family moved to Edinburgh 
a year after Geddes’s birth, and following a disruptive childhood in which 
he was ‘asked to leave’ a succession of public schools, he was eventually 
educated at the Oxford Military Academy. Geddes’s studies were ultimately 
competent enough for him to pass the preliminary examination for entry 
into Woolwich. However, rather than follow in his father’s footsteps and 
become an engineer (albeit along the military rather than civil path), the 
impetuous young Geddes ‘set sail on a passenger liner to New York with ten 
pounds … and an introduction to family friends in Pittsburgh’.106
The army’s short-term loss was its long-term gain. Over the following 
twenty years, Eric Geddes accumulated the breadth of knowledge and 
expertise required to fulfil the various roles he was asked to perform during 
the First World War. His professional education began in America, where 
he initially worked in occupations as diverse as theatrical agent, bar tender, 
typewriter salesman for Remington and labourer at Andrew Carnegie’s 
103 Parliamentary Archives (PA), papers of David Lloyd George, LG/D/1/2/1 Butterworth 
to Lloyd George, 27 May 1915; Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, i. 45.
104 The quotation refers to the impression left by Geddes upon the British military attaché 
in Paris, Colonel Herman Le-Roy Lewis, after their first meeting. See PA, Lloyd George 
papers, LG/E/3/14/29, Le-Roy Lewis to Lloyd George, 22 Nov. 1916.
105 A. C. Geddes, The Forging of a Family: a Family Story Studied in its Genetical, Cultural 
and Spiritual Aspects and a Testament of Personal Belief Founded Thereon (London, 1952), pp. 
89–104; R. A. Buchanan, ‘The diaspora of British engineering’, Technology and Culture, xxvii 
(1986), 501–24.
106 K. Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace (Manchester, 
1989), pp. 1–2; Geddes, The Forging of a Family, pp. 117–26.
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steel works.107 Both Remington and Carnegie were recognized innovators, 
and operated at the forefront of the systematic management ideology that 
spread across America and into Europe around the turn of the twentieth 
century.108 Remington was among the first private enterprises to experiment 
with modern office equipment – such as the typewriters Geddes sold for 
them – and had been swift to adopt the card index as an organizational tool 
following its transmission from the library sector.109 Carnegie’s Pittsburgh 
steel works possessed a global reputation for the ‘perfection’ of its response 
to the challenges of modern big-business organization.110 Whether the 
experience provided Geddes with similar insights into labour conditions 
as those espoused by Taylor and his disciples is unclear from the surviving 
records, but throughout his career Geddes extolled the virtues of manual 
labour for giving the budding manager ‘sympathy with the point of view 
of the working man, the value of which cannot be exaggerated’.111 By the 
time Geddes held high office in the railway industry, as Gourvish’s research 
has demonstrated, managerial positions were increasingly held by men who 
benefited from the ‘initial advantages of birth and education’ rather than 
those who had climbed the internal ladder from the shop floor. Before 
1890, nobody in the role of general manager at a prominent British railway 
company had attended university. After 1890 there were eight graduates 
appointed to the position, five of them among the eighteen appointments 
made after 1910.112
Geddes’s first contact with the railway industry took place in America. 
Transport, he claimed after the war, soon became ‘my religion. It interests 
me more than anything else. Transport contains elements that are not 
appreciated by the uninitiated’.113 He clearly showed an aptitude for the 
sector, as he progressed swiftly from the position of station agent at a 
lumber-loading station in Virginia through to assistant yardmaster in a 
freight yard of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. With further promotions 
107 Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes, p. 2.
108 D. Nelson, ‘Scientific management, systematic management, and labor, 1880–1915’, 
Business History Review, xlviii (1974), 479–500.
109 M. Krajewski, Paper Machines: About Cards and Catalogs, 1548–1929, trans. P. Krapp 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2011), pp. 105–6.
110 G. Brown, Sabotage: a Study in Industrial Conflict (Nottingham, 1977), pp. 121–2.
111 Geddes to Ferguson, quoted in Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes, p. 2.
112 Gourvish, ‘A British business elite’, pp. 293–7; T. R. Gourvish, ‘The rise of the 
professions’, in Later Victorian Britain, 1867–1900, ed. T .R. Gourvish and A. O’Day 
(Basingstoke, 1988), pp. 13–35, at p. 29.
113 Geddes to Lord Riddell, 28 Aug. 1919, quoted in K. Grieves, ‘Sir Eric Geddes, Lloyd 
George and the transport problem, 1918–21’, Journal of Transport History, xiii (1992), 23–42, 
at p. 31.
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Geddes became the car tracer for the southern group of railroads known 
as the big four. The American railways of the late nineteenth century were 
pioneers in modern management techniques, having faced the challenges 
associated with efficiently coordinating the energies and efforts of large 
numbers of employees earlier than the huge industrial concerns established 
by the likes of Carnegie and Henry Ford.114 Illness impaired Geddes’s ability 
to continue climbing the managerial ladder and to further absorb the 
methods and working practices of America’s emerging corporations. He 
returned to Edinburgh in August 1895.
The United States provided Geddes with skills that proved invaluable 
the next time his ‘volcanic energy’ proved too large to be contained by the 
British Isles.115 After his recovery in Scotland, Geddes’s experiences in the 
railway and logging industries – assisted in good measure by his father’s 
contacts – secured him a managerial role on a forest clearance project in the 
Himalayas. Part of the job called for the construction and operation of a 
light railway system, which was linked up to the Powayan Steam Tramway. 
Geddes oversaw the line’s construction and managed the network, the 
efficiency of which so impressed an agent of the Rohilkund and Kumaon 
Railway (who happened to have been a former employee of Geddes’s father) 
that the company assumed control of the line. Thence began Geddes’s 
second rise in the railway industry. In 1901 he became the Rohilkund and 
Kumaon’s traffic superintendent and moved to the prominent railway 
junction at Bareilly with his wife, Alice Stokes, whose brother Claude 
was an officer in the Indian army. His wife’s ill health, exacerbated by the 
Indian climate, compelled Geddes to seek employment with a British 
railway company during a period of leave in 1903. His endeavours proved 
unsuccessful. However, upon his return to the sub-continent Geddes 
became reacquainted with the army he had decided not to join after he left 
school, and gained the opportunity to demonstrate his talents as a railway 
administrator to none other than Lord Kitchener.
The Russo-Japanese War, which broke out in February 1904, provided 
the catalyst for the meeting between Geddes and Kitchener. The Russians 
began to deploy troops to their frontiers upon the declaration of hostilities, 
to meet any force Britain may have decided to send north from India 
in support of its Japanese ally.116 The build-up of soldiers on the Afghan 
border fed into longstanding British concerns over Russian intentions on 
114 A. D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1977).
115 Geddes, The Forging of a Family, p. 202.
116 P. Towle, ‘The Russo-Japanese War and the defence of India’, Military Affairs, xliv 
(1980), 111–17, at p. 112.
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the north-west frontier, and led Kitchener to call for the conveyance of an 
all-arms force to the area as quickly as possible.117 Several lines intersected 
in and around Bareilly, which made the junction a key component of any 
large-scale troop movements and placed a significant responsibility upon 
the Rohilkund and Kumaon to ensure a smooth concentration. Geddes 
devised the programme of movements with such efficiency that Kitchener 
personally congratulated him for its success.118 It proved to be Geddes’s final 
act in India. At the end of 1904 he was offered the post of claims agent at the 
North-Eastern Railway, then under the management of George Gibb. For 
the next decade the structure and working practices Gibb had introduced 
to the North-Eastern played a critical role in Geddes’s maturation into the 
recognized transport expert he had become by August 1914.119
As the North-Eastern Railway provided the organizational culture within 
which Geddes obtained most of his pre-war experience, it is essential to 
establish both how the company operated and what Geddes learned 
from the North-Eastern’s approach to the administration of a large-scale 
organization. The British railways had confronted increasingly difficult 
operating conditions from the 1870s onwards, caused by rising expenditure 
on resources and augmented by parliamentary controls designed to limit the 
companies’ opportunities to shift price rises onto customers. The restrictive 
legislative situation produced an industrial environment in which efficient 
operating procedures became vital to the sustenance of profitability. 
However, contemporary observers such as William Acworth and George 
Paish believed that most British railway companies were unresponsive – and 
their managers too conservatively minded – to cope with the challenges 
that faced them. Acworth and Paish, although they stopped short of 
labelling Britain’s railway managers ‘donkeys’, did compare their abilities 
unfavourably with those of their counterparts on the American railways.120
Thanks to Gibb’s progressive attitude, contemporary observers did not 
consider the North-Eastern to be part of the conservative trend in late 
nineteenth-century British railway management. Instead, the North-
117 National Library of Scotland (NLS), papers of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Acc. 
3155/2D, diary entries, 13 June to 3 Oct. 1904 provide occasional references to Kitchener’s 
concentration on mobilization questions during this period, alongside demonstrating Haig’s 
own appreciation of the army’s dependence on reliable transportation.
118 R. J. Irving and R. P. T. Davenport-Hines, ‘Geddes, Sir Eric Campbell (1875–1937)’, 
in Dictionary of Business Biography: a Biographical Dictionary of Business Leaders Active in 
Britain in the Period 1860–1980, ed. D. J. Jeremy (5 vols., London, 1984), ii. 507–16, at pp. 
507–8.
119 R. Bell, Twenty-Five Years of the North Eastern Railway, 1898–1922 (London, 1951), p. 30.
120 W. M. Acworth, ‘Railway economics’, Econ. Jour., ii (1892), 392–8; G. Paish, The British 
Railway Position (London, 1902), pp. 5–6, 14–15.
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Eastern was held up as one of the too-few British companies to have 
revolutionized their working practices and organizational systems through 
the implementation of innovations developed across the Atlantic.121 Gibb, 
upon becoming general manager in 1891, was convinced that the North-
Eastern’s extant managerial framework was defective and included ‘few men 
in the higher grade of management who could give him a critical assessment 
of operating procedures which had remained basically unchanged’ for over 
thirty years.122 The by then traditional practice of promotion from within, 
coupled to an absence of managerial education opportunities, had created 
an executive branch that suffered from narrowness of vision and deficiencies 
in original thought. Subsequent historical analysis of the period has broadly 
accepted that Gibb’s observations were applicable across the British railway 
industry.123
Gibb’s response to such insularity of experience was the establishment 
of a traffic apprenticeship scheme, which provided Geddes with his 
introduction to the North-Eastern in 1904. The management development 
programme, created in 1897, focused on ‘young blood, some of it not long 
out of the universities’ and those from within the company who displayed 
the potential for higher appointments.124 Ralph Wedgwood, the scheme’s 
first graduate and the BEF’s director of docks from 1917, typified the class 
of outsider Gibb sought to attract to the North-Eastern. A descendant 
of the famous pottery family with a degree in classics from Cambridge, 
Wedgwood possessed no experience in the railway industry prior to his 
arrival in York at the start of his apprenticeship. J. George Beharrell, who 
had entered the North-Eastern as a junior clerk in the secretary’s office in 
1888, was invited to participate in the scheme in 1902. By the time Geddes 
arrived in 1904 the traffic apprenticeship scheme had been refined into one 
that offered a carefully planned, comprehensive overview of the company’s 
work. The programme was ‘designed to allow the employee to move around 
the system experiencing the work of various grades of labour, as well as 
that of supervisory and management levels’.125 Geddes, rather than being 
121 Paish, British Railway Position, p. 235; N. Crafts, T. Leunig and A. Mulatu, ‘Were 
British railway companies well managed in the early twentieth century?’, Econ. Hist. Rev., 
lxi (2008), 842–66.
122 R. J. Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company, 1870–1914: an Economic History 
(Leicester, 1976), pp. 214–15.
123 For a synthesis of the existing literature, see D. A. Turner, ‘Managing the “royal road”: 
the London & South Western Railway 1870–1911’ (unpublished University of York PhD 
thesis, 2013), pp. 14–18.
124 Irving, North Eastern Railway, pp. 215–16.
125 T. Strangleman, ‘Railway and grade: the historical construction of contemporary 
identities’ (unpublished Durham University PhD thesis, 1998), p. 45.
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expected to learn ‘on the job’ through traditional but haphazard methods, 
received the benefits of a planned introduction to best practice upon his 
entry to the company.
The traffic apprenticeship scheme promoted the emergence of a unified 
managerial culture, which was diffused throughout the multitude of 
departments within which its graduates were employed. In 1907 the North-
Eastern employed almost 48,000 workers, spread across the entire breadth 
of the company’s network and engaged in myriad tasks that demanded 
close coordination. Geddes outlined the variety of tasks for which specialist 
working units had to be created in a 1910 lecture delivered to the York 
railway and lecture debating society:
Sub-departments have been formed at headquarters to control the supply 
of wagons, the working of motor vehicles and the cartage of goods traffic. 
Advertising is the sole concern of a separate office. An inspector has been 
appointed to supervise the heating and lighting of the Company’s premises. The 
inauguration of the commercial agency emphasised the distinction between the 
functions of the man who creates and obtains traffic and his operating colleague 
who is expert at moving traffic economically. Lastly, the development of the 
Continental business in recent years has led to the creation of an office where 
a wide knowledge of shipping and general business in indispensable. These 
examples by no means exhaust the list.126
The quantity of separate sections within the company reflected the increasing 
complexity of the railway industry and its corresponding demand for 
further specialization of duties. The traffic apprenticeship scheme reduced 
the need for overwhelming, time-consuming, and initiative-stifling central 
control of the North-Eastern’s multiple business activities. Senior managers 
were relieved of administrative duties, which could be confidently devolved 
to talented junior executives ‘on the spot’. The subsequent freedom from 
the burden of detail allowed those at the top to focus upon considerations 
of strategy and procedure, just as the existence of a competent staff – whose 
shared ethos increased the likelihood that predictable decisions would be 
made when required – liberated the army commander from the need to 
micro-manage his forces.
Geddes acquired a substantial appreciation of the challenges involved in 
freight rail operations as chief goods manager at the North-Eastern Railway 
between 1907 and 1912. His efforts in the goods department prepared him 
for the wartime challenge of supplying an army that demanded colossal 
amounts of work to be performed by limited pools of human and material 
resources. During the period 1899–1912 the North-Eastern improved its 
126 TNA, ZLIB 29/691, education and advancement of the railway clerk, pp. 5–6.
58
Civilian Specialists at War: Britain’s Transport Experts and the First World War
earnings per freight train by 87 per cent. In part these improvements were 
due to new loading practices implemented across the industry, but one 
historian has also suggested that the application of working methods based 
on statistical analysis played a considerable role in the North-Eastern’s 
particularly notable rise. Data compiled by Beharrell – who became 
Geddes’s assistant for the rest of their careers – was applied to measures that 
led to ‘more work being done but [by] fewer trains, thus giving greater line 
capacity throughout the system … a smaller number of engines employed, 
economy in rolling stock, repairs, renewals, and … staff’.127 In 1912 the 
North-Eastern’s goods train mileage stood at roughly the same level as it 
had in 1906. However, over the same period the gross tonnage hauled over 
its lines increased substantially and its receipts per goods train mile rose 
from 75.2d in 1900 to 132.91d in 1912.128
Geddes’s performance at the North-Eastern Railway marked him out 
as the ‘coming man’ in the railway industry. Both the LSWR and the 
Buenos Aires Southern and Western Combine attempted to lure Geddes 
away from York with promises of substantial wage increases and the title 
of general manager. The North-Eastern responded by promoting Geddes 
to the role of deputy general manager and renegotiating his salary. Upon 
taking up his new position Geddes became the highest paid railway official 
in Britain. According to Sir Hugh Bell, a North-Eastern director, it was 
a decision the company ‘never regretted’.129 With the incumbent general 
manager, Alexander Kaye Butterworth, scheduled to retire in 1916, Geddes’s 
rise to the top of the company appeared to have its trajectory mapped out 
– he was considered the North-Eastern’s general-manager-in-waiting by 
his colleagues. Yet while Butterworth’s presence temporarily obstructed 
Geddes’s path to the general manager’s office, the former’s religiosity acted 
to reconnect the latter to the institution he had almost joined after leaving 
school and assisted with aplomb while in India: the army.
Upon replacing Sir George Gibb as general manager of the North-Eastern 
in 1906, Butterworth received a commission into the ERSC. However, the 
quasi-military status evoked by his membership of the corps sat uneasily 
alongside Butterworth’s faith and he resigned his commission in January 
1907.130 The North-Eastern was represented in the ERSC by the company’s 
127 Irving, North Eastern Railway, pp. 241–9, 281; Crafts, Leunig and Mulatu, ‘Were British 
railway companies well managed?’, p. 853.
128 Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes, pp. 6–7.
129 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/D/1/2/2, Bell to Lloyd George, 30 May 1915.
130 Butterworth’s father George was the vicar of St Mary’s parish church in Deerhurst. 
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engineer, Charles Harrison (commissioned 1900), and from 1910 by its 
traffic superintendent, Henry Watson, but there was no representation of 
the North-Eastern’s senior management in the corps for six years. The corps’ 
rules of qualification were explicit: only general managers were permitted 
to hold commissions. Yet on Geddes’s appointment as deputy – and in a 
further demonstration of the company’s long-term ambitions for the man 
they had paid handsomely to retain – Butterworth began to lobby the ERSC 
to relax its entry criteria. Geddes’s first recorded appearance at a meeting 
of the REC took place in December 1912, before – thanks to his superior’s 
representations – he obtained his commission and became Lieutenant-
Colonel Eric Geddes on 27 January 1913. He was the only deputy general 
manager of a railway company to gain admission to the ERSC before the 
First World War, and played an active role in the REC’s deliberations in the 
final years of peace.131
Conclusion
Eric Geddes only briefly participated in the vibrant civil–military 
exchanges that characterized the peacetime relationship between Britain’s 
army, government and prominent railway companies – and upon whose 
foundations a successful wartime partnership was constructed. The 
interactions of civilian and military figures assumed both practical and 
academic forms in the eighty years that preceded the First World War, and 
took place within a variety of domestic and imperial settings. As the railways 
spread across the British landscape almost every government department 
became invested in their efficient use, while army officers acquired a central 
position in the state’s governance of the nascent railway industry. Further 
afield, the widespread construction of railways across the empire provided 
the Royal Engineers in particular with ample opportunities to construct 
and operate railways, and officers with experience gained in China, South 
Africa, Nigeria and on multiple Indian railways served in prominent roles 
on the western front between 1914 and 1918.132 Similarly, Auckland Geddes 
and his eldest son represented just two of the many civil engineers and 
Butterworth enlisted in August 1914 and was shot in the head by a German sniper on 5 Aug. 
1916. His name is recorded on the Thiepval Memorial to the Missing of the Somme. See J. 
F. Addyman, ‘G. S. Kaye Butterworth, M. C.’, The North Eastern Express, xxxvii (1998), 64.
131 Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes, p. 10; TNA, WO 32/9188, re-constitution of council. A meeting 
took place in the QMG’s office on 10 Dec. 1912 to discuss the relationship between the REC 
and other permanent or temporary committees appointed to consider questions related to 
railway operations.
132 History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, ed. H. L. Pritchard (11 vols., Chatham, 1952), v. 
666–8.
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railway officials who obtained valuable experience of railway construction 
and operation across the empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.
The creation and maintenance of a productive partnership between 
Britain’s largest railway companies and the army during this period relied 
upon two complementary factors. On the one hand, the military proved 
keen to engage with and exploit the knowledge of those who emerged as 
specialists in the industry. Through the establishment of vocational courses 
at their vast workshops and their contributions of academic expertise to 
the administrative staff course offered to soldiers at the LSE, Britain’s 
railway companies imparted skills and knowledge to those tasked with the 
military application of railway technology. In the creation of civil–military 
bodies such as the ERSC, the army underlined its respect for the opinions 
and observations of those whose transportation experience lay beyond 
the military sphere – in the operation and management of railways and 
docks, in civil engineering, and in the direction of the great contracting 
firms. On the other hand, the provision of transport for the army’s annual 
manoeuvres, the development of timetables for the emergency movement 
of British forces around Britain and the identification of supply problems 
in the event of war each demanded substantial resource commitments from 
Britain’s transport enterprises and ensured they were thoroughly conversant 
with the needs of a modern, industrial army.
Such support was provided willingly during the period before 1914, 
even when the army’s interactions with civilian expertise were redeployed 
from domestic, purely defensive applications to those of a more blurred 
and potentially aggressive nature. Only Alexander Kaye Butterworth, 
the general manager of the North-Eastern Railway and a man of ‘strong 
religious scruples’,133 chose to sever the connections that bound the higher 
echelons of the railway industry to the army before August 1914 – and even 
he was persuaded to take his place alongside colleagues from Britain’s other 
strategically important lines following the outbreak of war. The REC, upon 
which Butterworth sat throughout the conflict, represented the ultimate 
manifestation of both sides’ commitment to the development of fruitful 
and harmonious relations between civilian and military experts. From 
August 1914 onwards, at an organizational level, the committee provided 
the foundations upon which Britain’s evolving domestic response to the 
war’s transport demands was constructed. However, the REC did not 
provide the platform from which Britain’s global response to transport 
requirements of an industrial war were met. Instead, the army’s exploitation 
133 Townsend, All Rank and No File, p. 45.
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of civilian knowledge and experience beyond British shores took place 
on an individual basis. For Geddes, the benefits of the tripartite pre-war 
relationship between army, government and the railways were most clearly 
evident from the summer of 1916 onwards. Yet for the BEF the interactions 
between Britain’s transport experts, the military and the state bore fruit far 
sooner. In the first instance, the nature of their collaboration had profound 
implications for the nation’s entry into the conflict.
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2. A fruitful collaboration: Henry Wilson, the 
railways and the British Expeditionary Force’s 
mobilization, 1910–14
A contributor to the North-Eastern Railway’s staff magazine in 1912, 
inspired by the popular invasion literature of the time, mused upon the 
trauma that could potentially face the railway in the event of a German 
incursion on the Yorkshire coast:
What an enormous strain would be thrown upon the NER and its officials! 
All ordinary traffic within the effected [sic] area would, for the time being, 
be suspended, and all resources taxed to the utmost … Supplies and all the 
necessary accoutrements, inseparable from an army on active service, would 
be rushed through in the wake of the troops. The railway line would have to 
be guarded throughout, together with all the bridges and tunnels – a most 
essential thing in time of war!1
To meet such a challenge, the author argued, myriad details and orders had 
to be prepared in advance to ensure that the fluidity of the network was not 
compromised by the sudden onslaught of impromptu traffic. ‘It is probably 
safe to assume’, the author concluded, ‘that the NER management have 
in their possession a secret timetable which could be put into operation at 
short notice in the event of mobilization’. In August 1914 the scenario was 
different, but the assumption was proven correct.
The evolution of modern, material-intensive industrial warfare engendered 
the development of armies that required quantities of manpower, munitions 
and equipment on scales incomparable in previous military experience. 
Britain’s island status, global interests and command of the seas made it 
highly unlikely in the early twentieth century that a large military force 
would ever need to be deployed on the British mainland (Ireland was an 
entirely different story). Therefore, any mobilization scheme developed for 
the BEF following its creation in 1907 necessitated the provision of sufficient 
transport to move the force over land and sea. For its bulk transportation 
needs, the British army relied upon the railways and the Royal Navy.
1 ‘Our railways in time of war’, North-Eastern Railway Magazine, ii (1912), 67. Unless 
otherwise stated, all quotations in this passage are taken from this source.
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Yet aside from a laudatory statement to the house of lords from the newly 
installed secretary of state for war, Lord Kitchener, which acknowledged 
that the railway companies had ‘more than justified the complete 
confidence reposed in them by the War Office’,2 Britain’s transport experts’ 
contribution to the BEF’s entry into the First World War received little 
recognition from contemporaneous military figures. Sir John French, 
the BEF’s first commander-in-chief, reserved his plaudits for the ‘Naval 
Transport Service and … all concerned in the embarking and disembarking 
of the Expeditionary Force’.3 Elsewhere, recognition for the British army’s 
successful mobilization was focused upon the QMG of the forces, Sir John 
Cowans,4 and the director of military operations (DMO) at the War Office, 
Sir Henry Wilson. Lord Roberts, Wilson’s friend and mentor, hailed the 
latter’s importance to the army’s entry into the war as early as 7 August. 
He wrote of Britain’s ‘indebtedness’ to Wilson for all he had achieved at 
Whitehall.5 Speaking shortly after the war, one of Wilson’s subordinates in 
the directorate of military operations claimed that ‘it was only the ardent 
spirit of Sir Henry Wilson, his tireless energy, wide vision and dauntless 
perseverance’ that turned hypothetical projections into the practical 
arrangements that existed in August 1914.6
Consequently, the pre-war preparations made for the BEF’s movement 
have been treated almost as if they were Wilson’s personal possession. John 
Bourne, exemplifying the historical approach to the WF scheme, referred 
to it as Wilson’s ‘administrative Rolls-Royce’.7 Robin Neillands, in the most 
thorough discussion of mobilization, transport and logistics in 1914 to have 
appeared to date, concluded his narrative with the observation that ‘Henry 
Wilson’s plan had worked to perfection’.8 Such one-sided accounts imply that 
Britain’s actions following the outbreak of war in August 1914 were a military-
led response to the ‘unaccountable disbelief of the authorities’, which had 
retarded a comprehensive system of preparation for conflict.9 Where the BEF’s 
mobilization and concentration in France have not been ignored altogether, 
2 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., xvii (25 Aug. 1914), col. 503.
3 J. D. P. French, 1914 (London, 1919), p. 40.
4 D. Chapman-Huston and O. Rutter, General Sir John Cowans, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.: the 
Quartermaster-General of the Great War (2 vols., London, 1924), i. 287–8.
5 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 2/73/45, Roberts to Wilson, 7 Aug. 1914.
6 TNA, WO 106/49A/1, history of the growth of the scheme; preparation of a plan 
for rendering military assistance to France, and notes on entrainment and embarkation, 
Address by Maj. Gen. Radcliffe on inception and working of scheme, p. 3.
7 J. M. Bourne, Britain and the Great War, 1914–1918 (London, 1989), p. 17.
8 R. Neillands, The Old Contemptibles: the British Expeditionary Force, 1914 (London, 
2004), p. 96.
9 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 2/73/45, Roberts to Wilson, 7 Aug. 1914.
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references to them have been invariably brief and limited to affirmations that 
the processes ‘proceeded remarkably well’.10 Indeed, most of the available 
literature on Britain’s entry into the war in 1914 tends to reinforce Julian 
Thompson’s remark that logistics only predominate over the more glamorous 
and controversial themes of tactics and strategy when the logistics fail.11 The 
presence of British troops at Mons on 23 August emphatically demonstrates 
that the BEF’s logistical preparations did not fail in 1914.
The establishment, development and implementation of the WF scheme 
was not the result of one man’s endeavours. Nor was it a spontaneous 
reaction to Belgian and French requests for assistance following Germany’s 
invasion of their territory. Rather, Britain’s mobilization programme 
was a thoroughly prepared example of civil–military cooperation, which 
depended upon the input of Britain’s transport experts. Previous over-
concentration on the political and military dimensions of the so-called 
July crisis – coupled with a desire to conceal the scheme’s evolution from 
the public and parliament (and, indeed, much of the government) before 
the war – has created an imbalanced picture of British actions in the days 
immediately surrounding Britain’s entry into the war. The success of the 
BEF’s mobilization was in large part due to the existence of a sophisticated 
network fostered and managed by Wilson during his period as DMO. 
Wilson recognized, and consistently represented to his political superiors, 
that it was only through careful, detailed preparations – undertaken both 
with future allies and the technical specialists employed to operate Britain’s 
largest transport companies – that the BEF could be rapidly and smoothly 
propelled into a European conflict. The nature of those preparations, and 
their influence over the decisions that governed Britain’s initial contribution 
to what became the western front, are the focus of this chapter.
Henry Wilson and the development of the ‘with France’ scheme
Brigadier-General Henry Wilson became DMO at the War Office in 
August 1910. His small and isolated directorate, established in 1904, was 
principally responsible for the production and assessment of military 
intelligence and ‘the development of strategic plans for the defence of 
Britain and the Empire’.12 The duties assigned to the directorate included 
10 I. M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919 (London, 1998), p. 43. For 
other concise references, see H. Strachan, The First World War: To Arms (Oxford, 2001), p. 
206; E. F. Carter, Railways in Wartime (London, 1964), pp. 80–1; J. N.Westwood, Railways 
at War (London, 1980), p. 138.
11 J. Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (Oxford, 1991), p. 3.
12 T. G. Fergusson, British Military Intelligence, 1870–1914: the Development of a Modern 
Intelligence Organization (Frederick, Md., 1984), p. 203.
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the collection of information about the military capabilities of the British 
empire, the collation of intelligence on Britain’s possible opponents in a 
future war, and the preparation of mobilization schemes to meet potential 
threats.13 Therefore, upon his appointment to the role of DMO, Wilson 
became intrinsically connected with two tasks: ensuring that Britain’s 
political and military leaders knew the identity and strength of Britain’s 
most likely adversaries; and preparing the army to respond to external 
dangers effectively.
Following the establishment of the directorate of military operations and 
the conclusion of the entente cordiale between Britain and France, Wilson’s 
predecessors had developed schemes for the deployment of a force beyond 
the British Isles within the narrow confines of the War Office. The army’s 
first two DMOs, Sir James Grierson and Spencer Ewart, had obtained 
government permission to establish contact with the French general staff and 
discussed the movement of British troops inland from the French coast to 
proposed concentration sites near the Belgian frontier. However, according 
to Wilson ‘they had not had time’ to investigate the question as to how the 
BEF was to be transported to the British coast from various locations across 
the country.14 Wilson’s remark was inaccurate. In fact, his predecessors had 
been explicitly forbidden from discussing the BEF’s mobilization plans 
with anybody outside the War Office, including the railway companies 
whose infrastructure and resources were vital to the swift concentration 
and movement of troops and their supplies.15 Within his first year in post, 
Wilson acknowledged that the ‘old scheme’ in place in August 1910 ‘had not 
been worked out in sufficient detail to admit of its being carried out’.16 The 
mobilization scheme upon which the BEF’s likely response to war in 1910 
was founded consisted of hypothetical projections. It was not the product 
of a meticulous examination of the modern army’s transport requirements 
undertaken in conjunction with the experts capable of assessing whether 
those requirements could be met. Prior to Wilson’s arrival at the directorate 
of military operations, the arguments for diplomacy and national secrecy 
prevailed over the bureaucratic and technical realities that governed the 
mass movement of an industrial army.
13 War Office (reconstitution) committee. Report of the War Office (reconstitution) committee. 
(Part II) (Parl. Papers 1904 [Cmnd. 1968], viii), p. 25.
14 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 3/7/2, minute to CIGS reporting progress on scheme of 
EF, Apr. 1913, p. 1.
15 C. E. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson Bart, G.C.B., D.S.O.: His Life and 
Diaries (2 vols., London, 1927), i. 91–2.
16 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 3/5/5, Wilson to Nicholson, 24 Apr. 1911.
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The decision to preclude the railway companies from the planning 
process severely constrained both the quantity and quality of the work that 
the directorate could achieve in relation to the BEF’s mobilization scheme. 
The British government’s attitude contrasted sharply with circumstances 
in Germany, where the specialist railway section of the general staff – 
described by Mark Stoneman as a ‘linchpin’ of German war planning – 
cooperated closely with the civil railway administration throughout the pre-
war period.17 Yet the absence of an equivalent pool of technically proficient 
officers within the British army, which fed into a perception within the 
railway industry that Britain’s military leaders consistently underestimated 
the railways’ capacity,18 did not mean that the army as an institution was 
ignorant of the technical aspects of railway operations. Each year the 
army made prolific use of the railways in conjunction with its annual 
manoeuvres. The transport demands for the army’s exercises in the years 
preceding the First World War graphically illustrated the size and weight of 
the impedimenta attached to the modern fighting force. In 1910 the LSWR 
was responsible for the movement of 26,000 officers and men; 8,000 horses; 
seventy guns; and 1,200 transport vehicles to the manoeuvre area ‘at the 
height of the holiday traffic’ season. ‘Between 9:55am on a certain Saturday, 
and 11:15am on the following Wednesday’, the LSWR successfully arranged 
for 137 trains to be run under war conditions on the army’s behalf.19 Three 
years later, the LNWR used the pages of its staff magazine to proudly record 
the company’s ‘exceptional efforts’ during the army’s manoeuvres in East 
Anglia the previous September. The troops’ concentration required the 
coordination of 209 trains, run over lines operated by the Great Western, 
Great Northern, Great Eastern and LSWR in addition to those handled 
by the LNWR. At the small and ill-equipped station of Potton alone, 
in ‘practically 36 hours work’ the railways delivered and unloaded trains 
containing 8,283 officers and men; 1,951 horses; forty guns and limbers; forty 
ammunition wagons; 251 four-wheeled wagons; eighty-four two-wheeled 
carts; and 124 bicycles. On the day after the successful completion of the 
movement, the LNWR’s general manager received a telegram that conveyed 
the army’s ‘great appreciation of the remarkable and efficient and punctual 
manner in which the move of the … army to the area of operations’ had 
17 M. R. Stoneman, ‘Wilhelm Groener, officering, and the Schlieffen plan’ (unpublished 
Georgetown University PhD thesis, 2006), p. 153. On the strategic importance of railways to 
German war planning, see A. Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning (New 
York, 1991).
18 ‘Railways and military operations’, Railway Gazette, 7 Aug. 1914, p. 174.
19 ‘Railways and military operations’, p. 174.
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been effected. ‘There was’, the telegram concluded, ‘absolutely no hitch in 
the arrangements’.20
The movement of troops, both actual and potential, also engendered 
dialogue between the military and civilian experts concerned. Representatives 
of the War Office ‘confided’ with railway servants up to three months 
before the manoeuvres were scheduled to take place,21 while senior railway 
executives made themselves available to the army both for consultation 
through the mechanisms of the REC and in informal meetings with 
individual soldiers. Wilson’s papers from 1909 contain the notes he had 
taken during a discussion with the traffic managers of the South-Eastern and 
Chatham Railway (SECR) and the Great Eastern Railway, on the subject of 
a hypothetical mobilization of a division for a staff college exercise. The level 
of detail within Wilson’s record of the meeting illustrates that, prior to his 
arrival at the War Office the following year, he was thoroughly conversant 
with the complexities that surrounded the army’s use of railways.22 That 
awareness undoubtedly contributed to his determination, upon becoming 
DMO, to overturn the restrictive governmental decree that forbade 
cooperation between the railways and the War Office for the purposes of 
planning the BEF’s mobilization. On 9 January 1911 Wilson elaborated his 
reasons for seeking the railway companies’ assistance with the process in a 
letter to the chief of the imperial general staff (CIGS), General Sir William 
Nicholson:
As far as I am a judge no tables drawn up in this office are of practical value 
until they have been submitted to and worked out in detail by the Railway 
Companies concerned, and I submit that we have ample material on which 
to approach the railway companies as a preliminary to the detailed timetable 
being drawn up … I am of course ready to discuss this question at any time, 
and to give any further information and assistance which it is in my power to 
give, but I hope no unnecessary delay may occur in having detailed timetables 
worked out by the W[ar] O[ffice] in conjunction with the railway companies, 
as until this has been done it is impossible to claim that our Expeditionary 
Force is ready to take the field.23
As the lengthy gaps between the ERSC’s receipt of and response to the 
War Office’s exercises in the latter part of the nineteenth century had 
20 W. E. Bradbury, ‘Manoeuvres in East Anglia’, London and North-Western Railway 
Gazette, Jan. 1913, pp. 6–9.
21 J. F. Bradford, ‘The war manoeuvres in the eastern counties—autumn 1912’, London 
and North-Western Railway Gazette, March 1913, pp. 89–90.
22 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 3/3/11, appendix D – movement of troops by rail, Oct. 
1909.
23 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 3/5/4, Wilson to Nicholson, 9 Jan. 1911.
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demonstrated, the coordination of large-scale troop movements across the 
country required thorough, time-consuming preparations. The failure to 
undertake those preparations in peace, Wilson believed, reduced Britain’s 
options in the event of a European war. The dominant military ideology 
of the period stressed the importance to an army of seizing the initiative 
through a rapid mobilization, followed by the application of that initiative 
to seek a decisive battle at a time and place that made success as likely 
as possible.24 Without prepared railway timetables the BEF could not be 
mobilized rapidly, should the government decide to commence hostilities. 
Without the input of the railway companies, Wilson argued, the necessary 
timetables could not be prepared.
Wilson was by no means a lone voice in arguing for greater collaboration 
in the development of the BEF’s mobilization scheme at the start of 1911. 
Sir Frederic Bolton’s gloomy assessment of the railways’ ability to cope 
with likely wartime demands elicited a politico-military response from the 
new under-secretary of state for war, Colonel Jack Seely. On 24 January 
he wrote to the prime minster, Herbert Asquith, about the ‘[e]specially 
valuable information’ that could only be obtained from closer cooperation 
between the army and the nation’s principal railway companies.25 Asquith’s 
reply raised no objections to the involvement of the ‘General Managers of 
the principle [sic] railways’, but emphasized ‘that the conditions of secrecy 
which have hitherto prevailed should, so far as possible, be preserved’.26 
Unbeknownst to Seely, Wilson had obtained authorization to discuss 
matters with the railways from the secretary of state for war, Richard 
Haldane, and the foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, three days earlier.27
The government’s decision to permit the War Office to discuss 
mobilization plans with the railway companies fundamentally shifted the 
relationship between the army and Britain’s transport experts. From that 
point forwards, the latter’s role in imperial military planning changed 
from one exclusively devoted to questions of national defence to one that 
was integral to the production of Wilson’s offensive-minded WF scheme. 
And the DMO quickly set about incorporating the railway companies 
into the task of producing timetables for the BEF’s concentration at the 
ports earmarked for its despatch to the continent. A schedule containing 
the details of every unit that required railway transport on mobilization 
was sent to the railway companies. The itemized list documented all of 
24 S. van Evera, ‘The cult of the offensive and the origins of the First World War’, 
International Security, ix (1984), 58–107.
25 NCL, Mottistone papers, Mottistone 11/40, Seely to Asquith, 24 Jan. 1911.
26 NCL, Mottistone papers, Mottistone 11/42, Asquith to Seely, 26 Jan. 1911.
27 K. Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: a Political Soldier (Oxford, 2006), pp. 91–2.
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the information required by the civilian specialists to make arrangements 
for the move: what the unit comprised in terms of men and equipment; 
the station(s) from which the unit was expected to commence its journey; 
and the time and date – after general mobilization – at which the unit was 
required to arrive at its designated port for embarkation. The companies 
arranged the technical details of the move in consultation with either the 
QMG’s department or the individual home commands, and drew upon 
their experiences of planning the annual manoeuvres to pull together a 
workable programme. The companies were responsible for ensuring the 
provision of suitable rolling stock, for calculating the times when individual 
trains would pass through stations and junctions en route, for drawing up 
a complete timetable and for taking the necessary steps to guarantee that 
sufficient crews and engines would be available and ready for action when 
the need for them arose. Wherever potential clashes arose, the matter was 
referred up to Wilson’s office where decisions as to the order of priority were 
made and communicated back to the railways.28
The LSWR became intimately connected to the evolution of the WF 
scheme after January 1911, thanks to its association with the principal 
departure point for the BEF. The port of Southampton, operated by the 
company since 1892, had a long history of military service and was earmarked 
to fulfil the same role at the outbreak of the next war as it had during the 
South African War.29 The government covertly directed public funds to 
the LSWR, which were used to remove the only substantial bottleneck on 
Britain’s dense railway network and to increase the length of track within 
the port to thirty-seven miles before 1914.30 The LSWR became Wilson’s 
‘secretary railway’, handling correspondence between the War Office and 
the railway companies between 1911 and 1914. It installed bespoke diagram 
boards at the port to chart the specialist facilities required by certain units 
and allow the staff at Southampton to keep a visual record of the BEF’s 
complex demands, and it was the only company to be entrusted with 
possession of the entire programme of movements.31 The LSWR recruited 
28 TNA, WO 106/50, scheme for mobilization on a war footing – progress of scheme for 
despatch of forces (WH/1), memorandum by Captain H. O. Mance (staff captain, QMG 2) 
on the questions raised by the executive committee in their memorandum of 10 Dec. 1912, 
23 Dec. 1912, pp. 2–3; E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War: Organisation, Efforts, 
Difficulties and Achievements (2 vols., London, 1921), i. 27–8.
29 I. F. W. Beckett, ‘Going to war. Southampton and military embarkation’, in 
Southampton: Gateway to the British Empire, ed. M. Taylor (London, 2007), pp. 133–46.
30 D. Stevenson, ‘War by timetable? The railway race before 1914’, Past & Present, clxii 
(1999), 163–94, p. 174; Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 1008–9.
31 Beckett, ‘Going to war’, p. 142; TNA, WO 106/49A/2, Wilson-Foch scheme – 
expeditionary force to France, outline of the scheme and details regarding mobilization and 
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a specialist clerk to work exclusively on the timetable, who received a list 
of the desired arrival times into Southampton for every train destined 
for the port upon mobilization. From that information each individual 
train was traced back to the point at which it was required to enter the 
LSWR’s system. Thereafter, the company over whose lines the train passed 
immediately prior to its transfer onto the LSWR’s network was notified 
of the time at which they were expected to pass the train over. Following 
the same method that company continued to plot the train’s journey in 
reverse, either to its point of origin or the next handover point on its voyage 
across the patchwork of lines that made up the pre-war British railway 
network.32 Once each journey had been traced back to its departure point 
an entrainment time was entered onto the corresponding unit’s individual 
mobilization timetable.33
The process was not complete once the entrainment times for each 
unit were recorded, however. The Army Council amended the war 
establishments of certain components of the BEF every year, which meant 
that the timetables demanded constant revision. Changes to the departure 
time of individual trains had knock-on effects in terms of the journeys 
scheduled for other trains over the affected lines, while units’ embarkation 
points could be switched to different ports as the army juggled with the 
varying capacities for troops, supplies and equipment at Avonmouth, 
Newhaven, Liverpool, Dublin, Glasgow, Belfast, Queenstown and the port 
of London. Given the numerous factors involved, the process of amending 
the timetables consumed a great deal of time and energy on the parts of 
both Wilson’s directorate and the railway companies. Over the winter of 
1912–13 the LNWR received such drastic alterations to their share of the 
programme that the company established a special department under W. E. 
Bradbury, chief of the timetable office in the company’s southern division, 
which worked exclusively on ensuring that it would be ready to meet its 
obligations to the War Office.34 Internal memoranda produced for the 
DMO indicate that the amendments handed down from the Army Council 
in December 1913 were only expected to be synthesized with the existing 
timetables in four months’ time. The scheme for 1914 became operational 
on 1 April of that year, and provided the foundations for the mobilization 
programme followed by the BEF when war broke out four months later.35
staff arrangements, n.d., p. 12.
32 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, i. 112–14.
33 TNA, WO 106/49A/1, history of the growth of the scheme, address by Radcliffe, p. 7.
34 E. A. Pratt, War Record of the London and North-Western Railway (London, 1922), pp. 
6–7.
35 TNA, WO 106/49A/2, Wilson-Foch scheme, revision of programme, remarks of 
72
Civilian Specialists at War: Britain’s Transport Experts and the First World War
In addition to moving the BEF’s various units to their assigned ports 
of embarkation on the outbreak of war, the War Office also had to 
provide transport to ship the troops and their myriad accoutrements 
across the English Channel. The personnel figures recorded in Table 2.1 
were supplemented by at least 93,364 tons of ammunition, stores, vehicles 
and other items during the BEF’s initial movements. Such figures were 
comprehensively dwarfed later in the war, but they ‘serve as a useful 
corrective’ to the idea that military transport was ever ‘a simple matter of 
embarking and disembarking personnel and horses’.36 The pre-war army 
was thoroughly aware of that fact, and of the deceptive complexity involved 
in the embarkation and disembarkation of a military force. Exercises took 
place at Southampton in both 1912 and 1913 to test the army’s embarkation 
procedures and identify the issues likely to arise when the mobilization 
took place for real. Henry Holmes, the LSWR’s superintendent of the line, 
provided the War Office with guidance as to Southampton’s capacity and 
underlined the importance of keeping the port’s railway connections clear 
of obstructions during the latter exercise.37
While Wilson and the railway companies focused upon the challenges 
involved in the movement of the BEF on and away from British soil, 
various directorates, unsigned memorandum, 4 Dec. 1913.
36 A. Hurd, History of the Great War. The Merchant Navy (3 vols., London, 1924), ii. 83.
37 TNA, WO 107/24, release of government personnel for active service: correspondence, 
Notes on the embarkation of the expeditionary force at Southampton; embarkation 
exercises, Southampton, 1913. Statement by L. S. W. Railway. On the 1912 exercise, see 
Chapman-Huston and Rutter, Sir John Cowans, i. 270; Beckett, ‘Going to war’, pp. 142–3.
Table 2.1. Numbers embarked at English and Irish ports 
between 9 August and 21 September 1914.
Port Officers Other ranks Horses Nursing sisters and civilians
Southampton 5,028 171,708 51,434 1,389
Newhaven 66 409 — 9
Avonmouth 58 4,547 — —
Liverpool 16 1,741 — —
Devonport 30 844 421 —
Dublin
826 25,921 10,184 —Belfast
Queenstown
Totals 6,024 205,040 62,039 1,398
Source: A. Hurd, History of the Great War. The Merchant Navy (3 vols., London, 1924), ii. 82.
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Colonel Seely – who was appointed secretary of state for war in 1912 – 
focused on the requirements necessary for the effective disembarkation of 
the force on the other side of the Channel. He invited four shipping experts 
to investigate the complications the BEF was likely to face on the French 
coast: Sir Thomas Royden of the Cunard Company; Sir Lionel Fletcher 
of the White Star Line; Sir Richard Holt of Blue Funnel; and Sir Owen 
Philipps of the Royal Mail. Royden and Fletcher accepted Seely’s invitation 
and, accompanied by officers from the military and naval staffs of both 
France and Britain, made a thorough reconnaissance of the French ports 
designated to receive the BEF.38 The disembarkation of a modern army 
was just as complex a technical challenge as its embarkation, and one 
that required detailed examination of such questions as the availability of 
berthing facilities, tidal limitations, the number and power of the cranes 
at each port, and the amount of suitable storage facilities in the vicinity 
of the wharves. Royden and Fletcher ‘gave up all their private work’, and 
devoted an entire six months to the production of a comprehensive review 
of the BEF’s shipping requirements. Their recommendations were handed 
over to the Admiralty in early 1913 and adopted as the foundations of the 
disembarkation instructions produced for issue to the troops.39
Royden’s and Fletcher’s expert investigations uncovered serious 
deficiencies in the infrastructure upon which the BEF’s swift deployment 
depended. At Boulogne, Le Havre and Rouen – the ports destined to 
receive the BEF upon its arrival in France – they identified that insufficient 
crane facilities were available to handle the impedimenta that accompanied 
the troops. Therefore, to prevent backlogs and congestion the BEF’s 
mechanical transport, which was projected at 950 lorries and 250 motor 
cars, was divided between all three ports rather than concentrated upon 
one facility.40 Inevitably, such dislocations to the existing plans necessitated 
further revisions to the mobilization programme in Britain and created 
additional work for the timetabling staffs of the railway companies involved. 
A hand-written note on the surviving records confirms that the timetables 
for 1913 had been amended in response to the recommendations made in 
the Royden–Fletcher report.41 However, the time and energy expended in 
peacetime to ensure that the BEF’s preparations were solid reduced the risk 
38 J. E. B. Seely, Adventure (London, 1930), pp. 140–1.
39 F. E. Smith, Contemporary Personalities (London, 1924), pp. 291–2; S. Cobb, Preparing 
for Blockade 1885–1914: Naval Contingency for Economic Warfare (Farnham, 2013), pp. 187–8; 
TNA, WO 106/49A/1, history of the growth of the scheme, address by Radcliffe, p. 4.
40 TNA, WO 107/296, report of the British armies in France and Flanders, 17 March 1919, 
p. 38; WO 106/49A/2, Wilson-Foch scheme, i. Factors affecting plan of movement and staff 
work.
41 TNA, WO 106/49A/2, Wilson-Foch scheme, v. Sea transport.
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of delays in the time-sensitive period following the government’s decision 
to mobilize in August 1914. As the QMG of the forces, Sir John Cowans, 
acknowledged in 1918, Royden and Fletcher ‘rendered our Movements 
branch in the War Office … enormous assistance before the war in drawing 
up the schemes for the despatch of the Expeditionary Force’.42
The WF scheme was not the only product of the collaborative environment 
of 1911–14. Wilson’s tenure as DMO bore witness to an increase in inter-
organizational coordination between institutions and departments that 
existed for martial purposes and those whose primary responsibilities lay 
in the government and administration of peacetime Britain. The work of 
Britain’s transport experts took place concurrently with an acceptance within 
British strategic circles of the inapplicability of the term ‘business as usual’ 
to state affairs in wartime. As the CID’s secretary noted in November 1910, 
many governmental departments had ‘much important work to undertake – 
either consequent on, or contributory to, the naval and military mobilisations’ 
of Britain’s armed forces.43 The government’s response to the national and 
imperial requirements for coordinated action on the outbreak of war took 
physical form in the shape of the war book – a series of instructions to be 
followed by the appropriate government departments and industrial concerns, 
both upon the declaration of a precautionary period and following the order 
to mobilize. First produced in 1912, and updated in 1913 and 1914, the book 
acted as a step-by-step guide for officials whose responsibilities ranged from 
the provision of police officers to protect vulnerable railway junctions to 
the despatch of mobilization telegrams to the nation’s soldiers and sailors. 
After 1913 the war book was arranged in chapters for each department, which 
allowed each to quickly obtain the instructions to guide their actions without 
having to concern themselves with material that only applied to others.44 To 
establish their roles and responsibilities at the start of a war, employees at the 
post office and the customs and excise board, or in the general managers’ 
offices of Britain’s railway companies, simply consulted the relevant section of 
the war book. It represented the ‘search for order and integration’ that took 
place within Britain’s largest businesses before the First World War on an 
imperial scale,45 and guided Britain’s entry into the conflict in August 1914.
42 TNA, WO 107/16, inspector-general of communications, general correspondence, 
Cowans to Clarke, 23 Feb. 1918.
43 TNA, CAB 15/2, memoranda, series K. 1–100, ote by the secretary, 4 Nov. 1910.
44 Copies of all three war books are available at TNA, CAB 15/3–5, war book: summary of 
action taken by departments, 27 Feb. 1912 to 30 June 1914.
45 J. Yates, ‘Evolving information use in firms, 1850–1920: ideology and information 
techniques and technologies’, in Information Acumen: the Understanding and Use of Knowledge 
in Modern Business, ed. L. Bud-Frierman (London, 1994), pp. 26–50, at pp. 29–30.
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From his appointment as DMO through to the outbreak of the First 
World War, Henry Wilson never missed an opportunity to highlight how 
anxious he was to make his superiors aware of the BEF’s state of readiness. 
His anxiety was frequently accompanied by a list of existing deficiencies 
that, in Wilson’s view, rendered the BEF unprepared for war. In one of 
Wilson’s regular letters to the CIGS he wrote that ‘all the great powers and 
many of the smaller ones are straining every nerve to increase the numbers 
and the efficiency of their armies: we alone are doing nothing to increase 
our numbers and but little, and that slowly, to increase our efficiency’.46 
During the Agadir crisis, he argued that:
There must be something radically wrong when a man in my position is forced 
to write, during a time of international strain, that he does not know when the 
E[xpeditionary] F[orce] can be made ready to take the field, nor even which 
of the larger units of that force could be made completely mobile, nor for how 
long the wastage of war can be made good; nor does he know if the Force 
will enter on the campaign with a serious deficiency of officers nor whether 
this deficiency will seriously increase. There must be something wrong when 
the officer responsible to you for the fighting efficiency of the E[xpeditionary] 
F[orce] in so far as plans of operation for that force are concerned is unaware that 
certain essentials in mobilization equipment are (or were) deficient; is unaware 
how long a time will elapse before the force is fully equipped with a resighted 
rifle and new ammunition; was unaware that there was a serious shortage in 
S[mall] A[rms] A[mmunition], or that the new howitzers would have to be 
fought in 4 gun batteries with a very inadequate supply of ammunition.
I submit that such a state of affairs ought not to exist, and ought not to be 
allowed to exist.47
When Sir John French replaced Nicholson as CIGS in March 1912, Wilson 
placed on record his opinion that, ‘as we stand today, we cannot claim that 
the E[xpeditionary] F[orce] is either ready to take the field, or capable of 
keeping the field as a thoroughly efficient fighting machine’.48
Yet through the collaborative efforts of the War Office and Britain’s 
transport experts, by the summer of 1914 the WF scheme was complete. 
A full set of timetables, which recorded the peace stations, locations of 
equipment and places of mobilization for every component of the BEF 
had been copied, printed and issued to the relevant units. A series of tables 
indicating the day after general mobilization on which each of their units 
46 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 3/5/21, Wilson to Nicholson, 26 Dec. 1911.
47 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 3/5/15, Wilson to Nicholson, 16 Aug. 1911.
48 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 3/5/22, Wilson to French, 3 Apr. 1912.
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had to be ready to move had been delivered to each home command.49 
Every unit or part thereof had been assigned to a train, and the expected 
departure and arrival times for each train had been carefully recorded. 
At the ports of embarkation, troops and supplies had been allocated to a 
cross-Channel transport, and the serial numbers of each ship were ready 
to be telegrammed across the sea to inform the French authorities of their 
contents.50 The 1st (Guards) Brigade’s schedule illustrates the level of detail 
within the programme, even for a unit with a comparatively short journey 
to the coast. Each half-battalion of the brigade was assigned to one of eight 
trains, which were timetabled to leave Farnborough for Southampton 
between 2:27 a.m. and 2:31 p.m. on the fifth day of mobilization. Three 
battalions, labelled A to C, were allocated to ships that left Southampton 
on the same day and were expected to arrive at Le Havre before sundown. 
Following an enforced rest at a base camp outside the French port, on 
day seven the three battalions were to entrain in France for transportation 
inland to their destination stations at Ohis, Neuve Maison, La Capelle and 
Buironfosse. The fourth battalion, D, was to land at Le Havre before noon 
on day six and detrain two days later at the same stations as their comrades.51
The character of modern warfare among industrialized powers demanded 
that the intervention of the BEF on the continent was ‘a diplomatic and 
military act too serious for its execution to be left to an eleventh-hour 
inspiration’.52 The effective deployment of a British force relied upon 
thorough planning and detailed preparations. When the government made 
the decisions both to commence hostilities with Germany and to send the 
BEF to France, the British army was able to implement a programme of 
movements created by the combined efforts of civilian and military experts. 
The WF scheme was founded upon Britain’s possession of a robust transport 
network and an abundance of technical specialists in the myriad professions 
required for the sustenance of a global trading empire. While the movement 
of the BEF in August 1914 represented a military manoeuvre more complex 
than any that had been previously attempted by a British force, the expertise 
that conceived and then oversaw the programme ensured that – unlike 
49 TNA, WO 106/49A/8, Expeditionary Force tables and details of the war establishments 
of units, mobilization dates by commands, Apr. 1914. The complete set of timetables is 
available at TNA, WO 106/49B/3, railway timetables, Expeditionary Force time tables, 1914.
50 TNA, WO 106/49B/3, railway timetables, Expeditionary Force timetables, 1914.
51 TNA, WO 106/49B/3, railway timetables, Expeditionary Force timetables, 1914; TNA, 
WO 106/49B/4, serial tables: Southampton for the 2nd–19th day details of train timetables: 
units and goods for entrainment, weight, etc., 1914; TNA, WO 106/49B/7, disembarkation 
tables, 1914.
52 A. de Tarlé, ‘The British army and a continental war’, trans. H. Wylly, Royal United 
Services Institution. Journal, lvii (1913), 384–401, at p. 400.
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Germany’s so-called Schlieffen plan – it did not contain elements that were a 
gamble logistically. Martin van Creveld, in his pioneering assessment of the 
German commander’s infamous scheme, concluded that ‘Schlieffen does 
not appear to have devoted much attention to logistics when he evolved 
his great plan’.53 Henry Wilson did, and he recognized the crucial need to 
involve Britain’s transport experts in the process.
Wilson’s role in the development of the WF scheme was that of a 
facilitator. In his biography of this ‘political soldier’, Keith Jeffery suggested 
that Wilson’s ‘larger than life persona’ may have made him appear more of 
a driving force behind the scheme than he actually was.54 The volume of 
work undertaken by the directorate of military operations under Wilson’s 
direction provides ample evidence of his leadership skills, personal drive 
and energy in the role of project manager for the WF scheme. Yet it also 
demonstrates that Britain’s mobilization planning before the First World 
War was a team effort. Wilson acknowledged the significant contributions 
of his subordinates, whose names and roles have been eclipsed by the 
theatrical and divisive personality of their director. Major Marr Johnson is 
one such figure. In the months immediately before the war began Johnson 
personally hand-wrote, typed and proofread the timetables for the 1914 
edition of the programme before they were approved and printed on the 
War Office’s secret press.55 His work may have been largely forgotten by 
historians, but it was clearly appreciated by his pre-war chief. After the 
war Wilson attempted to gain Johnson a position in the newly established 
Ministry of Transport, writing to Sir Eric Geddes that:
There is a Colonel Marr Johnson who used to work for me before the war and 
who did an immense amount of most detailed work on the railway side and the 
shipping side for getting the E[xpeditionary] F[orce] over to France. It is not 
too much to say that a great deal of the success of the initial moves of the troops 
from England to France was due to Colonel Marr Johnson.56
Johnson only completed his gargantuan task in July 1914, as Europe slid 
towards war.
Yet Johnson’s timetables could not have been committed to paper 
without the substantial investment of time and resources made by the 
railway companies in the three years prior to the First World War. Wilson 
lobbied for access to the railway companies in 1911 because he understood 
53 M. Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge, 1977), 
p. 138.
54 Jeffery, Henry Wilson, p. 99.
55 TNA, WO 106/49A/1, history of the growth of the scheme, address by Radcliffe, p. 7.
56 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 2/26/4, Wilson to Geddes, 3 Apr. 1919.
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that a workable mobilization scheme required the support and input – in 
terms of knowledge, resources and time – of those who both maintained 
the flow of men and materials around the country on a daily basis and 
would be required to implement the programme when war began. Britain’s 
transport experts were an integral part of the process that evolved from what 
‘would certainly have been a shambles’ in 1910 to the thorough collection of 
instructions that existed by August 1914.57 Thanks to the technical expertise 
possessed by a highly skilled, industrialized society, working in conjunction 
with an effectively managed directorate of military operations, the BEF’s 
movements programme existed on paper. When the signal to mobilize was 
issued, the same combination of civilians and soldiers was responsible for 
converting the WF scheme from paper to practice.
Britain’s mobilization and concentration in August 1914
Colonel Victor Huguet, France’s former military attaché to Britain, wrote 
on 2 August 1914 to appraise Wilson of the day’s events on the continent. 
Huguet informed Wilson that the French army’s mobilization had begun, 
and that ‘great hopes are entertained in France concerning British assistance. 
Should you not join us, it would be a great disappointment here’.58 Wilson, 
a committed Francophile since his youth,59 wished for nothing more than 
to see the BEF immediately mobilized and sent to France’s aid. He had 
frequently stressed the importance of the BEF’s swift mobilization in 
the event of war during his tenure as DMO, and claimed that the ‘early 
intervention of our six divisions would be more effective than the tardy 
presence of double their numbers’. Therefore, he concluded, ‘we must 
mobilise the same day as the French’.60 However, as the French authorities 
began to mobilize in response to German activity on their eastern frontier 
on 1 August, the British government did not follow Wilson’s advice. 
Furthermore, when the war council met for the first time on 5 August – 
following the expiration of Britain’s ultimatum to Germany the previous 
night – it was unclear whether the timetables produced over the previous 
years were going to be put to their intended use.
In Britain the decision to go to war was far from constrained by the rigidity 
of railway timetables. In recent years David Stevenson has comprehensively 
debunked A. J. P. Taylor’s provocative thesis, while William Philpott has 
57 B. Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854–1914 (London, 1972), p. 258.
58 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 2/73/38, Huguet to Wilson, 2 Aug. 1914.
59 Jeffery, Henry Wilson, p. 4.
60 TNA, WO 106/47, defence and operational plans, conditions of a war between France 
and Germany (E2/25), 12 Aug. 1911.
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even gone as far as to claim that ‘the importance of Wilson’s timetables has 
been overemphasised’ in the historiography.61 However, the existence of the 
WF scheme – with its interlocking transport schedules – did factor into 
the government’s calculations in the days either side of the declaration of 
war.62 On Sunday 2 August the QMG ordered Captain Henry Mance to 
‘bring all the mobilization programmes to 10 Downing Street to explain the 
railway situation’ to the prime minister. Mance told Asquith that ‘owing to 
the Territorials being scattered at that moment all over the country it would 
not be possible to make the following day the “First day of mobilization”[,] 
but that the programme would work if the “First day” was deferred’ until 
Wednesday.63 The army’s use of the August bank holiday period as an 
opportunity to call out the territorials for summer manoeuvres meant that 
some 100,000 men were either far from their mobilization stations or in the 
middle of journeys to camp when the crisis in Europe deepened. All had 
to be returned before the mobilization programme could begin. Asquith 
ordered the immediate cancellation of the territorials’ movements, before 
raising the question of whether the order for the BEF to mobilize could be 
detached from the order for it to embark for France. In response, Mance
showed [Asquith] a diagram illustrating the different categories of moves to be 
carried out in connection with Home defence, mobilization, and the despatch 
of the Expeditionary Force, and how it was not possible to postpone the 
E.F.[’s embarkation] to a later date without making the trains of the different 
programmes clash or disorganising the arrangements for rolling stock.64
Mance demonstrated that the various segments of the railway programme 
devised over the previous three years could not be operated separately 
without ‘alterations to the orders to every unit and every railway’. Following 
consultation with the REC, Mance confirmed to the government that 
embarkation could begin on the fifth day of mobilization at the earliest.
The outcome of the meeting of 2 August was that both the size and 
destination of Britain’s contribution to the war in Europe remained unsettled. 
Consequently, when the war council met three days later, those in the room 
61 A. J. P. Taylor, War by Time-Table: How the First World War Began (London, 1969); 
Stevenson, ‘War by timetable?’; W. Philpott, ‘The general staff and the paradoxes of 
continental war’, in The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, c.1890–1939, ed. D. 
French and B. Holden Reid (London, 2002), pp. 95–111, at p. 99.
62 S. R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 
1904–1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 336–7.
63 TNA, PRO 30/66/9, correspondence and papers relating to the shipment of troops 
to Ireland and France, and the establishment and organization of the director-general of 
military railways, recollections of the first few days of mobilization, p. 3.
64 TNA, PRO 30/66/9, correspondence and papers, recollections, pp. 3–4.
80
Civilian Specialists at War: Britain’s Transport Experts and the First World War
considered the BEF’s deployment to be open for discussion. Sir John French, 
who had been issued command of the BEF, advocated that the WF scheme 
be rendered void because its mobilization had not been synchronized with 
that of the French army. In place of the proposed transportation of the 
British force to the French Channel ports, as coordinated by the directorate 
of military operations, Sir John suggested his troops be shipped to Antwerp 
to act in concert with the Belgian army it had ostensibly entered the war 
to protect. However, as Sir Charles Douglas, Sir John’s replacement as 
CIGS pointed out, the arrangements that had been made for the BEF’s 
despatch from Southampton and other ports had been drawn up with the 
journey times to and from France in mind. The extra distance to Antwerp 
demanded either the spontaneous sourcing of extra naval transports or the 
recalculation of the existing railway timetables for the delivery of troops 
and supplies to the British coast.65 Wilson also believed that the waters of 
the Scheldt, the river upon whose banks the port of Antwerp sits, could 
be ‘closed by a schoolboy’. In the event of a major European war, Wilson 
had warned Churchill three years earlier, Antwerp was likely to be ‘cut off 
from all direct communication with the sea’.66 Furthermore, the Royal 
Navy refused to guarantee the safety of naval transports north of the Dover 
Straits until the German fleet had been destroyed.67 That the BEF’s senior 
commander could raise such a logistically impractical suggestion augured 
ill for his appreciation of the role transportation was to play in the conflict.
The deliberations of the war council emphasized that the only practicable 
concentration scheme available to the British government in August 1914 
was ‘with France’. Wilson’s carefully constructed plan boasted the benefits 
of interdepartmental cooperation, thorough logistical preparation and 
the input of suitably qualified transport experts. Once Sir Douglas Haig’s 
suggestion to retain the BEF at home for two to three months – during 
which time the ‘immense resources of the Empire’ could be developed – 
had been rejected in favour of the immediate despatch of four divisions 
to the continent,68 the programme of movements contained within the 
WF scheme dictated the location to which those troops would be sent. 
Sir John’s attempts to reintroduce Antwerp as a possible base of British 
operations, coupled with Haig’s desire to hold the BEF back from France, 
demonstrated the reluctance of Britain’s two senior commanders to enter 
65 TNA, CAB 22/1, minutes of meetings, secretary’s notes of a war council held at 10 
Downing Street, 5 Aug. 1914, pp. 1–2.
66 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 3/5/16A, Wilson to Churchill, 29 Aug. 1911.
67 P. Guinn, British Strategy and Politics, 1914 to 1918 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 13–14.
68 TNA, CAB 22/1, minutes of meetings, secretary’s notes, 5 Aug. 1914, p. 2; secretary’s 
notes of a war council held at 10 Downing Street, 6 Aug. 1914.
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into too close a relationship with the French army.69 The existence of 
Wilson’s embarkation programme did not govern Britain’s decision to enter 
the war. However, once that decision had been made – and the trains began 
to roll into Southampton on 8 August – the rigidity of railway timetables 
locked the British and French armies into a partnership, which materially 
diminished Britain’s freedom of action for the duration of the conflict.
By the time the embarkation process began, Britain’s transport experts 
and the directorate of military operations had already been preparing for 
war for more than a week. On 31 July Sir Sam Fay received a coded telephone 
call, which informed him that the ‘precautionary stage’ had begun. He set 
off for the LNWR offices that housed the REC and did not see his home 
again for a fortnight.70 Mance was detained by the requirements of the WF 
scheme for even longer. He was in Worcestershire when the announcement 
of the precautionary stage reached him on 29 July, coordinating movements 
associated with the territorials’ summer manoeuvres with the Great Western 
Railway. He returned to London that day and slept in the War Office every 
night from 31 July to 24 August.71 Fay was joined in the capital by his REC 
colleagues, each of whom were connected to their home railways by the 
telephone network specially installed over the previous two years. On 4 
August the War Office delivered a letter to 130 railway companies, which 
announced that the government had taken control of the railways and 
that they were to be managed on the government’s behalf by the REC. It 
informed them that:
Although the railway facilities for other than Naval and Military purposes may 
for a time be somewhat restricted, the effects of the use of the powers under [the 
Regulation of the Forces Act] will be to coordinate the demands on the railways 
of the civil community with those necessary to meet the special requirements of 
the Naval and Military Authorities. More normal conditions will in due course 
be restored, and it is hoped that the public will recognize the necessity for the 
special conditions and will in the general interests accommodate themselves to 
the inconvenience involved.72
69 For a discussion of Sir John’s strategic ideas before the First World War, see W. Philpott, 
‘The strategic ideas of Sir John French’, Journal of Strategic Studies, xii (1989), 458–78.
70 S. Fay, The War Office at War (London, 1937), pp. 20–1. The precautionary stage was 
the first of three phases of operations that took place at the outset of war, the others being 
mobilization (the movement of troops to their mobilization stations), and concentration 
(the delivery of troops to the theatre of operations). In the precautionary phase, the army 
communicated its railway requirements to the REC and guards were placed at tunnels and 
bridges to ensure the security of the network. See Stevenson, ‘War by timetable?’, p. 166.
71 TNA, PRO 30/66/9, correspondence and papers, recollections, pp. 1–2.
72 Quoted in J. A. B. Hamilton, Britain’s Railways in World War I (London, 1947), p. 26.
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Following the delivery of this letter the REC became responsible for 98 per 
cent of the railway mileage in Britain (but not Ireland, which was excluded 
from the Act), the instructions to general managers contained within the 
war book were brought into effect and the breadth of the secret plans 
developed over the previous three years was finally revealed to the majority 
of Britain’s railway servants.73
The smoothness of the mobilization and concentration process 
depended upon the professionalism of the railways’ employees and their 
military passengers. The annual peacetime manoeuvres had given both 
groups invaluable experience of the technical nature of railway transport 
before they were called upon to realize those movements in wartime: 
the army with regards to the loading and unloading of troops and 
their equipment, and the railways in terms of the coordination of the 
locomotives, crews and rolling stock required for the specialist moves.74 
The 12th Horse Transport Company’s experience in August 1914 illustrates 
both the complications that arose from a mobilization during the summer 
bank holiday and the breadth of accoutrements that accompanied the 
industrial army. Based at Colewort barracks in Portsmouth, the company 
began August at their annual training camp on Salisbury Plain. Following 
receipt of the order to return to Portsmouth as quickly as possible, the 
unit undertook a march of fifty-five miles in just one day. Only one horse, 
which went badly lame, returned to the barracks by train. After medical 
inspections at Colewort the company marched out of the barracks to 
mobilize at Hilsea, where their ten-day mobilization schedule began. At 
Hilsea ‘life became more strenuous than ever as stores of all description, 
but mainly wagons and harnesses, were drawn from Ordnance, and 
reservists and specially enlisted men began to roll in from all over the 
country’.75 In addition to the extra men, the company had to incorporate 
between fifty and sixty horses per day as they arrived by rail according to 
pre-arranged impressment schedules devised before the war. In less than 
two weeks – and a day ahead of schedule – a pre-war transport company 
of around thirty men and forty horses emerged as No. 5 Reserve Park, 
which comprised seven officers, 289 men, 153 wagons and 358 horses. The 
unit ‘shook down with local treks to accustom a variegated collection of 
73 Hamilton, Britain’s Railways in World War I, pp. 26–9; TNA, PRO 30/66/9, 
correspondence and papers, recollections, p. 6.
74 Norman Pattenden’s series of articles describes the LSWR’s experience of the manoeuvres 
in 1914, and highlights both the complexity of the work and the professionalism of the 
railway staff involved. See N. Pattenden, ‘Armageddon? – No just practising’, The South 
Western Circular, xii (2001).
75 M. Young, Army Service Corps, 1902–1918 (London, 2000), pp. 44–5.
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men and horses to convoy duties and march discipline’, and then headed 
to Southampton for embarkation.
The impressment of horses provides a further example of the depth 
of civil–military cooperation required for the WF scheme to function 
effectively. Wilson observed early in his tenure as DMO that ‘there 
[would] be a difficulty about moving some 15,000 horses from the north 
of England to Aldershot’.76 Wilson underestimated the size of the task. The 
BEF’s peacetime establishment of horses was 19,000. Upon mobilization 
the BEF immediately required 55,000 horses and the territorials a further 
86,000. A census of horses, compiled in each of the home commands from 
data provided by local police forces, confirmed that sufficient horses were 
available. However, a system for the identification, collection and transport 
of animals suitable for army requirements had to be created. Over the next 
two years the War Office used the information to draw up lists of horses 
available in various locations around the country, and trained around 1,400 
‘prominent local gentlemen of suitable knowledge and status’ – usually 
landowners or experienced horsemen – to collect an assigned number of 
horses on mobilization.77 By April 1913 the ‘various horsebrows, slings and 
stores required by the home ports’ for the embarkation of the animals had 
been purchased, and timetables for the movement of the horses were brought 
into operation on 1 April 1914 with the rest of the railway programme for 
the year.78 The civilian collectors received their orders to commence the 
collection of horses on 3 August. Within twelve days the British army 
had successfully impressed 165,000 horses, an impressive number but one 
significantly smaller than the 615,000 initially mobilized by the German 
army.79
The timetable for the horses purchased on mobilization for the Aldershot 
command alone highlights the level of cooperation required for the scheme 
to work effectively. The civilian purchasers who provided horses for the 
first train to depart for Aldershot had to ensure their animals were at 
Worcester station by 8:40 p.m. on the first day of the programme, and the 
final departure for Aldershot was scheduled to leave Birmingham on the 
third day. During that period, trains for the Aldershot troops and Cavalry 
76 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 3/6/4, note from a meeting in Major-General Heath’s 
room, 27 July 1911.
77 T. R. F. Bate, ‘Horse mobilisation’, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, lxvii (1922), 
16–25, at pp. 18–19; J. Singleton, ‘Britain’s military use of horses 1914–1918’, Past & Present, 
cxxxix (1993), 178–203, at p. 184; Chapman-Huston and Rutter, Sir John Cowans, i. 251–9.
78 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 3/7/3A, note containing ‘48 points’ concerning the 
expeditionary force scheme prepared for the DMO, 3 Apr. 1913, p. 2.
79 Singleton, ‘Britain’s military use of horses’, p. 184.
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Division were entrained at Worcester, Pershore, Coventry, Nuneaton, 
Amesbury, Basingstoke, High Wycombe, Abingdon, Reading, Aylesbury, 
Maidenhead, Chipping Norton, Oxford and the two Birmingham stations 
of Hockley and Small Heath. The stations of Bordon, Liphook and 
Farnborough received the animals, which had travelled along the lines of 
the Great Western, LSWR and LNWR on their journeys to Hampshire.80 
The surviving timetables for the eastern command present a similar story 
but on an even larger scale. The LNWR, Midland, SECR, Great Eastern, 
Great Northern and the London, Brighton and South Coast (LBSCR) 
railways all participated in the movement of horses from various sites across 
East Anglia and the south-east to fulfil the mobilization requirements of the 
Essex and Norfolk Yeomanry.81
The passages above demonstrate that the railways’ work in August 1914 
was not merely restricted to the delivery of the BEF and its stores to various 
ports in southern England. In the weeks that followed the government’s 
decisions to enter the war and to send the BEF to France, Britain’s railways 
were responsible for the mobilization and concentration of the BEF, the 
movement of the territorials, reserves and Royal Navy personnel, the 
supplies and equipment required by all of the above, and the maintenance 
of Britain’s colossal passenger and freight traffic with as little dislocation to 
the rhythms of civil life as possible. Notices were pinned up at prominent 
stations across the country to warn commuters of potential disruption to 
regular passenger services by the demands of the armed forces. However, 
‘the business trains to and from London ran very much as usual, and the 
normal service was maintained on nearly all parts of the system’.82 Britain’s 
railways ran 1,408 specially timetabled trains for the carriage of over 334,500 
troops during the first fortnight of the mobilization period. The Great 
Western alone handled 632 special troop trains, forty-one trains containing 
coal for the Admiralty and 149 trains containing petrol, oil and various 
stores. Aside from the suspension of excursion services, the ordinary goods 
and passenger traffic across the Great Western’s system was maintained 
80 TNA, WO 33/657, mobilization railway time tables for southern command, section 
III: Aldershot command, table 4(G) – horses bought on mobilization (revised to July 1914). 
Under the army horse reserve agreement, approved by the Great Western’s directors in 
March 1913, the railway agreed to provide the army with 221 horses on the outbreak of war. 
In August 1914 the army requisitioned a further 40 light draft horses from the railway, and 12 
more animals were commandeered by the military authorities. See TNA, ZLIB 10/11, Great 
Western Railway: war reports of the general manager to the board of directors, 1914–1919, p. 
16; S. Gittins, The Great Western Railway in the First World War (Stroud, 2010), p. 17.
81 TNA, WO 33/676, eastern command mobilization railway timetables for horses, 
Category (G) – mobilisation horses, 1914.
82 ‘Railways and the war. Reduced passenger service’, Railway Gazette, 7 Aug. 1914, p. 194.
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throughout.83 Welsh coal for the fleet began to arrive at Grangemouth on 
the Caledonian Railway’s network on 10 August.84 During that month the 
Caledonian handled 342 naval and military trains, most of which originated 
on their system and were composed of Caledonian stock. Thanks to the 
Admiralty’s decision not to demobilize the fleet following test mobilizations 
in mid July, the human traffic connected to the Royal Navy’s entry into the 
war was relatively small. Consequently, the comparatively tiny Highland 
Railway – the closest point on the railway network to the naval base at 
Scapa Flow – was not overloaded by the northward movement of reservists 
in early August. Those who had not been called up on 12 and 14 July headed 
towards Orkney from 2 August in a series of movements that were ‘carried 
out with perfect smoothness’.85
It was at the opposite end of the country where the vast majority of 
the railways’ attentions were directed in August 1914, however. All railroads 
may not have led to Southampton (see Figure 2.1), but at the start of the 
war a large volume of traffic was delivered into the BEF’s principal port of 
departure. The first troops, charged with the establishment of supply bases 
and rest camps near the French Channel ports in readiness for the main 
body of the BEF, arrived on 7 August. Captain R. H. D Tompson was 
among them, and described arriving on a construction site as the railway 
access to the port was swiftly increased. The existing provision, described 
by Tompson as ‘a strategic disgrace’, was augmented by new construction 
undertaken by a ‘very large group of navvies [who toiled] night and day’. 
Their exertions created ‘a very fine piece of work’, which ‘seemed to grow 
almost as one watched’ and was complete by 8 August when the bulk of 
the BEF started to filter through to the docks.86 The programme demanded 
that the LSWR receive 350 trains – each composed of an average of thirty 
vehicles – into the port, unload their passengers and cargo, and remove 
them from the platforms in readiness for the next train within sixty hours. 
They did so within forty-eight. A train pulled into the docks every ten 
minutes in the first twenty-four hours of the concentration period, and for 
the following nineteen days in a row Southampton received ninety trains 
83 C. Hamilton Ellis, British Railway History: an Outline from the Accession of William 
IV to the Nationalisation of Railways, 1877–1947 (2 vols., London, 1959), ii. 300–1; Gittins, 
The Great Western Railway, p. 13; C. Maggs, A History of the Great Western Railway (Stroud, 
2015), p. 175.
84 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 546.
85 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, i. 110.
86 Brotherton Library Special Collections (BLSC), Liddle collection, papers of Captain 
R. H. D. Tompson, LIDDLE/WW1/GS/1612, diary entries 7 and 8 Aug. 1914. My thanks to 
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86
Civilian Specialists at War: Britain’s Transport Experts and the First World War
per day – each one loaded with men, horses, wagons, guns, ammunition 
and myriad other supplies. The flexibility and contingency that had been 
built into the programme resulted in the majority of trains arriving at 
Southampton between twenty-five and thirty minutes ahead of schedule. 
In the first twenty-four-hour period, just one train was recorded as having 
arrived late, and that by only five minutes.87
By 26 August, 65,814 officers and men had left Southampton aboard 
steamers sourced by the Admiralty from civilian firms – including, as 
the operators of a variety of waterborne services, many ships owned and 
operated by railway companies.88 Second-Lieutenant Lyndall Urwick 
of the 3rd Battalion, Worcestershire Regiment, was among them. In an 
unpublished autobiography, he wrote that the scene on the evening he set 
sail was unforgettable:
Pleasure steamers and ferry boats from every short sea crossing round the British 
Isles had been called in. For the Channel crossing to Le Havre and Rouen they 
could afford to pack the decks. Down both sides of Southampton Water as far 
as the eye could reach they were moored alongside the quays, stern to stern, and 
every ship was a mass of men. Yet still there were thousands more on the quays 
waiting their turn. In the middle of the Water, line ahead, going out into the 
sunset, were six more ships fully loaded. And every man Jack of 60,000 men 
was singing Tipperary.89
The accumulation of men and materials at the ports proved the only major 
concern for the QMG’s staff during the concentration. Heavy fog in the 
English Channel meant that transports did not return to Britain as quickly 
as the timetable demanded. The weather, combined with an examination 
process at Southampton that Mance described as ‘too rigorous’, created a 
backlog of ‘over one day’s troops at the rest camps’ around the port. Anxious 
at the build-up of men, Sir John Cowans went to Southampton to examine 
whether the railway programme should be postponed for a day to allow the 
port to be cleared. However, the fog dispersed, the examinations process was 
streamlined and the natural contingency built into the railway programme 
from its inception meant that the arrears were rapidly rectified.90
87 Chapman-Huston and Rutter, Sir John Cowans, i. 281; Beckett, ‘Going to war’, p. 143; 
‘Railway administration in war’, Railway Gazette, 20 Nov. 1914, pp. 529–30; TNA, ZPER 
7/103, records of railway interests in the war, 1915, p. 18.
88 A. J. Mullay, For the King’s Service: Railway Ships at War (Easingwold, 2008).
89 Greenlands Academic Resource Centre (GARC), papers of Colonel Lyndall Fownes 
Urwick, 8/3/2, management pilgrimage, p. 2.
90 TNA, PRO 30/66/9, correspondence and papers, recollections, pp. 6–7; Chapman-
Huston and Rutter, Sir John Cowans, i. 282.
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Once the troops had disembarked on French soil they passed beyond the 
limits of Britain’s transport experts’ influence on the WF scheme. From that 
point forward the successful concentration of the BEF depended upon the 
collaborative efforts of Wilson’s staff and the French army. The planning 
for the final step of the BEF’s concentration was complicated by the 
different train-loading methods employed on either side of the Channel. 
Figure 2.1. Diagram showing how all (rail) roads lead to Southampton.
Source: E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War; Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and 
Achievements (2 vols., London, 1921), ii. 1008.
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In Britain trains ‘of medium weight [were run] at a fairly high speed; on 
the continent the practice [was] to run very heavy trains at slow speed’. In 
Britain a battalion or battery was transported in two trains; in France they 
travelled in one.91 Therefore, the units that disembarked in France did not 
entrain on vehicles of the same composition as those they had left behind 
in Britain. Fresh timetables had to be compiled between the British and 
French authorities to provide for the inland movement of the BEF. The 
French proved more than happy to collaborate in an activity that further 
cemented the growing alliance between the two nations, and in July 1914 
Wilson ordered three staff officers to attend the French 11th Division’s 
manoeuvres alongside Sir John French, Haig and other senior figures. The 
object of their visit was to become familiarized with the military workings 
of the French railways, and the lavishness of Huguet’s praise is noteworthy:
I also met at the same time [as Sir John, Haig, et al.] three of your officers, 
Radcliffe, Johnston [sic] and ______, and very glad to say they made a very, 
very good impression, first by themselves, their intelligence, their cleverness, their 
way of working, their seriousness … and also, I am glad to say, by the very 
good work which they had brought with them – our people were very gratified 
to see how well they work in the DMO department, how the thing has been 
seriously taken and carefully studied. In all this, I recognize the hand of my 
friend General Wilson, but all the same, it is really a pleasure to work with 
officers like those three whom you sent out.92
Unfortunately, the details of ‘the very good work which they had brought 
with them’ was not elaborated upon. However, the results of their endeavours 
became clear once the BEF arrived in France a month later. Each unit was 
issued with a manual that advised them of the procedures to be followed 
on their journey to the front, while officers who arrived in advanced parties 
received detailed instructions that delineated their responsibilities from 
those undertaken by the local authorities.93 There were teething problems, 
particularly as the British troops struggled to entrain quickly onto unfamiliar 
rolling stock from rail level rather than from platform level. The first unit 
to entrain took five-and-a-half hours to load its vehicles; the equivalent 
91 A. M. Henniker, History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western Front, 1914–1918 
(London, 1937), p. 14.
92 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 2/73/27, Huguet to Wilson, 16 July 1914. Emphasis in 
original.
93 TNA, WO 106/49A/7, instructions for First and Second army commanders and 
officers of advanced parties and railway transport establishment, pp. 1–3; WO 106/49B/1, 
instruction for entrainment and embarkation (short voyage) for units of the expeditionary 
force; BLSC, Tompson papers, LIDDLE/WW1/GS/1612, diary entry, 6 Aug. 1914.
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French force was expected to complete the task in ninety minutes.94 Yet the 
lack of standardization between the railway operations of the two countries, 
and the three-day gap between the mobilizations of their forces, did not 
materially obstruct the British concentration on the French army’s left. 
The BEF entrained upon 361 trains from 15 August onwards, undertaking 
journeys from Boulogne, Le Havre and Rouen to the concentration area 
around Maubeuge, Busigny and Hirson that took up to seventeen hours 
to complete. Only thirty-six of the 343 trains that passed through Amiens 
during the period were more than thirty minutes late.95 By 23 August, as 
the battle of the Frontiers raged to the south and took a horrific toll on the 
French and German forces involved, the BEF had crept forward to Mons 
where its own war began in earnest.
Conclusion
In an address to the American Luncheon Club on 13 November 1914, the 
acting chairman of the REC and general manager of the LSWR, Herbert 
Walker, remarked on the successful despatch of the BEF to the continent 
that:
Magnificent and unprecedented as this feat was, we can pay the British railways 
no higher compliment than to say that it was expected of them, and that every 
man in the service knew the railways were equal to every demand that could be 
made on them, without it being necessary to dislocate ordinary traffic to one-
quarter of the extent which mobilization involves abroad.96
Between 10 and 31 August Walker’s own railway had carried 4,653 officers, 
113,801 men, 314 guns, 5,221 vehicles, 1,807 cycles, 4,557 tons of stores 
and 37,469 horses on the army’s behalf.97 Its efforts – and those of its 
counterparts across the British Isles – pale by comparison to the railway 
efforts undertaken elsewhere across Europe as the gigantic conscript forces 
of the great powers readied for battle. In the first six days of mobilization 
alone the eastern border corps of the German army mobilized over 148,000 
94 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 21.
95 M. Peschaud, Politique et fonctionnement des transports par chemin de fer pendant la 
guerre (Paris, 1926), pp. 83–4; J. H. F. Le Hénaff and H. Bornecque, Les chemins de fer 
français et la guerre (Paris, 1922), pp. 215–22. Lieutenant Evelyn Needham’s recollections 
of the ‘interminable’ journey from Le Havre to the front are quoted in P. Hart, Fire and 
Movement: the British Expeditionary Force and the Campaign of 1914 (Oxford, 2015), pp. 
63–4.
96 ‘Railway administration in war’, p. 530.
97 ‘Modern armies and modern transport: the work of the London and South-Western 
Railway during the war’, Railway Gazette, 31 Jan. 1919, p. 160.
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men, mainly drawn from Berlin and the Rhine area. At the same time, on 
the other side of the country, the XV, XVI and XXI Army corps received 
almost 112,000 men and 23,000 horses by rail. In total, the German and 
French armies ran 20,800 and around 10,000 trains respectively in support 
of their mobilization programmes; far higher than the 1,408 trains operated 
on the British rail network. The 361 trains that delivered the BEF to its 
concentration area from the Channel ports were a mere fraction of the 
4,278 trains that traversed the French rail network in the French army’s 
fourteen-day concentration period – during which up to 380 trains per 
day delivered some 1,300,000 French troops into position.98 The British 
railways’ effort was ‘magnificent and unprecedented’, but it was undertaken 
on a far smaller and less conspicuous scale than those on the European 
mainland in August 1914.
However, the substantial investments of time and resources made by 
Walker, his colleagues in the REC and the thousands of unnamed railway 
servants to the British mobilization should not be reduced to a mere footnote 
in the history of the First World War.99 For over three years Britain’s most 
prominent railway companies provided labour ‘greatly in excess of what had 
previously been necessary’ in response to the army’s complex and changeable 
transport demands.100 They participated in an exchange of ideas and expertise 
with Henry Wilson and his staff within the directorate of military operations. 
Their joint endeavours underline both the applicability of industrial 
knowledge and skills to military operations and the existence of a far closer 
working relationship between the army and industry than has hitherto been 
acknowledged. The British army, ‘contemptible’ in size as it may have been, 
was absolutely reliant upon privately owned locomotives, rolling stock and 
track for its propulsion to the front. Henry Wilson understood this, and 
turned a professional relationship that had been focused upon defensive and 
educational activities into one that was integral to the swift deployment of 
Britain’s ‘strike force’. By the time Europe’s armies began to roll out their 
gargantuan mobilization schemes – drawn and redrawn by large-scale, state-
sanctioned military organizations – Britain possessed a thoroughly researched 
and mapped out scheme for the deployment of the BEF.
98 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, 1914 Bis 1918: Das Deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen (Berlin, 
1928), p. 12; Les armées françaises dans la grande guerre: la direction de l’arrière (Paris, 1937), 
p. 24; Le Hénaff and Bornecque, Les chemins de fer français, p. 28; Stevenson, ‘War by 
timetable?’, p. 167.
99 Robin Neillands, in an otherwise broad account of the mobilization process, only 
referred to one railway company’s contribution to the WF scheme: the LSWR. See Neillands, 
The Old Contemptibles, p. 90.
100 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, i. 16.
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Railway timetables did not impose the First World War upon the 
statesmen of Britain or any other of the European powers in 1914, as A. J. P. 
Taylor famously asserted in the 1960s.101 Henry Wilson’s vituperative diary 
entries in early August, as his carefully coordinated plans for a simultaneous 
mobilization and embarkation were cast aside by Asquith’s government, 
illustrate the limited influence of logistics over the state’s decision-making 
processes.102 Yet once it had taken the decision to commence hostilities, the 
lack of alternatives to the WF scheme severely constrained the government’s 
freedom of action. No other programme of movements existed in the detail 
required for it to be carried out swiftly in August 1914. From the very outset 
the options available to British civil and military leaders were limited by the 
transport factor. For the four years that followed, the roads, railways and 
shipping lanes that had delivered the BEF to the western front became part 
of a global transport infrastructure that sustained and shaped the fighting 
that took place during the First World War. The contribution of Britain’s 
transport experts to the processes and procedures of industrial warfare did 
not end once the firing started.
101 A. J. P. Taylor, The First World War: an Illustrated History (London, 1963), p. 20.
102 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 1/23, diary entries, July–Aug. 1914. The period is 
summarized in Jeffery, Henry Wilson, pp. 128–9.
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3. Stepping into their places: Britain’s transport 
experts and the expanding war, 1914–16
In August 1915, the Great Western Railway Magazine carried photographs and 
brief biographies of twenty-four of the company’s employees, each of whom 
had recently died while in the service of their nation. The men’s details 
illustrate the great diversity of work undertaken and the geographical sprawl 
of Britain’s largest pre-war railway companies. Porters, clerks, relayers, lamp 
men, carpenters, packers and labourers were among the two dozen men 
featured in the magazine, who had enlisted from such places as the company’s 
works at Swindon, its London terminus at Paddington, the engine shed at 
Newton Abbot and the engineering department at Plymouth. The locations 
of their deaths highlight how Britain’s commitments to the First World War 
had grown beyond France and Flanders in the first twelve months of the 
war. While Emmanuel Rowland died of pneumonia in Exeter, and Lance-
Corporal F. Hammond was killed in action at Hill 60 near Ypres, both 
James Gully and Walter Lamacroft were lost on 12 May 1915 when HMS 
Goliath was torpedoed and sank at Cape Helles.1 As the magazine went to 
print the 5th Battalion, Wiltshire Regiment – whose recruits included many 
with pre-war attachments to the Great Western’s Swindon works – were 
overwhelmed by Turkish forces at Chunuk Bair. At least nineteen of those 
who died in the assault were railwaymen. The Great Western, Great Eastern 
and LNWR all lost former employees on the slopes of the Sari Bahr ridge. 
In the first year of the First World War the railwaymen of Britain found 
themselves at the forefront of Britain’s expanding war effort.2
Alongside their contributions to the fighting forces on various front 
lines, employees from some of Britain’s largest railway companies helped 
underwrite the organizational effort required to gear the nation towards 
the prosecution of a war effort on an unprecedented scale. The creation, 
maintenance and sustenance of a mass army capable of rivalling the 
conscripted forces of the other European powers presented Britain’s civil 
and military authorities with a series of colossal challenges, which revealed 
1 ‘G.W.R. men who have lost their lives in the war’, Great Western Railway Magazine, 
Aug. 1915, pp. 206–7.
2 J. Higgins, Great War Railwaymen: Britain’s Railway Company Workers at War 1914–1918 
(London, 2014), pp. 100–1.
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themselves gradually from the moment the decision to raise such a force was 
taken. ‘Issues of management and logistics’, claimed two British scholars, 
‘were the primary concerns of senior commanders for the first three years of 
the war’. The army, they continued, underwent a ‘conceptual change’ that 
involved the mobilization of businessmen who brought ‘their knowledge 
of forecasting and economies of scale to military logistical supply’.3 This 
process is viewed almost exclusively through the prism of Sir Eric Geddes 
and the creation of the directorate-general of transportation in the autumn 
of 1916. Even Elizabeth Greenhalgh’s Victory through Coalition, which more 
than any previous history analysed the bureaucratic machinations behind 
the inter-allied management apparatus, devoted little more than two pages 
to the logistical complexities and frailties that afflicted the Franco-British 
coalition before the battle of the Somme.4
Yet prior to Geddes’s arrival on the western front, as this and the following 
chapters will demonstrate, the British army actively sought out and engaged 
with the skills and expertise possessed by Britain’s transport experts. 
Individuals and companies from across the country, the empire and beyond, 
were tasked with identifying solutions to the multiple conundrums posed by 
modern industrial warfare. Both at home and in the multiple theatres that 
emerged as the war spread from Europe, those who possessed technical and 
managerial experience in the railway industry found profitable employment 
in the production and distribution networks that underpinned the British 
war effort. However, the army’s initial attempts to utilize civilians to grapple 
with the implications of industrialized warfare were relatively small in scale 
and limited in scope. Furthermore, they were hamstrung by the constant 
presence of the two factors that inhibited the British army’s development 
before 1916: a continued belief in the impermanence of trench warfare and 
subsequent disinclination to prepare for a static war; and the French army’s 
reluctance to relinquish control over the shared transport infrastructure 
upon which the coalition’s forces depended.
Transport organization and the clash of arms
The War Office, like its compatriots across Europe, entered the First World 
War with no proposals for how to deal with the consequences of an indecisive 
opening engagement. ‘Whether the General Staffs really expected a war to 
3 D. Todman and G. Sheffield, ‘Command and control in the British army on the 
western front’, in Command and Control on the Western Front: the British Army’s Experience, 
1914–18, ed. G. Sheffield and D. Todman (Staplehurst, 2004), pp. 1–11, at p. 6.
4 E. Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War 
(Cambridge, 2005), pp. 33–5.
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end by Christmas’, argued David Stevenson, ‘all they planned in detail was 
the opening campaign’.5 The pre-war conversations between the French and 
British general staffs had resulted in an arrangement whereby the BEF’s 
transport requirements were to be ‘manned and controlled by the French’. 
The BEF’s hosts undertook to complete ‘the work of construction, repair, 
maintenance, traffic management and protection’ necessary to maintain the 
British troops on the western front.6 In a sign of the French army’s confident 
approach to the impending hostilities – and its assumption that the BEF 
was unlikely to substantially increase in size over the course of the war – the 
French also committed to provide for all the BEF’s transport needs after the 
allies had pushed the Germans back beyond the French-Belgian frontier. 
The terms of the coalition arrangement were such that the duties nominally 
assigned to a British director of railway transport (DRT) were almost 
entirely assigned to the French army. Consequently, the British officer 
earmarked for the position, Colonel John Twiss, remained in London when 
the BEF set sail. Only a small staff of liaison officers, the railway transport 
establishment, crossed the Channel to act as intermediaries between the 
BEF and the French railway authorities in early August 1914.7
The twenty-nine officers who constituted the initial railway transport 
establishment – twelve of whom were students at the staff college when 
war was declared – were thrown into action immediately. Captain R. H. 
D. Tompson, one of the staff college students, recorded in his diary the 
disappointment he felt at being given such a ‘poor job’. ‘It is very hard after 
all this sweat of getting to the Staff College’, he wrote on 6 August, ‘to find 
oneself in a rotten job like this’. Tompson, a veteran of the South African 
War, embarked on the LSWR ship SS Vera on 9 August, and went onshore 
at Le Havre at 6:30 a.m. the following morning. Before he embarked for 
France, the relationship between the British officers and the French railway 
authorities was clearly explained. The French were to control operations 
within the stations, and Tompson’s role was to ensure that disembarking 
troops complied with the instructions issued by the station staff. For each 
train that arrived at his allocated station of Vaux (and later Busigny), 
Tompson worked alongside the ‘excellent fellows’ of the commission de la 
gare to ensure the swift unloading of troops and equipment from the trains, 
their removal from the station’s surroundings and the preparation of the 
5 D. Stevenson, ‘War by timetable? The railway race before 1914’, Past & Present, clxii 
(1999), 163–94, at p. 166; I. M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919 
(London, 1998), pp. 75–6.
6 TNA, WO 33/686, instructions for the IGC, part II, section 1, 1914; A. M. Henniker, 
History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western Front, 1914–1918 (London, 1937), p. 13.
7 Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 16–17.
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area to receive the next arrival. The work was incessant. The steady stream 
of trains meant that he could only snatch occasional periods of rest, and as 
the concentration period climaxed Tompson recorded that he ‘had not slept 
in three days and two whole nights’. By 24 August, when the BEF had just 
commenced its infamous retreat from Mons, Tompson’s boots had already 
worn through.8
The French authorities’ desire to retain control inside the railway stations 
near the concentration area was not matched by the ability to honour their 
agreement with the BEF at the coast. The pre-war arrangement at the ports 
was broken before the bulk of troops had begun to arrive. Before he set sail 
to take up his post, the IGC Sir Frederick Robb was dismayed to discover 
that the French ‘had not kept their promises about the dock employees, 
they can only furnish 1000 stevedores out of the 3000 [and] they propose 
not to work at night. I have had to be very firm about this, they have 
now promised to try and get some more’.9 This inauspicious beginning to 
the practical operations of the Franco-British coalition set a pattern that 
continued once the fighting commenced in earnest.
The outbreak of war sparked a colossal volume of traffic on the French 
railways. According to one American correspondent, ‘no fewer than 
1,800,000 troops were gotten to the front, and each of these soldiers were 
handled three times, so that in reality 5,400,000 troops were delivered at 
the required points … while possibly 5,000,000 of the civil population were 
also travelling’ between 1 and 24 August.10 The mass of refugees provided a 
noteworthy concern for the allies’ supply officers. Around 100,000 people 
‘threw themselves’ at any trains heading west from Laon in the final days of 
August, while at Busigny Tompson witnessed the ‘poor haunted creatures’ 
who choked the station in search of transport away from the front and 
complicated the movements of troops.11 In the less sympathetic view of 
the QMG, Sir William Robertson, the refugees were ‘an awful nuisance, 
blocking our roads, and even our fire’ during the retreat from Mons. In a 
letter to the king’s private secretary he described ‘colonies of perhaps 200 
or 300 families’, who in some cases had travelled from central Belgium to 
the outskirts of Paris. ‘The selection they have made of their belongings’, 
Robertson noted, ‘has amused me more than anything. It includes in some 
cases of a flock of about 1,000 sheep. Two or three wagons of what looks 
8 All quotations in this passage are taken from BLSC, Tompson papers, LIDDLE/WW1/
GS/1612, diary entries, 6–24 Aug. 1914.
9 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 2/73/49, Robb to Wilson, 10 Aug. 1914.
10 ‘France saved by her railroad men’, Railway Gazette, 16 July 1915, p. 58.
11 J. H. F. Le Hénaff and H. Bornecque, Les chemins de fer français et la guerre (Paris, 1922), 
p. 37; BLSC, Tompson papers, LIDDLE/WW1/GS/1612, diary entries, 24 and 25 Aug. 1914.
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like straw or hay, but which really consist of furniture and clothing, hidden 
under the straw. Bicycles, mattresses, perambulators, boxes, cocks and hens, 
turkeys and so on’ comprised all the refugees had been able to remove in the 
face of the German advance.12
As QMG, it was Robertson’s responsibility to ensure that his troops 
were supplied with the items they required. Yet as the location of the front 
constantly shifted, the BEF’s administrative departments behind the lines 
could not be certain of the troops’ locations from day to day.13 By the 
time rendezvous points had been selected by GHQ and communicated 
to Robb’s headquarters on the lines of communications, there was no 
guarantee that British troops would be in position to receive the supplies 
once they had been shifted forwards. Closer to the front the quartermasters 
of individual formations struggled to maintain contact with their troops 
as the road network became increasingly congested with troops, guns, 
refugees and abandoned supplies.14 Lyndall Urwick recalled that ‘only once 
or twice during the retreat and the Battle of the Marne had our regimental 
transport caught up with us’. Consequently, the food Urwick and his 
comrades received on the retreat ‘had been uncertain but monotonous, 
consisting, when we got any, almost entirely of bully beef and biscuit’ or 
whatever the enterprising soldier could scrounge.15 With the distribution 
system insufficient to meet the needs of an army on the move, Robertson 
arranged for food and ammunition to be ‘dumped’ at busy crossroads for 
the men to take as they passed.16 Inevitably, he recalled, such a system led to 
‘excessive waste’ and huge volumes were left behind. ‘But when the troops 
are fighting hard’, he reasoned, ‘one does not like to worry them too much 
about administrative matters. The chief thing is to beat the enemy’ rather 
than obsess over red-tape.17
12 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), papers of Field Marshal Sir 
William Robertson, 7/1/1 Robertson to Wigram, 1 Sept. 1914.
13 Brown, British Logistics, p. 61.
14 A. Whitty, A Quartermaster at the Front: the Diary of Lieutenant-Colonel Allen Whitty, 
Worcestershire Regiment, 1914–1919, ed. E. Astill (Eastbourne, 2011), pp. 22–31; H. A. Stewart, 
From Mons to Loos: Being the Diary of a Supply Officer (Edinburgh, 1916), pp. 54–72.
15 GARC, Urwick papers, 8/4, apprenticeship to management, pp. 34, 47; 8/3/2, 
management pilgrimage, p. 3; F. Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die (London, 1933), p. 27.
16 J. Spencer, ‘“The big brain in the army”: Sir William Robertson as quartermaster-
general’, in Stemming the Tide: Officers and Leadership in the British Expeditionary Force 1914, 
ed. S. Jones (Solihull, 2013), pp. 89–107, at p. 97. Urwick recalled the scene at one roadside 
dump where, had it not been for the posting of guards with fixed bayonets, the Royal 
Irish Rifles ‘would have looted the lot’. See GARC, Urwick papers, 8/4, apprenticeship to 
management, p. 37.
17 TNA, WO 95/27, branches and services: quarter-master general, Robertson to Maxwell, 
23 Oct. 1914; W. R. Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal (London, 1921), pp. 208–10.
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The initial campaigns of the First World War underlined the inaccuracy 
of Lord Kitchener’s insistence that Sir John French’s command was ‘an 
entirely independent one’.18 The arrangements by which control of the 
railway network remained in the hands of Grand Quartier Général (GQG), 
and the relative strengths of the French and British forces, ensured that 
priority was consistently given to the demands of the former during the 
emergency of the war’s opening months. All orders for railway transport 
had to be made through the French railway authorities. Therefore, the BEF 
was entirely reliant upon their host’s willingness to run trains filled with 
British supplies.19 By the end of September Robertson grumbled that he 
had ‘always doubted the possibility of our obtaining much, if any, transport 
from French sources’.20 Furthermore, GQG allotted the best railheads to 
French troops, which forced the BEF to rely on inferior facilities, and when 
French supply trains blocked the lines ahead of British railheads the BEF 
simply had to wait. As battle raged around Ypres on 23 October, Robertson 
observed with mounting frustration that the troops were struggling to 
obtain sufficient ammunition:
Some of the ammunition trains yesterday were within a few miles of our 
railheads but we could not get them there. It seems ridiculous that it should 
take some eighteen hours from Boulogne [to] here but it does, and the greater 
part of that time is probably spent near where we are … If anything goes wrong 
with the ammunition train there may be a shortage, of which there can be 
no greater QMG’s offence. Besides, it is exceedingly wearing and worrying 
for one every day to be wondering whether the ammunition required will be 
forthcoming.21
The French army was engaged heavily in a struggle for national survival 
alongside a small, untested force, perceived in Paris as hesitant and unreliable. 
Unsurprisingly, the BEF’s requests were persistently subordinated by GQG 
to the demands of their own troops and civilian population.
The discussions surrounding the BEF’s transfer to Flanders ahead of the 
first Ypres battle neatly illustrate the reality of the Franco-British relationship 
in 1914. In late September Sir John conceived a plan to unite his forces and 
undertake a huge enveloping manoeuvre against the Germans concentrated 
18 W. Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18 
(Basingstoke, 1996), pp. 15–16.
19 TNA, WO 95/3949, headquarters branches and services. Inspector general, Robertson 
to Maxwell, 24 Oct. 1914.
20 TNA, WO 95/3949, IGC war diary, Robertson to Maxwell, 29 Sept. 1914.
21 TNA, WO 95/27, QMG war diary, Robertson to Maxwell, 23 Oct. 1914. Emphasis in 
original.
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on Lille. The plan would take ‘a week or nine days’ to execute, and if successful 
would put an end to the German invasion of France.22 Sir John wrote to his 
opposite number, the French commander-in-chief General Joseph Joffre, to 
forcefully request that British troops be moved north to put his ambitious 
plan into action. ‘Both from strategical reasons and tactical reasons’, Sir John 
argued, ‘it is desirable that the British Army should regain its position on 
the left of the line. There remains the question of when this move should 
take place. I submit that now is the time’.23 In response, Joffre stated that he 
would ‘endeavour to satisfy this request’, but warned that ‘the movement of 
the British troops can only be carried out in succession’. Joffre’s letter went 
on to ‘assure Marshal French’ that ‘the greatest efforts’ would be made to 
concentrate the whole of the BEF in the northern sector of the front, but 
noted that to immediately comply with Sir John’s wishes would severely delay 
the French army’s intended operations. Consequently, the British troops 
moved not as a whole but in small groups, and they travelled according to a 
schedule devised at GQG rather than GHQ.24
The BEF’s movement to Flanders and the onset – although not perceived 
as such at the time – of static warfare, provided Robertson and his colleagues 
with an opportunity to reflect on the efficacy of the transport arrangements 
on the western front. To maintain a regular supply to their forces, the British 
needed a thoroughly staffed traffic organization able to coordinate the 
BEF’s transport needs with those of the French. The first steps to providing 
such an organization had already been taken. Between 18 September and 
1 October, the BEF’s railway transport establishment more than doubled 
thanks to the arrival of thirty-two new officers in France, while several 
officers with experience on the Indian railways – including Major Henry 
Freeland and Lieutenant-Colonel Valentine Murray – took up positions 
on the IGC’s staff to coordinate their activities. By 10 October the newly 
established traffic office, under Freeland’s command, had seventy-five men 
at its disposal to facilitate the BEF’s movements on the French railways.25
22 S. Badsey, ‘Sir John French and command of the BEF’, in Stemming the Tide: Officers 
and Leadership in the British Expeditionary Force 1914, ed. S. Jones (Solihull, 2013), pp. 27–
50, at p. 48.
23 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 2/73/62, note (signed by Sir John French), 29 Sept. 1914. 
Emphasis in original.
24 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 2/2/85, Joffre to French, 5 Oct. 1914; TNA, WO 95/27, 
QMG war diary, Railway transport for the British army, 12 Oct. 1914; Le Hénaff and 
Bornecque, Les chemins de fer français, p. 223; Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, p. 19. 
See Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 73 for a schedule of the rail movements involved 
in the transfer of British troops from the Aisne, and Indian divisions from Marseille, to the 
northern flank of the French army.
25 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 41.
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Further forward, the BEF’s contribution to the construction and repair 
of railways was also dealt with. Colonel Twiss took up his duties as DRT 
on 16 September, and attended a meeting at GQG to discuss the subject 
of railway construction the following day. The 8th (Railway) Company, 
Royal Engineers, had been in France for a month. Since their arrival the 
company had laid a short length of siding in the port of Le Havre and 
shadowed the work of French railway engineers, but by mid September 
the company had achieved little of value to the allies. Indeed, such was the 
unit’s perceived redundancy that in late August a proposal had been floated 
that men without knowledge of specific railway trades should be withdrawn 
to replace losses among the front-line troops.26 Following Twiss’s meeting at 
GQG the French agreed to modify the pre-war arrangements, and accepted 
the offer of British railway troops to assist with repairs on the Chemins 
de Fer du Nord – provided that the French retained overall control of the 
work undertaken. The 8th (Railway) Company was immediately set to 
work repairing the Pont de Metz, ‘a lofty brick bridge of two spans’ to the 
south-west of Amiens that had been destroyed by the Germans during their 
retreat from the Marne. Upon completion of the heavy timbering work 
required for the ‘semi-permanent repairs’ to the bridge the company headed 
to St Omer en Chaussée and Gamaches, where they worked alongside 300 
employees of the Nord railway to install short connections that eliminated 
the need for engines to be reversed on single lines.27
With the BEF’s available transport assets fully engaged in the task of 
keeping the troops supplied and the French army aware of their requirements, 
a comprehensive examination of the BEF’s supply arrangements could not 
be handled from within. Therefore, when Colonel Twiss and Lieutenant-
Colonel Murray arrived at the IGC’s office to commence an investigation 
into the BEF’s transport organization, they were accompanied by a transport 
expert sent to France by Kitchener to oversee the task. Despite the rank, 
Brigadier-General Sir Édouard Percy Cranwill Girouard was not a serving 
officer in October 1914. However, his role cannot be considered equivalent 
to that of the purely civilian railway experts that contributed to the army’s 
operations later in the conflict. Girouard, a French-Canadian from Montreal, 
had acquired railway construction and operation experience – both in 
war and peace – across three continents. After graduation from the Royal 
Military College at Kingston he had spent two years on the engineering 
staff of the Canadian Pacific Railway, before he accepted a commission in 
26 Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 53–4.
27 TNA, WO 95/4052, lines of communication troops. 8 Railway Company Royal 
Engineers, diary entries, 28 Aug. to 21 Oct. 1914.
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the Royal Engineers to become the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich’s first traffic 
manager.28
At Woolwich Girouard observed the ‘confusion and waste’ that emerged 
when competing departments attempted to exert influence over a shared 
transport system. Before his arrival no central administration existed to 
oversee traffic flows around the 824-acre site, and each factory had arranged 
their own train schedules on the arsenal’s narrow-gauge railway. Girouard 
took control of the rolling stock and motive power – thirty-six engines and 
1,000 carriages, vans and trucks – and centralized all traffic requests within 
the arsenal. Under his authority, the narrow gauge became an integral 
component of operations at Woolwich, provided a ‘valuable link between 
office and shop, storehouse and magazine’, and even acted as a passenger 
service for the employees of various factories.29
If Woolwich had taught Girouard that competitive behaviour between 
units that were working towards a shared goal had to be avoided – whether 
in the south-west of London or the north-east of France – his next role 
exposed him to the practical advantages to be gained from the use of 
railways for military purposes. In 1896 he was seconded to the Egyptian 
army, and was responsible for overseeing the construction of a railway 
across the Nubian Desert early the following year.30 By July 1898 the 
‘cholera-decimated’ engineers under his charge had extended the railway 
to Atbara, and the line was of sufficient quality to sustain Kitchener’s 
22,000-strong force as it triumphed at Omdurman. According to 
Edward Spiers, ‘this remarkable victory in which 10,200 Mahdists had 
been killed, and possibly another 16,000 wounded in a morning, derived 
from the transformative effect of the Sudan Military Railway’.31 Girouard 
received the Distinguished Service Order for his efforts on the project 
and was appointed president of the Egyptian railway and telegraph 
administration. However, less than a year later his services were required 
in a theatre of war at the other end of Africa. Girouard became director 
28 R. P. T. Davenport-Hines, ‘Girouard, Sir Édouard Percy Cranwill’, in Dictionary of 
Business Biography: a Biographical Dictionary of Business Leaders Active in Britain in the 
Period 1860–1980, ed. D. J. Jeremy (5 vols., London, 1984), ii. 570–4; J. Flint, ‘Girouard, Sir 
(Édouard) Percy Cranwill (1867–1932)’, ODNB <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/33415> 
[accessed 14 Sept. 2014]; O. F. G. Hogg, The Royal Arsenal: its Background, Origin and 
Subsequent History (2 vols., Oxford, 1963), ii. 878, 1292; M. Smithers, The Royal Arsenal 
Railways: the Rise and Fall of a Military Railway Network (Barnsley, 2016).
29 Hogg, The Royal Arsenal, pp. 878, 1309–10.
30 W. Baker Brown, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers (11 vols., Chatham, 1952), iv. 
256–66; J. N. Westwood, Railways at War (London, 1980), p. 94.
31 E. M. Spiers, Engines for Empire: the Victorian Army and its Use of Railways (Manchester, 
2015), pp. 96–111.
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of railways in South Africa following the outbreak of hostilities with the 
Boers in 1899.
The war in South Africa presented Girouard and his staff with a range of 
operational challenges. The British captured some 1,100 miles of damaged 
railways from the Boers and utilized thousands of miles of railway to supply 
an army of 250,000 troops.32 As director of railways he assembled a ‘special 
military staff’ to act as the sole channel of communications between the army 
and the technical railway personnel. The directorate provided a centralized 
organization for the management and maintenance of the network, and 
ensured that the overall efficiency of railway operations was not jeopardized 
by the localized concerns of commanders ignorant of the force’s overall 
transport priorities. Following the war, Girouard catalogued the lessons 
that had emerged from the British army’s largest undertaking prior to 1914. 
Alongside delivering a lecture, subsequently published in the Royal Engineers 
Journal, he wrote the first volume of History of the Railways during the War 
in South Africa, 1899–1902 in 1903.33 The text was quickly recognized as a 
valuable educational resource for officers tasked with understanding the role 
of railways in modern warfare and, despite post-war fiscal retrenchment that 
precluded the publication of subsequent volumes in the series through official 
channels, the Royal Engineers chose to publish the works themselves.34
The publication of Girouard’s histories emphasized their author’s 
mastery of the details and the high regard with which the army valued his 
expertise on railway matters.35 His specialist background, coupled with his 
fluency in the French language, made him an obvious choice to undertake 
the transport investigation in October 1914. He met first with Sir Ronald 
Maxwell, who had taken over from Sir Frederick Robb as IGC on 19 
September, before he travelled to Paris to discuss matters with the military 
commission responsible for running the Chemins de Fer du Nord and the 
French director of railways. Prior to his departure from France he met with 
Robertson at GHQ and visited the port of Boulogne to assess its suitability 
as an army base.36 The report he submitted after his inspection outlined 
32 For a brief overview of the British army’s operation of railways in the South African war, 
see C. M. Watson, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers (11 vols., Chatham, 1914), iii. 104–8.
33 É. P. C. Girouard, History of the Railways during the War in South Africa, 1899–1902 
(London, 1903); É. P. C. Girouard, ‘Railways in war’, Royal Engineers Journal, ii (1905), 
16–27.
34 ‘Detailed history of the railways in the South African War, 1899–1902’, Royal Engineers 
Journal, i (1905), 133–5.
35 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, ‘Canada in Africa: Sir Percy Girouard, neglected colonial 
governor’, African Affairs, lxxxiii (1984), 207–39, at p. 237.
36 TNA, WO 32/5144, report on rail transport arrangements for British army on the 
continent by General Sir E. Girouard, Girouard to Cowans, 24 Oct. 1914.
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the French system of railway organization, and compared it both with the 
practice recommended in the pre-war British Field Service Regulations (FSR) 
and the system in place at the time of his visit. The French railways – quite 
apart from the efforts required to mobilize and concentrate the French 
army, transport the BEF inland from the ports and remove hundreds of 
thousands of civilians from the areas of France and Belgium under threat 
of German invasion – had been called upon to handle large numbers of 
locomotives and rolling stock removed from the Belgian railways and 
the supply of a multitude of entangled fighting units both in retreat and 
advance.37 Robertson’s frustrations with the lack of priority afforded to the 
BEF’s needs notwithstanding, Girouard concluded that the French had 
managed their numerous tasks with a remarkable degree of success.38 Their 
organization resembled Girouard’s system from the Royal Arsenal on a 
far larger scale, with control over the entire network located at GQG. The 
ability to direct railway operations from the principal information centre 
of the French army ensured that they both deployed their resources in 
response to the latest intelligence and could react to Joffre’s strategic designs 
immediately.
The French system of organization compared favourably to that laid 
down in FSR part two. The British divided responsibility for transport 
and supply between two officers. Maxwell, the IGC, maintained stocks at 
the bases and controlled traffic on the lines of communications from his 
headquarters at the BEF’s advanced base.39 Robertson described Maxwell’s 
role as ‘something like the managing directors of Harrods’ Stores and Carter 
Paterson rolled into one’.40 Robertson, the QMG, worked alongside Sir 
John French at GHQ and took charge of the administrative arrangements 
between Maxwell and the units at the front. Under the guidelines laid 
down before August 1914 the general staff was to identify priorities for 
movement, Robertson to issue instructions to the relevant units and 
Maxwell to coordinate the move.41 The system collapsed on contact with 
the enemy. Between 25 August and 1 September GHQ changed location 
five times. The frequency of GHQ’s movements afforded little opportunity 
for adequate communications to be established at each site, which made 
contact between Maxwell and Robertson almost impossible to sustain. 
37 Le Hénaff and Bornecque, Les chemins de fer français, pp. 31–52.
38 TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, pp. 1–2.
39 TNA, WO 33/686, instructions for the IGC, Part II, sections 5–6.
40 Robertson, From Private, p. 199. Carter Paterson was a road haulage firm that sold 
many vehicles and horses to the War Office in 1914.
41 R. G. Miller, ‘The logistics of the British Expeditionary Force: 4 August to 5 September 
1914’, Military Affairs, xliii (1979), 133–8, at p. 133.
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Messages and orders from GHQ regularly failed to reach their destination 
or were wholly inapplicable to the prevailing circumstances by the time they 
arrived. As Captain Tompson reflected, ‘the situation altered so rapidly that 
railheads required to be settled finally only a few hours before the arrival 
of the daily supply trains’.42 With the communications system unable to 
maintain reliable connections between the base depots, GHQ and the 
front, Robertson advocated a temporary abandonment of the principles 
laid down in FSR part two. In its place Robertson favoured the guidelines 
recommended in FSR part one, which emphasized that the ‘man on the 
spot’ use his initiative when the circumstances compelled such an action. 
As Robertson was located at GHQ, the spot upon which the most up-to-
date information on the dispositions of troops and the military situation as 
a whole was to be found, he argued that he was best placed to identify the 
BEF’s priorities and respond to urgent requests.43
To discharge the duties he had taken on, Robertson sought out an expert 
in French railway practices who could coordinate the movements he ordered 
from GHQ. Major Marr Johnson, who had created the railway timetables 
for the WF scheme and worked alongside the French to develop the BEF’s 
concentration inland from the ports, was well equipped for the role. He was 
fully conversant with the technical aspects that governed French railway 
operations, and had been on the IGC’s staff since his arrival in France. 
Johnson arrived at GHQ – supposedly on a temporary basis – on 26 
August, and began to act as an expert conduit between Robertson and the 
French authorities immediately. The sheer volume of railway questions that 
required his expert consideration meant that Johnson remained attached 
to Robertson’s staff, where he was engaged in a process of streamlining the 
BEF’s transport arrangements when Girouard’s examination took place.44
The existence of a solitary British officer with expert knowledge of the 
French railways and their military applications contrasted sharply with the 
expertise available to the French army. Following the defeat of 1870–1, in 
which uncoordinated military command of the railways contributed to 
confusion and congestion on the lines, French efforts had been channelled 
42 BLSC, Tompson papers, LIDDLE/WW1/GS/1612, short account of the introduction 
of an ‘advanced regulating station’ into the French traffic system and the subsequent control 
(British) of the railhead area, p. 1.
43 TNA, WO 95/3950, Headquarters branches and services. Inspector general, French to 
Kitchener, 20 Nov. 1914; Spencer, ‘“The big brain in the army”’, pp. 95–6.
44 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 2/2/83, Robertson to Maxwell, 3 Oct. 1914; TNA, WO 
95/27, QMG war diary, Robertson to Maxwell, 21 Oct. 1914; Henniker, History of the 
Great War, pp. 26–8. The difficulties experienced at Maxwell’s headquarters by Johnson’s 
prolonged absence are discussed in Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 39–41.
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into the establishment of a unified civil–military command system to 
operate the network during wartime.45 As the French director of railways 
admitted to Maxwell in September 1914, the absence of a recognized 
command structure had ‘resulted in most serious failures in the working 
of our railways during the war of 1870’.46 Orders and counter-orders had 
been issued direct to the civilian operating staff by the general staff, the 
administrative staff, individual departments and even the minister of war.47 
The French were keen to avoid a repeat, and established an administrative 
system that reduced the possibility of contradictory and conflicting orders 
being issued by local commanders unaware of the army’s wider requirements. 
Upon mobilization in 1914 the entire network came under the control of 
a single railway authority, which consisted of commissions made up of 
senior military officers and professional railwaymen with an encyclopaedic 
knowledge of their portion of the system. Each of the commissions existed 
in peacetime, and took over their designated section of the network upon 
mobilization.48 Therefore, the staff on each line possessed an intimate 
knowledge of the system’s limitations, and were thoroughly aware of 
individual stations’ capacities. The combination of military and civilian 
expertise minimized the prospect of trains being despatched to stations 
incapable of handling them, and the location of the railway directorate at 
GQG ensured that orders were sent from the source best placed to take a 
holistic view of the situation.
The methodical structure of the French organization contrasted sharply 
with Girouard’s assessment of the BEF’s arrangements. Johnson’s transfer 
to GHQ symbolized the collapse of FSR part two’s guidelines, which were 
themselves an abandonment of the principles Girouard had advocated 
a decade earlier. Maxwell was unable to comply with the directive that 
all communications with the French railway authorities were to be 
made through the IGC’s office because the officer responsible for those 
communications no longer worked there.49 However, Johnson’s relocation 
had not engendered a thorough re-examination of the BEF’s administrative 
structure. The various directorates concerned with supply and movement 
continued to be split between the IGC’s headquarters and GHQ. The 
45 F. P. Jacqmin, Les chemins de fer pendant la guerre de 1870–1871: leçons faites en 1872 à 
l’École des Ponts-et-Chaussées (2nd edn.,Paris, 1874), pp. 55–87.
46 The directeur des chemins de fer to Maxwell, 19 Sept. 1914, quoted in Henniker, History 
of the Great War, p. 5.
47 Girouard, ‘Railways in war’, pp. 17–18.
48 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/F/18/2/8, Geddes to Lloyd George, 8 Aug. 1918.
49 TNA, WO 33/686, instructions for the IGC, Part II, section 6; WO 32/5144, Girouard 
report, pp. 6–8.
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director of works, for example, reported to Robertson. However, his office 
space was located at Maxwell’s base on the lines of communications.50 
Effective liaison between the two staffs, particularly given the unsatisfactory 
state of communications during the war of movement, had proven largely 
impracticable.
Following the tumult of defensive action, retreat, advance, offensive 
operation and movement around the front, Girouard’s investigation 
represented both the BEF’s first attempt to assess the applicability of 
pre-war regulations to wartime conditions and its first opportunity to 
replace reactive, ad hoc adjustments to the system with an effective, long-
term solution. Girouard’s recommendations consisted of abandoning the 
guidelines laid down in FSR part two and replicating the French system of 
organization. He argued that the BEF had to establish coordination between 
the French and British railway staffs at all levels of authority, right up to the 
executive branch of the transport hierarchy, upon which the British point of 
view was absent.51 A modification on these lines, Girouard suggested, would 
provide the BEF with a forum within which it could influence the allies’ 
future transport policy. The French had begun to request that British troops 
be provided to repair lines behind the BEF in the event of a general advance, 
and Girouard deemed it highly desirable that any organization established 
to oversee the reconstruction and operation of the Belgian railways ‘should 
have a considerable [British] voice’.52
Both Robertson and Maxwell had already recognized the need for greater 
liaison between the French and British staffs. Their attempts to provide 
better facilities for inter-allied contact included Twiss’s arrival in France 
and the increased establishment of railway transport officers on the lines 
of communications. However, Girouard believed that Twiss had ‘not [yet] 
been encouraged to take his proper place in the field and assume control’ 
of the BEF’s railway staff.53 The former’s report codified the latter’s role as 
DRT in France. Twiss’s directorate became responsible for collecting the 
‘various demands for railway transport’ that arose across the BEF, and for 
coordinating them ‘in the manner best suited to meet the organization of 
the British Army, while putting as little strain on the French railways, which 
were being worked under very high pressure’.54 In the final five months 
50 Brown, British Logistics, pp. 48–55; J. E. Edmonds, History of the Great War: Military 
Operations, France and Belgium, 1914 (2 vols., London, 1928), i. 415–16.
51 TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, pp. 5–6, 12.
52 TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, p. 12; Girouard to Cowans, 24 Oct. 1914.
53 TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, pp. 6–7.
54 TNA, WO 107/69, work of the QMG’s branch of the staff: and directorates controlled, 
British armies in France and Flanders 1914–1918: Report, p. 15.
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of 1914 alone, the northern and eastern networks in France carried 12,000 
supply trains for the French and British armies – far higher than the volume 
of peacetime traffic but, unsurprisingly, well below the traffic figures 
recorded as the war expanded in scale in subsequent years.55 The success 
with which Twiss felt he had achieved harmonious relations with the French 
railway staff was summed up in a letter that he sent to his counterpart in 
June 1915. Twiss celebrated the ‘confidence and good feeling between your 
railway staff and mine … and may I also say my dear Colonel Le Hénaff, 
between you and me, [which] is a matter of the greatest satisfaction to 
me’.56 Twiss’s retention of Marr Johnson – well known among the French 
staff – as assistant DRT undoubtedly contributed to the ‘good feeling’ that 
accompanied Franco-British collaboration on railway matters after October 
1914.
The whereabouts of Twiss’s department also solved the question of which 
senior officer, Robertson or Maxwell, should take responsibility for traffic 
coordination on the western front. Maxwell, identified as the authority in 
the pre-war instructions, had proven unable to exercise effective control 
over the railways. It was impossible for Maxwell to retain responsibility 
for the coordination of traffic unless the supply departments were placed 
under his direct control, which meant their relocation from GHQ and 
an inevitable reduction in their access to the latest intelligence on the 
army’s requirements. These disadvantages produced agreement between 
Maxwell and Robertson that Girouard’s recommendations should be 
adhered to, the French hierarchy mirrored and the DRT accommodated 
at GHQ. Consequently, Robertson accepted overall responsibility for the 
coordination of the BEF’s traffic arrangements.57
Maxwell and Robertson’s adaptability in October 1914 confirms 
Ian M. Brown’s argument that a working environment fostered by staff 
college training, pragmatism and professionalism existed within the BEF’s 
administrative echelons.58 Robertson’s actions during the retreat from 
Mons were evidence of his belief that regulations and procedures were 
‘hand-rails to guide decision-making rather than barriers to creativity’, 
55 Le Hénaff and Bornecque, Les chemins de fer français, p. 63. In 1915 the figure rose to 
65,000, or 180 trains per day. In 1916 it rose still further, to 84,500 (an average of 231 per 
day). The figure decreased in 1917 to 72,000 trains before it rose again in the first half of 1918 
to 45,000 trains.
56 TNA, WO 95/64, branches and services: director of railway transport, Twiss to Le 
Hénaff, 19 June 1915.
57 TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, Maxwell to Robertson, 23 Oct. 1914; WO 95/3949, 
IGC war diary, Robertson to Maxwell, 24 Oct. 1914.
58 Brown, British Logistics, p. 61.
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while Maxwell’s admission that ‘the French system is likely to give the best 
results’ highlights the broadminded response to Girouard’s investigation 
from the officer most directly affected by the proposed changes.59 However, 
Maxwell’s and Robertson’s approach was not universally accepted within 
the army, as the War Office’s responses to Girouard’s report demonstrate. 
The former IGC, Sir Frederick Robb, denounced Girouard’s proposals as 
‘nothing new’ and criticized the ‘absurdity’ of holding one man responsible 
for all transport requirements in the theatre of war. Furthermore, while 
Robb noted correctly that the system Girouard had reviewed was not that 
recommended in the pre-war guidelines, he blamed the ‘co-efficient of 
human nature’ for the modifications to those instructions that had taken 
place between August and October 1914. The thinly veiled implication 
of Robb’s statement was that Robertson’s actions, rather than a genuine 
response to inadequate communications between the BEF’s administrative 
departments, had been an attempt to centralize authority under himself 
and reduce the IGC’s influence.60 An even more condemnatory reaction to 
Girouard’s report emerged from the QMG of the forces, Sir John Cowans. 
In a note written three days after Girouard submitted his observations – and 
with the fighting for the town of Ypres increasing in intensity – Cowans 
argued that Girouard had ‘far exceeded his instructions. He was not told to 
produce a scheme for uprooting organizations deliberately laid down after 
deep deliberation … The Regulations have been issued and acted upon and 
it is no time in the middle of a campaign to tinker with them’. For Cowans, 
despite his personal misgivings about the ‘anomalies’ in the structure of 
the BEF’s original supply system, the short-term exigency of ensuring the 
troops engaged around Ypres remained fed and equipped superseded the 
rearrangement of rearward services decided upon before the war.61
The contents of Cowans’s note flatly contradict the commentary on 
Girouard’s report that appeared in a hagiographic biography of the former 
published after his death. Cowans’s biographers claimed that the report 
had been ‘shelved’ by the BEF, ‘most probably because the authorities 
in France were not ready for any change and because they … resented 
anything that looked even faintly like interference from home’.62 This 
statement is not borne out by the evidence, such as Sir John’s confirmation 
59 Spencer, ‘“The big brain in the army”’, p. 106; TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, 
Maxwell to Robertson, 23 Oct. 1914.
60 TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, note by Major-General Sir F. S. Robb on Sir Percy 
Girouard’s proposals, n.d., pp. 1–3.
61 TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, note on memo. by Sir P. Girouard, 27 Oct. 1914.
62 D. Chapman-Huston and O. Rutter, General Sir John Cowans, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.: the 
Quartermaster-General of the Great War (2 vols., London, 1924), ii. 102.
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to Kitchener that the centralization of responsibility under the QMG 
was ‘working to the satisfaction of all concerned’ after a month,63 or 
Robertson’s correspondence with Cowans following the reorganization. 
Far from exhibiting lingering resent over Girouard’s contribution, 
Robertson wrote to enquire whether the Canadian was going to return 
to France to address the many ‘important questions’ on the operation of 
the Belgian railways that required consideration.64 French and Belgian 
representatives had already engaged in bilateral discussions and, in an echo 
of Girouard’s observations, Robertson underlined the need for the BEF to 
have a ‘voice’ in any formal agreements reached between their coalition 
partners. For reasons that have not been established, Colonel Henniker, 
rather than Girouard, was chosen to participate in what became known 
as the Calais commissions. However, as Robertson’s letter makes clear, the 
decision over Girouard’s non-participation was made in London rather 
than at GHQ.65
Girouard’s report contained only one recommendation that the BEF 
could be accused of having ‘shelved’. To guarantee Britain’s possession of 
sufficient dock accommodation to offload the troops and supplies (and to 
store the latter) required to maintain the BEF over the winter and beyond, 
Girouard advised that the pre-war agreements with the French needed to be 
revisited.66 In early December 1914 Maxwell amplified Girouard’s concerns 
in letters to Robertson, which voiced the IGC’s concern that the limit for 
traffic allotted to the BEF was about to be reached. He warned that only 
two additional infantry divisions and a cavalry division could be supplied 
through the existing port space allocated to the BEF, and urged GHQ to 
consider the establishment of a second line of communications and request 
immediate access to Dieppe.67 However, in an early demonstration that 
the BEF was never the sole focus of British military attention during the 
war, Sir John was reluctant to commence negotiations with the French over 
port space until the outcome of developments ‘in the Eastern theatre of 
operations’ became clearer. Consequently, the matter was dropped for the 
rest of the year.68
63 TNA, WO 95/3950, IGC war diary, French to Kitchener, 20 Nov. 1914.
64 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 2/2/24, Robertson to Cowans, 28 Nov. 1914.
65 Henniker recorded the outcome of the commission’s deliberations in his volume of the 
official history. See Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 93–101.
66 TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, p. 15.
67 TNA, WO 95/3951, headquarters branches and services. Inspector general, Maxwell to 
Robertson, 1 and 5 Dec. 1914.
68 TNA, WO 95/3951, IGC war diary, Robertson to Maxwell, 3 Dec. 1914; Brown, British 
Logistics, p. 76.
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Sir John’s ‘wait and see’ approach exemplified a desire not to commence 
potentially longwinded negotiations over organizations, allocations and 
responsibilities that – should the fighting formations achieve success 
– may never be required. Throughout the First World War, as will be 
demonstrated further below, the allies had to balance the requirements of 
their immediate demands with preparations to ensure sufficient resources 
for the continuation of a war of indeterminate length. His views reflected 
a widespread tendency to regard the trench-bound stalemate of late 1914 as 
a temporary anomaly, and were founded on the hope that the BEF would 
soon be operating again on Belgian rather than French soil.
This optimistic outlook, combined with the French army’s continued 
desire to adhere to the pre-war agreement, thwarted a second attempt to 
re-evaluate the BEF’s transport arrangements in the war’s first six months. 
In December 1914 Kitchener summoned Eric Geddes, the railway organizer 
he had been impressed by a decade earlier in India, to a meeting at the 
War Office. In the Geddes family chronicle, written by Geddes’s younger 
brother Auckland, what happened next was presented as an example of the 
insular and protective military family closing ranks to avoid the criticisms 
of an expert from outside the profession. Auckland Geddes claimed that 
Kitchener wished to send Eric to France to ‘see what was wrong’ with the 
BEF’s transport services, but that the proposition was vetoed by Cowans:
Eric realised … that such a mission would be hopeless unless he had the good 
will of the soldiers; and, from the way in which Lord Kitchener, in Eric’s 
presence, sprang the proposal on a totally unprepared QMG, it was obvious 
that the officer must think Eric had already passed adverse judgment on his 
department’s handling of railway transport. In such circumstances good will 
would inevitably be lacking.69
It was not the first time that Geddes had been in contact with the War 
Office since the start of the conflict. In August 1914 he had approached the 
DOM, Brigadier-General Richard Montagu Stuart-Wortley, with the idea 
of raising a battalion of skilled railwaymen of all grades for service in France. 
Stuart-Wortley rebuffed the approach, and Geddes wrote later that he had 
been told ‘that the military railway personnel were competent to deal with 
the situation in France and that railway units were not wanted’. Doubtless 
coloured by that incident, Geddes reflected that Stuart-Wortley’s rejection 
of his offer was the result of the latter’s membership of a ‘military machine’ 
that was not prepared to accept civilian specialists in its ranks.70 The legacy 
69 A. C. Geddes, The Forging of a Family: a Family Story Studied in its Genetical, Cultural and 
Spiritual Aspects and a Testament of Personal Belief Founded Thereon (London, 1952), p. 222.
70 Geddes’s introduction in J. Shakespear, A Record of the 17th and 32nd Service Battalions 
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of this misunderstanding, as demonstrated by Geddes’s recollection of the 
event twelve years later, needlessly politicized the transportation mission in 
1916 and infused Geddes’s memory of his second attempt to work alongside 
the army at Kitchener’s behest in December 1914.
Cowans was a fellow officer of the Rifle Brigade and close friend of 
Stuart-Wortley’s, and Geddes later suggested to Lloyd George that it was 
personal jealousy and professional ‘demarcation’ that curtailed any possible 
transportation mission in January 1915.71 Cowans’s biographers made no 
mention of the meeting in their celebratory account of the QMG’s career, 
perhaps as a result of Geddes’s subsequent contributions to the British 
war effort, while Peter Cline’s alternative proposal – that the North-
Eastern Railway’s reluctance to release Geddes contributed to the scheme’s 
abandonment – appears unlikely.72 The North-Eastern’s chairman did write 
that the ‘board of the … railway were loath to dispense with Mr Geddes’s 
services, even for a short period’ when Lloyd George recruited Geddes 
for the Ministry of Munitions the following summer,73 but the company 
conceded that its deputy general manager was ‘not very fully employed’ 
by the railway’s wartime operations. Under such circumstances, Alexander 
Kaye Butterworth observed, ‘when every man of ability should be utilised 
to the best advantage of the State, I feel it to be one’s duty to let those in 
authority know of any good men who are “spare”’.74
Yet it would be unfair to portray the aborted transportation mission, and 
the earlier dismissal of Geddes’s offer of a specialist railway battalion, as 
purely the result of rhadamanthine military attitudes to civilian assistance 
in Whitehall. Cowans, for example, was a prominent early advocate of 
civil–military collaboration in the field of army sustenance. At Deptford 
Cattle Market, rented from the City of London Corporation for military 
use at the start of the war, Cowans ‘realised from the outset’ that the depots 
required ‘men with business, rather than military experience to run them 
and to maintain their efficiency once they were organised’. Each depot was 
Northumberland Fusiliers, N.E.R. Pioneers, 1914–1919, ed. H. Shenton Cole (Newcastle upon 
Tyne, 1926), p. xiii.
71 TNA, MUN 9/35, Geddes. A handwritten, undated note in this file suggests that 
Kitchener’s project fell through when the QMG’s department claimed responsibility over 
railway organization in France; K. Grieves, ‘The transportation mission to GHQ, 1916’, 
in ‘Look to Your Front!’ Studies in the First World War by the British Commission for Military 
History, ed. B. Bond et al. (Staplehurst, 1999), pp. 63–78, at p. 71.
72 Chapman-Huston and Rutter, Sir John Cowans; P. K. Cline, ‘Eric Geddes and the 
“experiment” with businessmen in government, 1915–22’, in Essays in Anti-Labour History, 
ed. K. D. Brown (London, 1974), pp. 74–104, at p. 77.
73 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/D/1/2/6, Knaresborough to Lloyd George, 5 June 1915.
74 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/D/1/2/1, Butterworth to Lloyd George, 27 May 1915.
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managed by a businessman, supported by ‘junior officers with thorough 
knowledge of railway work, shipping, labour, accounting, etc., so that the 
whole of the work was carried out, as far as possible, on business lines’.75 
Furthermore, less than a month prior to the uncomfortable meeting 
between Kitchener, Geddes and Cowans, the latter had been instrumental 
in the recruitment of Commander Gerald Holland to create an inland 
water transport (IWT) department on the western front (see Chapter 5).
These examples illustrate that the British army was receptive to 
specialist, non-military advice in early 1915. However, the differences 
between the Deptford Cattle Market on the one hand, and the proposed 
Geddes mission on the other hand, were considerable. Deptford Cattle 
Market was a British base, located in the centre of London and free of 
any requirement to consider the wishes of Britain’s coalition partners. 
The French railway network remained firmly under the control of the 
French rail authorities, who had shown little inclination to materially 
alter the arrangements both nations had agreed to before the war. Under 
such circumstances – and considering Girouard’s recently completed 
investigation, the comparatively miniscule size of the BEF’s demands, the 
continued applicability of the pre-war agreement and the apathy of his 
subordinates towards the proposal – it is perhaps understandable that 
Kitchener did not consider another transportation mission to be a high 
priority at the start of 1915. 
The allies’ failure to produce a substantial battlefield success, rather 
than military intransigence, was responsible for GHQ’s inability to act 
upon the most prominent of Girouard’s recommendations. The division 
of responsibility between the French and British forces for the repair and 
operation of the Belgian State Railways in the event of an allied advance 
consumed much of Girouard’s discussions with the French railway 
authorities. Girouard recognized that there was ‘little doubt that any 
retirement of the enemy [would] be accompanied by very grave damage to 
the railway lines and structures. Much damage’, he observed, had ‘already 
been effected both by the Belgian authorities and the enemy’. The Belgian 
public works department, responsible for repairs to the railway network 
in wartime, had ‘practically disappeared’, and the staff of the Belgian State 
Railways were scattered across occupied, allied and neutral European 
territory.76 Therefore, Girouard argued, it was important that the coalition 
partners agreed their duties with regard to the repair and operation of the 
railway lines before they were liberated from German occupation (the ports 
75 Chapman-Huston and Rutter, Sir John Cowans, ii. 55.
76 TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, p. 10.
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of Ostend and Zeebrugge were included in Girouard’s considerations for the 
same reason). For Girouard, the effective exploitation of the Belgian railways 
provided the most important reason why the British needed to possess 
a voice in inter-allied transport discussions. While those conversations 
remained hypothetical until the final months of the war, elsewhere Britain’s 
transport experts became embedded in the very real development of the 
nation’s expanding continental commitment.
Materials, manpower and the continental commitment
The anticipated German retirement failed to materialize in 1915. The western 
front’s relative stability during the year ensured that the BEF’s transport 
experiences were comparatively unremarkable. In the week commencing 10 
March, 25,000 reinforcements were concentrated around Neuve Chapelle, 
while the roads behind the First Army were improved by working parties 
drawn from the 125th Rifles and the 34th Sikh Pioneers, Lahore Division. 
Wooden tramlines ‘greatly facilitated’ the accumulation of ammunition 
in readiness for the attack, as the average number of ammunition wagons 
sent forward rose from fifteen per day to fifty-five in the period 11–15 
March.77 At 7:30 a.m. on 10 March the artillery opened a thirty-five-minute 
bombardment that expended more munitions than the British had fired 
in the entirety of the South African War. Yet Colonel Henniker’s only 
comment on the preparations for the battle claimed that, from a transport 
perspective, they were ‘insignificant’; traffic around the battle zone was 
‘heavy but not more than the railways could cope with’.78
The French transport network had proven itself able to deliver to the 
BEF’s artillery firepower on a scale hitherto unprecedented in British 
military history. Yet as the subsequent fighting in Artois demonstrated, a 
colossal weight of fire at the outset of the attack was not enough to propel 
the attacking troops through the German positions into open country. 
Furthermore, the First Army’s munitions expenditure of 10 March could 
not be sustained without jeopardizing the stockpiles available to the rest 
of the BEF. The First Army had fired the equivalent of 132 rounds per 
18-pounder field gun on 10 March. The rate of fire dropped to sixty-four 
rounds per gun the following day and to forty-nine rounds per gun on 
the 12th. By 16 March the BEF’s supplies of field gun ammunition were 
almost exhausted and, at a replenishment rate of just 7.5 rounds per gun per 
day, it took seventeen days to replace the stocks fired indecisively at Neuve 
77 J. E. Edmonds and G. C. Wynne, History of the Great War: Military Operations, France 
and Belgium, 1915 (2 vols., 1927), i. 82–3.
78 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 118.
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Chapelle. The BEF was unable to maintain pressure on the enemy under 
such circumstances, a fact recognized by Sir John when he announced to 
Kitchener on 15 March that future offensives had been abandoned ‘until 
sufficient reserves are accumulated’.79
The availability and deployment of munitions has been central to many 
debates on the quality of British generalship during the First World War.80 
The South African War had emphasized the ‘absolute necessity’ of a good 
supply of ammunition being made available ‘at the required place at the 
required time’, but it was between 1914 and 1918 that artillery became the 
‘great destructive force’ in modern warfare.81 Artillery fire was responsible 
for perhaps 60 per cent of combatant casualties during the First World 
War, and for much of the devastation of the landscape over which the war 
was fought. Yet in 1915, for a variety of reasons, the available artillery was 
unlikely to hit German targets concealed from view. Consequently, the BEF 
required sufficient volumes of shells to effectively ‘drench’ a target area with 
fire in support of an infantry assault. Under such conditions the strictly 
limited ‘per diem’ allocation of shells reduced the likelihood that enemy 
positions could be suppressed by artillery activity.82 The call for ‘more shells’ 
and ‘more heavy howitzers’ from The Times’s military correspondent in May 
1915 both exposed the paucity of pre-war preparations for a war of extended 
duration and over-simplified a complex technical and organizational 
challenge.83 The heavy howitzers from which the shells were delivered to 
their ultimate recipients in the German lines were just the final step in a vast 
wartime production and distribution network.
The creation of the Ministry of Munitions signified an official recognition 
that the war had outgrown the War Office’s capacity to handle it. As the 
British army had been a comparatively small purchaser of arms before the 
war, the British arms industry was not adapted to the demands of a large 
79 D. French, ‘The military background to the “shell crisis” of May 1915’, Journal of 
Strategic Studies, ii (1979), 192–205, at p. 200; Edmonds and Wynne, History of the Great 
War, i. 149–50.
80 See, e.g., J. B. A. Bailey, The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare 
(Camberley, 1996); R. Prior and T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front: the Military 
Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson, 1914–18 (Oxford, 1991); P. Harris and S. Marble, ‘The “step-
by-step” approach: British military thought and operational method on the western front, 
1915–1917’, War in History, xv (2008), 17–42.
81 R. Prior and T. Wilson, Passchendaele: the Untold Story (New Haven, Conn., 1996), p. 
17.
82 See Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, pp. 36–43 for a discussion of the 
technical framework within which the BEF’s artillery operated in 1915.
83 ‘Shells and the great battle’, The Times, 14 May 1915, p. 9.
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army engaged in protracted operations.84 Furthermore, the arms industry 
and associated sectors had not been subject to government protection at the 
outbreak of war. By mid 1915, as Britain’s industrial labour force participated 
in the so-called rush to the colours, the two government factories and sixteen 
private firms engaged on munitions work were short of 14,000 workers. 
Almost 24 per cent of male employees from the chemical and explosives 
industry, 19.5 per cent from the engineering trades, 18.8 per cent from the 
iron and steel industry and 16.8 per cent from small arms manufacturers had 
enlisted in the army by June 1915.85 The new ministry commenced its work 
from a less than opportune position. However, within one month of taking 
up the newly created post of minister of munitions, David Lloyd George 
had appointed almost one hundred men of ‘first class business experience’ 
to execute the decisions made at the ministry’s headquarters in Whitehall 
Gardens.86 Their principal goal was to coordinate the output of the nation’s 
factories, and to ensure that future battles on the western front were not 
hamstrung by insufficient firepower.
Eric Geddes was among the first railwaymen to apply his business skills 
to the challenge of munitions production, following what Lloyd George 
later referred to as ‘one of the luckiest discoveries in my life’.87 According to 
the Geddes family chronicle, Lloyd George interviewed Geddes with a view 
to utilizing his talents in the newly formed ministry after he had received a 
glowing account of Geddes’s abilities from the foreign secretary, Sir Edward 
Grey (a director and former chairman of the North-Eastern Railway). 
Geddes admitted to knowing nothing about munitions production at his 
interview, but professed a ‘faculty for getting things done’. This conviction 
was supposedly enough for Lloyd George to make Geddes the head of 
a department in the nascent ministry.88 However, as Keith Grieves has 
demonstrated, the accounts provided by Lloyd George and the Geddes 
family of the former’s ‘discovery’ of Eric Geddes were ‘largely fictional’.89 In 
fact, Geddes was first interviewed by Christopher Addison, the ministry’s 
parliamentary secretary, as part of the ‘man-grabbing’ process that took 
84 H. Strachan, The First World War: To Arms (Oxford, 2001), p. 1066.
85 Strachan, To Arms, p. 1071; P. Simkins, Kitchener’s Army: the Raising of Britain’s New 
Armies, 1914–1916 (Manchester, 1988), p. 111.
86 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (2 vols., London, 1938), i. 254.
87 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/F/18/4/36, Lloyd George to Geddes, 24 Feb. 1922.
88 Geddes, The Forging of a Family, p. 223; K. Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes: Business and 
Government in War and Peace (Manchester, 1989), p. 12; TNA, MUN 9/35, ‘Sir Eric Geddes’, 
undated note.
89 K. Grieves, ‘Improvising the British war effort: Eric Geddes and Lloyd George, 1915–
18’, War & Society, vii (1989), 40–55, at p. 40.
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place immediately after the ministry was established.90 Addison’s first 
impression – that Geddes appeared to be ‘first rate’ – was supplemented 
by positive references forwarded to Lloyd George by Grey, Alexander Kaye 
Butterworth, Sir Hugh Bell, Sir Percy Girouard and the North-Eastern’s 
chairman, Lord Knaresborough.91
The positive reports Lloyd George received confirmed what Geddes’s 
pre-war career had demonstrated in detail. His referees described Geddes 
as a successful administrator of complex, large-scale organizations, a man 
of energy, efficiency and drive, and a manager with the capacity to think 
big and work outside the constraints of established routine.92 Geddes had 
successfully managed a vast, geographically dispersed workforce at the 
North-Eastern Railway, a proficiency that suited the national distribution 
of the ministry’s production facilities.
From July 1915 onwards Geddes acted as a trouble-shooter on Lloyd 
George’s behalf. He dealt first with the slow delivery of rifles, then moved 
on to the task of reducing congestion at Woolwich. In December 1915 he 
became head of the national filling factories and component distribution 
organization. Lloyd George’s aversion to questions of detail provided Geddes 
and the ministry’s other directors with executive freedom, which facilitated 
administrative innovation. Over the winter and spring of 1915–16 Geddes 
and the other ‘men of push and go’ that were drawn into the ministry’s 
operations infused the manufacture of munitions with the latest managerial 
methods: the so-called American practice of statistical analysis adapted 
from the North-Eastern Railway; the scientific management techniques 
popularized by Frederick Winslow Taylor; and the motion studies developed 
by Frank and Lilian Gilbreth were all incorporated within the Ministry of 
Munitions’ approach.93
The progressive, analytical managerial style that Geddes had been 
introduced to in the United States – and applied to the operations of the 
North-Eastern Railway for a decade before the war – combined with the 
90 C. Addison, British Workshops and the War (London, 1917), p. 5; R. J. Q. Adams, Arms 
and the Wizard: Lloyd George and the Ministry of Munitions, 1915–1916 (London, 1978), pp. 
38–55.
91 Cline, ‘Eric Geddes and the “experiment”’, p. 78; Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes, pp. 12–13; PA, 
Lloyd George papers, LG/D/1/2/1, Butterworth to Lloyd George, 27 May 1915; LG/D/1/2/2, 
Bell to Lloyd George, 30 May 1915; LG/D/1/2/6, Knaresborough to Lloyd George, 5 June 
1915.
92 Adams, Arms and the Wizard, pp. 45–8.
93 History of the Ministry of Munitions: General Organisation for Munitions Supply (12 vols., 
London, 1922), ii. 19; C. Wrigley, ‘The Ministry of Munitions: an innovatory department’, 
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pioneering methods of some of Britain’s leading industrial figures to raise 
the nation’s munitions output ahead of the battle of the Somme. Through 
a management technique Geddes referred to as ‘intelligent control’ – 
founded upon statistics devised by J. George Beharrell, which allowed the 
team to compare outputs, identify available capacities and create more 
accurate forecasts of production – the department established a more 
efficient method for the use of available labour supplies and raw materials.94 
Improvements in output were substantial, despite the complications 
involved in the production of modern armaments. A single 18-pounder 
shell contained sixty-four components; a complete round of 4.5-inch 
ammunition comprised fifty-seven individual pieces, all of which had to 
be drawn together, assembled, and despatched to the front in an organized, 
efficient flow.95 By 1 June 1915 only 1,992,000 of the 5,573,000 shell bodies 
ordered by the War Office had been delivered. Yet by July 1916 ‘the weekly 
deliveries to the War Office averaged just over a million rounds … of 
which rather over 50 per cent were high explosive shell, as compared with 
a weekly average of 166,500 rounds in June 1915, of which only 23 per cent 
were high explosive’.96 Geddes received a knighthood in recognition of his 
contribution to the vast improvement in munitions production that had 
taken place in the ministry’s first year of existence.
Geddes was by no means the only figure from the transport industry 
to influence the operations of the Ministry of Munitions. Nor were his 
pre-war compatriots employed by the ministry purely for their managerial 
qualities. Both Henry Fowler and Vincent Raven, the chief mechanical 
engineers of the Midland and North-Eastern railways respectively, 
brought technical expertise and supervisory abilities to various facets of 
munitions production. Fowler was initially appointed to direct the national 
projectile factories department, before becoming both deputy controller 
of shell manufacture and superintendent of the Royal Aircraft Factory 
at Farnborough in September 1916. He became assistant director-general 
of aircraft production in December 1917, and chaired the inter-allied 
conference on the standardization of aircraft components in 1918.97 Raven 
initially joined Geddes in the organization of efforts at the Royal Arsenal, 
and acted as chief superintendent at Woolwich from December 1915. When 
the incumbent of the post, Brigadier-General Sir Hay Frederick Donaldson 
94 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/D/3/1/6, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 March 1916.
95 Grieves, ‘Improvising the British war effort’, p. 44; I. F. Marcosson, The Business of War 
(New York, 1918), pp. 269–70.
96 General Organisation for Munitions Supply, pp. 29, 30.
97 General Organisation for Munitions Supply, p. 265; G. W. Carpenter, ‘Fowler, Sir Henry 
(1870–1938)’, ODNB <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/37427> [accessed 29 Sept. 2017].
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– himself a mechanical engineer who had worked for the LNWR, in Goa, 
on the Manchester Ship Canal and at London’s India Docks in a peripatetic 
career – went to the United States and Canada to arrange new sources of 
supply for the British forces, Raven took over his responsibilities. Following 
Donaldson’s death aboard HMS Hampshire in June 1916 (he had been 
selected to act as a technical advisor on Kitchener’s trip to Russia), Raven’s 
temporary appointment was made permanent.98
Raven’s technical background and familiarity with the North-Eastern’s 
statistical methods made him a perfect fit for the task at Woolwich, which 
principally involved the coordination of 88,000 workers. In the House of 
Commons in December 1915, Lloyd George celebrated Raven’s contribution:
The manufacture and filling of various articles has increased since he took it in 
hand in some cases by 60 per cent, and in others by as much as 80 per cent, 
whereas the staff has only increased 23 per cent. One of the reforms he initiated 
are statistical records of the output. These records were not compiled prior to 
his assumption of control. Now they are having, and will continue to have, a 
potent effect not only upon the output, but upon the cost of output. As an 
illustration of the use to which such figures can be put, I will mention that when 
the output of a certain shop or section of a shop is noted the following morning 
it is possible for the superintendent or the works manager to immediately put 
their finger upon the fact that perhaps the flow of raw material fails, or that 
owing to congestion of the arsenal railways the output cannot be got rid of; 
and, therefore, the inefficiency can be checked. Such hitches in the daily work 
of a factory can only be avoided and minimised by a most complete system of 
statistical control, and that has been instituted at Woolwich.99
Both Raven and Fowler received knighthoods for their work in the higher 
administration of the ministry, and demonstrated the transferability of 
skills they had applied successfully to the management of large departments 
within their peacetime professions. As the Ministry of Munitions’ official 
history attests, they were accompanied throughout the nascent organization 
by railway servants from across the British railway industry.100
Yet the contributions of Britain’s transport experts to the widening war 
were not made solely by the employees of British railway companies. Other 
men with valuable experience, such as Alfred Collinson and Follett Holt, 
were drawn into the munitions production effort from much farther afield. 
98 General Organisation for Munitions Supply, p. 272; A. Everett, Visionary Pragmatist: 
Sir Vincent Raven: North Eastern Railway Locomotive Engineer (Stroud, 2006), pp. 131–5; J. 
Pollock, Kitchener (London, 2002), p. 479.
99 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., lxxvii (20 Dec. 1915), col. 105.
100 See the list of some of the principal officers employed in the Ministry of Munitions 
during the war in General Organisation for Munitions Supply, pp. 260–75.
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Collinson’s and Holt’s careers emphasize both the global dispersal of British 
expertise prior to the First World War and the extent of an international 
talent pool open to Britain’s political and military authorities during the 
conflict. Following a career that had begun on the Great Northern Railway 
in the late 1880s, the decade before 1914 saw Collinson acting as engineer-
in-chief on the construction of several railways in China and as a consulting 
engineer to the Chinese Government Railways. Between 1914 and 1918 
he was responsible for the inspection of munitions outside London, and 
travelled across the Atlantic to organize the munitions inspection process 
in the United States. Holt’s engineering career began in the LSWR’s 
locomotive superintendent’s office, and took in service in India and South 
America prior to his retirement in 1910. In April 1915 he became one of the 
first transport experts to acquire a position in the Ministry of Munitions, 
when he entered the shell production organization.101
Holt was by no means unique in possessing an attachment to munitions 
production that pre-dated Lloyd George’s famed recruitment of ‘men 
of push and go’. The pre-war relationship between the military and the 
railway companies facilitated contacts between the two groups, and helped 
place the skills and productive capacity of Britain’s transport experts at the 
War Office’s disposal from the very outset of the war. Sir George Gibb, 
Sir Percy Girouard and George Booth (a ship owner and director of the 
Bank of England), alongside representatives of the machine tools industry 
and private armaments firms, offered their services to the government in 
the conflict’s opening months.102 The royal ordnance factories were first to 
take advantage of the adaptability of the railway companies’ plant, when 
they requested the REC’s assistance in the manufacture of 4.5-inch howitzer 
carriages on 13 August 1914.103 A second request followed in early September, 
as the higher-than-anticipated number of casualties created an urgent 
demand for ambulance stretchers. Eleven companies agreed to construct 
12,250 stretchers between them (see Table 3.1), and the first deliveries were 
made as early as 12 September. A fortnight later twenty-two companies 
from across England, Scotland and Ireland agreed to produce 5,000 general 
service wagons for the Royal Artillery, a figure which ultimately rose to 
101 ‘Alfred Howe Collinson’, Grace’s Guide to British Industrial History, 2017 <http://www.
gracesguide.co.uk/Alfred_Howe_Collinson> [accessed 29 Sept. 2017]; ‘1922 who’s who 
in engineering: name H’, Grace’s Guide to British Industrial History, 2017 <http://www.
gracesguide.co.uk/1922_Who’s_Who_In_Engineering:_Name_H> [accessed 29 Sept. 2017].
102 General Organisation for Munitions Supply, p. 17; D. Crow, A Man of Push and Go: the 
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9,300 wagons as the war progressed. The productive facilities available 
to the railway companies were the subject of further enquiries from the 
Royal Arsenal in October 1914, and by the end of the month the REC had 
recognized the necessity for a civil–military sub-committee to coordinate 
the ‘various requests made by or through the War Office to the railway 
companies to assist in the manufacture of war-like stores and equipment’.104
The creation of a large-scale industrial production system drew heavily 
upon the manufacturing capacity of the railway companies and the 
organizational abilities of their managers, whose professional careers were 
dominated by challenges that involved the coordination of dispersed 
but interlinked activities. Following the constitution of the railway war 
manufactures sub-committee all applications for work to be undertaken on 
behalf of the War Office, or its subcontractors, were submitted to the REC 
through one of two military members of the sub-committee: Captain Henry 
Mance, the pre-war liaison between the army and the railway companies; 
104 E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War: Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and 
Achievements (2 vols., London, 1921), ii. 583–88.
Table 3.1. Railway companies’ manufactures of ambulance stretchers, September 1914.
Railway company Total number to be made
Number to be made 
per week
London and North-Western 2,000 300
Great Western 1,500 200
Midland 1,500 200–250
Great Central 1,000 200
Great Eastern 1,000 500
Lancashire and Yorkshire 1,000 200
London, Brighton and South Coast 1,000 200
North-Eastern 1,000 200
South-Eastern and Chatham 1,000 100
Great Northern 750 100
London and South-Western 500 100
Total 12,250
Note: The Midland Railway increased production from 200 to 250 stretchers in the third week 
of the schedule.
Source: E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War; Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and 
Achievements (2 vols., 1921), ii. 584.
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and Brigadier-General Herbert Guthrie Smith, the director of artillery. The 
railway members – who included the general managers of two railways, 
the chief mechanical engineers of four others and the Midland Railway’s 
carriage and wagon superintendent (see Table 3.2) – decided whether the 
railway companies could fulfil the request and devised a programme for 
completion when the project had been accepted. The sub-committee met 
for the first time on 2 November 1914. By the end of the year the great 
railway workshops at Derby and Swindon had erected and despatched 
twenty-three gun carriages for 8-inch howitzers. Further requests, for 
products that varied from water tanks, miners’ trucks and heavy-capacity 
wagons to picketing posts, artillery wheels and brake blocks arrived from 
the armed forces and private firms between November 1914 and April 1915. 
The railway companies also accepted responsibility for the manufacture of 
‘two armoured trains for home defence, gun carriages and limbers, fittings 
for 60-pounder guns, sets of elevating gear, drop forgings, limber hooks, 
wagon hooks and flanges, [and] mountings for 6-pounder Nordenfeldt 
guns’. Each order was divided between as many as twenty-four companies, 
while four companies committed to work on behalf of the Admiralty in 
addition to their work on the construction of ambulance trains for use at 
home and overseas.105
Yet for the secretary of state for war these efforts did not prove ambitious 
enough. Kitchener believed that further use could be made of the railway 
companies’ facilities. In response, the REC expanded the membership of 
the railway war manufactures sub-committee and inverted the procedure 
by which the companies’ workshops became involved in war-related 
production. The sub-committee was provided with a further representative 
from the War Office, Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Redman, and augmented 
by an extra eleven members from railways across Britain. With further 
input from the Admiralty and – following its creation – the Ministry of 
Munitions, the sub-committee provided a link between the government, 
the railways and the manufacturers of Britain for the remainder of the war. 
From April 1915 the committee took a more active role in the allocation of 
work to the railway workshops. Rather than passively await enquiries from 
the War Office or armament firms, the sub-committee divided the country 
into six districts and despatched members to visit manufacturers in their 
area to ascertain what assistance the railways could offer in the realization of 
their government contracts.106 After just one month the new procedures had 
generated a diverse range of demands for the railways’ plant. The first list of 
105 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 586–7.
106 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 589–90.
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Table 3.2. Members of the railway war manufactures sub-
committee, October 1914 and April 1915.
Name Organization Date of appointment
Military 
representatives
H. Guthrie Smith War Office October 1914
H. O. Mance War Office October 1914
A. S. Redman War Office April 1915
Railway 
company 
managers
A. Beasley Taff Vale Railway April 1915
G. Calthrop* London and North-Western 
Railway
October 1914
C. H. Dent* Great Northern Railway October 1914
D. A. Matheson* Caledonian Railway April 1915
Railway 
superintendent 
officers
D. Bain Midland Railway October 1914
C. J. B. Cooke London and North-Western 
Railway
October 1914
J. Cameron Taff Vale Railway April 1915
G. J. Churchward Great Western Railway October 1914
P. Drummond Glasgow and South-
Western Railway
April 1915
H. D. Earl London and North-Western 
Railway
April 1915
H. Fowler Midland Railway October 1914
H. N. Gresley Great Northern Railway October 1914
A. J. Hill Great Eastern Railway April 1915
G. Hughes Lancashire and Yorkshire 
Railway
October 1914
W. Pickersgill Caledonian Railway April 1915
V. L. Raven North-Eastern Railway April 1915
J. G. Robinson Great Central Railway April 1915
A. R. Trevithick London and North-Western 
Railway
April 1915
E. A. Watson Great Southern and 
Western Railway, Ireland
April 1915
Note: * denotes members of the Railway Executive Committee.
Source: E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War; Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and 
Achievements (2 vols., London, 1921), ii. 586, 589–90.
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items requested of the railway companies ran to eleven pages. It included 
lethal items such as shells, bombs, steel forgings for guns and 6-pounder 
Hotchkiss guns alongside more mundane but morale-boosting equipment 
such as travelling kitchens, kettles and drinking cups. By November 1918 
the railway companies had sub-contracted work from over one hundred 
firms, and the list of items produced at the railway workshops stretched to 
121 pages.107
The pre-war composition of the British railways played a crucial role in 
allowing the railway companies to respond to the army’s needs. The plethora 
of privately owned companies across the country meant that, ‘in important 
respects, the British railways were over-resourced and over-manned, with 
substantially more locomotives and twice the carriages per mile of Germany 
and three times that of France. This surplus capacity became invaluable 
in war time’.108 British railway companies could afford to redirect their 
plant into the production of war-like stores to a degree unobtainable in 
France and Germany without profound implications for the efficiency of 
the railway network – every man employed on the manufacture of gun 
carriages was unavailable for the restoration of the passenger carriages or 
goods wagons that carried the regular and military traffic upon which the 
nation depended.
The application of civilian expertise to the conundrum of munitions 
production greatly increased the BEF’s capacity to wage intensive warfare. 
By 1 July 1916 the BEF possessed 714 heavy guns, more than double the 324 
that had been in France on 1 January that year. By the time the battle of the 
Somme had ground to an inconclusive end in November the number of 
heavies in France had risen to 1,127. As the new divisions of Kitchener’s army 
continued to pour into France – and correspondingly increased the number 
of trains required to service the force’s appetite for food, ammunition and 
other supplies – the formerly insignificant logistical challenges posed 
by the presence of British troops on the continental mainland assumed 
imposing proportions. For the daily provisions of the new army divisions 
alone the French railway network was tasked to accommodate an extra 59.5 
divisionally packed supply trains per week.109
The demand that the French railway authorities provide sufficient 
transport capacity to supply the enlarged BEF in addition to its own 
107 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 594–95, 602.
108 A. Gregory, ‘Railway stations: gateways and termini’, in Capital Cities at War: Paris, 
London, Berlin 1914–1919, ed. J. Winter and J. L. Robert (2 vols., Cambridge, 2007), ii. 
23–56, at p. 27; J. A. B. Hamilton, Britain’s Railways in World War I (London, 1947), pp. 
29–30.
109 Brown, British Logistics, p. 112.
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army’s needs further exposed the inadequacy of the pre-war arrangements 
agreed between the coalition partners. As early as November 1914 the 10th 
(Railway) Company and three special reserve companies were despatched 
to France to join the 8th (Railway) Company on railway construction and 
repair duties. However, events around Ypres meant that the companies were 
immediately employed on defensive rather than railway works until March 
1915.110 The War Office, unlike in August 1914 when presented with Geddes’s 
proposal for the recruitment of a skilled railway battalion, perceived that five 
companies were insufficient for the volume of work likely to be generated 
by the fighting in 1915 – particularly should the much hoped for advance 
into Belgium take place. They requested that the REC recruit a large force 
of construction and railway operating troops, to provide a pool of skilled 
labour for the army’s use. The REC’s railway recruitment sub-committee 
was established under the stewardship of William Forbes, general manager 
of the LBSCR and the ERSC’s commandant. Forbes was assisted by Francis 
Dent, general manager of the SECR, and Arthur Watson, general manager 
of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway. Dent took responsibility for the 
recruitment of railway operating personnel – the chrysalis of the Railway 
Operating Division (ROD) – and initially also interviewed all applicants 
for commissions and non-commissioned officers’ roles within the new 
construction and operating companies. He recommended men for those 
positions based upon their ‘railway qualifications’, while Watson identified 
men suitable for enlistment as railway traffic officers. Forbes was responsible 
for enlisting the construction personnel that comprised the first four 
companies to be despatched to France, among whom were to be found 
platelayers, carpenters, timbermen, blacksmiths and telegraphists.111
The railway recruitment sub-committee’s activities were complicated 
both by the pre-existing number of army reservists employed by the railway 
companies and the uncoordinated nature of British military recruitment at 
the beginning of the war. Within eleven days of the outbreak of hostilities 
27,600 railway servants had left their peacetime occupations for service 
with the armed forces as reservists, territorials or volunteers. The War 
Office swiftly realized the importance of efficiently operated railways to 
the sustenance of Britain’s war effort, and issued instructions to recruiting 
agents not to enlist railwaymen without the written approval of the man’s 
head of department. However, by 23 February 1915 around 17 per cent of 
110 History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, ed. H. L. Pritchard (11 vols., Chatham, 1952), v. 
596–97.
111 ICE, Original communications, O.C./4277, H. A. Ryott, ‘The provision of personnel 
for military railways in the war of 1914–1918’, p. 1; Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, 
ii. 613–14.
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the companies’ pre-war male staff had signed up. The haemorrhage of men 
was slowed, but not entirely stopped, by the introduction of ‘badging’ 
in July 1915. By then, significant numbers of men who might have been 
more effectively employed in railway-related activities later in the war had 
already been recruited for the fighting formations.112 The enlistment of 
skilled railwaymen elsewhere in the forces notwithstanding, the first railway 
construction company arrived in France just before Christmas 1914, and 
was engaged on the unloading of stores and the construction of sidings at 
Arques.113 They were joined by ten further companies by the summer of 
1915, and their duties included doubling the Hazebrouck–Poperinghe line, 
the construction of a new line between Candas and Acheux, the building 
of a railway store at Audruicq and the laying of sidings at Abbeville, Calais 
and Blargies. By December 1915 British construction companies had laid 
105 miles of track on the western front, and by the end of the war forty-
five companies had been raised from among the employees of British or 
dominion railways.114
Recruitment for the companies initially followed the blueprint provided 
by the ‘Pals battalions’, with individual railways raising complete sections 
that allowed their employees to serve together. In 1914 Canada possessed a 
far higher proportion of workers who were suitable for railway construction 
companies than did Britain, as increased migration into the prairie west 
had stimulated the expansion of Canada’s railway network in the 1900s. The 
first two railway construction companies from Canada were formed of ‘500 
picked men from the construction forces of the Canadian Pacific Railway’, 
who arrived in France as the Canadian Overseas Railway Construction 
Corps in August 1915. They were the nucleus of a corps that eventually 
attained a strength of 16,000 men on the western front.115
The arrival of the Canadians in France was emblematic of the British 
empire’s deepening commitment to the transport infrastructure on the 
western front, and emphasized Britain’s access to global supplies of suitable 
manpower. The appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel William Waghorn as 
112 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, i. 348; Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, p. 111; 
Gregory, ‘Railway stations: gateways and termini’, pp. 34–5; TNA, ZPER 7/103, records of 
railway interests, pp. 23, 27.
113 TNA, WO, 95/4053, lines of communication troops. 109 Railway Company Royal 
Engineers, war diary.
114 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 596; C. Baker, ‘The RE railway construction 
companies’, The Long, Long Trail: the British Army of 1914–1918 – for Family Historians 
<http://www.1914-1918.net/re_rlwy_cos.htm> [accessed 20 September 2017].
115 A. E. Kemp, Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918 (London, 
1919), p. 355; G. W. Taylor, The Railway Contractors: the Story of John W. Stewart, His 
Enterprises and Associates (Victoria, BC, 1988), pp. 107–8.
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chief railway construction engineer in the spring of 1915 underlined both 
the transnational reach of the BEF’s call for suitable officers and the extent 
to which pre-war imperial service imbued men with the skills required to 
prosecute an industrial war. Waghorn had entered the Royal Engineers at 
the age of twenty, and seen engineering service in India and South Africa 
before he became acting manager of the North-Western Railway in India in 
June 1910. By 1914 he had established himself as one of the leading experts 
in the construction and operation of railways in the army – and, indeed, 
the empire – and as he was on leave in England when war was declared he 
was immediately appointed to the role of deputy DRT.116 When Waghorn 
took on the role of chief railway construction engineer the majority of his 
subordinates were drawn from Argentina and Brazil. In South America, as 
in Canada, ample opportunities for ambitious railway builders to develop 
their careers had existed before the outbreak of war.117
Britain’s transport experts and the global war
The arrival of skilled men from the Americas and Asia into the major 
European theatre of war in 1915 demonstrated Britain’s growing military 
commitment to the western front. In contrast, the deployment of the 
first railway construction companies raised in Britain – drawn from the 
ranks of the LNWR and Great Western’s huge workforces – illustrates how 
Britain’s military focus had widened since August 1914. The 115th and 116th 
railway construction companies arrived in Egypt between December 1915 
and March 1916, where they were employed to strengthen Britain’s military 
position in the Middle East against the Ottoman empire.118 The British had 
acted to secure their interests in the Persian Gulf at the beginning of the 
war, and soon turned their attentions to the defence of Egypt and the Suez 
Canal. Egypt’s location, climate, and resources made it an ideal centre for 
the concentration and training of troops from India and Australasia, while 
116 M. Kaye Kerr, ‘Waghorn, Brigadier-General Sir William Danvers’, in Biographical 
Dictionary of Civil Engineers in Great Britain and Ireland: 1890–1920, ed. M. M. Chrimes 
et al. (London, 2014), p. 626; C. Messenger, Call-to-Arms: the British Army, 1914–18 
(London, 2005), p. 224; Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 591; J. Bourne, ‘William 
Danvers Waghorn’, Lions Led by Donkeys <http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/activity/
warstudies/research/projects/lionsdonkeys/t.aspx> [accessed 20 Sept. 2017].
117 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v, pp. 35–6. On Britain’s wider economic 
interests in South America before 1914, see P. A. Dehne, On the Far Western Front: Britain’s 
First World War in South America (Manchester, 2009), pp. 8–39; C. Emmerson, 1913: the 
World Before the Great War (2013), pp. 252–66.
118 For details of the two companies’ activities during the war, see the relevant war diaries 
in TNA, WO 95/4410, general headquarters troops; WO 95/4718, line of communication 
troops.
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the canal formed a ‘vital artery for war and merchant ships’. At least 376 
transport ships, carrying 163,700 troops, passed through the canal between 
August and December 1914. Its continued accessibility to allied tonnage 
saved time and fuel, and allowed Britain to bring the weight of its global 
empire to bear on the fighting.119
Egypt, although legally part of the Ottoman empire, was heavily 
under British influence when Sultan Mehmed V declared ‘holy war’ on 11 
November 1914. The higher tax officials and senior officers of the police and 
army were British, and the country had been under British administration 
since 1882. Commercial life in Egypt was also dominated by the British 
– alongside French, Italian and Greek expatriates – and the Suez Canal 
Company and the Egyptian State Railways were run by French and British 
officers respectively.120 The three senior managers of the Egyptian State 
Railways were all retired Royal Engineers. Major Sir George Macauley 
(general manager), Major R. B. D. Blakeney (deputy general manager), 
and Captain C. M. Hall (traffic manager) represent further examples of 
the diaspora of British engineering knowledge in the pre-war period, which 
played a significant role in the creation and maintenance of the imperial 
trading network. The peacetime experience acquired by such individuals 
became invaluable to the sustenance of the empire’s global supply system 
after 1914. Macauley was appointed director of railways in the Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force (EEF), with Blakeney and Hall named among his 
deputies.121
Cooperation between the military and civil authorities was, as in Europe, 
of ‘utmost value’ to British operations in Egypt. By the end of 1914 the 
pre-war garrison of 5,000 soldiers had been replaced by a force of 70,000 
men drawn from India, Australia and New Zealand. The rapid expansion 
of Britain’s military presence in Egypt outpaced the construction of 
accommodation and highlighted the poor state of communications in the 
canal’s vicinity. There were no metalled roads alongside the canal and only 
a single-track railway linked it to the main line terminus at Zagazig. The 
railway company built sufficient sidings and stations to supply eight defence 
posts along the length of the canal during the autumn of 1914, and provided 
the Royal Engineers with temporary officers to supervise the works required 
to improve the canal’s defences. When the much-anticipated Turkish attack 
upon the canal was finally launched on the night of 2–3 February 1915 it was 
119 E. Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans: the Great War in the Middle East, 1914–1920 (London, 
2015), p. 116.
120 R. Johnson, The Great War and the Middle East: a Strategic Study (Oxford, 2016), pp. 
60–3; Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, vi. 161.
121 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, vi. 175–6.
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repulsed, and the assaulting troops withdrew having lost over 1,000 men. 
The Ottoman forces retreated to Beersheba and made no further organized 
attacks upon the canal during the war. Consequently, the British developed 
Egypt as a base for the expeditions to Gallipoli and Salonika during 1915 
with only minor disruptions from Turkish raiding parties.122
The expansion of Egypt’s capacity as a training area and base for military 
operations drew heavily upon the resources and expertise of its foreign-run 
institutions. As Kristian Coates Ulrichsen noted, the EEF ‘recognized and 
acted upon the need to introduce civilian expertise into military matters’ 
long before Sir Eric Geddes’s feted transport mission in August 1916.123 After 
some hesitation the Suez Canal Company placed its engineering resources 
and a range of craft at the army’s disposal, and in December 1915 a civilian-
operated IWT organization was inaugurated to supplement the railway 
network. The public works ministry provided the EEF with ninety-seven 
tugs, steam barges, and lighters, 260 sailing craft, and all the canal and river 
craft of its inspection fleet. They were used for the distribution of road 
metal, coal, tools and machinery to the troops engaged on construction 
work around the canal.124 The renewed threat of a Turkish attack on the 
canal in 1916 – following the allied evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula 
– acted as a catalyst for increased engineering activity in Egypt over the 
winter months. A five-mile-long light railway constructed by the 116th 
Railway Company comprised just a fraction of the ninety miles of track 
laid to service the defensive positions built six to seven miles east of the 
canal during this period. 
The Egyptian State Railways were integral to the infrastructure 
improvements on the eastern shore of the canal. The company provided 
most of the labour and resources utilized in the ‘forward railway policy’ 
implemented by the EEF,125 including 15,000 local labourers deployed in 
support of the two British railway construction companies in the country. 
The Egyptian State Railways doubled the line between Zagazig and Ismailia, 
laid out large stations for camps in the Nile Delta and on the canal and erected 
new sidings from the mainline to the banks of the canal. Further north 
the company oversaw ‘a considerable programme of improvements’ to the 
122 Johnson, The Great War and the Middle East, pp. 64–7; Pritchard, History of the Royal 
Engineers, vi. 163–9.
123 K. C. Ulrichsen, The Logistics and Politics of the British Campaigns in the Middle East, 
1914–22 (Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 59, 60–1.
124 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, vi. 166, 177.
125 TNA, WO 106/712, defence of Suez Canal and railway policy, notes on the forward 
railway policy in Egypt, outlined in War Office telegram, 3 Dec. 1915; estimate by the general 
staff of forces required for defence of Egypt, 11 Dec. 1915.
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single line along the canal from Port Said, which included the development 
of existing sidings, the addition of nearly eight-and-a-half miles of branch 
lines, passing loops, extensions to the dock facilities and eight stations at 
camp sites. The doubling of the line between Zagazig and Ismailia alone 
consumed almost one hundred miles of track, and the commencement of 
a further line east into Sinai in February 1916 left the company with no 
reserve stocks for maintenance.126 The situation became increasingly critical 
once the EEF decided to advance on Palestine after the battle of Romani 
in August. However, following a slow, methodical progression across the 
desert, by December 1916 the railway from Qantara was of sufficient quality 
to maintain a force of 200,000 men on the Palestinian border.127 Both the 
size of the force and the length of the line expanded further in the second 
half of the conflict.
Whereas the British possessed a free hand to undertake construction and 
improvements to the transport infrastructure in Egypt, circumstances in 
southern Europe bore closer resemblance to those in France. Forces from 
both Britain and France participated in the operations that took place 
following the landing of troops at Salonika. However, in western Europe the 
chain of command and the limits of British authority had been established 
and agreed upon during the pre-war conversations between the French and 
British general staffs. No such agreements existed to guide the transport 
organization in Macedonia, and to complicate matters still further both 
nations’ forces disembarked on the soil of a third party. In the words of the 
Royal Engineers’ history of the campaign, 
The allied Balkan campaign of 1915–18 was conceived in haste in the autumn of 
1915 in fundamental disagreement between the British and French governments, 
and even more so between their military advisers. There was also disagreement 
in the Greek government upon whether they should be neutral or belligerent, 
and if the latter then on which side.128 
As Asquith pointed out in a heated exchange with France’s political and 
military leaders in June 1916, ‘the British Government … had sent their 
126 ‘The Palestine campaign’, Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation Number, 21 Sept. 
1920, pp. 119–28.
127 For a description of the ‘Herculean British efforts that were made to construct the 
railway’, the battle of Romani, and the EEF’s systematic advance across the desert, see 
Johnson, The Great War and the Middle East, pp. 116–20; Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, 
pp. 312–18.
128 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, vi. 95. On the development of a Franco-British 
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July 1918, pp. 2–4.
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troops [to Salonika] reluctantly at the request of Greece, at the insistence of 
France, and had always tried to get them away’.129 The expedition to assist 
Serbia was viewed in Britain as a ‘useless dissipation of effort and resources’, a 
conviction founded upon Britain’s role as the principal provider of shipping 
for the expedition and unmodified by the Greek railway authorities’ 
‘uncooperative attitude’ towards the British Salonika Force’s (BSF) advance 
from the coast.130
Salonika was far from an ideal location for the disembarkation of a 
modern army and its accoutrements, and the Admiralty strongly disputed 
French claims that 2,000 tons per day could be landed once suitable piers 
had been constructed. Only three full-depth berths existed at the port, and 
the facilities required for the unloading and removal of stores from the water 
were virtually absent. These difficulties were reflected in the Admiralty’s 
estimation that the capacity of the port was just 500 tons per day, a quarter 
of the French assessment.131 The infrastructure to support the movement of 
men and materials inland was equally poor. The BSF possessed 350 lorries, 
but there were few roads upon which to use them. Locomotives and rolling 
stock were scarce and in bad repair. Even before the first troops arrived, on 1 
October a small party of officers had landed at Salonika with the intention 
of establishing contact with the Greek authorities. Led by Colonel Maurice 
Sowerby of the Sudan Government Railways, the party proved unable to 
provide their hosts with information on the BSF’s requirements for four 
days. The Royal Engineers’ history records the officers’ reception as having 
been ‘so frigid and obstructive, not to say hostile’, that Sowerby was advised 
by the War Office to ‘go to ground until the situation became clearer’. 
Relations gradually thawed as the allied presence around the town grew, 
and the British railway staff eventually managed to ‘cajole the Greeks into 
providing the absolute minimum’ of the force’s railway requirements.132 The 
BSF, unlike their Egyptian counterpart, was unable to make effective use of 
the transport expertise provided to it by an imperial railway. In December 
1915 Sowerby headed back to North Africa, where he made a valuable 
contribution to the construction of the EEF’s railway line to El Arish.133
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Just as Sir John French had found his desired railway movements 
superseded by the demands of the French army on the western front, the 
BSF was assigned a lower priority than the French forces in Salonika when 
it came to the allocation of transport in Macedonia. On 4 November 1915 
the movement of elements of the 10th Division to Doiran was postponed 
for a week as the French demanded use of the trains. When the departure 
of the troops was rescheduled for 12 November, it was again aborted as no 
trucks were available. Journeys originally arranged for 6 November were 
not completed until nine days later.134 The arrival of the 117th Railway 
Construction Company in the first week of February 1916 permitted the 
construction of new sidings in the base depots and passing places on the 
single-track railway that headed north from the port, but civilian traffic 
took top priority and the local railway staff permitted only one or two 
military trains to run each day. The Greek authorities remained in control 
of the railways between the port and the Serbian frontier until June 1916, 
when the French commanding officer General Maurice Sarrail appointed a 
Franco-British administration to take over operations.135 Like the Gallipoli 
campaign before it, the Macedonian sideshow was incapable of replacing 
the western front as the British army’s primary theatre of operations. 
However, unlike around the Dardanelles, French pressure to maintain an 
allied presence at Salonika ensured that British troops remained stationed 
in the theatre for the rest of the war.
Conclusion
Britain’s position at the heart of a global empire profoundly influenced its 
approach to the First World War’s expansion. The acquisition, development 
and maintenance of imperial possessions in Asia and Africa had provided 
the Royal Engineers with ample opportunities to augment their theoretical 
training with practical experience in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Conditions in India had demanded the construction of roads and 
offered soldiers the chance to build railways before the war, while the Egyptian 
and Sudanese state railways provided the wartime army with a pool of experts 
capable of working comfortably under both civilian and military conditions. 
Beyond the theatres of war vast railway construction and civil engineering 
projects across the globe created demands for a pool of skilled engineers, 
which the British war effort took advantage of both at home and abroad. 
134 LHCMA, papers of Field Marshal Sir George Milne, general staff (operations) Army of 
the Black Sea, diary entries, 4–15 Nov. 1915.
135 ‘Railways and the Salonica campaign’, Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation 
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Sir George Macauley and Follett Holt exemplified both the global 
experience acquired by Britain’s transport experts before 1914 and the 
diversity of applications found for such expertise within the expanding 
British war effort. Macauley, a Royal Engineers officer, had resigned his 
commission after service in the Sudan to take up the posts of general 
manager on the Sudan Military Railway and subsequently the Egyptian 
State Railways prior to the war.136 His knowledge of the Egyptian railways 
made him the obvious candidate to take charge of the EEF’s railway 
requirements. Holt entered the Ministry of Munitions at the end of a career 
that had seen him work on the London and South-Western, the Indian 
State, the Buenos Aires and Rosario, the Great Western of Brazil and the 
Entre Ríos railways. He was joined at the ministry by established engineers 
from the British railway industry, such as the Midland’s Henry Fowler and 
the North-Eastern’s Vincent Raven, and by managerial figures like Eric 
Geddes. Together with their compatriots on myriad REC sub-committees, 
these men laid the groundwork for the material-intensive war fought by the 
British army in the second half of the war.
At home and in Egypt, where Britain possessed a free hand, Britain’s 
transport experts exerted a substantial influence over the empire’s approach 
to the First World War from the very outset. Macauley and his colleagues 
from the Egyptian State Railways coordinated transport operations and 
constructed significant lengths of railway on behalf of the troops stationed 
either side of the Suez Canal. Elsewhere, Britain’s position within an 
international coalition restricted the extent to which the army could 
immediately make use of the empire’s transport experts. The BEF and BSF, 
in France and Salonika respectively, lacked the freedom of action enjoyed 
by the EEF. Control of the ports and railways in the former remained firmly 
in the hands of the French authorities, while inter-allied relationships in 
Macedonia were complicated by the concerns and priorities of a neutral – 
and by no means friendly – host nation.
The shadow of the Franco-British pre-war arrangements and the enticing 
prospect of an imminent return to manoeuvre warfare loomed large over 
organizational developments on the western front. In France the BEF could 
not call upon the services of an experienced, civil–military transportation 
service, liberated from the requirement to consider the needs of a strong-
willed and fiercely independent ally. While the BEF’s expansion was 
encouraged by the French military authorities, it was not mirrored by a 
corresponding growth in the facilities and authority offered to the British. 
136 A. Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914–1918 
(Cambridge, 2017), p. 176.
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Stepping into their places
As Valentine Murray later reflected on the BEF’s predicament:
From first to last, and whatever its size, so far as the railway situation was 
concerned, the British Army was only a unit of the French Army – and in 
accordance with the principles of centralisation … its railway requirements 
had of necessity to be centralised at French GHQ – so that no British railway 
move could take place without the authority of the French. Consequently, all 
British railway requirements had to be carried out under the authority and 
orders of the French Railway Commissions and in this respect from the outset, 
the British Army was completely under the orders of the French.137
The stability of the line in front of the BEF made the lines of communications 
more recognizably civilian in appearance. The supply task that faced the 
British command equated to the provision of a small, rapidly growing town, 
rather than the supply of a small, rapidly growing and moving town.138 As 
such, trench warfare created a situation for which Britain’s transport experts’ 
civilian occupations provided excellent apprenticeships. As the following 
chapters demonstrate, the BEF’s position as the junior partner in the land-
based coalition in France and Flanders constrained the exploitation of 
British transport expertise in the war’s principal theatre between 1914 and 
1916. However, that did not prevent the BEF from accessing and engaging 
with the employees of some of Britain’s largest companies as it sought to 
perfect its continental commitment.
137 V. Murray, ‘Transportation in war’, Royal Engineers Journal, lvi (1942), 202–32, at p. 
207.
138 Brown, British Logistics, p. 65.

137
‘Commitment and constraint I: the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway and the port of Boulogne’, 
in C. Phillips, Civilian Specialists at War: Britain’s Transport Experts and the First World War (London, 
2020), pp. 137–67. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0.
4. Commitment and constraint I:  
the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway  
and the port of Boulogne
Britain’s commitment to the First World War increased substantially during 
1915. On the western front alone the BEF more than trebled in size. Between 
January and October over 650,000 men were added to the ration strength 
in France and Flanders, as the BEF rapidly grew into ‘a force outside the 
bounds of British tradition and experience’. To maintain the growing 
requirements for food, fodder, munitions, equipment and raw materials 
generated by the BEF – alongside the supply of Britain’s forces operating 
on the fringes of Europe and beyond – the British army and state ‘needed 
a sound, coherent support infrastructure’.1 Yet in the historiography of the 
British war experience of 1915 – dominated by the dismal failure of the 
Gallipoli campaign, General Charles Townshend’s retreat to Kut Al Amara, 
the inconclusive results of the BEF’s operations at Neuve Chapelle and Loos 
and the ongoing transformation of Kitchener’s volunteers into the citizen 
army that fought the battle of the Somme – the administrative achievement 
that ensured Britain’s vast manpower and resource commitments were 
not accompanied by starvation has been eclipsed. The dominant narrative 
centres upon shortages and insufficiency, the so-called shells scandal that 
underlined the soldiers’ inability to prosecute the war effort and engendered 
the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions. In the words of its first 
minister, David Lloyd George, the ‘war lords’ were ‘surly, suspicious, 
and hostile’ towards the new ministry – a by-product of the ‘ingrained 
distrust, misunderstanding and contempt of all businessmen … which was 
traditionally prevalent in the Services’.2
This chapter builds upon the previous, and demonstrates how the British 
army actively sought out and engaged with civilian specialists during this year 
of rapid growth. It was aware of the potential benefits to be gained from the 
application of civilian knowledge to the challenges of the modern battlefield, 
1 I. M. Brown, ‘Growing pains: supplying the British Expeditionary Force, 1914–1915’, 
in Battles Near and Far: a Century of Operational Deployment, ed. P. Dennis and J. Grey 
(Canberra, 2004), pp. 33–47, at p. 35.
2 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (2 vols., London, 1938), i. 83, 144.
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and attempted to use non-military skills to improve the efficiency of the 
working methods employed upon its lines of communications. However, as 
Spencer Jones argued, in 1915 the BEF ‘was thrust into a style of warfare for 
which it was conceptually and materially ill-prepared’.3 The British army – 
and the nation as a whole – had yet to comprehend the magnitude of the 
war in which it had become embedded by 1915, and failed to appreciate the 
scale and character of the commitment that would ultimately be required to 
successfully prosecute it. ‘The stationary character of the warfare of the first 
two years’, the QMG’s post-war report stated, ‘placed no undue strain upon 
the QMG’s branch’ to maintain communications between the coast and the 
front.4 The quantities of material demanded by front line commanders had not 
yet attained sufficient scale to severely tax the transportation system behind 
the growing BEF. Consequently, the early experiments in the application of 
Britain’s transport experts to the logistical challenges of the First World War 
were governed by localized responses to short-term issues rather than a clear 
understanding of the Franco-British coalition’s long-term priorities.
The wartime contribution of Francis Dent, general manager of the SECR, 
exemplifies the British approach to transportation during 1915. Dent’s 
experience of the railway industry and his pre-war working relationship 
with the army made him an exceptionally useful figure, a man upon whom 
the government and military could rely to provide specialist technical 
guidance and leadership on a range of organizational problems. As this 
chapter illustrates, his personal war effort was diverse in subject and global 
in scope. Yet Dent’s influence over the BEF’s transportation operations in 
France was restricted by three factors: a British army that had not accepted 
that its governing structures were ill-suited to the type of conflict that 
emerged from the stalemate of 1914; a French army and state unwilling to 
relinquish command over the foreign forces engaged on its soil; and his own 
insufficient understanding of the scale and complexities inherent in modern 
military logistics. Taken together, these constraints severely curtailed the 
influence that a man of Francis Dent’s undoubted abilities was able to have 
over the direction and character of the war prior to the battle of the Somme.
Creating capacity at the Bassin Loubet
The port space available on the French Channel coast played a fundamental 
role in determining the upper limits of the British force that could be 
3 S. Jones, ‘“To make war as we must, and not as we should like”: the British army and 
the problem of the western front, 1915’, in Courage Without Glory: the British Army on the 
Western Front 1915, ed. S. Jones (Solihull, 2015), pp. 31–55, at p. 31.
4 TNA, WO 107/69, work of the QMG’s branch, p. 1.
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deployed on the western front during the First World War. The size and 
composition of modern armies – made up of millions of men and horses 
with constant demands for food and fodder, and supported by complex 
machinery dependent upon manufactured spare parts and a steady supply 
of raw materials – demanded that the belligerents provided their forces 
with reliable connections between centres of industrial production and the 
theatres of military operations. In simple terms, the amount of port space 
that could be occupied and worked efficiently by the allies had a direct 
correlation to the scale of war effort that the Franco-British coalition could 
sustain between 1914 and 1918. The BEF was not the only body reliant upon 
the Channel ports, a factor that added a layer of inter-allied interest in the 
use of the space. Both the French and Belgian armies drew supplies from 
the northern French coast, and the demand for imports was exacerbated 
by the loss of much of France’s industrial heartland to the Germans at the 
outset of the war. The territory relinquished by the retiring allied forces left 
the French increasingly dependent upon Britain for deliveries of coal, as the 
area responsible for approximately three-quarters of France’s coal and coke 
production was directly affected by the German advance.5 Vast quantities of 
the fuel were necessary for the heating of homes, the powering of factories 
and the operation of the railways between the coast and the front line. By 
November 1914 a ‘coal famine’ had begun to emerge in France.6
Deliberations over the use of Dunkirk illustrate the reality of the Franco-
British relationship after the outbreak of war and the constraints placed 
upon the BEF by its hosts. As early as December 1914 the British requested 
access to Dunkirk, both to shorten the BEF’s lines of communications and 
to assist with the supply of the troops expected to arrive in 1915. The IGC, 
Ronald Maxwell, projected – based upon the requirements of a British force 
that comprised thirty infantry divisions and six cavalry divisions – that the 
BEF needed sufficient port space to deal with the supplies necessary to feed 
and equip 706,200 men and 244,200 horses. He was confident that a total 
of 350,000 men and 120,000 horses could be fed through the southern ports 
of Le Havre and Rouen, designated as group ‘A’. However, it was impossible 
for him to calculate the capacity of group ‘B’ – Boulogne, Calais and 
Dunkirk – until a detailed reconnaissance of Calais and Dunkirk had taken 
place. Maxwell had assembled a committee of British officers to undertake 
the investigation, but felt it expedient to request the company of a French 
officer. He wrote to the QMG Sir William Robertson on 1 December that 
5 J. Lawrence, ‘The transition to war in 1914’, in Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, 
Berlin, 1914–1919, ed. J. Winter and J. Robert (2 vols., Cambridge, 1997), i. 135–63, at p. 152.
6 TNA, WO 95/3951, headquarters branches and services. Inspector general, Cowper to 
Marrable, 27 Nov. 1914.
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‘it would be of great assistance to the officers to have some idea of what may 
be expected to be the attitude of [GQG] in connection with the details of 
this subject’.7 The response was unequivocal. Joffre refused to authorize the 
mission, telling Robertson that he preferred to await developments on other 
fronts before discussing the allocation of port space behind the western 
front.8 Consequently, the BEF did not gain access to Calais until April 1915 
while Dunkirk’s principal contribution to the British war effort was as a 
seaplane rather than supply base.
Dunkirk was a ‘sore point’ in inter-allied relations throughout 1915 and 
beyond, which consistently reinforced the French authorities’ primacy 
in the Franco-British coalition. In January 1915 Maxwell reiterated the 
importance of the port to the successful development of a mass army in 
France, but was offered facilities at Cherbourg instead. Joffre rebuffed 
Kitchener’s request for ten British ships to be accommodated at Dunkirk 
two months later with a claim that the port was part of the French front 
line ‘and any British installation would interfere with its defence’. Maxwell 
made a further demand for port space at Dunkirk prior to the battle of the 
Somme, warning the French that ‘imports of ammunition for the battle 
could not be processed in sufficiently large amounts’ unless the British were 
provided with more berths by their hosts. Once again Joffre held firm, and 
instructed the British to manage better their existing resources – a refrain 
commonly repeated in inter-allied discussions before November 1918.9
Alongside French reluctance to relinquish berths, the space available for 
the BEF’s imports was further limited both by the volume of traffic leaving 
continental Europe and the extent of the German occupation of Belgium. 
As the storm clouds gathered and burst in early August 1914 thousands of 
British and American tourists, together with ‘a certain number of well-to-do 
Belgians’, had travelled across the Channel from Ostend and Antwerp. As 
the front line swept ever farther across Belgian soil, thousands of desperate 
refugees descended on the ports in search of passage to England on the 
Great Eastern Railway’s ferries. The link between the Belgian ports and 
Britain did not last for long. The final allied craft, which included three 
vessels owned by the SECR, departed Ostend on 14 October – five days 
after the multinational force sent to defend Antwerp had evacuated the city. 
While a ‘fairly constant stream’ of Belgians travelled to Britain from the 
neutral Netherlands over the course of the war, the only route available to 
those driven west in the upheaval of 1914–15 was via Calais. Consequently, 
7 TNA, WO 95/3951, IGC war diary, Maxwell to Robertson, 1 Dec. 1914.
8 TNA, WO 95/3951, IGC war diary, Robertson to Maxwell, 3 Dec. 1914.
9 E. Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War 
(Cambridge, 2005), pp. 34–5, 244–5.
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that port was rendered inaccessible to BEF supply ships for the entirety 
of the war’s first winter by the incessant stream of human traffic seeking 
passage to England.10
The quantity of refugees, the higher-than-anticipated number of 
casualties that required evacuation to hospitals in Britain and the pace 
of the German advance combined to dislocate the pre-war arrangements 
agreed by the French and British authorities. The BEF’s original intention 
had been to abandon the port of Boulogne – alongside Rouen and Le Havre 
one of the three ports utilized for the disembarkation of troops and supplies 
during the concentration period – on the sixteenth day of mobilization. Yet 
orders for the evacuation of Boulogne were not issued until 10 p.m. on 25 
August, and only then as a precaution ‘owing to the rapid advance of the 
enemy’. By 2 a.m. on the 27th, despite a ‘continuous downpour of rain’, 
all the stores save for small quantities of hay and wood had been loaded 
onto vessels and removed from the port.11 After the German advance had 
been halted and their troops thrown into a retreat of their own following 
the battle of the Marne, Boulogne was reinstated as a port of entry for 
allied supplies on 14 October. Sir Percy Girouard visited the port during his 
investigation of the BEF’s transport organization the following week, and 
‘thoroughly [examined] its capacity as an army base’.12 His report succinctly 
concluded that the port was ‘in a somewhat disorganised condition’.13 The 
director of supplies’ post-war report was more vivid: it described Boulogne’s 
north quay as comprising ‘one chaotic heap of coal, manure, discarded 
engineering fittings, and material originally intended for the completion of 
the harbour’ upon the BEF’s re-entry to the port.14
Over the following weeks the situation at Boulogne and the BEF’s other 
base ports deteriorated. The docks possessed insufficient cranes to cope with 
the task of unloading military supplies for the growing force, and lacked 
covered accommodation under which to shelter items such as hay and oats 
from the deteriorating weather.15 Major Moore of the ASC complained to the 
base commandant at Rouen in late November that only one crane had been 
available for the unloading of two vessels, a situation that made it ‘necessary 
10 E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War: Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and 
Achievements (2 vols., London, 1921), i. 228–33.
11 TNA, WO 158/2, director of supplies: British armies in France and Flanders pt. I. 
147–8.
12 TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, Girouard to Cowans, 24 Oct. 1914.
13 TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, p. 13.
14 TNA, WO 158/2, director of supplies I, p. 147.
15 TNA, WO 95/74, branches and services: director of supplies, diary entries, 9 and 13 
Dec. 1914.
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to man handle a lot of cargo, which in these times of pressure is an absolute 
waste of labour’.16 Land for the expansion of sidings, the erection of storage 
accommodation and the construction of additional harbour space was 
available at Boulogne, and – acting under the assumption that the BEF’s 
residence at the port was likely to be far longer than that envisaged before 
the war – Maxwell had a scheme for extension work at the Bassin Loubet 
(one of two docking basins at the port) prepared and submitted to GHQ. 
Attached to the plan was a letter, in which Maxwell described the proposed 
works as ‘urgent’ and ‘vital’ to the BEF’s ability to develop Boulogne as an 
effective base.17
However urgent and vital, such projects were inevitably going to be time-
consuming, expensive and reliant upon the skilled and unskilled labour 
of thousands of workers. As the French army had suffered colossal losses 
in the war’s opening encounters – almost one million French soldiers 
became casualties before the end of 1914 – the coalition’s senior partner 
was in no position to provide the manpower necessary to bring large-
scale engineering projects into being. Yet while GQG granted the British 
permission to construct additional railway sidings at the Bassin Loubet to 
improve Boulogne’s capacity as a port, the BEF also lacked sufficient spare 
manpower to carry out the work.18 The onset of winter had begun to take its 
toll on the transport network behind the front line, and a few days earlier 
the BEF’s senior engineer had written to Lord Kitchener to complain about 
the paucity of men available to complete the extensive repairs required 
on the French road network.19 Both Kitchener and Sir John French were 
reluctant to ‘despatch [a] gang of navvies’ from Britain to repair the French 
roads, but the former was happy to allow the REC to identify a suitable 
authority to undertake the engineering works at Boulogne.20
Percy Tempest, the SECR’s chief engineer, was particularly suited for 
the role. Tempest had been a major in the ERSC since March 1902, was 
well regarded within the railway industry for having upgraded the SECR’s 
outdated network, and was thoroughly acquainted with the French railways. 
In the opening months of the conflict Tempest had acted as an agent for 
the Chemins de Fer du Nord and Belgian State railways. In this role he 
had overseen the purchase and inspection of railway materials destined for 
the reconstruction of lines destroyed by the Germans. The allies’ failure to 
16 TNA, WO 95/3951, IGC war diary, Moore to Marrable, 25 Nov. 1914.
17 TNA, WO 95/3951, IGC war diary, Maxwell to Robertson, 30 Nov. 1914.
18 TNA, WO 95/3951, IGC war diary, Robertson to Kitchener, 28 Nov. 1914.
19 TNA, WO 95/3951, IGC war diary, Kitchener to French, 27 Nov. 1914.
20 TNA, WO 95/3951, IGC war diary, Kitchener to French, 27 Nov. 1914; French to 
Kitchener, 27 Nov. 1914.
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liberate much of the conquered territory meant that such work was pursued 
in vain, but the emergence of the Bassin Loubet construction project 
provided Tempest with an opportunity to directly improve the transport 
infrastructure that supported the coalition’s military efforts. He accepted 
the REC’s offer to direct the work and ‘started at once on the necessary 
plans and preparations’.21
Between December 1914 and September 1916 – when the work was 
finally completed – the SECR provided all the tools, materials, labour and 
supervisory staff required for the construction of sidings, loading platforms, 
roads and railways, storehouses and workshops at Boulogne. The scheme 
initially involved the removal, via a specially constructed light railway, of 
34,000 cubic yards of soil to a dumping ground three-quarters of a mile 
along the coast. Then, before the sidings and roads could be laid, an 
extensive drainage system comprising almost three miles of pipe and 143 
manholes, gullies and grids was installed. Even so, the nature of the soil 
caused extreme difficulties during the construction of the Bassin Loubet’s 
56,774 square yards of new storage space, 1,317 yards of roads and 17,644 
yards of new and replacement sidings. A 700-foot-long retaining wall was 
also erected by the labourers, nine-tenths of whom were sent from England 
specifically to work on the project.22
Tempest’s input considerably increased Boulogne’s value to the BEF as 
a base. Between November 1914 and October 1916, the month before the 
work had begun and the month after it had been completed, the tonnage 
despatched by rail per month from Boulogne rose from 12,357 tons to 57,590 
– an increase of 366 per cent (see Figure 4.1). The number of trucks used 
within the port underwent a correspondingly large increase during the same 
period, from 1,737 to 7,918. In the following spring the material handled 
through Boulogne reached a wartime peak of 70,506 tons, for which 9,202 
trucks were required. From April 1917 onwards, Boulogne was responsible 
for issuing the rations to a monthly average of over half a million men 
per day, except in March 1918 when the number dipped to 483,000 in the 
wake of the German spring offensive. The ‘temporary’ port – expected to 
be a component of the British war effort for just sixteen days in August 
1914 – remained a crucial link in the army’s supply chain for the duration 
of the war. Between 14 October 1914 and December 1918 the port handled 
2,366,919 tons.
21 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 634.
22 The spoil from the initial excavations was used to form the foundations for a third 
group of sidings and an ammunition dump later in the war. See ‘Special war services by the 
South-Eastern and Chatham Railway’, Railway Magazine, May 1920, p. 347.
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Through its improvement of the facilities available for the storage and 
movement of goods in the Bassin Loubet, the SECR played a significant 
role in permitting the BEF’s colossal expansion after 1914. However, the 
company’s contribution to events at Boulogne was not restricted to the 
provision of labour, materials and construction expertise. In mid December 
1914 Tempest was joined at the port by the SECR’s general manager, Francis 
Dent. Alongside submitting Tempest’s estimates for the costs and duration 
of the projected works in the Bassin Loubet, Dent observed to the director 
of supplies that the cramped space and risks of exposure at Boulogne were 
likely to cause heavy losses to the BEF’s stocks of oats and forage in the near 
future.23 Rather than being dismissed out of hand by an intransigent and 
23 TNA, WO 95/74, director of supplies war diary, diary entry, 11 Dec. 1914.
Figure 4.1. Monthly tonnage record and average daily issue of 
men’s rations from the port of Boulogne, 1914–18.
Note: The sharp decrease in Boulogne’s output in January 1917 was caused by the accidental 
stranding of the SS Araby in the mouth of the port on 23 December 1916. The port was closed 
for twenty-seven days while the craft was salvaged, and only reopened in full on 18 January 
1917.
Source: TNA, WO 158/2, director of supplies: British armies in France and Flanders pt. I, pp. 
151–2.
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obstinate military command, the suggestion Dent went on to make on 11 
December led to the conduct of a civil–military experiment at Boulogne 
that ran for much of the following year.
As with every other area of the French transport network, the pre-war 
agreement between the allied authorities made no provision for the British 
to acquire administrative responsibilities at the ports after the outbreak 
of war.24 In his report of October 1914, Girouard emphasized that an 
‘arrangement with the French Government whereby they will allow us to 
organise bases, allocated to our use, in our own way and with our own 
men’ was ‘essential’.25 The SECR’s peacetime operation of the Folkestone–
Boulogne ferry service meant that the company had offices and staff 
attached to the French port, and the company’s employees at Boulogne 
had already been placed at the army’s disposal before Tempest and Dent 
arrived in France. However, as ‘full use’ had not been made of the civilian 
manpower by the military authorities, the DRT suggested in November 
1914 that the SECR might take over supervisory responsibilities within the 
Bassin Loubet with an ‘adjoint’ from the army as a liaison.26
The BEF was clearly receptive to the idea of securing civilian assistance, 
as Colonel Twiss’s suggestion was by no means an isolated example within 
the force’s administrative echelon. A month earlier the director of supplies, 
Major-General Frederick Clayton, had raised the possibility of deploying 
civilians on the BEF’s lines of communications. He argued that the army 
could benefit from the experience of moving goods around Britain and 
across the world in a timely fashion that employees of the railway companies 
and large department stores possessed. Clayton had served on the advisory 
board of the LSE’s ‘Mackindergarten’ course before the war, and was fully 
aware of the applicability of civilian methods to military requirements. He 
believed that suitably talented men could be used in ‘essentially the same 
roles in France as they had filled with their civilian firms in Britain’, thereby 
releasing trained soldiers for duties on the front line.27 So when Francis 
Dent offered to ‘study the situation on the spot’ at Boulogne for a fortnight 
with a view to improving efficiency in the Bassin Loubet, Clayton gratefully 
accepted the proposal.
24 M. G. Taylor, ‘Land transportation in the late war’, Royal United Services Institution. 
Journal, lxvi (1921), 699–722, at pp. 700–1.
25 TNA, WO 32/5144, Girouard report, p. 13.
26 TNA, WO 95/64, DRT war diary, Twiss to Murray, 12 Nov. 1914.
27 I. M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919 (London, 1998), p. 87.
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The application of civilian expertise: the Dent scheme
The so-called Dent scheme has garnered little attention in previous accounts 
of the BEF’s logistical organization.28 This is not merely a historiographical 
omission. Such was the perceived inconsequence of the scheme that the 
directorate of supplies, Dent’s first point of contact within the army with 
regards to the Bassin Loubet, made no reference to either the individual 
or the experiment in its post-war report.29 Ian M. Brown, despite noting 
that the experiment ‘had [both] the potential to radically alter the way in 
which the BEF operated [the] port’ and to rework the balance between 
civilian and military labour behind the lines, offered sparse coverage of 
events at the Bassin Loubet in 1915 in his published work.30 The official 
history provided an even briefer assessment. Henniker’s conclusion that ‘it 
was [considered] inadvisable’ to entrust the work of operating the port to 
‘civilian management and labour’ has been unquestioningly reproduced 
in subsequent texts.31 Yet the implementation of the Dent scheme at the 
Bassin Loubet merits reconsideration, as it underlines the character of the 
assistance that Britain’s transport experts could provide to the BEF in the 
first half of the war and the constraints applied to that support by factors 
present on either side of the Franco-British divide.
Francis Dent’s pre-war career, like that of his SECR colleague Percy 
Tempest, made him a suitable candidate for the task of solving the problems 
he identified at Boulogne. Born in 1866, Dent had begun his career in 
the railway industry at the age of seventeen. By August 1914 he had risen 
from a junior role in the general manager’s office of the LNWR, through 
appointments in the goods traffic departments of the LNWR and SECR, 
to the position of general manager of the latter in 1911. The SECR’s network 
covered the Channel ports at Folkestone and Dover as well as the prominent 
military sites of Woolwich and Chatham. Therefore, the company was an 
integral component of the British railways’ preparations for war, and acted 
as the secretary railway to the army’s eastern command in the development 
of the WF scheme. Unsurprisingly, given the line’s importance to the 
mobilization process, Dent both obtained a commission into the ERSC 
28 C. Phillips, ‘Early experiments in civil–military cooperation: the South-Eastern and 
Chatham Railway and the port of Boulogne, 1914–15’, War & Society, xxxiv (2015), 90–104 
represents the only extended piece of research on the SECR’s operations at Boulogne.
29 TNA, WO 158/2–3, Director of supplies: British armies in France and Flanders pts. I 
and II.
30 Brown, British Logistics, pp. 88–9; I. M. Brown, ‘Growing pains’, pp. 46–7.
31 A. M. Henniker, History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western Front, 1914–1918 
(London, 1937), pp. 91–2; J. Starling and I. Lee, No Labour, No Battle: Military Labour 
during the First World War (Stroud, 2009), p. 80.
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upon his appointment as general manager of the SECR and was appointed 
a member of the REC upon its formation in November 1912.
In addition to his direct contact with the military, Dent was also able 
to bring previous experience to bear upon the task at Boulogne – where 
restricted space made the employment of more efficient working practices 
the only immediately available solution to the BEF’s problems. In 1901 
he had been appointed as goods traffic superintendent for the LNWR’s 
Metropolitan district. At that time the company was faced by increasing 
congestion at Broad Street Station. Situated at the heart of the financial 
district, Broad Street was the third busiest station in turn-of-the-century 
London – the destination for thousands of commuters entering the capital 
each morning and a vital freight hub linking the Thames dockyards with 
industrial Birmingham. The LNWR’s board feared that a significant 
expansion to the station was required in order to help it cope with the 
increased volume of traffic expected to pass through Broad Street in the 
future, a costly venture in such a heavily built-up urban environment. 
However, through a reorganization of working methods in the station, 
the establishment of a bonus payment system and his ‘personal tact and 
influence’, Dent accelerated the turnaround of goods within Broad Street 
to such an extent that ‘the scheme for the enlargement of the station … 
was abandoned’.32 By August 1914 Francis Dent was a highly experienced 
professional manager with an established talent for the promotion of 
efficient working methods and a track record of success.
Furthermore, by the time he arrived at the Bassin Loubet in December, 
Dent had already made numerous contributions to the nascent British 
war effort. His service in the conflict’s opening months encapsulates the 
uncoordinated nature of Britain’s response to the multitude of challenges 
thrown up by its increasing involvement in the war, and indicates the 
transferability – from civilian to military applications – of the skills possessed 
by those who managed the nation’s largest transport enterprises. In late July 
he was called to London to oversee the SECR’s share of the armed forces’ 
mobilization procedure alongside his colleagues on the REC, before he 
turned his attentions to the provision of ambulance trains for the wounded 
soldiers who required evacuation from the theatre of combat. The volume 
of casualties in the early weeks of the war, particularly among the troops of 
the French army engaged in the battle of the Frontiers, rapidly outstripped 
the capacity of the ambulance trains available for service on the western 
32 ‘Retirement of Sir Francis Dent, general manager, South-Eastern and Chatham Railway’, 
Railway Magazine, Apr. 1920, p. 253. That a review of Dent’s professional career dedicated 
considerable space to the Broad Street reorganization demonstrates the significance attached 
to the project within the railway industry.
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front. The War Office requested that the REC despatch an ambulance 
train to France for the BEF’s use at the end of September 1914. Prior to 
its shipment Dent accompanied the LNWR’s carriage superintendent and 
the Great Eastern Railway’s chief mechanical engineer on a visit to France, 
where they discussed the technical requirements for ambulance trains with 
representatives of the Chemins de Fer du Nord. The group ascertained 
that no insurmountable obstructions existed between the rails and loading 
gauges used in France and Britain, and the LNWR immediately began work 
on an ambulance train for use on the French railways. Just three weeks after 
the REC had received the War Office’s request vehicles were on their way 
to the western front.33
By December, when the casualties of First Ypres had been added to the 
lists of the wounded, further demands for bespoke vehicles to serve on 
the western front had been forwarded to the REC by the War Office. In 
response, and in acknowledgement that periodic requests for ambulance 
vehicles were likely to recur in the future, Dent took the chair of the REC’s 
ambulance trains for the continent sub-committee. The sub-committee 
brought together representatives both of the railway industry and the 
army. From the former, Dent was accompanied by William Forbes, general 
manager of the LBSCR, and representatives of the engineering departments 
of twelve of Britain’s largest railway companies. From the latter, to ensure 
the suitability of the trains from both technical and medical points of view, 
the sub-committee received the input of professional soldiers from the Royal 
Army Medical Corps (RAMC) and the military railway authorities from 
France and Britain. In fact, the ambulance trains for the continent sub-
committee provided the reason for Dent’s visit to Boulogne in December 
1914. He attended a meeting at the port with Major Burke of the RAMC, at 
which they discussed the type of train best suited to wartime conditions and 
conferred with representatives of the Red Cross on financial and medical 
matters.34 The result of this ‘complete coordination’ was the standardized 
ambulance train, which evolved under Dent’s direction and combined the 
‘wisdom of experience’ possessed by the various stakeholders invested in the 
production of effective and useful carriages over the course of the conflict.35
Further to his concern for the comfort of wounded soldiers, Dent 
participated in two other prominent REC sub-committees from October 
1914 onwards. In the first he was responsible for the recruitment of officers 
33 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, i. 201–3.
34 TNA, WO 158/11, ambulance trains: sub-committee; minutes, Burke to Barefoot, 12 
Dec. 1914.
35 On the work of the ambulance trains for the continent sub-committee, see Pratt, 
British Railways and the Great War, i. 201–8.
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and men for what became the ROD; in the second, he took charge of a 
sub-committee established to identify and organize the Belgian railwaymen 
who had found refuge in Britain since the start of the war. The Belgian 
railways refugee sub-committee comprised representatives of four other 
British railway companies, Major Leggett of the war refugees committee 
and a senior figure from the Belgian State Railways. As Edwin Pratt noted, 
‘it was a matter of military as well as of economic importance’ that the 
Belgian railway experts ‘should be readily available whenever the need for 
them arose, either during the course of the war or afterwards’. However, 
the Belgian railwaymen, ‘in common with the other refugees [had] been 
allocated where suitable hospitality was available, so that while some found 
themselves in seaside resorts or country villages where no railway work 
could be provided for them, others were traced as far away as Tipperary 
or the North of Scotland’. The sub-committee dealt with 3,681 Belgian 
railwaymen during the war, 2,801 of whom lived in Great Britain and 
Ireland as refugees. They found employment in Britain for 1,755 of them, 
either on the British railways or – for those such as clerks and stationmasters 
who lacked suitable language skills – in the munitions factories.36
Dent set his existing commitments aside over Christmas 1914 to spend 
time at Boulogne observing operations. In a letter to Sir John Cowans he 
stated that:
There is no doubt stores are suffering to a great extent through there being 
insufficient provision for stacking and storing under cover. Boulogne is a very 
good port for quick handling and, by using it properly, the transit of supplies to 
the front is much accelerated. In view of the increase in the army, it is desirable 
that we should get on as quickly as possible.37
To ensure that proper use was made of Boulogne, Dent proposed that the 
SECR should be given responsibility for the operation of all areas of the 
port reserved for the BEF’s use – replacing the existing system whereby the 
naval staff discharged vessels onto the quayside and the army looked after 
the onward transport or storage of the goods.38 His offer entailed the railway 
company taking over the ‘work of discharging ships, stacking supplies and 
loading trains, [and] providing all the personnel’ for these tasks in place of 
36 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, i. 239–42.
37 TNA, WO 95/3952, headquarters branches and services, inspector general, Dent to 
Cowans, 31 Dec. 1914.
38 TNA, WO 95/3953, headquarters branches and services, inspector general, Proceedings 
of second meeting of committee on Mr Dent’s scheme held at Boulogne, 15 Feb. 1915; 
Brown, British Logistics, p. 88.
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the BEF’s current reliance on an ever-dwindling supply of French labourers.39 
There was, Dent wrote, ‘nothing in the way of checking or loading that 
would not be easy enough for a railway checker to perform’ at the Bassin 
Loubet.40 The object of the basin in peacetime was ‘to ensure quick transit 
between steamer and train. The hangars were laid out with a view to easy 
checking and customs examination’, and in many cases were supplied 
during the war by the same railway steamers that operated the routes in 
peacetime. Therefore, the task of discharging ships quickly, loading trains 
for the front and stacking supplies for later despatch was almost identical to 
the work undertaken at the railway ports under the SECR’s control. In fact, 
Dent claimed, ‘the military supplies business [was] simpler than ordinary 
trade practices’ as most of the BEF’s supplies arrived in bulk and did not 
require lengthy customs examinations upon arrival in France.41
Dent believed that a number of factors combined to retard the efficiency 
of operations at Boulogne in late 1914. Alongside the ‘want of railway 
accommodation for internal movement’ and the ‘rough and unfinished 
state of parts of the yard’ that Tempest’s construction work was set to 
remedy, Dent considered the mixture of French, Belgian and British labour 
at the port, the import of huge reserves of forage before there was suitable 
covered accommodation available and the presence of en-cas mobile trains 
as the predominant causes of delay at Boulogne. His proposed solution 
to these issues involved on the one hand the separation of the various 
nationalities of labour at the port – the British assigned responsibility for 
the stacking of goods and other duties in the sheds, while the French and 
Belgians merely handled them – and on the other hand the establishment 
of a system whereby the majority of supplies were transferred direct from 
ship to rail upon arrival in France. Items required at the front urgently 
could be sent forward immediately, while those not considered to be 
priorities could be shifted to storage sites away from the docks. This would 
ensure that the quayside remained free of obstructions that complicated, 
and inevitably slowed down, the discharge of arriving ships. Dent claimed 
that if these problems could be rectified the Bassin Loubet was capable of 
handling over 5,000 tons per day.42 (The true capacity of the Bassin Loubet, 
39 TNA, WO 95/3952, IGC war diary, Dent to Clayton, 28 Dec. 1914; Clayton to Dent, 
30 Dec. 1914; diary entry, 13 Jan. 1915.
40 TNA, WO 95/3952, IGC war diary, Dent to Clayton, 28 Dec. 1914.
41 TNA, WO 95/3952, IGC war diary, Boulogne – memorandum by F. H. Dent, 28 Dec. 
1914.
42 TNA, WO 95/3952, IGC war diary, Boulogne – memorandum. The term en-cas mobile 
refers to a group of wagons ‘kept permanently under load ready for immediate despatch’ in 
the event of an emergency. See Henniker, History of the Great War, p. xxxi.
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in Dent’s opinion, was 7,000 tons per day. The lower estimate given in his 
memorandum reflected the nature of the labour available for work in the 
port, which consisted principally of ‘boys and men not of military age’.)
With the BEF’s projected demands for food alone set to reach 4,400 tons 
per day once the first troops of Kitchener’s armies arrived on the western 
front, Dent’s estimates were understandably appealing to the officers 
tasked with keeping the BEF fed and equipped.43 However, Clayton was 
sceptical that Dent’s projected figures could be achieved at Boulogne and 
had reservations over the practicability of the railwayman’s proposed quick 
transit scheme. A central tenet of Dent’s plan to maximize throughput 
at the Bassin Loubet involved loading cargo in Britain so that ‘each ship 
should have approximately sufficient of everything to make the greater part 
of one or more supply trains’. Under such an arrangement, the trains for the 
front line could be made up directly from the quayside – with any surplus 
stocks on each ship or perishable items that had to be regularly turned over 
placed in systematized stores. The benefit of the proposal lay in the fact that 
it would involve comparatively less double-handling than the extant system 
in which ships were unloaded, the goods moved from the quayside for 
storage elsewhere in the harbour and then loaded onto rail at a later date.44
Dent’s quick transit system was ideal in terms of operational efficiency, 
but unfeasible as a solution for the requirements of an industrial army 
with a multitude of demands. Clayton’s response to Dent’s memorandum 
illustrated the civilian’s under appreciation of the difficulties faced by the 
military authorities between 1914 and 1918.45 In response to Dent’s criticism 
that forage had been imported into France before sufficient accommodation 
was available for it, the director of supplies pointed out sardonically that 
‘this I am afraid is one of the necessities of war; the Germans would not 
wait until we had everything in readiness’.46 Yet the German army was not 
the only factor that had made Clayton’s life difficult. The sustenance of 
the BEF’s troops and machines depended upon a range of commodities – 
to prevent the risk of contamination, items such as petrol and lubricating 
oils were not transported on the same vessels as food. Nor was the food 
consumed by the BEF entirely despatched from Britain. Meat was taken 
from cold storage ships berthed at Boulogne, while bread was baked in 
43 TNA, WO 95/3952, IGC war diary, diary entry, 16 Jan. 1915.
44 TNA, WO 95/3952, IGC war diary, Boulogne – memorandum.
45 Dent was by no means alone in considering the suitability of direct loading. As Brown 
demonstrated, in Jan. 1915 correspondence on the subject passed between the IGC in France 
and the QMG at the War Office. See Brown, British Logistics, p. 82.
46 TNA, WO 95/3952, IGC war diary, Clayton to Dent, 30 Dec. 1914. Unless otherwise 
stated, all quotations in this passage are taken from this source.
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vast quantities at bakeries near the port and transported to the railway by 
lorry. The volumes of the other items in the soldiers’ diet were ‘trifling’ in 
comparison to these two staple foodstuffs. Therefore, neither of the integral 
components of the troops’ daily rations were going to be on board the 
ships that were central to Dent’s concept. In addition, the type of food sent 
forward was frequently altered: ‘We change from fresh meat to preserved 
and then to meat and vegetable rations; change bacon for butter and 
give the soldier as much variety as possible’, Clayton noted. In short, the 
director of supplies summarized that it was impossible to ‘pack a train for 
any formation straight from the ship except as regards hay and oats’.
Yet despite his detailed criticisms of Dent’s proposals, Clayton was 
sufficiently amenable to the idea of greater civilian involvement in the war 
effort – at this stage of the conflict at least – to encourage further discussion 
of the scheme. As he recognized at the end of his reply to the SECR’s 
general manager, ‘after all, we are all out for the same object – the good of 
the country and to end the war as speedily as possible, so if you can help 
in this the Army will be grateful to you’.47 Both Clayton and Robertson 
saw the potential benefits of transferring responsibility for the operation of 
Boulogne to the SECR. Consequently, a committee was formed to amend 
and improve Dent’s outline – the membership of which illustrates the scale 
of the organization required to supply a modern army in the field. Officers 
from the directorate of supplies (Clayton took the chair), the directorate of 
works and the directorate of ordnance services joined the principal naval 
transport officer in the committee’s deliberations.48 Both the naval and 
military elements saw an ‘advantage’ in the centralization of responsibility 
at Boulogne, and indicated their willingness to accept the SECR’s offer 
subject to approval from GHQ, the War Office and – as the BEF’s hosts 
and partner – the French authorities. Even Dent’s subsequent downward 
revision of the Bassin Loubet’s capacity from 5,000 tons per day to 3,536 
tons per day did not alter the committee’s resolve.49 Fred West, the goods 
superintendent of the SECR’s London district, was instructed to ‘ascertain 
the system of work of the various departments and to discuss various points 
with the officers in charge’ following the committee’s first meeting.50
47 TNA, WO 95/3952, IGC war diary, Clayton to Dent, 30 Dec. 1914.
48 TNA, WO 95/3952, IGC war diary, Robertson to Maxwell, 9 Jan. 1915.
49 TNA, WO 95/3952, IGC war diary, diary entry 29 Jan. 1915; WO 95/64 DRT war diary, 
French to Kitchener, 23 Feb. 1915.
50 TNA, WO 95/3952, IGC war diary, Commandant, Boulogne base to Clayton, 27 
Jan. 1915. Clayton had taken over as IGC the day before this letter was written, in the 
administrative reshuffle that accompanied Sir William Robertson’s appointment as CIGS. 
Lieutenant-General Ronald Maxwell vacated the role of IGC and became the new QMG in 
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West’s report was a combination of observations on the existing situation 
at Boulogne and recommendations to help the BEF ‘obtain the maximum 
amount of efficiency and economy’ in the future.51 His comments were 
circulated ahead of the second meeting of Clayton’s committee, at which 
Dent played a key role. The civilian fielded questions from the military and 
naval officers, and elaborated upon his vision of the SECR’s position within 
the new organization.52 The members unanimously agreed that the navy, 
due to their ignorance of the landside procedures for the removal of goods 
from the quayside, should cede responsibility for the work of discharging 
ships to the port’s ‘single authority’.53
Multiple factors combined to recommend the SECR as a suitable 
organization to take on the duties of the ‘single authority’ at the Bassin Loubet. 
The company already had experience in the operation of railway ports, a 
working understanding of the port of Boulogne and a pre-existing working 
relationship with the Chemins de Fer du Nord. In addition, the company had 
a strong presence at the port – both in terms of the men placed at the army’s 
disposal during the autumn and those connected with Tempest’s engineering 
works – and Dent had demonstrated an evident willingness to participate in 
the experiment.54 A request for permission to change the procedure at the port 
was duly despatched to the War Office in early February, but despite persistent 
appeals from Clayton ratification from London was inexorably slow to arrive. 
The SECR was finally authorized to take over operations within the Bassin 
Loubet on 17 March – a delay that effectively put the new system into stasis 
for six weeks, after which further time was required for Dent to ‘collect his own 
staff’ for work in the port, for those men to ‘observe the routine working of a 
[military] port’ and for arrangements to be finalized between the SECR and 
the French rail authorities.55 Following discussions between Dent, the SECR 
and representatives of the commission regulatrice, the British railway company 
was eventually authorized to take over ‘all the work of shunting, marshalling 
and the making up of trains in the Bassin Loubet’ from 25 April 1915.56
France, while Clayton’s post as director of supplies was handed to Colonel E. E. Carter – a 
graduate of the LSE’s ‘Mackindergarten’.
51 TNA, WO 95/3953, IGC war diary, Bassin Loubet – Boulogne, Mr West’s report, 13 
Feb. 1915.
52 TNA, WO 95/3953, IGC war diary, Proceedings of second meeting.
53 TNA, WO 95/3953, IGC war diary, Clayton to Shortland, 16 Feb. 1915.
54 TNA, WO 95/3953, IGC war diary, Clayton to Maxwell, 16 Feb. 1915; Clayton to 
Maxwell, 20 Feb. 1915; WO 95/75, Branches and services: Director of supplies, diary entries, 
24 and 26 Feb. 1915.
55 TNA, WO 95/3953, IGC war diary, diary entries, 5 and 27 Feb. 1915; WO 95/3954 
Headquarters branches and services. Inspector general, diary entries, 8 and 17 March 1915.
56 TNA, WO 95/3954, IGC war diary, Clayton to Maxwell, 21 March 1915; WO 95/27, 
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The delays that postponed the company’s takeover of operations at 
Boulogne meant that the SECR inherited a port that had experienced 
increasing congestion during the spring. The demands for material to 
support the offensive at Neuve Chapelle in March overloaded the Channel 
ports’ capacity, as the War Office had responded to the unprecedented scale 
of the fighting by despatching vessels in the direction of the battlefield as 
swiftly as possible. Ships were arriving in France without sufficient intervals 
to allow for one ship to be unloaded and cleared from the quay before the 
next arrived. As highlighted in a post-war article by the shipping expert 
Charles Ernest Fayle, the significant advantage in maritime carrying capacity 
available to the allies was of little value if that capacity was inefficiently 
utilized:
The number of voyages a ship can make … depends not only on her speed at 
sea but on the rapidity with which she can be loaded and discharged, and this, 
in turn, depends not only on the actual equipment of the ports, but on the 
prompt arrival of cargo at the port of loading and on the rapid distribution 
of cargo from the port of discharge. The ports, docks, quays, and wharves; the 
railways, roads, and canals by which the ports are served; the offices in which 
arrangements for the voyage are made; the cables by which fixtures are effected 
and instructions given, are all as important as the ships themselves.57
Ships in port awaiting discharge, or delayed due to inefficiencies in the 
discharging process, could not quickly return to their port of origin to 
acquire their next cargo.
Poor communications between the ports of origin and those on the 
French coast hampered operations at the Bassin Loubet. The staff at 
Boulogne, both before and after the SECR took over, were frequently left 
with incomplete information as to the contents of incoming ships. On 13 
March the SS Juno set out for the port behind an advanced notification from 
Britain that informed operators at Boulogne only that the ship contained 
‘general cargo’.58 With limited crane facilities available it was imperative that 
the port authorities received detailed prior notice of the composition of 
each ship’s contents, so that they could be directed to the berth best suited 
to their discharge immediately upon arrival. Without such information, 
QMG war diary, diary entry, 12 Apr. 1915; WO 95/3955, Headquarters branches and services. 
Inspector general, diary entry, 20 Apr. 1915; WO 95/58, Branches and services: Director of 
ordnance services, diary entry, 19 Apr. 1915.
57 C. Ernest Fayle, ‘Carrying-power in war’, Royal United Services Institution Journal, lxix 
(1924), 527–41, at p. 531.
58 TNA, MT 23/353/1, naval transport officer, Boulogne. As to his advance notification of 
general nature of stores on transports, Hamilton to Shortland, 15 March 1915.
155
Commitment and constraint I
Clayton warned, the supply services could not guarantee that supplies 
required urgently at the front could be processed through the port in a 
timely fashion.59 To alleviate the communications difficulties between the 
Bassin Loubet and Britain, Dent recommended that a bespoke telephone 
connection be installed to link Boulogne with the SECR’s offices in 
London, Dover, Folkestone, Calais and Dunkirk. Precise information as to 
the contents of each ship could be received by telephone prior to the vessel’s 
arrival, allowing staff to direct it to the most suitable berth and arrange for 
any specialist equipment to be provided to the stevedores responsible for its 
discharge.60
The responses to Dent’s suggestion illustrate the limitations of the 
Franco-British coalition. The War Office in London raised no objections 
to a scheme with an obvious benefit to the BEF’s supply operations behind 
the western front. However, although the BEF had been granted ‘every 
latitude’ for the improvement of local facilities within the zones populated 
by its fighting forces during the war, projects that included the installation 
of more permanent equipment also had to be signed off by the French 
authorities.61 The provision of telephone facilities for the SECR’s use was, 
somewhat unsurprisingly, clearly far from the top of GQG’s list of priorities. 
By the end of October 1915 Clayton had received no decision on the 
request. He had believed all along that the French were ‘unlikely’ to accede 
to Dent’s wish but – following an appeal to ‘badger’ Joffre’s staff – a further 
enquiry was made, which generated a firm refusal from the French in early 
November.62 The potential benefits of the telephone line for the prosecution 
of the allied war effort were acknowledged by the French authorities. 
However, the French government realized that the system’s installation 
would have conferred significant competitive advantages to the SECR after 
the war. Combined with a perception among French authorities at the port 
that a ‘custom’ of unauthorized telephone use had ‘grown up’ in the SECR’s 
offices at Boulogne over the course of 1915, the BEF’s hosts asserted that the 
existing telephone facilities – if used properly – were adequate for British 
requirements.63
The disagreement between the French authorities and Britain’s civilian 
specialists may appear superficial, but the ‘telephones incident’ underscores 
59 TNA, WO 95/3954, IGC war diary, diary entry, 23 March 1915.
60 TNA, WO 95/3954, IGC war diary, diary entries, 12 and 23 March 1915.
61 TNA, WO 95/3953, IGC war diary, diary entry, 27 Feb. 1915.
62 TNA, WO 95/3955, IGC war diary, diary entry, 7 Apr. 1915; WO 95/3961, Headquarters 
branches and services. Inspector general, diary entry, 31 Oct. 1915; WO 95/3962, Headquarters 
branches and services. Inspector general, diary entry, 8 Nov. 1915.
63 TNA, WO 95/3962, IGC war diary, 8 Nov. 1915.
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the instability of Franco-British relations during the First World War. 
Throughout the conflict French and British authorities were involved in a 
complex web of negotiations, to which were added the voices of Belgians, 
Italians, Americans and other allies as the war progressed. Political and 
military leaders discussed and sought conciliation in conference rooms 
across Europe, yet the post-war economic and strategic concerns of the 
coalition’s individual components provided an underlying context that 
militated against absolute cooperation. Even the provision of a unified 
command in the person of General Ferdinand Foch in the latter months 
of the war did not eradicate the preponderance of national interests and 
underlying suspicions. A Franco-British disagreement over who should 
provide the manpower and materials required for the repair of Dunkirk 
continued until the armistice came into force. Both the British army and 
the Admiralty acknowledged privately that the port was a more suitable 
candidate for improvement than any of the others that served the BEF 
in October 1918, but the then QMG Travers Clarke was unable to ignore 
misgivings that the French wanted to see Dunkirk repaired for commercial 
reasons. Clarke stated baldly in the immediate aftermath of the conflict that 
‘unless absolutely demanded by the interests of victory, it was no part of our 
military or national duty to enlarge or modernize the equipment of foreign 
ports for after-the-war trade’.64
The war aims of France and Britain in western Europe – despite 
both ostensibly seeking the defeat of Germany – were in many respects 
profoundly different. These disparities, coupled with the changing nature 
of the two nations’ comparative contributions, required French and British 
leaders to engage in constant discussion and compromise to preserve the 
delicate coalition. The fact that a formal contract between the two countries 
did not exist, and the absence of any organ for collective decision-making 
within the coalition, helped reinforce the primacy of national considerations 
over inter-allied requirements throughout 1915. The Dent scheme was 
implemented at Boulogne during a period in which the relative strength 
of the French in terms of land power – and the BEF’s dependence upon 
the French transport network as a conduit for the output of the munitions 
factories across the Channel – acted as powerful bargaining chips in Franco-
British negotiations. Within the tense atmosphere of an allied war effort that 
continued to achieve relatively little on the western front, the installation 
of a telephone system to improve throughput at the Bassin Loubet was not 
64 TNA, WO 95/40, branches and services: quarter-master general, minutes of conference 
held in the QMG’s office on the subject of the use of the ports of Havre, Rouen and 
Dunkirk, 7 Oct. 1918; explanatory review, Nov. 1918, p. 14.
157
Commitment and constraint I
deemed sufficiently important to override French considerations of their 
post-war industrial strategy. Yet it was far from the sole reason why the 
Dent scheme was abandoned before the year of the Somme had even begun.
The growing complexity of Britain’s war machine meant that Francis 
Dent became increasingly detached from events at Boulogne after April 
1915. The proliferating demands for men of recognized managerial ability 
were such that Dent’s commitments to the REC were already substantial by 
the time the SECR became responsible for operations at the Bassin Loubet. 
He continued to oversee the identification and deployment of displaced 
employees of the Belgian State Railways as part of the Belgian railways 
refugee sub-committee, maintained his central role in the ambulance trains 
for the continent sub-committee and became immersed in the recruitment 
of personnel for the ROD – Dent’s portion of the work of the railway 
recruitment sub-committee – which took on fresh importance just as the 
Dent scheme finally got underway.
Dent’s duties in relation to the new division in April 1915 were significant. 
He dealt ‘with the multitudinous questions which arose in regard to the 
methods of enlistment, rates of pay, [and the] nature of duties’ for recruits, 
and personally interviewed all applicants for commissions. He was, 
according to Pratt, ‘accustomed to “father” the division’s early recruits, 
and took great care to provide for their needs’.65 Yet his most important 
contribution to the ROD’s development lay in the selection of Cecil Paget 
as the division’s commanding officer. In an atypical career that had taken in 
both engineering and traffic management positions at the Midland Railway 
before the war, Paget had gained a reputation as a ‘brilliant organiser and 
administrator’.66 Alongside his ‘precise knowledge of the French language’ – 
critical in a role that demanded constant liaison with the BEF’s hosts – his 
rounded knowledge of locomotive engineering and traffic operations made 
him a perfect candidate to lead a division with mechanical and operational 
responsibilities. Colonel L. S. Simpson, the ROD’s chief mechanical 
engineer, spent most of 1915 interviewing Belgian and French railway and 
military personnel alongside Paget, and observed that his chief
had no difficulty in working in with the French or in carrying out the orders of 
higher authority, often involving complicated movements of men and materials, 
and it is entirely due to him that the Railway Operating Division took such a 
large and important part in contributing to the success of our arms. Both on 
the operating and the mechanical side we came to be regarded as a seventh 
65 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 615, 617.
66 E. G. Barnes, The Midland Main Line, 1875–1922 (London, 1969), p. 224.
158
Civilian Specialists at War: Britain’s Transport Experts and the First World War
railway company, and our relations with the French staff and the officials of the 
State and five private companies were always most cordial.67
Paget retained command of the ROD throughout the war, a clear indication 
of his suitability for a role in which he ‘acted as the equivalent of a 
superintendent of the line in conjunction with the French railway officers’. 
Sir Sam Fay wrote approvingly after the war that he ‘could have been graded 
a general if he had so wished’, such was the army’s appreciation of Paget’s 
contribution on the western front. However, ‘he was more intent upon his 
duties than upon advance in military rank’.68
The ROD’s first contribution to operations in France took place in the 
Bassin Loubet, where it became responsible for marshalling the supply trains 
made up at the port in June 1915. As the number of ROD units in France 
increased the division became responsible for more marshalling yards and 
depot sidings, before on 1 November the French authorities transferred 
operations on the Hazebrouck–Ypres line to the British.69 Before the ROD 
took over the Hazebrouck–Ypres service, Simpson and his troops acquired 
responsibility for the repair of engines earmarked both for the division and 
the BEF’s construction troops. A temporary workshop was established in a 
sugar factory near Calais for the overhaul of thirty-five Belgian locomotives, 
which were ‘in a terrible state owing to their not having been touched since 
they were rescued from Belgium’ the previous summer. However, once again 
the requirements of the French economy superseded the convenience of the 
British army in France. As early as mid August 1915 Simpson was ‘obliged 
to find some other place where the repairing of engines could go on’ as the 
premises they had occupied were required for sugar production. The British 
mechanics removed their tools and equipment to a temporary site in an 
ancient chalk pit between Calais and Boulogne, before they finally moved 
into a permanent locomotive repair shop at Audruicq in December.70
The provision of ambulance trains for use at home and abroad competed 
with the ROD for Dent’s attentions in the spring and summer of 1915. 
Alongside his duties as chairman of the ambulance trains for the continent 
sub-committee of the REC, Dent acted as a conduit for communications 
between the predominantly civilian sub-committee in London and the 
ambulance train advisory committee in France – which comprised British 
67 L. S. Simpson, ‘Railway operating in France’, Journal of the Institution of Locomotive 
Engineers, xii (1922), 697–728, at p. 701.
68 S. Fay, The War Office at War (London, 1937), p. 91.
69 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 168; History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, ed. H. 
L. Pritchard (11 vols., Chatham, 1952), v. 594.
70 Simpson, ‘Railway operating in France’, pp. 699–700; Henniker, History of the Great 
War, pp. 168–9.
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and French military railway authorities and RAMC officers. Dent’s role 
was crucial as it facilitated the standardization of equipment on both sides 
of the Channel, a process that reduced both costs and production times 
for new vehicles.71 By the end of the conflict the British railway companies 
had provided thirty ambulance trains for the British army’s use, consisting 
of 518 carriages and all of the spare parts and materials necessary for their 
maintenance. As well as serving on the western front, British-built ambulance 
trains were sent to Salonika and Egypt and provided transport for the 
evacuation of casualties along the Mediterranean line of communications. 
In addition, following consultation between the REC and the American 
military authorities in the summer of 1917 – at which Dent was present – 
the British railway companies had constructed nineteen ambulance trains 
(comprising 304 vehicles) for the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) and 
had a further twenty-nine in varying states of readiness when the armistice 
came into effect.72
Within the maelstrom of work on the REC’s behalf, Dent continued to 
be the general manager of a critically important railway line in the south-
east of England – one that experienced its own significant challenges as 
the war continued. As noted above, the SECR connected London to the 
two shortest ferry routes between Britain and Europe, and in peacetime 
it principally operated as a passenger line for commuters into the capital 
and tourists to the coast and continent. However, the character of the 
SECR’s traffic changed radically once Britain’s productive capacity was 
geared towards the war effort. By the summer of 1915 passenger traffic – 
excluding troop movements – no longer predominated, and the SECR’s 
system had to be adapted as quickly as possible to carry a heavy goods 
traffic ‘for which they had never been designed and were, at first, not fully 
prepared to meet’.73 In July 1915 the SECR’s London district handled 56 per 
cent more wagons than it had twelve months earlier (see Table 4.1), even 
though the company’s workforce had been diminished by the enlistment 
71 See, e.g., the agendas for meetings of the ambulance train advisory committee in 
February, June and August 1915. Each meeting discussed agenda items supplied to the 
committee by Dent on behalf of the ambulance trains for the continent sub-committee 
in London. TNA, WO 158/9, ambulance trains: advisory committee meeting; general 
correspondence, Agenda for ambulance train committee on Saturday 13 Feb. 1915 at 5:30 
p.m.; Agenda for meeting of advisory committee on ambulance trains to be held at Boulogne 
at 10 a.m., on Sunday 6 June 1915; Agenda for meeting of advisory committee on ambulance 
trains to be held at Abbeville on 18 Aug. at 5:30 p.m., 1915.
72 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, i. 206–7; TNA, WO 158/11, Ambulance trains, 
Minutes of meeting held at 35 Parliament Street, Westminster, at 2:45 p.m. on Monday 18 
Nov. 1915, pp. 1–2.
73 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 1075.
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of 2,689 employees to the colours. The patriotic sacrifice of the railway’s 
servants left Dent and his management team facing a significantly increased 
workload with a workforce some 12 per cent smaller than it had been when 
the war began.74
The army’s decision to exploit Folkestone more thoroughly presented the 
SECR with further traffic to deal with from April 1915 onwards. As a locally 
produced chronicle of the town’s experience of the war recorded:
The port of Folkestone was opened for [the] transport of troops about the 
end of March 1915, when the Authorities discovered that it was very much the 
quicker route. After that date a steady flow of troops to and from France was 
maintained. On an average six ships, not including cargo ships and lighters, 
sailed daily all through the war with reinforcements and leave men.75
The Folkestone–Boulogne service became the principal route for British 
personnel both on their way home from the front on leave and on their 
return journey. There is some disagreement over the accuracy of Yelverton’s 
and Carlile’s figures for the number of men and women who passed through 
Folkestone during the war, which provides a caveat to the authors’ claim 
that the SECR handled ‘3,416 motor cars; 192,468 tons of the Company’s 
traffic; nearly 91,000 tons of Government stores; 11,641 tons of material 
for Red Cross societies; 383,098 mails and parcel post; and 63,985 tons 
for Expeditionary Force Canteens; making a total tonnage, outwards and 
inwards, of 742,188’ tons between August 1914 and February 1919.76
74 TNA, ZPER 7/103, records of railway interests, pp. 80–1.
75 B. J. D. Yelverton and J. C. Carlile, ‘The cross-Channel service’, in Folkestone during the 
War: a Record of the Town’s Life and Work, ed. J. C. Carlile (Folkestone, 1920), pp. 186–98, at 
p. 195.
76 Yelverton and Carlile, ‘The cross-Channel service’, p. 197. On the variety of figures 
Table 4.1. Wagon turnover for the London district of the 
South-Eastern and Chatham Railway, 1914–18.
Date Number of wagons Increase over 1914
July 1914 223,798 ———
July 1915 340,193 56 per cent
July 1916 432,896 93 per cent
July 1917 464,121 107 per cent
July 1918 447,000 100 per cent
Source: E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War; Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and 
Achievements (2 vols., 1921), ii. 1078.
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Regardless of the exact figures, the quantity of traffic that passed over 
the SECR’s lines was far beyond anything carried before 1914. Under 
such arduous circumstances Dent felt unable to oversee the day-to-day 
operations of the Bassin Loubet, and he handed over control of the dock 
to the superintendent of the SECR’s northern district, Francis Flood-Page. 
Flood-Page was clearly a capable official – he received the Military Cross in 
1916 – but he lacked both the experience and the authority of the company’s 
general manager. Flood-Page’s name, unlike Dent’s in late 1914 and early 
1915 – is conspicuous by its absence from the war diaries of the BEF’s senior 
supply officers in the second half of 1915. His influence did not reach beyond 
the confines of the Bassin Loubet, and his presence did not command the 
same degree of attention among the military authorities as that of Dent – a 
pre-war senior executive of a large company, a lieutenant-colonel in the 
ERSC and a member of the REC from its establishment.
The effects of the war’s evolution into a battle of material were rapidly 
felt at the Bassin Loubet. By 3 May – a week after the SECR had taken 
over as the single authority at the port – the director of supplies, Colonel 
Carter, recorded that ‘considerable progress’ had been made in the 
arrangement of storage accommodation within the area.77 However, within 
a fortnight the congestion at Boulogne reached the point at which Carter 
felt compelled to authorize the stacking of stores ‘in the open’.78 Sustained 
calls for ammunition from the front the following month forced GHQ 
to shift additional labour to Boulogne, to ensure that the shells required 
by the artillery were discharged and sent forward as a priority.79 The ASC 
were called upon to transfer men from Calais to deal with the potentially 
hazardous and specialist task of handling explosives, while officers stationed 
at Boulogne for training purposes ahead of assignments elsewhere found 
themselves pressed into temporary action to help clear backlogs within 
the port. Eric de Normann, destined for Salonika, was one such officer. 
He wrote to his mother that he was relieved to be involved in the ‘very 
interesting’ work of unloading munitions, and saw it as a diversion from the 
parades and drills that had hitherto dominated his wartime experience.80 
recorded for passenger traffic through Folkestone during the war, see C. Fair, ‘The Folkestone 
harbour station canteen and the visitors’ books’, Step Short: Remembering the Soldiers of the 
Great War, 2008 <http://www.kentfallen.com/PDF%20REPORTS/FOLKESTONE%20
HARBOUR%20STATION.pdf> [accessed 6 Sept. 2016].
77 TNA, WO 95/75, director of supplies war diary, diary entry, 3 May 1915.
78 TNA, WO 95/75, director of supplies war diary, diary entry, 14 May 1915.
79 TNA, WO 95/3957, headquarters branches and services. Inspector general, diary entry, 
15 June 1915.
80 IWM, Private papers of Sir Eric de Normann, 72/72/1, de Normann to his mother, 3, 5 
and 10 Sept. 1915.
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De Normann had a grandstand seat over the summer, during which he 
observed a ‘very heavy traffic in the port’. ‘Everything’, he wrote, was ‘being 
accumulated for der Tag’ at Boulogne.81
The additional support failed to remedy the mounting congestion, and 
by the end of August Carter had lost patience with what he dubbed the 
‘so-called Dent scheme’s’ inability to meet the standards promised by the 
transport expert the previous winter.82 Following an inspection of the port 
and discussions with Clayton about the difficulties that had been experienced 
since the adoption of the Dent scheme at Boulogne, Carter ordered the ‘old 
method’ of working at the Bassin Loubet to be adopted for a fortnight’s trial 
on 1 September.83 The ASC regained responsibility for the removal of stores 
from the quayside and the personnel of the SECR were retained purely 
for the discharge of arriving ships – to act as civilian labour under military 
direction. After the two weeks had elapsed, officers from the departments 
that had initially authorized the Dent scheme’s implementation adjudged 
the trial to have been ‘an unqualified success’. They reported that ships had 
been offloaded and dealt with more quickly than had been the case under 
the SECR’s management, even though the average daily tonnage handled 
through the port remained far below the targets set by the IGC.84 However, 
while the army representatives wished to make the organization trialled 
during September a permanent fixture at Boulogne, the navy demurred. 
Instead, a report that proposed a reversion to the system in place before 
April 1915 was forwarded to the committee for its consideration.85 Clayton 
requested that nothing be done to ‘disturb the existing arrangement’, but 
the War Office was forced to concede that it was illogical to resist the navy’s 
demand to regain authority over the labour employed to discharge ships 
now that the army once again controlled the onshore workforce.86
When placed within the wider context of the BEF’s supply operations in 
1915, the navy’s argument was particularly compelling. Only at Boulogne 
had the ‘single authority’ experiment deviated from the procedures to which 
the navy sought a return. By reverting to the working practices familiar to 
the soldiers, sailors and labourers at each of the other ports that contributed 
81 IWM, De Normann papers, 72/72/1, de Normann to his mother, 5 Sept. 1915.
82 TNA, WO 95/75, director of supplies war diary, diary entry, 25 Aug. 1915.
83 TNA, WO 95/75, director of supplies war diary, diary entry, 1 Sept. 1915.
84 TNA, WO 95/3960, headquarters branches and services. Inspector general, diary entry, 
18 Sept. 1915; WO 95/3961, IGC war diary, diary entry, 12 Oct. 1915.
85 The report itself does not appear to have survived. However, its contents can be deduced 
from TNA, MT 23/443/4, naval transport work overseas. Report of proceedings of principal 
naval transport officer, 3 Oct. 1915.
86 TNA, WO 95/3961, IGC war diary, diary entries, 12 and 26 Oct. 1915.
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to the BEF’s subsistence – which happened on 24 October 1915, when the 
SECR surrendered responsibility for the unloading of ships in the Bassin 
Loubet – operations were standardized across the Channel ports for the 
remainder of the war.87 Just six months after it had begun, the civil–military 
experiment set in motion by Francis Dent the previous December was 
modified to restore the managerial authority of the navy and army at the 
port.
The reassertion of military control at Boulogne, and the official history’s 
later emphasis on the ‘inadvisability’ of entrusting such work to ‘civilian 
management and labour’, implies that the civilian operators at Boulogne 
had proven uniquely incapable of dealing with the growing strain of 
servicing the needs of Britain’s expanding continental commitment. 
However, Boulogne was not alone in experiencing difficulties during 1915. 
Congestion at ports both in France and Britain became pronounced in 
the first full year of the conflict, as the allies attempted to respond to the 
traffic changes engendered by the war’s outbreak. The provision of adequate 
labour to deal with the BEF’s increasing traffic requirements – whether 
from civilian or military sources – was a constant source of correspondence 
between London and GHQ during 1915, as the latter received an incessant 
stream of departmental demands for men to offload ships, shift road stone, 
build defences and myriad other unspectacular but necessary duties.88 
The virtual closure to international traffic of the ports on the east coast of 
England, and the continued use of Southampton as a military port, shifted 
a colossal amount of traffic onto the port of Liverpool. By 11 January 1915 
there were forty-four steamers waiting to berth, and by the start of March 
several vessels containing perishable goods had been unable to discharge 
their cargoes for over a month. The formation of the Liverpool Dock 
Battalion by the War Office in March 1915 – a military unit under military 
law – did not alleviate the problem. As Starling and Lee recorded, by June 
an average of sixty vessels per day were recorded as awaiting berths on the 
Mersey.89
The SECR’s tenure as the Bassin Loubet’s ‘single authority’ was 
comparatively brief, but its withdrawal did not spell the end of civil–military 
cooperation at the port; the ROD’s civilians in uniform retained command 
over the railway operations within the ‘small and inconvenient marshalling 
yard’ at the Bassin Loubet following the termination of the experiment.90 
87 TNA, WO 95/3961, IGC war diary, Thomson to Macgregor, 24 Oct. 1915; Clayton to 
Macgregor, 25 Oct. 1915.
88 Starling and Lee, No Labour, No Battle, pp. 77–86.
89 Starling and Lee, No Labour, No Battle, pp. 34–6.
90 TNA, WO 95/3963, headquarters branches and services. Inspector general, British lines 
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Nor did it diminish the opportunities for Francis Dent, the architect of 
the scheme, to make direct contributions to the supply operations of the 
wartime British army. Following his appointment as DGT, Sir Eric Geddes 
chose Dent to lead an investigation into the organization of railways in Egypt 
and Salonika, which provided the former with a thorough understanding 
of the EEF’s and BSF’s resource requirements for 1917. Dent left Marseille 
for Cairo on 31 October 1916 where, after discussions with the EEF’s senior 
command, he visited the Alexandria docks and drew upon his experience at 
Boulogne to recommend improved wagon-loading methods at the port.91 
He then spent much of November at Salonika before returning to Cairo to 
produce a comprehensive report on the railway situation in Egypt with Sir 
George Macauley.92
Dent ensured that the eastern theatres were placed on a solid transport 
footing ahead of 1917, and that precious railway equipment was not 
distributed inefficiently. Unsurprisingly, given Macauley’s knowledge of the 
country and expertise as a railway engineer, Dent was able to report to 
London that the line east towards Palestine from Qantara had been well 
constructed and was capable of supplying a force twice the size of that 
being readied for the advance. In addition, ‘the rolling stock position was 
not acute, and, provided greater use was made of water rather than rail 
communication in Egypt itself, the State Railway rolling stock might be 
considered sufficient for the time being. It would, however, be necessary 
later to supply additional stock’ if the EEF’s advance crept further into 
Ottoman territory.93
The absence of an equivalent to Macauley within the BSF made the 
Salonika portion of Dent’s investigation more complicated. Following his 
arrival at Salonika he inspected operations at that port and then viewed the 
construction of a light railway between Stavros and Tasli.94 Ahead of his 
arrival at Stavros Dent had forewarned Sir Guy Granet, the director-general 
of military railways (DGMR) at the War Office, to expect an order for ‘5 
locomotives and 140 wagons, 20 miles of flat-bottomed rails not less than 
80 lbs and new sleepers’. ‘It is of greatest importance’, Dent continued, 
‘for [the] Army here to know if you can supply standard gauge material 
of communication in 1915, p. 2; Simpson, ‘Railway operating in France’, p. 700.
91 TNA, WO 95/4389, branches and services: Director of railway transport, diary entries, 
7–9 and 12 Nov., 2 Dec. 1916.
92 TNA, PRO 95/4389, DRT war diary, diary entries, 16–27 Dec. 1916.
93 ‘The Palestine campaign’, Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation Number, 21 Sept. 
1920, pp. 119–28, at p. 119.
94 TNA, WO 95/4784, branches and services: director of railways, diary entries, 17–18 and 
28 Nov. 1916.
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as suggested above instead of the 40 miles of narrow gauge and 18 locos 
ordered already and probable dates of shipment in either alternative. Latter 
information is key to situation’.95 The standard gauge material was never 
despatched. Dent’s confirmation that the port at Stavros was unsuitable 
for the unloading of standard gauge equipment – combined with the 
lack of material immediately available from British or Egyptian sources; 
the fact that necessity for the railway to be completed before the summer 
months made construction impracticable; General Milne’s preference for 
the ‘rapidity’ of narrow-gauge laying; and the eventual movement of the 
British forces westward to Doiran – meant that the locomotives, wagons, 
rails, sleepers and shipping capacity required to transport them to the 
Mediterranean could be deployed more effectively elsewhere.96
Conclusion
Geddes’s decision to entrust Dent with the leadership of the transportation 
mission to Egypt and Salonika, alongside his multiple ongoing commitments 
to the REC’s work, underlines the high regard within which the SECR’s 
general manager’s technical skills were held by civilian and military authorities 
during the First World War. Dent’s wartime service was not curtailed by 
the perceived failure of the civil–military experiment at Boulogne in 1915. 
Instead, he was awarded a knighthood in January 1916 in recognition of his 
ongoing service to the nation at war, and was unanimously elected by his 
peers to the chairmanship of the Railway Clearing House general managers’ 
conference in July 1917.97 Nor were the acknowledgements of Dent’s 
expertise restricted to Britain. In 1917 he was despatched to the United 
States to provide the American military authorities with advice on the use 
of ambulance trains ahead of their own troops’ introduction to the fighting 
on the western front. Yet it was from the French that Dent received the 
most fulsome praise. The French government awarded the British railway 
manager a Légion d’Honneur in the summer of 1915, and he was issued 
with a replica of the award at a special gathering of French and British 
dignitaries that August.98 However, his wartime contribution was eclipsed 
in the railway industry’s post-war records of the conflict. Dent – unlike his 
95 TNA, WO 95/4764, branches and services: Adjutant and quarter-master general, Dent 
to Granet, 27 Nov. 1916.
96 LHCMA, Milne papers, BSF: summary of information, 15 Nov. to 8 Dec. 1916; 
TNA, WO 95/4389, DRT war diary, diary entry, 13 Dec. 1916; ‘Railways and the Salonica 
campaign’, Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation Number, 21 Sept. 1920, pp. 110–18, at 
p. 114.
97 ‘Ministerial changes’, The Times, 26 July 1917, p. 8.
98 ‘General news section’, Railway Gazette, 3 Sept. 1915, p. 233.
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contemporaries Sir Sam Fay, Sir Guy Granet, Sir Guy Calthrop and Sir Eric 
Geddes among others – was not highlighted for praise within the pages of 
the Railway Gazette’s 1920 special issue on wartime transportation or Edwin 
Pratt’s exhaustive account of British railways in the First World War.99
He and his colleagues at the SECR may have proven unable to match 
the ambitious projections he had made in the winter of 1914, but they 
embodied the approach of Britain’s transport experts to the challenges of 
the First World War. Dent and Percy Tempest made themselves available 
to the service of the nation from the very outset of the conflict – having 
already been active participants in Britain’s pre-war preparations – and 
made demonstrably important contributions to the establishment of a 
supply chain capable of sustaining the expanding BEF.
However, Dent’s exertions at Boulogne also exemplify the weaknesses 
of the coalition’s approach to the unprecedented growth of the British 
contribution to the war’s principal theatre of operations. The single port 
experiment at Boulogne was essentially nothing more than ‘tinkering’ with 
a thread in a large and complex web, one with a multitude of potential 
weaknesses that lay dormant until the colossal demands of 1916 exposed 
the structural frailties in the BEF’s transport infrastructure. The relative 
paucity of the demands made upon it in 1915 – before the French and 
British war economies had achieved maximum output – meant that 
transportation facilities had not yet replaced production shortages as the 
constraining factor on allied operations on the western front. Under such 
circumstances, the SECR’s failure to reach the throughput levels estimated 
to be possible at the Bassin Loubet – which were partly a consequence 
of French protectionism in addition to Dent’s overambitious projections 
– overshadowed the long-term improvements to the dock’s capacity that 
were overseen by Percy Tempest and his team. Through the construction of 
new facilities within the port, the SECR played a vital role in facilitating 
the thorough exploitation of the Bassin Loubet in the second half of the 
war. Elsewhere in the BEF, another civil–military collaboration initiated 
in the war’s opening winter produced similar results. However, in the same 
month that the SECR was removed from managerial responsibilities at the 
Bassin Loubet, those in charge of the department of IWT experienced a 
very different fate.
99 ‘British railways and the war’, Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation Number, 21 
Sept. 1920, p. 7; Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, i, pp. ix–xiii.
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5. Commitment and constraint II:  
Commander Gerald Holland and the role of  
inland water transport
The nomenclature that identifies the actions of the First World War in 
the English language is peppered with references to individual towns – 
Ypres, Verdun and Amiens among others – and by association with local 
waterways, such as the Marne, the Somme and the Lys. Their presence 
indicates that the patch of Europe that became the western front was served 
by a communications network comprising more than merely roads and 
railways. The canal and river systems of northern France and Belgium in 
1914 were, from a transportation point of view, ‘undoubtedly among the 
finest in the world’.1 Across the two nations ran almost ten thousand miles 
of navigable waterways that – unlike in Britain, where the spread of the 
railways had severely curtailed the use of canals for the bulk carriage of 
goods – remained an integral component of the local and regional freight 
traffic infrastructure. In 1905 the total quantity of freight carried by water 
in Belgium amounted to 53,345,000 tons, approximately half of the nation’s 
entire goods and merchandise traffic.2 The outbreak of war in August 1914 
brought this traffic almost entirely to a standstill. However, the ‘permanent 
way’ of the canal and river network remained relatively undamaged by the 
opening campaigns and – in many areas – within the hands of the allies.
This chapter examines the manner in which the BEF exploited waterborne 
transport during the First World War. As at the port of Boulogne in 1914–15, 
the development of an inland water transport (IWT) service on the western 
front demonstrates the British army’s open minded approach towards the 
input of suitably qualified experts before Sir Eric Geddes’s transportation 
mission in August 1916. Gerald Holland, the man responsible for establishing 
an IWT service on the western front, was embedded within the BEF’s 
command hierarchy from the outset – unlike the SECR’s Francis Dent and 
Percy Tempest – and provided specialist technical advice to the British army 
1 TNA, WO 95/56, branches and services. Director of inland water transport, 
memorandum number 1, 19 Sept. 1915, p. 1.
2 TNA, WO 158/851, director general of transport: history of inland water transport, p. 
2; WO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, memorandum 1, p. 2.
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until his death in 1917. Rather than offering guidance at arms-length or 
overseeing the delivery of a solitary endeavour, Holland was incorporated 
into the army and given the freedom to devote his energies and expertise to 
the provision of canal and river freight services in France. His talents were 
recognized and respected by the army’s most senior administrative officers, 
and the British commenced upon a multitude of expensive engineering 
projects (in terms of time, resources and costs) upon the strength of 
Holland’s advocacy.
However, in addition to illustrating the BEF’s willingness to engage with 
Britain’s transport experts, the development of Holland’s department in the 
first half of the war demonstrates the inadequacies of the allies’ response to 
the conflict’s evolution. Holland’s experiences at GHQ provide evidence 
both of the limitations of the Franco-British coalition and the deficiencies 
within the BEF’s extant transportation organization before Geddes’s arrival. 
The British army’s compartmentalized approach to transport meant that 
IWT remained an under-exploited resource on the western front in 1915–
16, which had significant implications for the road and rail networks behind 
the BEF before and during the battle of the Somme. Holland, although part 
of the army’s command structure, possessed responsibility for solving issues 
related to only one link in the transport chain. Throughout 1915, and until 
the great battles of 1916 had devastated the existing infrastructure, there was 
neither the political will to broaden the scope of civil–military cooperation 
nor the military imperative to reassess the coalition’s existing administrative 
structures. Consequently, the allies’ approach during this period was 
characterized by a fixation on the resolution of short-term, localized, 
specific transport challenges rather than a consideration of the long-term 
organizational and infrastructural improvements that underpinned the war 
effort in France and Belgium.
The establishment of the department of inland water transport
The British army was thoroughly aware of the presence and importance of 
the French and Belgian waterways prior to the First World War. In a lecture 
delivered to the Aldershot command in 1908, the then Brigadier-General 
William Robertson directed his audience’s attention to the fact that – with 
the ‘aid of canals here and there’ – the Scheldt, Sambre and Meuse rivers 
were all navigable ‘in their course through Belgium’.3 Five years later the 
War Office produced a report on the available communications in Belgium, 
which dedicated almost eighty pages to reconnaissance of the Sambre, the 
3 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 1/3/2, text of a lecture given by Robertson at Aldershot, 
Hampshire, on the military geography of western Europe, 1908, p. 14.
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Meuse and the Blaton–Ath Canal.4 Yet despite the acknowledged existence 
of a network of waterways in a potential theatre of operations, the War 
Office’s studies were not buttressed by the creation of a procedure for 
the operation of waterborne transport in the event of war.5 The possible 
exploitation of IWT was almost entirely absent from the instructions issued 
to the IGC upon mobilization.6 Whereas the French and British pre-war 
discussions had created distinct – if in the event unworkable – demarcations 
of responsibility around the operations of the French railway network, the 
canal and river systems were overlooked in the arrangements under which 
the Franco-British coalition entered the war.
There were three reasons for the almost complete omission of waterborne 
traffic from the BEF’s considerations at the outset of the war. First, the 
army had not utilized IWT during its most recent large-scale conflict, 
the South African War of 1899–1902. Coupled with the comparatively 
insignificant use of canals within peacetime British industry by 1914, the 
army had consequently become blinded to the potential advantages of an 
efficiently operated fleet of IWT vessels. Waterborne carriage was briefly 
touched upon in the lectures delivered to students on the LSE’s course for 
administrative staff officers, but as John Cowans stated in December 1914: 
‘from a transport point of view, and my knowledge is fairly wide in this 
respect, I am unaware of any [Royal] Engineer officer who has much idea of 
working inland water transport’.7
Second, the limitations of IWT were stark when compared to railway 
and road transport. Waterborne traffic routes were fixed by nature and 
the process of altering the flow of rivers or canals took far longer than the 
equivalent task for a railway line or road. Furthermore, repairs to waterways 
damaged during operations required a far greater commitment of manpower 
and resources than were necessary to reconstruct a similar length of railway. 
The sedate rate of progress of rivercraft also made them unsuitable for 
supplying an army engaged in a war of manoeuvre – the type of conflict 
most pre-war strategists predicted would characterize the conflict. Barges 
were restricted to travel during daylight hours only as they possessed no 
lights, and had to deal with the negotiation of lock gates, currents, adverse 
winds and ice that – except for the latter – did not unduly affect rail or 
4 TNA, WO 33/615, report on roads, rivers and billeting in Belgium, volume ii, 1913.
5 A. M. Henniker, History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western Front, 1914–1918 
(London, 1937), p. 174.
6 TNA, WO 33/686, instructions for the IGC, Part V, sub-section 5.12.
7 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 126; C. W. Gwynn, ‘The administrative course 
at the London School of Economics’, Royal Engineers Journal, vi (1907), 229–35, at p. 232; 
LHCMA, Robertson papers, 2/2/43, Cowans to Robertson, 14 Dec. 1914.
170
Civilian Specialists at War: Britain’s Transport Experts and the First World War
road services.8 Millicent Peterkin, a nurse who spent much of 1918 aboard 
an ambulance barge, experienced the impact that poor weather could have 
upon the operations of IWT during the war. Following a period of leave 
at the start of the year, Peterkin arrived at No. 10 Stationary Hospital in St 
Omer on 1 February to await the arrival of her barge from Calais. However, 
ten days later she was still at St Omer as there had been ‘a great deal of wind 
for several days’. The barges ‘should have been back three or four days ago 
… I wish my barge would hurry up, for I badly need a change of clothes!’9 
Throughout the war’s final year Peterkin’s letters home frequently described 
the wind as a ‘beastly nuisance’, and catalogued the disruption caused by 
the weather upon her barge’s ability to complete its journeys to and from 
Calais.10
In addition to their susceptibility to inclement weather, canal and river 
traffic was governed by strict speed limits well below those permitted for 
trains and mechanical transport. Barges were restricted to a top speed of six 
kilometres per hour for single vessels and just four-and-a-half kilometres 
per hour for convoys. In the same way that speed limits for motor transport 
were carefully managed to protect the condition of both vehicles and the 
road surface, the restrictions placed on IWT were introduced to ensure 
that the wash that emanated from the craft did not damage the banks. 
Consequently, even under perfect conditions a self-propelled barge required 
two days to traverse the fifty-two miles between Dunkirk and Béthune; a tug 
with four barges required a further twelve hours to make the same journey.11 
Such a stately rate of progress made IWT an unsatisfactory medium for the 
conveyance of supplies demanded urgently at the front line.
Finally, the use of IWT was largely excluded from the thoughts of 
British commanders as the opening exchanges of the conflict left a large 
stretch of the Belgian system and key connections to the French waterways 
(such as the St Quentin Canal) either within German-held territory or 
unsafe for navigation until the location of the front line settled.12 These 
impediments did not deter Commander Gerald Holland from approaching 
the War Office in the opening weeks of the war with a conviction that 
the ‘splendid’ waterways of France could provide a useful supplement to 
8 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 174.
9 BLSC, Bamji collection/PET, hospital barges in France: correspondence from a nursing 
sister, with the British Expeditionary Force, during World War I, p. 8.
10 BLSC, hospital barges in France, pp. 9, 10, 12, 16.
11 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 34; A. C. Fewtrell, ‘The organisation of the 
transportation services of the British armies on the western front’, Minutes of Proceedings of 
the Engineering Association of New South Wales, xxxiv (1919), 153–72, at p. 171.
12 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 4; Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 173.
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the existing road and rail facilities.13 Like Eric Geddes – whose offer to 
recruit a battalion of skilled railwaymen from among the employees of the 
North-Eastern Railway was made to the War Office around the same time 
– Holland’s approach fell victim to the nature of the French and British 
staffs’ pre-war arrangements, which located responsibility for the provision 
of all the BEF’s transport requirements with the French. The comparatively 
low strain placed on the French railways by the ‘contemptibly’ small BEF, 
combined with the fluidity of the front line and the dearth of navigable 
waterways in the section of front initially held by the BEF, meant that the 
formation of an IWT service was not a priority for the army in August 
1914. Consequently, Holland’s proposal was declined by the military ‘as it 
was at that time considered that rail transport, supplemented by adequate 
road transport, would fully meet the [BEF’s] requirements’ for logistical 
support.14 
The nature of Holland’s rebuff, unlike that issued to Geddes, did not 
engender a longstanding animosity between the former and the soldiers 
at the War Office. As the rank suggested, Commander Holland possessed 
previous experience with the armed forces. He had served with the Royal 
Indian Marine between 1880 and 1905, and saw service in Burma, India, and 
during the South African War. Following his departure from the navy he had 
entered the employment of the LNWR and, after a brief stint at Fleetwood, 
in 1907 Holland became the marine superintendent at Holyhead (a role 
formerly held by Francis Dent’s father, Admiral Charles Bayley Calmady 
Dent). According to Cowans, who knew Holland personally, he was ‘a 
most able officer’.15 Therefore, when the circumstances in France changed, 
Holland’s proposal was revisited.
Two factors compelled the army to reassess the potential role of IWT 
on the western front. First, the decision to raise and deploy a large force 
in France brought with it the requirement to create and maintain lines of 
communications capable of feeding and equipping that force. Second, the 
BEF’s relocation to Flanders in October 1914 placed it within proximity 
of the northern network of waterways (see Figure 5.1). Therefore, by the 
winter of 1914–15 the exploitation of IWT was far more practicable than 
it had been when Holland approached the War Office in the summer. 
On 10 December the loading of barges began at Bergues, with the loaded 
vessels placed under the command of non-commissioned officers from 
13 TNA, CAB 45/205, Lieutenant-Colonel G. E. Holland, information dictated by Major 
Bradbury.
14 TNA, CAB 45/205, Holland, information dictated by Major Bradbury.
15 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 2/2/43, Cowans to Robertson, 14 Dec. 1914.
172
Civilian Specialists at War: Britain’s Transport Experts and the First World War
the ASC for their journeys to Estaires and Béthune.16 Two days later the 
DOM at the War Office, Brigadier-General Richard Montagu Stuart-
Wortley – correctly identifying that the provision of IWT in France was 
likely to become a large enough job to require the establishment of a 
separate department – wrote to Sir William Robertson to recommend 
Commander Holland, ‘a most energetic and useful officer’, to head the 
department.17
In the same month that Geddes experienced his uncomfortable 
meeting with Lord Kitchener and Cowans at the War Office, the army 
was open minded enough to recommend an ‘outsider’ to a position 
of seniority within the BEF’s command structure. Before Christmas, 
Holland had called upon Stuart-Wortley to discuss matters in France, 
and on 28 December he was offered a temporary commission in the Royal 
Engineers. Within forty-eight hours the newly commissioned Lieutenant-
Colonel Holland had crossed the Channel to ‘report as to the steps which 
16 TNA, WO 95/27, QMG war diary, the use of canals for supply purposes, 15 Dec. 1914.
17 TNA, WO 32/5162, formation and organisation of inland water transport in France 
and Belgium; establishment and appointments, Stuart-Wortley to Robertson, 12 Dec. 1914.
Figure 5.1. Map of the northern waterways, France and Belgium. 
Source: A. M. Henniker, History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western Front, 
1914–1918 (London, 1937), p. 173. Map drawn by Cath D’Alton.
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should be taken to enable the waterways to be utilized for transport work 
for the British Army’.18
Holland’s private diary from this period survives, and illustrates the 
unpromising foundations upon which he had to construct an IWT 
department within the BEF. On 30 December 1914 he reported for duty 
at GHQ and was placed under the authority of the director of railways in 
the QMG’s office.19 A day after his arrival he interviewed a local tug captain 
and ascertained that the French custom was for a barge to be operated and 
lived upon by an entire family.20 Rather than work to orders and provide 
transport on routes identified and requested by the British, the barge 
owners preferred to choose their own routes and only carry cargoes between 
docks they themselves had selected.21 A meeting with the French army’s 
canal expert on 1 January 1915 quickly revealed that this obstinacy was not 
based on any kind of xenophobic prejudice or nationalist intransigence; 
the French boating community happened to be just as truculent in the 
face of French military authority. Holland met with the Belgian canal 
representative the next day, which meant that within four days of his 
arrival on the western front he had established what appear to have been 
friendly and progressive relations with his counterparts in both the French 
and Belgian armies. However, his conversations with the BEF’s coalition 
partners had not engendered an agreement for them to provide the British 
with either the manpower or materials required to create an IWT service 
behind Sir John’s expanding army. As Holland reflected later, in January 
1915 the IWT department in France comprised ‘two officers, no men, one 
hired tug and 34 barges’.22
Holland’s diary also documents both the complexity of the task that 
lay ahead of him and the assistance he received from the army and the 
British transport industry. Without a pool of reliable local barge operators 
to call upon, the only alternative open to Holland was the enlistment of 
personnel from Britain to crew the vessels and provide the technical and 
administrative support required to maintain an efficient fleet. His diary 
recorded the names and occupational backgrounds of those chosen to 
18 TNA, WO 32/5162, formation and organisation of IWT, note 6, 19 Dec. 1914; WO 
158/851, History of IWT, p. 5.
19 TNA, CAB 45/205, Holland, diary entry, 30 Dec. 1914.
20 See IWM, private papers of Brigadier A. E. Hodgkin, Documents.12337, diary entry, 2 
May 1916 for a vivid account of the extraction of a civilian barge from difficulties. Hodgkin’s 
narrative is accompanied by two sketches of the methods by which young children aboard 
the civilian barges were tethered to the vessel to prevent them from falling into the water. 
My thanks to Edward Spiers for alerting me to Brigadier Hodgkin’s diary.
21 TNA, CAB 45/205, Holland, diary entry, 31 Dec. 1914.
22 TNA, WO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, memorandum 1, pp. 3–4.
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populate the new department. The entries also emphasize the breadth of 
skills necessary to manage an industrial army. The majority of recruits, 
such as Horace Pitman, were selected because of their previous associations 
with waterborne transport. Pitman possessed ten years’ experience as a 
yachtsman, while Corporal William McKinlay was transferred into the 
department thanks to his having trained as a surveyor with Lloyd’s before 
the war. George Tagg, despite being fifty-two years of age, was appointed 
both for his knowledge of the French and Belgian canal systems and his 
familial links to the boat-building industry.23 Others were chosen for 
less obvious but equally important qualities. E. G. Weston, for example, 
brought his experience as assistant secretary in the colonial civil service to 
the provision of clerical support to the newly established department, while 
the War Office also contributed a cadre of officers. Stuart-Wortley agreed 
to release Lieutenant Baugh from the directorate of movements and to 
Colonel Albert Collard’s attachment to Holland’s fledgling outfit.24
Yet like the BEF as a whole, the force’s IWT department was heavily 
dependent for personnel upon those from outside the pre-war British army. 
Holland’s own pre-war career, both at sea and on the railways, provided 
the nucleus around which the BEF’s IWT organization was constructed. 
His three most senior subordinate officers in France were former Royal 
Indian Marine officers, while the LNWR contributed numerous labourers 
and administrative staff keen to serve under their former manager.25 On 
13 January a list of fifty men who were willing to enlist from the marine 
department at Holyhead was compiled; they were medically examined 
soon after and sent to the Royal Engineers’ training camp at Longmoor 
for instruction under Major Cyril Luck – one of Holland’s former naval 
colleagues who had been appointed officer commanding IWT troops.26 
Elsewhere, Private R. H. Williams transferred into the department from 
the 16th (Service) Battalion (Public Schools), Middlesex Regiment – and 
received a promotion to lieutenant – following an interview with Holland 
on 20 January. Williams, Holland recorded, possessed previous LNWR 
locomotive experience and was ‘intelligent looking’.27
23 TNA, CAB 45/205, Holland, diary entries, 20 and 23 Jan. 1915.
24 TNA, CAB 45/205, Holland, diary entries, 9 and 10 Jan. 1915.
25 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, pp. 8–9; IWM, Hodgkin papers, diary entry, 19 
June 1916.
26 TNA, CAB 45/205, Holland, diary entry, 13 Jan. 1915; WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 
9.
27 TNA, WO 32/5162, formation and organisation of IWT, particulars of officers; CAB 
45/205, Holland, diary entry, 20 Jan. 1915.
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Whereas Williams came to Holland’s attention as a result of a direct 
recommendation from the former’s commanding officer, an ‘active 
campaign of enlistment’ at various ports across the country accounted for 
the lightermen, watermen, seamen, engineers and other assorted trades 
required to ensure the department’s ability to fulfil its duties.28 Brigadier 
Adrian Hodgkin, who was attached to IWT between December 1915 and 
August 1916, recorded the assortment of technical skills that were collected 
upon each barge during the war. A chemical glass manufacturer prior to 
the war, Hodgkin served on the water purification barge A.174 after being 
wounded at Ypres in July 1915. Nobody on A.174 matched the maritime 
experience of Corporal Mapplebeck, the commander of A.412, whom 
Hodgkin described as ‘a delightful old man, one of the dirtiest looking 
villains I have ever seen; he talks in the broadest Yorkshire, comes from 
Hull, and has lived “all us lives” on a boat similar to A.412’.29 Yet most 
of Hodgkin’s crewmates on A.174 were employed in shipping-related 
occupations. Corporal Fernandez had worked on the Mersey ferries in 
peacetime; Sapper A. Arnold was a second mate sailor; Sapper D. Applegate 
had been a motorboat driver; Sapper Humphreys was a Thames waterman; 
and Sapper Marsh had been both a Thames waterman and a former stoker 
in the Royal Navy. In fact, only Hodgkin and Sergeant J. W. McCririck – a 
‘general engineer in peacetime’ – possessed no previous experience in the 
operation of waterborne transport.
The directorate’s headquarters, to which Hodgkin transferred in June 
1916, was less reliant upon waterborne experience but still contained a 
higher proportion of Britain’s transport experts than it did professional 
soldiers. In addition to the former Lloyd’s surveyor William McKinlay, who 
by that point had attained the rank of major, two of the ten deputy assistant 
directors of IWT in mid 1916 had backgrounds in the merchant navy. 
Another, Captain Daniels, had worked before the war in ship repairs. Three 
of the remainder were servants of Holland’s immediate pre-war employer, 
the LNWR.30
Holland’s technical expertise, alongside the skills of the officers who 
helped him to build the IWT department, were clearly valued highly by 
those charged with ensuring that the expanding BEF continued to receive 
ample logistical support. The paper strength of the IWT department when 
Holland was appointed stood at thirty-six officers and 654 other ranks – 
although by the end of January 1915 just five of each were actually at work 
28 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 19.
29 IWM, Hodgkin papers, diary entry, 24 Apr. 1916.
30 IWM, Hodgkin papers, diary entry, 19 June 1916.
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in France – and throughout the army there existed an expectation that 
IWT would be called upon to undertake ‘an immense amount’ of work 
‘sooner or later’.31 In acknowledgement that the British army lacked the 
knowledge base to make the most effective use of the canal and river systems 
in France, senior British officers on both sides of the Channel favoured 
the employment of men with comparatively little military experience to 
positions of significant responsibility over the use of inadequately prepared 
professional soldiers.
Concurrent with the appointment of officers and the enlistment of other 
ranks, work in France began in earnest. On the morning of 5 January 1915 
road stone from Guernsey was discharged direct to a barge drawn alongside 
a ship berthed at Calais, and a second vessel was loaded in the same way that 
afternoon. The following day Holland agreed a price of ninety centimes per 
ton with a local contractor in Armentières for the vessels’ discharge.32 As 
the units raised in Britain passed through the training camp at Longmoor 
and crossed to France, the local labour withdrew and the IWT department 
gradually came to more closely resemble a recognizable provider of military 
logistics. By the end of June, Holland’s department had swollen from just 
two officers and no men to comprise twenty-five officers and 423 other 
ranks, with plans in place for further expansion. In the same period the 
BEF’s fleet of craft had provided transportation for 15,926 tons of supplies, 
27,241 tons of road metal, and 3,216 tons of miscellaneous supplies (which 
included bridging materials and coal), while 628 officers and men had 
been evacuated from the battle zone by ambulance barge – reducing the 
loads carried by rail and providing the wounded men with a comfortable, 
if sedate, journey back to the base hospitals.33 In September, when Holland 
wrote his first memorandum on the progress of IWT in France, he wrote 
with evident pride that barges were carrying 1,200 tons every day across the 
northern waterways and that requisitions for over 156,000 tons to be moved 
by IWT before the end of the year had been received.34
To fulfil such obligations, a more appropriate fleet of vessels had 
to be introduced. The pre-war traffic on the northern waterways was 
predominantly towed by horses, which Holland identified ‘would not cope 
effectively with the heavy demands which he foresaw would be made for the 
transport of war material by water’. He recommended the use of tugs capable 
31 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 2/2/43, Cowans to Robertson, 14 Dec. 1914; 2/2/44, 
Robertson to Cowans, 16 Dec. 1914; TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 8.
32 TNA, CAB 45/205, Holland, diary entries, 5 and 6 Jan. 1915.
33 TNA, CAB 45/205, Holland, IWT Corps, British army France 1915. Summary of 
organization and development, pp. 6–7.
34 TNA, WO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, memorandum 1, p. 9.
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Figure 5.2. The development of inland water transport 
resources on the western front, 1915–18.
Source: TNA, WO 158/851, director general of transport: history of inland water transport, 
Appendix B2: Schedule showing development of inland water transport resources in France 
month by month, 1915–18.
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of hauling conveys of ‘dumb’ barges – which relied upon either a horse or 
tug for propulsion – and the provision of self-propelled barges capable of 
operating independently and responding more swiftly to urgent demands 
from GHQ.35 Orders for the construction of vessels were placed with British 
firms immediately, and suitable craft already in use in Britain, Belgium and 
the Netherlands were purchased by the War Office and despatched to the 
front.36 As the department grew in size the craft originally hired from French 
sources – which in the first instance came complete with their original crews 
– were purchased outright and manned by military personnel, ‘as it was found 
that the civilian crews were very unsatisfactory’.37 In just nine months the 
department expanded from ‘one tug and 34 hired barges’ to control a fleet of 
over two hundred vessels, with a total carrying capacity in excess of 38,000 
tons (see Figure 5.2). The standard barge was capable of carrying about 280 
deadweight tons of material.38 Therefore, as Hodgkin noted in his diary, the 
IWT service quickly acquired the ability to remove a significant volume of 
traffic from the railways: three barges held the same quantity of material as 
two trains comprised of fifty ten-ton wagons.39
In addition to his duties with regard to the provision of adequate 
personnel and the equipment to maintain an effective delivery service, 
Holland’s department was also made responsible for the repair of vessels 
and waterways, the operation of inland quays and docks, the regulation of 
traffic on the water and the establishment and upkeep of a communications 
network across the entire IWT system.40 Telephone communications 
played a vital role in the IWT department’s operational practices, 
which drew heavily upon the organizational structures employed by the 
railways in peace and war. In the same way that the railway transport 
establishment was formed to oversee the BEF’s use of railways – and to 
provide a conduit for British requests to be presented to the French rail 
authorities – responsibility for the management of IWT on the western 
front was divided into districts.41 District officers supervised the loading and 
unloading of vessels within their jurisdiction, maintained contact with the 
British and French military authorities in the area, ensured the safe passage 
35 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 6.
36 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, pp. 10, 32.
37 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 32.
38 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 3.
39 IWM, Hodgkin papers, diary entry, 28 June 1916.
40 The complete list of duties devolved upon the IWT department upon its formation are 
given in TNA, WO 95/56, director of IWT, war diary, memorandum 1, p. 4.
41 TNA, WO 32/5162, formation and organisation of IWT, memorandum – IWT, 4 Jan. 
1915, p. 2.
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of craft through their zone and circulated information about the traffic 
in their district to their colleagues in neighbouring areas. In essence, the 
IWT department established a system of decentralized responsibility, which 
devolved the detail of everyday work to the district officers. The existence of 
these ‘men on the spot’ freed Holland and his senior subordinates at GHQ 
to concentrate upon the establishment of the principles and procedures 
required to obtain the highest degree of efficiency from the fleet. 
The effective deployment of its fleet was crucial to the department’s 
success, as the construction of new waterways was practically impossible. 
To ensure smooth operations, Holland’s department had to coordinate the 
movements of the BEF’s traffic, the smaller number of craft being used to 
supply the French and Belgian armies, and the relatively insignificant volume 
of civilian traffic that continued to ply the waterways.42 To keep track of 
the whereabouts of these craft – particularly once the British IWT presence 
in France spread beyond the northern waterways – Holland’s department 
implemented a system of control that had been pioneered in the previous 
decade by the Midland Railway, which relied heavily upon the presence of a 
reliable telecommunications network.43 On 2 February 1915, just over a month 
after he had arrived in France, Holland was issued with twenty-five expert 
telephone linesmen who undertook all the communications work required 
to make the IWT department a self-sufficient unit of the BEF. Telephone 
lines ran across the northern waterways and were later installed along the 
River Somme as the department’s sphere of operations expanded.44 The 
telephone system provided the link required for district officers to pass vessels 
from district to district and to update their colleagues on their impending 
traffic commitments. The detailed information gathered through the system 
gave district officers advanced warning of likely busy periods, affording them 
opportunities to source extra labour for deployment at lock gates to reduce 
transit times.45 The locations of all craft were relayed back to GHQ each night 
and recorded on a diagram board – a principal component of the Midland’s 
train control system – which gave Holland’s staff a regularly updated, graphic 
illustration of the fleet’s distribution. Such innovations aided decision making 
within the department in relation to the redistribution of craft and personnel 
as circumstances dictated during the conflict.46
42 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 46.
43 TNA, ZLIB 6/88, Midland Railway train control issued by Midland Rly, 1914, p. 62.
44 TNA, CAB 45/205, Holland, diary entry, 2 Feb. 1915; WO 95/27, QMG war diary, 
Maxwell to Kitchener, 12 March 1915; WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 61.
45 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, pp. 45–46.
46 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 22; ZLIB 6/88, Midland Railway train control, 
pp. 17–20.
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The growth of the directorate of inland water transport
The IWT department began its work in 1915 on just a small section of the 
northern waterways, which connected the ports of Dunkirk and Calais with 
the towns of Armentières and Béthune. However, the limited scope of the 
department’s initial zone of operations did not limit Holland’s focus. From 
his arrival on the western front, he adopted a ‘policy of looking well ahead 
and forecasting the probable requirements of the future … both as regards 
new demands for transport and new constructional and repair work’ on 
waterways acquired by the allies in the event of an advance.47 As we have 
seen, such an outlook was not unique within the British military effort. 
A core component of Sir Percy Girouard’s report into the BEF’s transport 
organization in October 1914 surrounded the question of ensuring the 
British possessed a ‘voice’ in the administration of captured transport 
infrastructure, while a significant proportion of the IGC’s voluminous 
correspondence over the winter of 1914–15 covered the preparations required 
to maintain Kitchener’s armies once they arrived in France.48 In the summer 
of 1915 an IWT service began to operate on the River Somme in support 
of the British divisions stationed in the area, and by the end of the year 
over 215 miles of navigable waterways behind the western front lay open to 
British traffic.49 By the autumn of the same year, the number of men whose 
work was coordinated from Holland’s office under the DRT had grown to 
830.
The continued growth of the IWT department, and the ambitious plans 
for further expansion made by its head, were retarded by its subordination 
to Colonel Twiss. Holland had been placed under Twiss’s authority in 
December 1914 to mirror the structure of the French army, which regarded 
canals and railways as ‘one question’ and administered them within the 
same department.50 Therefore, Holland had no direct access to the QMG. 
He could not personally represent his department’s needs and advocate for a 
more thorough exploitation of the French and Belgian waterways. Instead, 
he was forced to ‘express all his views’ through Twiss who – like all of his 
colleagues within the pre-war British army – ‘had not technical knowledge 
[or] experience’ of IWT and ‘whose time moreover was fully occupied with 
matters appertaining to the railway transport problem’.51 Twiss’s ignorance 
of the peculiarities of waterborne traffic led to the detachment of Holland’s 
department from the DRT’s oversight in October 1915. Two weeks later, 
47 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 15.
48 See, e.g., TNA, WO 95/27, QMG war diary, Maxwell to Robertson, 1 Nov. 1914.
49 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, pp. 11–12, 14.
50 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 2/2/44, Robertson to Cowans, 16 Dec. 1914.
51 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 17.
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and just four days after the Dent scheme at the Bassin Loubet had been 
finally terminated, Holland was gazetted as a temporary colonel at the head 
of an independent IWT directorate. Instead of working through Colonel 
Twiss’s office, from 28 October onwards Holland answered directly to the 
QMG in France, Sir Ronald Maxwell.52
The re-establishment of military command at the port of Boulogne 
in October 1915 should not overshadow the successful formation and 
development of an IWT organization heavily influenced by non-military 
personnel. Far from being gripped by anti-civilian phobia at this point of 
the war, the continued expansion of IWT in 1915 demonstrates that the 
BEF’s senior commanders were far more open to the application of civilian 
expertise than has previously been asserted. Within such an environment, 
Holland’s contacts, knowledge and attitude were highly sought-after 
attributes in the expanding British war effort. However, the period following 
the separation of the command link between IWT and the railways was not 
one of steady, unbroken expansion. Holland’s experience of directorship in 
France over the following year exposed two weaknesses: the threshold of the 
BEF’s freedom of action on the territory of a powerful, sovereign nation; 
and the perceived limitations of a slow means of transport, which operated 
outside of the pre-existing, land-based supply hierarchy behind the western 
front.
There were a number of reasons why Holland pressed for the acquisition 
and deployment of ‘double, even treble, and possibly still a greater number 
of vessels’ than the 330 accounted for by his department in September 1915.53 
First, the pre-war transport arrangements between the French and British 
had already begun to unravel, and Holland was quick to identify that 
responsibility for the maintenance and operation of the waterways could 
not be divorced from control over the network if the BEF were to gain the 
maximum possible benefit from IWT. Inter-allied discussions under the 
umbrella of the railways and canal commission had taken place that summer, 
and decreed that the British were to undertake the repair, maintenance, and 
operation of any waterways behind the BEF in the event of an advance.54 
Colonel Henniker, who represented the British on the commission, did not 
record the specific outcomes of the discussions on waterborne transport 
in his account of the commission’s deliberations. However, it is clear from 
Holland’s diary that he had emphasized the importance of securing British 
52 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, pp. 17–18; WO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, 
memorandum number 2, 5 May 1916, p. 2.
53 TNA, WO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, memorandum 1, p. 9.
54 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 64; Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 
94–101.
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control over the Belgian waterways – should an advance take place – to 
Henniker long before the commission met.55
A second reason provided by Holland for his promotion of an expanded 
IWT provision was financial. The British incurred a charge for all freight 
carried by the French railways on the BEF’s behalf, which generated a vast 
correspondence within the QMG’s offices. In contrast, the French did 
not request payment for cargo moved in British vessels along the rivers 
and canals behind the front. Furthermore, Holland observed, the vessels 
constructed for the BEF’s use during the war represented an investment. 
At an initial estimate of £138,140 for the construction of barges, cranes, 
tugs and the provision of stores, the IWT department could not have been 
developed without a significant material and monetary commitment.56 
However, the devastation wrought by the conflict upon the European 
boat-building industry had created what Holland anticipated would be 
significant post-war demand for the BEF’s fleet. The port of Antwerp alone 
required six million tons of lighterage per year, while the engagement of 
French workshops on war-related activities – and the ongoing military 
recruitment of men from the French labour force – meant that the stock 
of IWT craft in France was likely to be severely depleted when the fighting 
ended. Consequently, Holland argued, ‘any vessels we may have will be of 
great value to replace losses, and will assuredly be bought by those, who 
then turn their attention to the restoration of commercial business, at prices 
which will, I confidently expect, recoup a large proportion of our outlay’.57
The possibility of recouping some of the costs incurred in the provision 
of a substantial IWT fleet on the western front was persuasive, but by far 
the most compelling justification for the sustained expansion of Holland’s 
directorate lay in conjunction with the difficulties experienced at the docks 
under the BEF’s control throughout 1915. As demonstrated from the very 
outset of their employment in France, IWT vessels drawn up alongside ships 
berthed at the ports eliminated the need for supplies to be landed on the 
quayside. This arrangement saved the labour needed to move goods from 
the shore into the storage depots, reduced the demand for space within the 
confined accommodation immediately surrounding the harbours and did 
not require locomotives and rolling stock to be deployed to remove supplies 
from the port area by rail. Goods that were transported several miles inland 
by water allowed the wagons in circulation in northern France to be worked 
55 TNA, CAB 45/205, Holland, diary entry, 25 Feb. 1915.
56 TNA, WO 32/5162, formation and organization of IWT, Estimate of cost of craft now 
required for IWT, BEF, 13 Jan. 1915.
57 TNA, WO 32/5162, formation and organization of IWT, conference on canal transport, 
12 Jan. 1915, pp. 1–2; WO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, memorandum 1, p. 3.
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over shorter distances – an action that ensured individual wagons returned 
to the depots more frequently and consequently increased the number of 
journeys each could make to and from the front line. Furthermore, the 
extra capacity offered by the hulls of IWT craft provided the BEF’s senior 
supply officers with the option to remove from the railways altogether 
stores whose demand was stable and predictable. The availability of a 
waterborne alternative freed up rolling stock to respond to more volatile and 
unpredictable requests for stocks such as ammunition, whose expenditure 
could not be accurately predicted in advance – particularly in the event of 
an enemy attack.58 In March 1916 Maxwell noted that approximately 2,000 
tons of road ‘stone metal, engineering stores and material, [and] hay and 
oats’ were among the stores delivered daily by IWT – the majority of it 
achieved ‘without [the cargo] touching a road or railway’ between the coast 
and its destination.59
As the pressures on the available rolling stock became acute over the 
winter of 1915–16, and congestion at Calais and Dunkirk threatened both 
the despatch of trains and the turnaround of ships, GHQ decided to pursue 
the construction of an IWT depot capable of handling stores removed by 
barge from the two ports. The project’s principal goal was merely to reduce 
the BEF’s reliance upon the limited railway facilities around Calais and 
Dunkirk, and upon the communications that linked the ports to the wider 
French rail network (see Figure 5.3). A suitable location for the depot, 
known as Zeneghem, was found at the junction of the Calais Canal and 
the River Aa. The site was within ‘a summer day’s journey by barge’ of both 
Calais and Dunkirk, and had the added advantage of offering a separate 
return route for traffic from the latter. The operation of different inbound 
and outbound routes meant that congestion at lock gates was minimized, 
which made fluidity in the network easier to sustain.60
 However, Holland’s ambitions for the depot grew as the BEF’s expansion 
continued and the strain on the Channel ports – and British shipping 
capacity – became consequently greater. Rather than simply alleviate 
congestion at the docks by permitting the discharge of ships direct to barge, 
the director of IWT began to envisage the site near St Pierre Brouck as 
the French hub of a cross-Channel service that could bypass the congested 
ports entirely. He laid down his views on the subject on 29 April 1916 in 
response to an enquiry from Sir John Cowans into the practicability of 
58 Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 175–76.
59 TNA, WO 107/15, inspector-general of communications, Maxwell to Clayton, 25 
March 1916.
60 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, pp. 47–8; WO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, 
memorandum no. 3, Dec. 1916, p. 2.
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‘bringing material from England to France … with a view to economising 
on shipping’. Holland argued that goods could be loaded onto barges in 
Britain rather than ships, despatched across the Channel, and unloaded 
at an inland site away from the cramped conditions at the coast. Such a 
service would help relieve some of the pressure on the limited dock space 
available to the BEF, free up shipping and reduce the travelling distance 
for the locomotives and rolling stock that connected the docks and the 
front line. ‘Provided it was understood that the service could not be looked 
upon as a daily one, as the barges could only cross as and when weather 
conditions permitted’, Holland believed the proposal for a cross-Channel 
service that terminated at Zeneghem was ‘a practical one’.61
61 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 56.
Figure 5.3. Detail of the 
railway facilities surrounding 
Calais and Dunkirk. 
Source: J. H. F. Le Hénaff and 
H. Bornecque, Les chemins de fer 
français et la guerre (Paris, 1922); A. 
M. Henniker, History of the Great 
War: Transportation on the Western 
Front, 1914–1918 (London, 1937). Map 
drawn by Cath D’Alton.
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It was also expensive. In addition to the development of Zeneghem as a 
depot capable of receiving the goods transported by cross-Channel barge, 
the service required the construction of a suitable departure point for the 
vessels in southern England. Richborough on the River Stour was chosen 
to host the British terminus of the cross-Channel service because of ‘its 
geographical position, relative to the Channel ports and the Continental 
canal system, the existence of large deposits of sand and gravel, ease of 
railway access, and the extensive areas available for camps and store yards’. 
As John Kerr Robertson’s exhaustively detailed paper in the ICE Proceedings 
demonstrated, the creation of a ‘great military depot … consisting of 
camps, workshops, power houses, shipyards, wharves with extensive 
basins, warehouses, store yards, [and] salvage depots’ at Richborough 
required significant investments of materials, manpower and money.62 The 
construction costs incurred at Richborough amounted to some £433,476, 
while over one-and-a-half million concrete blocks were manufactured on 
site for the construction of camps, offices and workshops.63 Despite the 
existence of competing demands for the finite resources available to the 
leaders of Britain’s war effort, Holland’s opinion was held in sufficiently 
high regard both at the War Office and GHQ for work to be commenced 
at Richborough even before the battle of the Somme had highlighted 
the deficiencies in the BEF’s transport infrastructure. By early May 1916 
Colonel Collard was immersed in the ‘very extensive’ work of placing orders 
for the construction of craft capable of operating in the English Channel 
and on the northern waterways, and by September enough progress had 
been made at Richborough to permit the first barge to be loaded up. The 
cross-Channel barge service commenced regular operations in December 
of the same year.64
While senior military figures in Britain were quick to respond to the 
expanding transport requirements of the war, on the other side of the 
Channel the French authorities took a different approach. In February 1916, 
62 J. K. Robertson, ‘Richborough military transportation depot’, Minutes of the Proceedings 
of the Institution of Civil Engineers, ccx (1920), 156–207, at p. 157.
63 Using 1916 as a base year, the Bank of England’s inflation calculator suggests a total of 
£35,845,130.77 (at 2017 prices) was spent upon construction at Richborough. See ‘Inflation 
calculator’, Bank of England <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/resources/
inflationtools/calculator/default.aspx> [accessed 23 Oct. 2018]; Robertson, ‘Richborough 
military transportation depot’, pp. 174–5, 185.
64 University of Warwick Modern Records Centre (UWMRC), papers of Sir William Guy 
Granet, MSS. 191/3/3/51, memorandum to Sir Guy Granet, 19 Oct. 1916, p. 3; Robertson, 
‘Richborough military transportation depot’, p. 188; Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 
238. The specifications of the cross-Channel barges, designated as ‘&c. barges’, are given in 
TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, pp. 56–7.
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the French had made an initial request to GHQ for the British to provide 
rolling stock to relieve the pressure on the French railways’ own reserves. 
Yet the advantage for the railway network of Zeneghem’s development as an 
alternative to rail transport in France did not engender automatic approval 
from GQG for the British to proceed with construction. Work on the depot 
did not begin until 25 July 1916, almost a month into the Somme offensive 
and nearly three months after Collard had begun to source vessels to ply the 
cross-Channel route. The location of a suitable site and the accumulation 
of building materials for the depot contributed to the delay, but the chief 
cause lay in the fractious relationship between Britain and its host. The site 
near St Pierre Brouck was only, in Holland’s words, ‘eventually agreed upon’ 
after ‘several proposals’ and numerous meetings between representatives 
of the French and British armies.65 Construction on the first quay, which 
measured 1,575 feet in length and ultimately contained fifteen berths, was 
not completed until 14 October 1916.66 Only four barges were able to 
make the crossing during the following month.67 Consequently, the cross-
Channel barge service was unable to provide any meaningful support to the 
allies’ major offensives in 1916.
GQG’s insistence that they retained overall control of the decision-
making process acted as a significant retardant on the growth of Holland’s 
directorate. Even before the discussions surrounding the development 
of Zeneghem had begun, French bureaucracy had served to frustrate the 
former railwayman’s ambitions for the IWT service. As early as October 
1915 Holland had suggested that barges could be loaded direct from ships 
at Le Havre, to facilitate the discharge of vessels and reduce the growing 
levels of congestion at the port. The loaded barges could then be sent 
inland to Rouen via a combination of the River Seine and the Tancarville 
Canal. Both Maxwell and Clayton approved of Holland’s plan. However, 
following ‘protracted negotiations’, Holland recorded that the French 
authorities ‘would not hear of the proposal although it would undoubtedly 
have done much to relieve the congestion on the railways’.68 The relatively 
dispassionate language of the directorate’s post-war report – written in 
the glow of victory – claimed that the French authorities had ‘at all times, 
given courteous, prompt, and ungrudging aid’ to the BEF.69 Holland’s 
65 TNA, PRO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, memorandum 3, p. 1.
66 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, Appendix C 1A – Particulars of quays constructed 
and equipped by the IWT, p. 1.
67 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 57.
68 TNA, CAB 45/205, Holland, summary of organization and development, p. 11; WO 
158/851, history of IWT, p. 52.
69 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 16.
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contemporaneous remarks provide a stark contrast to the diplomacy of 
the official document. In a memorandum written on 5 May 1916 Holland 
noted that ‘all sorts of reasons were put forward by the French against [the 
Tancarville Canal] project, none of them convincing’.70 In his private diary 
he went even further, defacing the page that recorded the chrysalis of the 
idea with a note scrawled in red pencil and denoting obvious frustration: 
‘Finally French refused permission for any British service’.71
As with the delays to the cross-Channel service between Richborough and 
Zeneghem, what British officers perceived to be French obstinacy meant 
that the military operations on the western front in 1916 did not benefit 
from the foresight displayed by Holland during the previous eighteen 
months. Rather than commence in or around October 1915, when Holland 
first received his superiors’ support for the Tancarville Canal scheme, the 
French only withdrew their objections to the BEF’s use of the canal on 
4 August 1916. The colossal demands of the fighting around Verdun and 
the Somme had created severe congestion and rolling stock shortages 
at Le Havre, which finally persuaded the French to sanction a ‘limited 
inland water transport service’ to receive cargo from ships berthed at the 
port for onward transport.72 The IWT directorate was unable to respond 
immediately. The barges required to operate the Tancarville Canal route 
had to be transferred from their locations on the northern waterways and 
the River Somme via the English Channel, a journey that took thirty-three 
days to complete. Consequently, IWT did not begin to load goods at Le 
Havre direct from ship to barge until 22 September 1916 and construction 
on an inland depot at Soquence (near Rouen) was only completed a month 
later – almost exactly one year after Holland had made the proposal to 
utilize the canal.73
Holland was attempting to be proactive, and was planning for the 
continued expansion of the BEF’s logistical capabilities. At the same time 
the French authorities appeared to want the British to take on a larger share 
of the responsibility for the sustenance of their troops, while simultaneously 
acting to constrain their ability to do so – until the necessities of the military 
campaign intervened. However, this is a highly Anglo-centric perspective 
on events, which does not take into account the wider considerations of 
the allied war effort. Alongside the BEF’s demands, the French authorities 
70 TNA, WO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, memorandum 2, p. 1. Sadly, Holland did 
not elaborate upon the reasons offered to justify the French authorities’ decision.
71 TNA, CAB 45/205, Holland, summary of organization and development, p. 11.
72 TNA, WO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, memorandum 3, p. 2.
73 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, Appendix C 1A – Particulars of quays constructed, 
p. 1.
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in the winter of 1915–16 had to balance the requirements of a much larger 
French army and the needs of the civilian population upon whose shoulders 
the French war effort rested. The BEF was not the only institution seeking 
to make use of IWT as the pressures on the French railway network 
intensified. The French military authorities began to appreciate the value 
of their waterways, and attempted to reintroduce pre-war traffic in heavy 
goods to the rivers and canals as the war intensified. The volume of coal 
transported on French vessels along the River Seine was almost doubled – 
increasing from 350,000 to 600,000 tonnes per month – and improvements 
were made to IWT depots on the Marne, the Moselle and other navigable 
waterways across the country. With the capacity of the canals limited in the 
same way as that of the railways and roads, the vessels deployed in support 
of the BEF had to be integrated with the local traffic rather than imposed 
upon it.74 
Furthermore, to lay the blame for the lethargic expansion of IWT in 
1915–16 purely at the feet of Britain’s principal ally is unwarranted and creates 
a deceptive impression of the extent to which transportation’s complexities 
were appreciated within the BEF prior to the battle of the Somme. There 
was a clear willingness to engage with and support the development of 
IWT among senior administrative soldiers such as Maxwell and Cowans. 
However, such commitment was by no means universal in the British army. 
In this respect, the decision to sever the command relationship between 
waterborne transport and the DRT in October 1915 may have reduced 
the influence Holland and his directorate were able to have over decisions 
made at army and corps level. As in the pre-war British economy, where 
the bulk carriage of goods over long distances was dominated by the 
railways (although coastal shipping also made a significant contribution 
where available),75 the independent IWT directorate was unable to attract a 
substantial demand for its services.
Individual formations, each desirous of obtaining the resources they 
believed were necessary to ensure the continued efficiency and security 
of their own troops, were reluctant to utilize the canals. In the absence 
of a centralizing authority to collate and coordinate the BEF’s transport 
demands – and until the sheer volume of goods entering France made the 
identification of priorities a fundamental requirement for the sustenance 
of operations on the western front – there was little Holland could do to 
persuade commanders to embrace the canals and reduce their dependency 
74 J. H. F. Le Hénaff and H. Bornecque, Les chemins de fer français et la guerre (Paris, 1922), 
pp. 176–7.
75 J. Armstrong, ‘The role of coastal shipping in UK transport: an estimate of comparative 
traffic movements in 1910’, Journal of Transport History, viii (1987), 164–78, at p. 176.
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on the overburdened rail network. Holland’s assistant directors of IWT, 
along with the various district officers stationed across the waterway system, 
were responsible for ‘keeping in close touch’ with the units in their area 
and ensuring that local transport requirements were met.76 However, there 
appears to have been little desire among army, corps and divisional officers 
to reduce their demands upon the fastest method of transport available – 
even when the railway network became incapable of answering all of the 
requests that emanated from the front. Few followed the lead of Major-
General Sir John Moore, the director of veterinary services, who approached 
Holland directly in June 1916 to arrange for the evacuation of sick horses 
by barge. Following Moore’s enquiry, small open barges with a capacity 
of approximately seventy tons were drawn together and equipped with 
gangways for the loading and unloading of animals almost immediately. 
The first barges for the veterinary service were put into operation on 5 July 
1916 – a reaction that highlighted both the IWT directorate’s responsiveness 
to the army’s needs and the existence of spare capacity within the fleet. By 
the end of the year a fleet of ten specialist craft had been sourced from the 
Yorkshire canals to operate the service, and 4,675 horses and mules had 
been transported away from the front by barge.77
The supply of road stone provided a ludicrous counterpoint to the success 
story of equine evacuation. The carriage of stone by train was suspended at 
the outset of the battle of the Somme to free up railway capacity for the 
movement of munitions and other supplies required by the fighting forces.78 
Further back along the line of communications, shipments of 1,000 tons 
of stone per day into Dunkirk were maintained throughout July but were 
‘suddenly’ reduced to 400 tons per day – without GHQ’s knowledge – 
the following month.79 In the middle of September Major-General Charles 
Dawkins wrote to Lloyd George to stress that the ‘operations which are 
now taking place have resulted in greatly increased use of all roads in the 
Fourth and Reserve Army areas, and the roads on territory taken from 
the enemy require entirely remaking. The requirements for road metal are 
increasing daily, and still further demands on a larger scale may be expected 
at any time’. The latest fortnightly returns illustrated that only 76 per cent 
of the BEF’s 193,000-ton requirement for road stone had been received. 
76 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, pp. 23–4, 42.
77 TNA, WO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, memorandum 3, pp. 3–4; WO 107/296, 
report of British armies, p. 27; WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 37.
78 R. U. H. Buckland, ‘Experiences at the Fourth Army headquarters: organization and 
work of the R.E.’, Royal Engineers Journal, xli (1927), 385–413, at p. 389.
79 TNA, WO 95/3970, headquarters branches and services. Inspector general, diary entry, 
23 Aug. 1916.
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‘These figures’, Dawkins complained, were ‘both actually and relatively, 
considerable [sic] worse than any previous figures with which I have been 
furnished’.80 However, despite the BEF’s shortages of a material described 
by Haig as ‘of vital importance for the conduct of operations’ on the western 
front, no demands for the carriage of road stone by barge had been made by 
British commanders. During the same period IWT vessels within Holland’s 
fleet were being utilized for the conveyance of road stone along the River 
Somme, but at the request – and for the use – of the French army.81
The BEF’s failure to thoroughly exploit IWT as part of an integrated 
transport solution had deleterious effects both on the efficiency of the 
railways and the capacity of the road network directly behind the front-line 
troops. The ‘deplorable state of the roads’ in the BEF’s zone of operations 
soon became the ‘chief source of anxiety’ both for the Fourth Army’s chief 
engineer and for Colonel Woodroffe, the deputy QMG, who catalogued 
his concerns in a series of notes written to his superior.82 A lack of materials 
in France was not to blame for the state of the roads behind the BEF. As 
Woodroffe noted on a visit to the railhead at Belle-Église on 12 August, 
‘[t]he stone dump is assuming a really ridiculous size. It is now so high in 
places that it requires a big lift to get the stone out of the truck onto the 
dump’. So much stone had accumulated at the railhead that quantities of 
the material fell back off the dump onto the tracks after they had been 
unloaded, an occurrence that caused the removal of empty wagons from the 
railhead to be delayed while the line was cleared – reducing fluidity on the 
railway network.83 In early August Brigadier Hodgkin passed through the 
area of the Somme occupied by French troops. On his journey to Froissy to 
investigate the disappearance of chemicals from one of the filtration units 
attached to the IWT directorate he travelled through Longueau, Villers-
Bretonneux, Lamotte-en-Santerre, Proyart and Chuignolles, and remarked 
that the roads behind the French troops were ‘kept as smooth as glass … 
Compare these with the roads in Flanders, in our charge … where there are 
more shell holes than roads’.84
The British approach to road repairs was only one component of the war 
effort that Hodgkin criticized within his wartime diary. Unlike many of his 
80 TNA, WO 95/3970, IGC war diary, Dawkins to Lloyd George, 16 Sept. 1916.
81 TNA, WO 95/3970, IGC war diary, 23 Aug. 1916; WO 95/56, director of IWT war 
diary, memorandum 3, p. 3.
82 Buckland, ‘Experiences at the Fourth Army headquarters’, pp. 391–2; IWM, papers of 
Brigadier-General C. R. Woodroffe, 3/38/1/2, notes and reports (forwarded to QMG), June 
to Nov. 1916.
83 IWM, Woodroffe papers, diary entry, 19 Aug. 1916.
84 IWM, Hodgkin papers, diary entries, 8 and 9 Aug. 1916.
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colleagues within the higher echelons of the IWT directorate, as a pre-war 
territorial officer Hodgkin was thoroughly conversant with the particular 
requirements of a military organization. The discipline within the IWT 
service on the western front did not meet Hodgkin’s expectations, and upon 
his departure from the directorate in mid August 1916 he reflected that:
I shall be sorry to go in one way, because I have found most of the officers here 
very jolly; but the organization from a military point of view is non-existent, 
and neither the other officers nor myself are able to feel any pride in the Corps, 
a state of things which does not conduce to efficiency. And the CO [Holland] 
won’t allow the organization to be improved, which is annoying.85
Hodgkin singled out the ‘most miscellaneous collection of personages’ that 
comprised the IWT directorate’s senior team as the chief culprits behind 
its inefficiency, and claimed that Holland’s organization contained ‘no 
chain of command and no discipline worth speaking of ’. He perceived that 
the training the men had received at Longmoor prior to their despatch to 
France, and the minimal supervision that could be applied to men who 
were constantly circulating around the waterways, had resulted in the IWT 
directorate suffering an ‘undue proportion of courts martial and other 
nuisances’.86
However, Hodgkin’s observations should be approached with caution. 
Throughout the portion of his diary dedicated to his time as an IWT officer 
he recorded his frustrations at not making what he believed to be a valuable 
contribution to the British war effort. While on board barge A.174 Hodgkin 
peppered his diary with entries that claimed he had experienced a ‘week of 
absolute idleness’, that he was ‘still hard at work doing nothing’, and that 
he had ‘wasted, absolutely – and-without-any-extenuating-circumstances-
wasted, five months, and I am sick and tired of it’.87 He desired a return 
to combat duties and had requested a transfer to the Special (Gas) Brigade 
within two months of having received his assignment with the IWT 
directorate. His comments demonstrate a common attitude among British 
officers that ‘combat remained the measure of the soldier’.88 Through his 
contribution to the provision of safe drinking water, Hodgkin possessed 
a role within the IWT directorate where his scientific background was of 
direct benefit to the BEF. Yet throughout what he dubbed his ‘six months of 
unbroken idleness’ aboard A.174 and at IWT headquarters, Hodgkin failed 
85 IWM, Hodgkin papers, diary entry, 19 Aug. 1916.
86 IWM, Hodgkin papers, diary entry, 28 June 1916.
87 IWM, Hodgkin papers, diary entries, 6–10 March and 1 May 1916.
88 I. M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919 (London, 1998), p. 86.
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to fully appreciate the work he and his colleagues had undertaken.89
The same lack of appreciation for IWT’s role affected the BEF more 
widely. For all the unprecedented scale of the demands generated by the 
fighting on the Somme in 1916, Holland was forced to return barges 
requisitioned from French civilian sources due to a lack of military material 
for them to convey.90 Regardless of the 309 per cent increase in the tonnage 
conveyed by IWT in 1916 over the figures from the previous year (see Table 
5.1), significant spare capacity existed across the fleet. A total of 73,500 
deadweight tons carrying capacity was available to the BEF in October 
1916, but Sir Eric Geddes recorded that the maximum quantity conveyed 
by IWT in a single month was just 69,000 tons. ‘Each deadweight ton’, 
Geddes observed, ‘was not fully occupied once in the month … A great 
carrying capacity has been provided and no adequate use found for it’.91 The 
man who had been more responsible than anyone else for the provision of 
that great carrying capacity was Gerald Holland, marine superintendent of 
the LNWR. However, the task of making the best use of it ultimately fell 
elsewhere; to Geddes and his successors as DGT, and to Cyril Luck, who 
replaced Holland as director of IWT in the summer of 1917.
Luck’s promotion did not come about as a result of any deficiency in 
Holland’s execution of the role of director. Rather, in 1917 the latter became 
‘the highest ranking and most decorated railwayman to die in the Great 
War’.92 Holland’s commitment to the war effort was a significant factor in 
his death. Following the German retirement on the Somme in early 1917, 
Holland chose to personally survey the devastation wrought on the canal 
89 IWM, Hodgkin papers, diary entry, 19 June 1916.
90 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916, p. 2.
91 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/102, memorandum by Sir Eric Geddes, 26 
Nov. 1916, p. 23.
92 J. Higgins, Great War Railwaymen: Britain’s Railway Company Workers at War 1914–1918 
(London, 2014), p. 237.
Table 5.1. Approximate tonnages of materials carried by 
inland water transport on the western front, 1915–18.
Year Tons Percentage increase over previous year
1915 205,047 — 
1916 839,519 309.43
1917 2,378,342 183.30
1918 2,843,793 19.57
Source: TNA, WO 158/851, Director general of transport: History of inland water transport, 
p. 15.
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network east of Péronne. He recommended that the section between Frise 
and Péronne be repaired for traffic immediately, but beyond that point he 
reported on 31 March that ‘the destruction was so complete as to make 
the expenditure of labour, material, etc. necessary for its rehabilitation, 
inadvisable, having regard to the limited use to which this waterway could 
be put owing to its relation to the Army on its new line’.93 The exertions of 
a thorough survey in the adverse weather conditions of a notoriously cold 
spring took a heavy toll on the fifty-six-year-old.94 He contracted an illness 
and returned to England on sick leave the following month, but did not 
recover. He died at St Leonards-on-Sea in Sussex on 26 June 1917 and was 
buried near his pre-war home at Holyhead. The post-war history of the 
directorate he created recorded its appreciation of Holland’s influence on 
IWT in France in glowing terms:
[Holland was] an officer of great foresight and powers of initiative with wide 
experience in connection with the services, civil, marine and mechanical 
engineering problems, a born administrator with a particularly strong capacity 
for the mastering of details, he had worked whole-heartedly to make the 
IWT service in France efficient and capable of meeting any demands upon its 
resources.95
Yet Holland’s influence upon the use of waterborne transport in the 
British war effort stretched far beyond France, as the sustained growth of 
Richborough as a home base for the IWT directorate in the second half of 
the war illustrated.
Every item that did not pass through the Channel ports freed up space 
on the French coast for cargo ships, and the development of Richborough 
allowed it to play a vital role in the BEF’s supply operations. By the end of 
1916 the ‘mystery port’ in Kent had evolved from a concept into a working 
dock, and the cross-Channel ferry service championed by Holland had 
despatched 1,969 tons of goods to France. In the two years that followed 
‘a fleet of sixty tugs and 160 craft delivered … 1,400,000 tons, of which 1 
million were delivered at inland depots’, from a sprawling complex that 
employed almost 16,000 people.96 As the BEF drove towards victory on 
93 TNA, WO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, memorandum number 4, 29 Apr. 1917, p. 4.
94 A series of recollections from those who experienced the winter and spring of 1916–17 
on the western front can be heard at IWM, ‘Winter 1916–17’, IWM Voices of the First World 
War <http://www.iwm.org.uk/history/podcasts/voices-of-the-first-world-war/podcast-25-
winter-1916-17> [accessed 31 Aug. 2017].
95 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 21.
96 History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, ed. H. L. Pritchard (11 vols., Chatham, 1952), v. 
621; H. Best, ‘The Mystery Port’, Richborough (Blackpool, 1929), p. 9.
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the western front in October 1918 the cross-Channel barge service moved 
25,000 tons per week.97 Stores from Richborough were also sent to the 
other theatres of war in which British troops were employed, supplied to 
waterways and docks depots throughout Britain and even used for the 
construction of aerodromes across southern England.98 Furthermore, the 
port was connected to the SECR’s main line and, from 10 February 1918, 
to the French rail network thanks to the installation of a train ferry service.
The establishment of the train ferry owed a great deal to civilian 
expertise. The idea for a cross-Channel train ferry service between Britain 
and France had been raised prior to the war, but it was given fresh 
impetus in late 1916 by Follett Holt, the former chief engineer and general 
manager of the  Entre Ríos Railway in Argentina; Brodie Henderson, 
whose pre-war career in railway, dock and bridge construction spanned 
Africa and South America; and Alexander Gibb, the Scottish civil 
engineer responsible for the extension of Alexandra Docks at Newport 
and the construction of Rosyth naval base in Scotland. Holt had opened 
a train ferry service across the Paraná River in 1907, and drew upon that 
experience when he ‘made a strong appeal to the British government to 
install a system of train ferries’ across the Channel. The ferries allowed 
a train made up in any part of Britain to be transferred to a railhead in 
France without the need for transhipment at any point of its journey. ‘In 
this way, still further relief would be given to the shipping situation; there 
would be a greater saving of labour at the ports, while the distribution 
on the other side of the Channel would be much more effective than 
was possible under the barge system’ due to the relative abundance of 
railheads when compared to ‘canalheads’.99 Instructions to proceed with 
the construction of train ferry termini at Richborough and Southampton 
were issued by the War Office on 17 January 1917, and sanction was 
received by the French authorities for the provision of French termini at 
Dunkirk, Calais and Dieppe within a month. Gibb was appointed chief 
engineer of ports construction and oversaw the building work required 
to prepare the landing facilities in France, while Henderson designed the 
‘berths and accessory works’ associated with the termini.100 The first train 
97 S. D’A. Crookshank, ‘Transportation with the B.E.F.’, Royal Engineers Journal, xxxii 
(1920), 193–208, at p. 197.
98 E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War: Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and 
Achievements (2 vols., London, 1921), ii. 1107.
99 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 1109–10.
100 A thorough account of the engineering challenges overcome in the development of the 
train ferry termini is given in F. O. Stanford, ‘The War Department cross-Channel train 
ferry’, Minutes of the Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, ccx (1920), 208–38.
195
Commitment and constraint II
ferry arrived in France before the end of 1917, less than twelve months 
after the scheme had been authorized.101
The train ferry service handled a comparatively modest volume of traffic 
during the war. Between February and December 1918 just over 200,000 
tons were conveyed to France aboard the three vessels constructed to ply 
the route – a pale shadow of the weekly average of 224,000 tons discharged 
from vessels at the French ports in May 1917 alone.102 However, the real 
value of the train ferry lay in the conveyance of railway materials and large, 
bulky items such as tanks and siege guns. A total of 164 locomotives and 
tenders, seventy narrow-gauge locomotives, 7,142 railway wagons, and 
658 tanks were despatched to the western front aboard the train ferry.103 
‘Originally’, Henniker noted in the official history, ‘tanks were sent across 
[the Channel] in special vessels, but after the ferry service started they were 
sent by rail, loaded on the specially-built tank wagons, direct from the 
testing centres at home to the tank depots in France’ without the need to be 
loaded and unloaded several times on their journey.104 Similar advantages 
accrued in the transportation of the BEF’s heaviest guns, such as the 14-
inch railway guns ‘Scene Shifter’ and ‘Bosche Buster’ that weighed almost 
300 tons and measured eighty-seven feet each.105 The latter of these guns 
made a particularly lethal contribution to the fighting in France. Under 
the watchful eye of King George V, a shell fired from ‘Bosche Buster’ on 8 
August 1918 from a location near Marœuil scored a direct hit on the railway 
station at Douai some nineteen miles away. A German troop train was 
destroyed by the shell at a cost of 400 casualties, and the Germans were 
prevented from making full use of the railway for the remainder of the 
conflict.106 Under war conditions such vast weapons could only have been 
transported overseas by train ferry. Therefore, the transport experts who 
conceived of, constructed, and operated the service between Britain and 
France had a deadly impact upon the conduct and character of industrial 
warfare.
101 Best, ‘The Mystery Port’, pp. 29–30.
102 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 1112; Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 
238.
103 ‘The directorate of inland waterways and docks’, Railway Gazette: Special War 
Transportation Number, 21 Sept. 1920, pp. 141–51, at p. 147; D. Chapman-Huston and O. 
Rutter, General Sir John Cowans, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.: the Quartermaster-General of the Great 
War (2 vols., London, 1924), ii. 219–20.
104 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 241.
105 Best, ‘The Mystery Port’, p. 56; Crookshank, ‘Transportation with the B.E.F.’, pp. 197–8.
106 C. Hooper, Railways of the Great War (London, 2014), p. 104.
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Conclusion
The colossal scale of demands placed upon the BEF’s transportation services 
as the force’s presence in France and Flanders grew were such that IWT could 
only ever play a subsidiary role in their fulfilment. The relatively diminutive 
quantity and capacity of the IWT fleet in France, coupled with the reluctance 
of the French authorities to permit the establishment of new traffic routes 
and the position of Holland’s directorate as a scion of the recognized supply 
chain, constricted IWT’s growth in the year that followed its separation 
from the directorate of railway transport. The minor role afforded to the 
development of IWT on the western front in Henniker’s official history has 
combined with these factors to overshadow the evolution of a small, under-
exploited, but effectively managed civil–military partnership at GHQ. He 
may not have been able to generate demands within the BEF for canal 
transport that kept pace with the IWT fleet’s growth, but Gerald Holland’s 
talents for organization and his technical expertise were recognized and 
respected by the British army’s senior administrative officers. The leaders 
of Britain’s war effort commenced upon engineering projects that involved 
considerable commitments of time, money and resources – both human 
and material – on the strength of Holland’s advocacy.
However, Holland’s proactive approach was insufficient to counteract 
the constraints caused by deficiencies in the command structure within the 
BEF’s transport hierarchy. Prior to Sir Eric Geddes’s arrival on the western 
front the abilities of Britain’s transport experts were, as a consequence of 
the compartmentalized approach to transportation within the QMG’s 
department, only applied to the solution of individual problems in solitary 
links of the supply chain. Throughout 1915 and 1916 there was neither the 
political desire to further embed civilian specialists in the military hierarchy, 
nor the operational necessity to conduct a wholesale replacement of the BEF’s 
administrative foundations. The result was a tendency towards a focus on 
tinkering with individual transport challenges rather than reconsideration 
of the infrastructure and systems that underpinned the British and allied 
war efforts.
The concentration on such localized responsibilities rendered individuals 
like Holland and Francis Dent unable to negotiate successfully with their 
French allies, who were attempting to do two things simultaneously: first, 
to balance demands for further assistance from the British with a desire 
to retain superiority within the coalition; and second, to prioritize the 
short-term possibilities of bringing the war to a swift conclusion rather 
than divert attention towards the development of a coherent long-term 
strategy for the maintenance of the allied forces on French soil. The effects 
of the continued lack of a formal alliance structure to guide and govern the 
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expansion of Britain’s contribution to the land war in northern France – 
carefully omitted from the diplomatic post-war reports submitted by the 
officers of a victorious BEF – were evident in Holland’s exasperated diary 
entries during 1916, as his vision for the IWT directorate was subjected to 
the pressures of coalition warfare. The absence of a coordinated Franco-
British consideration of the logistical requirements of a greatly expanded 
BEF, combined with a continued trend towards decentralization and 
self-sufficiency within the British force, impaired the development of a 
fully integrated, centrally directed transportation system on the western 
front.107 This pattern endured until the ‘strain imposed by active operations’ 
highlighted the ‘non-appreciation of the real meaning of the service of 
transportation’ within the British army.108 It did so astride the Somme 
in the summer of 1916, and it precipitated the reorganization of military 
transportation in France and beyond. The man chosen for this task, which 
dwarfed that taken on by Gerald Holland in December 1914, was another 
of Britain’s transport experts. Between August 1916 and May 1917 Sir Eric 
Geddes, the highest paid railway official in pre-war Britain, made a pivotal 
contribution to the British empire’s conduct of the First World War.
107 On the encouragement of a decentralized administration within the BEF, see TNA, 
WO 95/74, director of supplies war diary, diary entry, 20 Dec. 1914; WO 95/27, QMG war 
diary, French to Kitchener, 18 Jan. 1915; WO 107/15, IGC, general correspondence, Maxwell 
to Cowans, 18 July 1915; LHCMA, Robertson papers, 2/2/63, Robertson to Cowans, 8 Jan. 
1915.
108 M. G. Taylor, ‘Land transportation in the late war’, Royal United Services Institution. 
Journal, lxvi (1921), 699–722, at p. 704.
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6. The civilians take over? Sir Eric Geddes and the 
crisis of 1916
In his post-war memoirs David Lloyd George predicted that when ‘the 
whole story of British achievement in the sphere of transport during the 
war’ was charted by historians it ‘would reflect very high credit on those who 
were responsible for its development, most of all on Sir Eric Geddes’.1 Sir 
Douglas Haig had already paid a glowing tribute to Geddes’s contribution, 
when he reflected in 1919 that:
The Directorate-General of Transportation’s Branch was formed under the 
brilliant direction of Major-General Sir Eric Geddes in the autumn of 1916 … 
To the large number of skilled and experienced civilians included by him on his 
Staff, drawn from the railway companies of Great Britain and the Dominions, 
the Army is greatly indebted for the general excellence of our transportation 
services.2
These commendations from the principal political and military figures 
in Britain’s war effort, whose ‘opinions diverged more often than they 
coalesced’ during and after the First World War,3 echoed earlier praise 
for Geddes’s role in the reorganization of Britain’s military transportation 
services recorded in the railway press. ‘There is nothing like a war to make 
or break the reputations of a nation’s leaders’, wrote the Railway Magazine 
in 1917, ‘and so far as the British Empire is concerned there is no subject of 
His Majesty the King who has made more remarkable progress in national 
service and public recognition than Sir Eric Geddes’.4
Few civilians could claim to have had a larger, more profound impact 
on the BEF’s command structure during the conflict than Geddes. In 
August and September 1916 he investigated and reported upon the existing 
1 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (6 vols., London, 1933; 2 vols., 
London, 1938), i. 479.
2 D. Haig, Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (December 1915–April 1919), ed. J. H. Boraston 
(London, 1919), p. 351.
3 K. Grieves, ‘Haig and the government, 1916–1918’, in Haig: a Reappraisal 80 Years On, 
ed. B. Bond and N. Cave (Barnsley, 2009), pp. 107–27, at p. 121.
4 TNA, ZPER 39/41 The Railway Magazine, vol. xli, ‘British railway service and the Great 
War’ [xvli], 1917, p. 186.
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transport network in France and Flanders. From then until May 1917 
he created, populated and directed entirely new transport management 
hierarchies on the western front and at the War Office. He then bequeathed 
fully functioning directorates to civilian successors drawn from among the 
ranks of Britain’s transport experts.
This chapter examines the precarious nature of civil–military relations 
within the British war effort in the summer of 1916, the conclusions of Geddes’s 
mission to GHQ and the establishments both of the directorate-general of 
transportation in France and the directorate-general of military railways in 
London. Geddes’s unprecedented appointment to the directorships of both 
organizations – located within the military machine – exemplified Lloyd 
George’s desire to more thoroughly exploit the skills possessed by Britain’s 
civilian specialists, and it precipitated an overhaul of the personnel and 
procedures involved in the supply of British forces dispersed around the 
world. Yet Geddes’s twin role could not have been conceived, let alone his 
duties discharged successfully, without the personal and professional support 
of Britain’s political and military leadership. Lloyd George in London and 
Haig in France provided Geddes with the institutional assistance required 
to bring the concept of a centralized transportation service into being. Both 
protected Geddes from the criticisms and petty jealousies of those within 
and outside the ‘military trade union’, both understood the weaknesses 
in the BEF’s supply foundations that were exposed by the battle of the 
Somme and both worked to ensure that transport requirements received a 
priority hitherto denied them in a war effort that had been predominantly 
focused upon the creation of a mass army and the manufacture of ever-
larger volumes of firepower. Together they created the platform from which 
the British army unleashed its ultimately successful war of material.
Military attitudes to civilian ‘interference’ in 1916
On 19 November 1917, Lloyd George, by now the prime minister, delivered 
a statement in the House of Commons. He claimed during his address that 
he had acted against the advice of the military high command on just two 
occasions during the war. In the first instance he had ordered ‘extravagant’ 
quantities of guns and shells when he was minister of munitions. ‘I was 
told that I was mad’, he said. ‘The second case where I pressed my advice 
on soldiers against their will’, he continued, ‘was in the appointment of a 
civilian to re-organise the railways behind the lines – my Right Honourable 
Friend (Sir E. Geddes) – and I am proud to have done it’.5 Lloyd George 
reiterated his position on the latter incident in his War Memoirs, taking aim 
5 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., xcix (19 Nov. 1917), col. 904.
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at a War Office that had, he claimed, ‘held the opinion that [transport issues] 
were purely military matters, into the sanctity of which no profane civilian 
must be allowed to intrude’.6 As the previous chapters have demonstrated, 
Lloyd George’s enduring image of the British army as a narrow-minded 
and obstinate institution is not borne out by its multiple interactions with 
transport experts in the first half of the conflict.
Yet the notion of a British military clique, disengaged from the wider world 
and reluctant to engage with civilians, was not forged in the aftermath of a 
controversial battle or in the pages of post-war memoirs. In 1913 the French 
military attaché Colonel Huguet described the British army as ‘insular 
and therefore mistrustful of whatever came from outside’.7 Politicians 
were especially likely to raise the suspicions of the army authorities, and 
an atmosphere of apprehension about Lloyd George’s motives was evident 
from the moment he became secretary of state for war in July 1916.8 Asquith, 
sensitive that the ‘fluttering of military dovecotes’ could accompany Lloyd 
George’s appointment, urged the latter to ‘work intimately with the 
soldiers’ rather than seek confrontation.9 Lord Esher, himself no stranger to 
the inner workings of the military mind, also counselled Lloyd George to 
exercise ‘care’ in his use of civilian specialists within the army.10
The new secretary of state for war was not alone in being cautioned to 
tread carefully. In an ‘unofficial’ chat at the War Office, Auckland Geddes 
was informed that ‘you can’t do a war-dance on senior officers’ pet corns 
and expect them not to kick’. Consequently, ‘brother Eric’ was implored 
‘not to start a row’ or present himself at GHQ as Lloyd George’s ‘dogsbody’. 
Instead, Auckland advised his brother to ‘talk the language’ of the army, 
emphasize his education at the Oxford Military Academy and his experience 
of working on the railways, and stress to the officers in France that his 
purpose was to be an expert assistant rather than a civilian usurper.11 Allied 
to his fraternal pep talk, Geddes’s visit to GHQ was preceded by a letter 
from Lloyd George to Haig that set out the transport problem in plain 
terms:
6 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, i. 471.
7 E. Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War 
(Cambridge, 2005), p. 7.
8 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW/2/83/65, Hutchinson to Wilson, 7 July 1916.
9 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/3/14/26, Le-Roy Lewis to Lloyd George, 8 Nov. 1916; 
LG/E/2/23/2, Asquith to Lloyd George, 6 July 1916.
10 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/2/11/2, Esher to Lloyd George, 13 Aug. 1916.
11 A. C. Geddes, The Forging of a Family: a Family Story Studied in Its Genetical, Cultural 
and Spiritual Aspects and a Testament of Personal Belief Founded Thereon (London, 1952), pp. 
233–5.
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The output at home of munitions has now so greatly increased that we can meet 
with comparative ease the higher demands which you quite properly make on 
us, but I doubt whether, without careful preparation, the powers of absorption 
of the ports and lines of communication can expand to a commensurate 
degree. What I have specifically in mind is the desirability of ensuring such an 
expansion as will next year, and the year after if necessary, enable us to cope 
with the ever increasing volume of munitions and stores which will be needed 
for the services of your force.12
Put simply, Lloyd George felt confident that the colossal firepower 
demanded by the BEF’s commanders could be produced. However, he 
could not guarantee that the munitions could be delivered to where they 
were required in a timely fashion – with obvious implications for the BEF’s 
effectiveness as a fighting force.
The BEF’s experience at the battle of the Somme reinforced Lloyd 
George’s concern. From an artillery perspective alone the requirements 
of the Somme were prodigious. Until mid June 1916 some five to twelve 
ammunition trains per week were sufficient to meet the BEF’s demand for 
shells. Yet in the weeks that preceded the offensive the number rose rapidly 
to between forty-five and ninety trains per week.13 The equivalent of thirty-
six miles of motor lorries per division were required to shift the forty-nine 
ammunition trains per week that arrived in the Fourth Army’s area in the 
period after 5 June.14 The Ministry of Munitions’ success in raising the 
output of shells engendered hitherto unprecedented pressure upon the lines 
of communications behind the western front.
The demands of the Somme offensive exposed the inadequacy of the 
transport infrastructure in the battle zone, and underlined the subordinate 
position to which considerations of logistics had been relegated in the 
first half of the war. According to the official historian ‘the railways were 
inadequate, [and] the roads in the area behind the front [in Picardy] … 
were few and indifferent’. In 1916 ‘almost any part of the Arras–Ypres front 
was better furnished with villages, railways and roads’.15 Two single-lines to 
Arras and the double-line between Amiens and Albert, which was within 
12 TNA, WO 32/5163, appointment of Sir E. Geddes and others to investigate transport 
arrangements in connection with the British Expeditionary Force at home and overseas, 
Lloyd George to Haig, 1 Aug. 1916.
13 I. M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919 (London, 1998), p. 120.
14 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/106, diary entry, 5 June 1916.
15 J. E. Edmonds, History of the Great War. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916 
(2 vols., 1932), i. 271. Even in the more understated words of Colonel Henniker, ‘the railways 
serving [the Somme] … were not good’. See A. M. Henniker, History of the Great War: 
Transportation on the Western Front, 1914–1918 (London, 1937), p. 120.
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range of the German artillery, represented the only pre-war main line rail 
communications available in the twenty-three miles between Arras and 
the River Somme. Furthermore, the undulating countryside made the 
provision of reliable new railways impractical. Railway construction in the 
area had been underway since October 1914, and a seventeen-mile line that 
linked Fienvillers, Candas and Acheux had been handed over to the ROD 
in April 1916.16 However, a considerable bottleneck around the key railway 
junction of Amiens could not be eliminated before the battle’s scheduled 
start date (see Figure 6.1). The one-mile section heading east from St Roch 
comprised: the principal rail connection between the zone of operations 
and the BEF’s southern line of communications (which ran inland from the 
ports of Dieppe, Le Havre and Rouen); the only inland north to south line 
16 Edmonds, France and Belgium, 1916, i. 273.
Figure 6.1. The railway lines near Amiens at the 
time of the battle of the Somme, 1916. 
Source: A. M. Henniker, History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western Front, 1914–
1918 (London, 1937). Map drawn by Cath D’Alton.
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between the Béthune coal field and Paris; a heavily worked civilian traffic 
route; and the vital junction through which any strategic troop movements 
required during the battle would have to pass. At the Camon–Longueau 
interchange east of Amiens all the traffic heading to and from the BEF’s 
Fourth Army crossed the route used by most of the traffic required to supply 
the French Sixth Army, which operated on the BEF’s right flank during 
the offensive. To ensure the continued supply of the forces in the area the 
Camon–Longueau junction had to handle 240 trains each day, expected to 
intersect each other’s routes at a rate of one train every six minutes.17
However, the BEF’s supply trains did not keep to a regular schedule. 
Thanks to the ongoing problem of congestion at the ports, trains were 
despatched when they were ready to depart rather than according to a set 
timetable. Therefore, trains arrived at the Amiens bottleneck from three 
different directions at largely unpredictable intervals. Coupled with the 
need to attach extra engines to help heavy supply trains deal with the steep 
gradients on the so-called Plateau line between Albert and Amiens, delays 
were inevitable. One eyewitness recalled that ‘eighteen miles of trains under 
load stood end-to-end waiting to get to railheads’ outside Amiens within a 
few weeks after zero hour.18 With so many trains held up on their journey to 
the front, too few locomotives and wagons were available to clear the docks 
of the voluminous quantities of material that poured into France every day. 
With the railways unable to clear the imported stock from the wharves, the 
quaysides became overcrowded and subsequently reduced the speed with 
which incoming ships were offloaded and put back to sea.19
Conditions in front of the railheads were no better. The roads in rural 
France had originally been constructed upon a chalk foundation to service 
a traffic that largely comprised farmers’ carts and bicycles. Under the ‘heavy 
pounding of the army’s mechanical transport’ the foundation of the road 
broke up, a ‘chalky ooze’ appeared on the surface, the granite setts worked 
loose, and the entire road began to disintegrate.20 The traffic required to 
service the battle was incessant. In a twenty-four-hour period in late July – 
described by the provost marshal as ‘one of the quietest we have had’ – the 
traffic that passed Fricourt Cemetery was recorded as 26,516 troops, 568 cars, 
17 Brown, British Logistics, p. 184; Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 136–7.
18 J. C. Harding-Newman, Modern Military Administration, Organization and 
Transportation (Aldershot, 1933), p. 16.
19 For a broader account of the events discussed in this passage, see C. Phillips, ‘The 
changing nature of supply: transportation in the BEF during the battle of the Somme’, in At 
All Costs: the British Army on the Western Front 1916, ed. S. Jones (Warwick, 2018), pp. 117–38.
20 History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, ed. H. L. Pritchard (11 vols., Chatham, 1952), v. 
293.
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1,244 lorries and ambulances, 3,832 horse-drawn vehicles, 1,660 motorcycles 
and cycles and 5,404 horses. In just six hours over 2,500 vehicles passed along 
the Amiens–Albert road the following day.21 When the weather conditions 
deteriorated, the problems caused by heavy traffic were exacerbated. Horse 
transport, which ordinarily travelled on open ground next to the roads, was 
forced to share the limited road space with the army’s mechanical transport. 
The intensification of the traffic reduced the speed of all vehicles on the 
roads and made their repair and maintenance increasingly difficult. In a 
post-war article, Major-General Sir Reginald Buckland recalled having 
witnessed ‘a man stooping down to spread stone between the feet of a team 
of horses while traffic was at a standstill, but as a rule congestion of traffic 
meant cessation of work’.22
Lloyd George had anticipated such a problem as early as September 
1915, when he wrote to Kitchener to enquire whether the French transport 
network would be able to handle the enormous mass of stores projected to 
be available by mid 1916.23 He received assurances at the time that it could.24 
The eighteen-mile-long queue of trains outside Amiens proved unequivocally 
that it could not. The demands of the Somme offensive, particularly the 
unprecedented scale of artillery expenditure and huge requirements for 
casualty evacuation, strained the BEF’s transport infrastructure to breaking 
point.25 However, Haig’s cool response to Lloyd George’s proposal that 
Geddes visit France to examine the transport situation gave little cause for 
the secretary of state to be optimistic. Haig replied to Lloyd George that 
‘you will, I am sure, realise that everyone behind the army, no less than at 
the front, is working at such high pressure at present that they will not be 
able to devote as much time to [Geddes] as we should like’.26
If Haig’s reaction was cool, the attitude of his QMG, Sir Ronald Maxwell, 
was positively icy thanks in part to the existence of a document that had 
arrived at GHQ three weeks earlier. Acting on Lloyd George’s behalf, Lord 
Derby handed Haig a memorandum on the transport situation on 11 July. 
The report outlined its anonymous author’s concept for a new directorate 
that ‘would be charged with the general supervision of the dock, rail and 
canal transport in France … charged with making adequate provision in 
21 TNA, WO 95/441, the Fourth Army. Deputy adjutant and QMG war diary, Census of 
traffic at Fricourt Cemetery, 24 July 1916; Amiens–Albert road, census of traffic, 24 July 1916.
22 R. U. H. Buckland, ‘Experiences at Fourth Army headquarters: organization and work 
of the R.E.’, Royal Engineers Journal, xli (1927), 385–413, at p. 389.
23 TNA, WO 107/15, IGC, general correspondence, Cowans to Maxwell, 10 Sept. 1915.
24 TNA, WO 107/15, IGC, general correspondence, Maxwell to Cowans, 12 Sept. 1915.
25 Brown, British Logistics, p. 109.
26 TNA, WO 32/5163, appointment of Sir E. Geddes, Haig to Lloyd George, 4 Aug. 1916.
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rail, dock and canal facilities, and with arranging for the necessary material 
and personnel in connection therewith for the present and future needs 
of the armies in the field … responsible for the transport of all classes of 
military traffic’ both to and from the front, and ‘would report directly to 
the Secretary of State for War’ in London rather than to Haig.27 A note 
on the file, written by Haig, recorded that the BEF’s commander-in-chief 
believed the memorandum to have been the work of one of ‘Lloyd George’s 
men’ – most likely the one who would seek to run the new directorate. No 
evidence has been unearthed to confirm or allay Haig’s suspicions. Yet as 
the memorandum drew upon the managerial structures of a large railway 
company to conceptualize the proposed organization it appears likely that 
Geddes had a significant influence over the document, which Maxwell 
dismissed as ‘quite impracticable’.28 Furthermore, in a demonstration of 
the QMG’s mind set towards external interference in the BEF’s forward 
planning activities, he noted that: ‘It is not stated [in the memorandum] 
why the time has arrived to strengthen the transport arrangements of the 
BEF. So far as the work in France is concerned these arrangements have 
worked perfectly smoothly and efficiently: 1. in the ports; 2. on the railways 
and canals; 3. on the roads’.29 As will be demonstrated further below, 
Maxwell’s attitude was not unique among both the officers in France and 
those at the War Office.
Maxwell’s reluctance to acknowledge the supply problems that were 
already manifest by the third week of the Somme was not the catalyst 
for Haig’s response to Lloyd George. Nor should Haig’s reply be taken 
as further evidence of an entrenched, insular military elite unwilling to 
embrace outsiders’ criticisms of their procedures. Instead, the commander-
in-chief ’s comments were a reflection of the fact that the BEF was engaged 
in the largest battle in British military history and, as a result, Haig felt 
unable to guarantee that an investigation into administrative processes 
and organizational responsibilities could receive priority at GHQ over the 
unfolding offensive. The emergence of severe logistical challenges during 
the first month of the battle meant that Haig was ‘anxious to afford Sir Eric 
Geddes every possible facility for conducting his enquiry’, and was ‘glad 
27 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/215Q, memorandum (received from Lord Derby), 11 July 
1916, pp. 1–2.
28 The memorandum proposed that the directors of railways and IWT ‘should occupy very 
much the same position to the [director-general of the new directorate] as superintendents 
of British railways occupy to the general managers’. See NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/215Q, 
memorandum, 11 July 1916, p. 1.
29 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/215Q, memorandum by Maxwell, 17 July 1916, p. 1. 
Emphasis added.
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to make arrangements for his visit’.30 As Ian M. Brown has demonstrated, 
Haig’s interest in transport issues was apparent from the moment he 
replaced Sir John French as commander-in-chief on 19 December 1915.31 
On his first day at GHQ he met with his adjutant general and QMG 
before touring the various branches of the general staff, and within his 
first week he had discussed the railways and roads behind the Third Army 
with Lieutenant-General Edmund Allenby. Haig followed up his meeting 
with Allenby by urging ‘the value of improved railway facilities’ behind 
the Third Army to the French, and ordered Maxwell ‘to hasten, and begin 
at once to build the railway projected into the Third Army area … I also 
went into the reasons why the narrow gauge lines in the Second Army area 
(near Poperinghe) had not been turned to military use’. By 27 December he 
could write with evident satisfaction that: ‘QMG recorded that work had 
begun on the railway in the Third Army area. A B[road] G[auge] line in the 
direction of Contay … It is just four days since I begged Joffre to help us in 
this matter’.32 Haig’s understanding of the proper place of transportation in 
the army’s activities – and the continued degradation of the BEF’s lines of 
communications as the demands of the Somme took their toll on the roads, 
railways and docks – were sufficient grounds for him to authorize Geddes’s 
visit to GHQ in late August.33
Where Haig’s attitude encouraged dialogue between the military and 
one of Britain’s leading transport experts, the War Office took a far less 
cordial stance towards Lloyd George’s proposal. Brigadier-General Richard 
Montagu Stuart-Wortley, the DOM in London, was the chief protagonist 
behind the War Office’s position. Lord Derby noted that Stuart-Wortley’s 
‘intense dislike for Geddes’ had not subsided in the aftermath of their frosty 
encounter at the start of the war, and his antipathy had been further fuelled 
by what Stuart-Wortley perceived to be increasing civilian encroachment 
into the military realm as the war progressed.34
Buttressed by the support of his commanding officer, Sir John Cowans, 
Stuart-Wortley’s disinclination to support Lloyd George’s proposition 
threatened to derail the transportation mission before it began. Mindful 
30 TNA, WO 32/5163, appointment of Sir E. Geddes, Haig to Lloyd George, 4 Aug. 1916.
31 Brown, British Logistics, p. 104.
32 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/104, diary entries, 22–27 Dec. 1915.
33 TNA, WO 32/5164, facilities and arrangements for Sir E. Geddes in conducting his 
investigation on transport arrangements in connection with the British Expeditionary Force 
at home and overseas, Haig to Lloyd George, 22 Aug. 1916.
34 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/1/1/6, Derby to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916; K. Grieves, 
‘The transportation mission to GHQ, 1916’, in ‘Look to Your Front!’ Studies in the First World 
War by the British Commission for Military History, ed. B. Bond et al. (Staplehurst, 1999), pp. 
63–78, at p. 71.
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of the fragility of civil–military relations, and the requirement that his 
investigations be conducted swiftly, Geddes wished to be accompanied 
in France by soldiers who could both explain the existing procedures and 
minimize the inconvenience to GHQ’s staff officers.35 Geddes identified 
the by now Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Mance, Stuart-Wortley’s deputy 
DOM, as an ideal companion. Geddes and Mance had worked closely on 
REC business in the fifteen months that preceded the war, and the civilian 
wished to exploit the soldier’s past experience of military railway operations 
– obtained within the railway directorate during the South African War. 
A letter was despatched from Lloyd George to Cowans, requesting that 
Mance be temporarily released from the War Office to join Geddes’s team 
in France. Stuart-Wortley’s response to the letter claimed that he ‘could not 
possibly spare [Mance] for so long a time as three or four weeks’, as to do so 
would ‘seriously prejudice the work of my directorate and I do not consider 
that I can be held responsible for what may occur during his absence’. He 
described Mance as his ‘head railway advisor’, his technical assistant on ‘all 
questions which involve dealings with the Railway Executive Committee 
or with the French and Belgian railways’ and the man responsible for ‘all 
questions connected with Mesopotamian, Egyptian and Salonika railways’. 
Stuart-Wortley argued that his deputy had an expertise that nobody within 
the directorate of movements could match, that he was the ‘designated 
Acting Director of Movements in the event of an invasion … and [that] he 
has a knowledge of all home defence schemes which is unique’.36 However, 
Stuart-Wortley’s pleas and the ongoing threat of invasion, although enough 
to ensure that an enormous permanent garrison of 1.5 million men was 
retained in Britain during the war, were not enough to prevent Mance from 
crossing the Channel with Geddes in late August.37
GHQ in France proved far less obstructive. Haig made no attempt to 
dissuade Geddes from utilizing the services of Colonel Henry Freeland 
during his visit, despite the sustained stress on the BEF’s staff as the battle 
of Somme continued. Like Mance, Freeland was handpicked by Geddes 
as the civilian had prior knowledge of his abilities. Geddes and Freeland 
had first met in India when they worked for adjoining railways at the same 
station – the former for the Rohilkund and Kumaon and the latter as deputy 
traffic manager with the North-Western. Alongside Geddes’s knowledge of 
35 TNA, WO 32/5164, facilities and arrangements for Sir E. Geddes, Geddes to Lloyd 
George, 10 Aug. 1916.
36 TNA, WO 32/5164, facilities and arrangements for Sir E. Geddes, Stuart-Wortley to 
Cowans, 7 Aug. 1916.
37 D. Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London, 2011), p. 
260.
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Freeland’s work in India, the latter was deemed valuable as he had studied 
the methods employed by the French army.38 He had observed the systems 
in use for the packing of French supply trains early in 1916, and his feedback 
had helped shape the composition of the BEF’s daily supply trains in the 
second half of the war.39
The reasons behind Geddes’s identification of Mance and Freeland 
emphasize the depth of interactions between the army and the railways 
in the period before the First World War. Both officers were chosen to 
participate in the transportation mission because of their demonstrable 
military experience and their pre-existing relationships with the civilian 
specialist. The railways of India, Africa, the United States and Britain had 
provided these men with the knowledge of railway operations in peace and 
war. They now came together on French soil to scrutinise the BEF’s existing 
transport infrastructure and operating procedures alongside two civilians 
with whom Geddes was also highly familiar.
The first, Philip Nash, was another example of the diaspora of British 
expertise throughout the pre-war empire. He had been in India since 1899 
and, after a series of promotions, had attained the position of joint secretary 
of the East Indian Railway (roughly equivalent to the role of assistant 
general manager) by 1911. It is unclear whether Nash and Geddes’s paths 
had crossed while the latter was resident on the sub-continent, but they 
were definitely brought together when Nash was recruited to the Ministry 
of Munitions in 1915. Nash, as head of the national filling factories, was 
one of Geddes’s assistants faced with the task of increasing the supply of 
gun ammunition to the British army. One of Geddes’s other assistants, the 
North-Eastern Railway’s statistics expert J. George Beharrell, comprised the 
final component of the civil–military transportation mission.40
The civilian members of the mission did not record any difficulties 
with regards to military attitudes prior to their departure from Britain, 
but Geddes observed that Mance joined the mission with some hesitancy. 
Stuart-Wortley’s hostility towards Geddes may partially explain Mance’s 
trepidation. However, his reluctance was also undoubtedly linked to 
the difficult position into which the civilian expert thrust his military 
companions. As Keith Grieves has explained, Mance and Freeland ‘found 
38 TNA, WO 32/5164, facilities and arrangements for Sir E. Geddes, Geddes to Lloyd 
George, 10 Aug. 1916.
39 TNA, WO 95/76, branches and services: Director of supplies, diary entry, 11 Jan. 1916.
40 ‘Philip Arthur Manley Nash’, Grace’s guide to British industrial history, 2016 <http://
www.gracesguide.co.uk/Philip_Arthur_Manley_Nash> [accessed 7 Dec. 2016]; K. Grieves, 
Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace (Manchester, 1989), pp. 19–24; 
Grieves, ‘The transportation mission’, p. 65.
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themselves in the unenviable position of assessing the failure of GHQ 
to organise the free flow of supplies behind the line’.41 The organization 
they were tasked to examine was in large part the creation of officers who 
outranked them, most notably the IGC, Major-General Sir Frederick 
Clayton. In 1915 Clayton had proven amenable to the idea of exploiting 
the SECR’s civilian expertise to improve the BEF’s supply operations at 
the port of Boulogne, but by the summer of 1916 his attitude towards 
civilian involvement on the lines of communications had become far less 
welcoming.
Clayton’s correspondence with Cowans in the twelve months prior to the 
transportation mission charts both his frustrations at the BEF’s approach 
to the challenges of trench warfare and his perception that his work as IGC 
had been underappreciated. He claimed that the ‘combing out’ of men 
suitable for front line duties in the summer of 1915 had robbed him of ‘all 
the important trained men’ within his department, and that ‘to send out 
men and expect them to pick up in a month what others have taken ten 
months to learn, is asking, in my opinion, a little too much’.42 By November 
1915 the continued removal of his subordinates for deployments elsewhere 
inspired Clayton to pen a spirited lament towards the approach taken by 
his superiors in London:
The War Office robbed me of my former M[ilitary] L[anding] O[fficer] 
(Watson), who went to the Dardanelles, and I understand they are now going 
to take away Blencowe, who manages all the movements of troops at Boulogne. 
Also I believe I am to lose Humphreys who does all the embarkation work at 
Havre, and in addition I have just had a man called Solomon, who was one of 
my Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-Generals here, taken away suddenly, after 
having trained him for three months, just as he was getting into the work.
I shall have to fill all these places by retired officers or Territorials, in fact anyone 
I can get. Of course this is not conducive to good staff work, and makes things 
extremely hard for me; however I suppose we shall have to carry on somehow.43
Clayton’s opinions on another letter within the same file, written by 
Cowans to Maxwell at the end of May 1916, were either not committed to 
paper or have not survived. However, as the letter requested the views of 
the BEF’s senior supply officers on the ‘possibility of transferring men from 
the Railway Transport Sections for more active duties in the field’ just as the 
41 Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes, p. 30.
42 TNA, WO 107/15, IGC, general correspondence, Clayton to Cowans, 8 July 1915.
43 TNA, WO 107/15, IGC, general correspondence, Clayton to Cowans, 23 Nov. 1915. For 
further missives on the same theme, see Clayton to Cowans, 4 Dec. 1915 and 7 Jan. 1916.
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supply services were gearing up for largest battle in British military history, 
one can surmise that the timing of the request alone confounded Clayton’s 
frustrations.44
In addition to exasperation at the removal of ‘his’ trained men, Clayton 
perceived himself to be an isolated figure within the BEF’s hierarchy. As 
his headquarters was located at Abbeville rather than GHQ, he felt cut off 
from the cluster of officers that surrounded the commander-in-chief. He 
bemoaned the lack of recognition for his endeavours in a letter to Cowans 
in February 1916, writing that:
I was not mentioned in the previous dispatch [sic] and as I have told you have 
never had a mention since I have been IGC over twelve months now. [Sir 
Frederick] Robb who was not a brilliant success as IGC got a KCB. Maxwell 
who was IGC for three months and only had 250,000 men to deal with got 
a KCB. I have had over one million to deal with and have not even had a 
mention.45
Clayton’s belief that his efforts had been insufficiently acknowledged was 
exacerbated by the number of investigations into logistical and administrative 
procedures that took place on the lines of communications during his tenure 
as IGC. Alongside pointing out that answering queries from soldier or 
civilian-led parties took up a ‘great deal’ of his and his staff’s time, Clayton 
asked whether ‘some steps’ could be taken to ‘stop these constant attacks and 
investigations being made on the lines of communication’. His reaction 
demonstrated that the aims of such examinations were not adequately 
understood by all the BEF’s senior officers in the summer of 1916. Clayton’s 
solitary concern was whether the work of his department had ‘been done to 
the satisfaction of the C-in-C’.46
The IGC’s growing antagonism towards outside interference threatened 
to jeopardize the efficacy of Geddes’s transportation mission, and his mindset 
endangered the future of the BEF’s supply operations. His argument, which 
was summarized in a response to the findings of a commission into the 
ongoing congestion at the Channel ports led by the shipping magnate Sir 
Thomas Royden, was that despite the BEF’s colossal expansion over the 
preceding eighteen months it had ‘been supplied with everything it requires 
with clockwork regularity; nothing had failed, all demands have been met 
and nothing but praise has been given to those who have done the work’. 
In addition:
44 TNA, WO 107/15, IGC, general correspondence, Cowans to Maxwell, 31 May 1916.
45 TNA, WO 107/15, IGC, general correspondence, Clayton to Cowans, 10 Feb. 1916.
46 TNA, WO 95/3969, headquarters branches and services. Inspector general, Clayton to 
Maxwell, 14 June 1916. Emphasis added.
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The only conclusion one can come to after reading [the Royden report] is, that 
it is impossible for the ordinary business civilian to understand what are the 
conditions under which we have to work and that it is a mistake to allow them 
to interfere with an army business that most of us have studied all our lives … 
when we fail in any way to keep the army supplied it will be time for criticism.47
Clayton was not alone in besmirching the conclusions produced by the 
myriad examinations of the BEF’s working practices. In April 1916 the 
director of supplies branded a report into the use of labour at Rouen 
by Major Ronald Williams of the Dockers Battalion, which had been 
commissioned by Haig rather than the government, as ‘simply valueless 
and useless’.48 Even Sir William Robertson, whose appreciation of supply 
questions at the start of the war had helped to sustain the BEF as a fighting 
force, believed that criticisms from London about congestion at the ports, 
poor storage practices, neglect of the canal network and the failure to 
develop railway traffic prior to the Somme were ‘misinformed’.49
Until the supply link that reached back from the front line to Britain 
(and the world beyond) had actually broken down, Clayton believed that 
it was unfair of the War Office to continue bombarding his department 
with civilians hell bent on ‘interfering’ with his operations. At the very 
least his response to the Royden report illustrates that he was unwilling 
to countenance the potential problems that awaited the BEF should the 
transport network in France collapse under the weight of goods shipped to 
the western front. Nothing within Clayton’s correspondence implied that 
he appreciated how examinations such as Royden’s and Williams’s were 
undertaken to ensure that catastrophic failure did not occur as the British 
war effort expanded. Inquiries that only took place after the system broke 
down – which in Clayton’s view was the correct time for them – would 
theoretically occur too late to rectify the situation should the BEF wish to 
remain an effective fighting force.
By August 1916, despite the emergence of fruitful working partnerships 
between civilian specialists and army officers both prior to and during 
the initial stages of the conflict, there existed a clear and palpable sense of 
distrust among those responsible for managing the war effort. The growing 
stresses of an unfamiliar form of warfare, for which no clear blueprint 
47 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/14, remarks on the report of the commission 
sent out by the shipping control committee, 30 July 1916. Emphasis added. The conclusions 
of Royden’s report are summarized in Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 610.
48 TNA, WO 95/76, director of supplies war diary, diary entry, 24 Apr. 1916. Haig 
considered Williams to be ‘broad minded and sensible’. See NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/105, 
diary entry, 28 March 1916.
49 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 7/6/60, Robertson to Haig, 28 July 1916.
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for success had emerged, ratcheted up tensions between the political 
and military actors charged with the delivery of victory. Suspicions and 
reservations within the army over the motives of ‘outsiders’ – particularly 
those as closely connected to Lloyd George as Geddes – to do anything more 
than meddle with pre-existing structures and erode the army’s jurisdiction, 
were mirrored by wariness and doubts over the competence of the soldiers 
responsible for overseeing the BEF’s umbilical cord. Lord Derby, who was 
‘much impressed’ by Geddes, described Clayton as ‘very stupid, conceited 
and narrow-minded’.50 Maxwell, Robertson acknowledged, was not ‘the 
sort of man who would favourably impress Lloyd George’ due to his ‘hide-
bound manner’.51 As IGC and QMG respectively, Clayton and Maxwell 
were the BEF’s two senior supply officers and both viewed the transportation 
mission with naked hostility. However, their superior did not replicate their 
attitude. Even though Haig had adjudged Clayton’s ‘methodical system’ 
to be ‘very remarkable’ in December 1915,52 the BEF’s commander-in-chief 
was thoroughly aware that the continued expansion of the British war effort 
necessitated frequent reassessments of the BEF’s logistical foundations. 
Consequently, Geddes and his colleagues were received at GHQ on 24 
August 1916 and began work the following day.
The transportation mission and the genesis of the directorate-general of 
transportation
The terms of reference issued to Geddes before his departure for France 
emphasize the enlarged scope of his mission in comparison to the localized, 
small-scale investigations of the previous eighteen months. His team were 
instructed by Lloyd George to: review the existing capacity of the BEF’s 
transport infrastructure and ascertain whether it was capable of conveying 
the ‘very considerably increased quantity of ammunition and other stores’ 
to be despatched from Britain in preparation for the offensives of 1917; 
identify the repairs, extensions and operational improvements that were 
required at the docks, on the railways and on both the canal and road 
networks to render them capable of sustaining an advance towards the 
German border; and learn ‘all that [was] possible from the very excellent 
transport arrangements of the French Army’, so that the British could 
appropriate efficient practices for implementation within the BEF.53 After 
50 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/1/1/3, Derby to Lloyd George, 30 Aug. 1916.
51 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 7/6/60, Robertson to Haig, 28 July 1916.
52 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/104, diary entry, 30 Dec. 1915.
53 TNA, WO 32/5164, facilities and arrangements for Sir E. Geddes, Lloyd George to 
Haig, 16 Aug. 1916; Lloyd George to Roques, 23 Aug. 1916.
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the investigation had taken place Geddes was to produce both a series of 
statistical breakdowns, which detailed the quantities of various materials 
that the BEF were likely to require for future operations, and a number 
of reports that catalogued the range of variables involved in the transport 
network’s maintenance and improvement.54 In short, Geddes was directed 
to assess the past and present of the BEF’s supply system before offering 
recommendations for the future of British transportation on the western 
front.
The mission began with a series of observational visits. Accompanied by 
the deputy QMG, Colonel Woodroffe, Geddes’s team undertook a two-
day tour of the BEF’s rear areas. Over the course of forty-eight hours they 
visited ammunition railheads and newly constructed stations and sidings, 
and Geddes was afforded the opportunity to discuss the supply situation 
with officers in command of the artillery batteries deployed along the 
Mametz–Carnoy valley.55 In his biography of Geddes, Keith Grieves stated 
that the tour was ‘largely uninformative’ due to the ‘model’ nature of the 
sites the civilian specialist was shown.56 However, Woodroffe’s account of 
the trip demonstrates that it provided the inspiration behind many of the 
improvements that were subsequently made to the transport infrastructure 
in France. The expedition impressed upon Geddes the immediate need for 
action to be taken to alleviate congestion and increase economy in the BEF’s 
‘tail’. Furthermore, the brief overview of conditions behind the fighting 
troops provided him with the lines of enquiry upon which his follow-up 
investigation rested. As Woodroffe recorded:
The points which appeared to impress themselves on [Geddes] most were: a) the 
enormous quantity of labour and material required to keep the roads in order 
and for the construction of the various station yards; b) the urgent necessity 
of some form of light railway to take the traffic off the roads and thus reduce 
the demand for road metal; c) the wastage of manpower particularly as regards 
the labour employed in transshipping stone either broad gauge to metre gauge, 
from rail to lorry or from rail to dump; d) the huge quantity of empty ammo 
boxes etc., the efforts which are being made to deal with the problem, and the 
large amount of labour employed for this purpose; e) the large quantities of 
brass 18-pdr. cartridge cases which are still lying about the British areas.57
Following his ‘model’ tour – but before he returned to London – Geddes 
54 A complete list of the statistics, projections, and reports originally demanded from the 
transportation mission is given in Appendix I.
55 IWM, Woodroffe papers, 3/38/1/2, notes and reports, 25 Aug. 1916.
56 Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes, p. 29.
57 IWM, Woodroffe papers, 3/38/1/2, notes and reports, 25 Aug. 1916.
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met with Haig and was asked by the commander-in-chief for his opinion 
on what he had seen. ‘His reply was guarded’, Auckland Geddes wrote 
later, ‘to the effect that he had seen plenty to think about but as yet did 
not know what to think’.58 Rather than risk sounding like he had arrived in 
France with pre-existing judgments, Geddes requested the opportunity to 
have a ‘free run’ of the BEF’s lines of communications and full access to the 
statistics and information required to complete his mission. Increasingly 
concerned by the blockage of supplies around Amiens, Haig acquiesced 
and notified Maxwell of Geddes’s requirements. Mindful of the QMG’s 
antipathy towards examinations on the lines of communications, Haig 
also issued a circular to all armies and administrative departments, which 
ordered that ‘all necessary information and any statistics required will be 
placed at the disposal of Sir Eric Geddes … and the C-in-C desires that 
every facility will be afforded [Geddes] in the conduct of [his] enquiries’.59
Geddes’s aspirations for the thoroughness of the ‘free run’ were emphasized 
by the composition of the party that returned to France in early September. 
The original team was augmented by the addition of John Blades, a ‘very 
highly skilled dock superintendent’ employed by the North-Eastern and 
Hull and Barnsley railway companies.60 Blades joined Nash and Freeland 
at the French Channel ports, where they were tasked to analyse existing 
conditions and discover the capacities of the docks based on the nature of 
the goods anticipated to be despatched in support of the 1917 offensives. 
Meanwhile, Geddes and the remainder of the party surveyed the rest of 
the transport network with the aim of building up a ‘complete statement’ 
of the weight of traffic required to supply the BEF.61 Within a fortnight, 
he felt sufficiently informed to offer a preliminary view of the situation on 
the western front to Lloyd George. It is clear from this letter that Geddes 
remained sensitive to the fragility of relations between his mission and many 
officers within the BEF. He implored the secretary of state for war not to 
reveal its contents to anyone in the War Office or at GHQ, as he feared that 
the criticisms contained within the document would severely jeopardize the 
remainder of the investigation if circulated.
The letter’s conclusions – formed even before the bulk of the necessary data 
had been collected, let alone analysed – were an unequivocal condemnation 
of the BEF’s logistical foundations and the innate reactivity of the force’s 
administrative echelon. ‘This is a war of Armies backed by machinery and 
58 Geddes, The Forging of a Family, p. 232.
59 TNA, WO 95/31, branches and services: quarter-master general, circular to all armies, 
IGC and engineer-in-chief, 3 Sept. 1916.
60 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916, p. 2.
61 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/102. memorandum by Geddes, pp. 2–3.
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“movement”’, Geddes wrote, ‘and I do not think that “movement” has 
received sufficient attention in anticipation of the advance. I judge this by 
the total absence of light railway or road organization, or policy for the use 
of waterways’.62 The fact that canal barges had been returned to civil work 
even as the French railways continued to be clogged by ever-increasing 
quantities of road stone exemplified the issue. Rather than operating as an 
integral component of the BEF’s transport mix, canals were considered as 
a carrier of last resort – to be requested only when rail transport was not 
available. The consequence of the BEF’s decision to go to war without an 
integrated IWT directorate was that, despite Gerald Holland’s efforts to 
develop capacity and promote waterborne transport, no guiding principles 
existed for the exploitation of the theatre’s abundant canals and rivers. 
Holland believed that IWT was capable of transporting far more than had 
hitherto been requested of it. However, ‘neither [in Britain] nor in France’ 
could Geddes ‘ascertain what the policy of canal user is. I doubt if one 
exists’.63
The BEF’s problems were the consequence of insufficient forward planning 
and coordination, a result of the move towards decentralization instigated 
when the force began to expand in early 1915. At that time Robertson had 
acknowledged that the BEF had assumed ‘too great a strength to admit of 
matters being centralized at GHQ to the extent they are now’.64 However, 
the redistribution of authority over the various components of the transport 
infrastructure had resulted in the emergence of heavily compartmentalized 
departments. Officers were only able to adjust working practices in their 
own sections, and no oversight was in place to ensure that seemingly 
minor modifications in one area did not adversely affect the operations of 
other departments whose work was necessarily interconnected. As Colonel 
Henniker noted, ‘the various transport agencies were a chain, the whole 
chain being no stronger than its weakest link’. In 1916 the links were not 
sufficiently connected ‘so as to ensure a smooth uninterrupted flow of traffic’ 
along the lines of communications.65 The geographical barriers between 
Maxwell’s offices at GHQ in Montreuil-sur-Mer, Clayton’s at Abbeville and 
Holland’s at St Omer (where IWT had remained following GHQ’s transfer 
to Montreuil-sur-Mer) were a physical manifestation of an organizational 
deficiency. In a text on military transportation published after the war, 
62 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916, pp. 
7–8.
63 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916, pp. 
2–3.
64 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 2/2/63, Robertson to Cowans, 8 Jan. 1915.
65 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 192.
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Major-General J. C. Harding-Newman was particularly scathing of the 
situation. He wrote that Clayton ‘seldom, if ever, saw the QMG’, and 
claimed evocatively that ‘if ever there was more convincing proof of the 
dangers of separating the sub-divisions of a Staff, only the memorial to 
77,000 unknown officers and men at Thiepval can provide it’.66
The BEF possessed no internal structures through which it could regularly 
review its procedures and consider the future of its transport organization. 
Facilities had been improved ‘here and there’ when experience proved they 
were incapable of handling the amount of work required, but no authority 
had been established to prioritize the distribution of materials and labour 
so as to ensure the most efficient use of the limited resources in France. 
The system was a ‘hand-to-mouth’ one, which had not kept pace with the 
growing demands on it or conducted accurate forward planning activities.67 
While railway construction in the event of an advance on the Somme had 
been planned between the DRT and French authorities, the extra quantity 
of rolling stock required to bridge the extended gap between the depots 
and the front line had not. Instead, the question had been subjected to 
‘rule-of-thumb’ estimates generated within the railways directorate that 
illustrate the inadequacy of the BEF’s planning mechanisms in 1916. The 
DRT tasked two officers to identify the number of wagons required to 
service the BEF’s railway requirements to the border between Belgium 
and Germany. Lieutenant-Colonel Henniker predicted that 22,501 wagons 
would be required to work the BEF’s daily traffic under such circumstances, 
whereas Lieutenant-Colonel Paget believed a mere 11,240 wagons would 
suffice. The wide discrepancy between the two figures was partly explained 
by the different parameters the officers had set themselves – Henniker, for 
example, added a 25 per cent margin to his estimate to take account of 
traffic dislocation and the unauthorized use of wagons as storage vehicles 
at railheads and in construction areas – yet neither soldier had based their 
calculations on a realistic prediction of the composition of the BEF’s likely 
traffic in 1917. The Somme demonstrated the artillery-intensive nature of 
the industrial battle, and its failure to dislodge the German army from 
French soil highlighted that even larger exertions would be required if 
future operations were to be successful. Geddes’s ‘scrutiny’ of Henniker’s 
estimate – the larger of the two – revealed that the latter had considerably 
underestimated both the BEF’s projected strength and the ‘tonnage of 
certain commodities’ that individual directorates had told the former would 
66 Harding-Newman, Modern Military Administration, p. 16.
67 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 184.
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be necessary to fulfil their ‘ultimate requirements’ on the western front.68
The absence of a comprehensive statement of the BEF’s needs meant that 
estimates like those produced by Henniker and Paget were at best misguided 
and at worst essentially worthless. Furthermore, the dearth of accurate 
forecasts concealed the scale of the challenge that the extant transport 
infrastructure was going to face in 1917. Nowhere was this more apparent 
than at the ports responsible for receiving all the BEF’s imported supplies. 
Prior to Geddes’s departure for France, Stuart-Wortley had provided him 
with a statement written by Clayton in July 1916, which outlined the 
‘tonnage which he was prepared to discharge at the French ports’. The 
figure of 138,000 tons per week, which the IGC referred to as ‘the ultimate 
requirement’ for sixty divisions, almost exactly matched the maximum 
weekly tonnage discharged at the ports during August 1916.69 Following a 
discussion with Geddes on what the civilian referred to as ‘general matters’, 
Clayton revised his estimate of the ports’ maximum possible discharge 
upwards to 160,916 tons. For reasons Geddes chose not to speculate upon, 
between July and September 1916 Clayton’s calculation for the volume of 
work he believed the BEF’s ports to be capable of increased by over 16 per 
cent.
Through the production of a comprehensive statement of the BEF’s 
requirements, acquired from the force’s individual directorates and 
departments, Geddes discovered that even Clayton’s higher estimate was 
woefully inadequate for the war the British hoped to fight in 1917. With the 
provision of a ‘margin for irregular arrivals and for contingencies’, Geddes 
established a maximum discharge to be provided for at the BEF’s ports of 
248,327 tons per week – 40,225 tons every day (see Table 6.1). The provision 
of an accurate forecast meant that, for the first time, the discrepancy 
between the force’s demands and its ability to fulfil them was made tangible 
and clear. To meet the projected requirements for 1917 the capacity of the 
ports under the BEF’s control would have to increase by over 54 per cent.70
Geddes’s almost immediate exposure of the inadequacy of the BEF’s 
forecasting capabilities convinced him that the transport mission as originally 
conceived could not continue. The time for investigations, formal enquiries 
and interviews with overworked officers had passed. ‘Executive action’ 
was called for on both sides of the Channel – to install a comprehensive, 
68 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/155, railway arrangements for advance through 
Belgium, 28 Oct. 1916, pp. 1–2.
69 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/102, memorandum by Geddes, p. 2. In the 
week ending 20 Aug. 1916 a total of 138,897 tons were discharged at the ports allocated to 
the BEF. The weekly average over the four weeks ending 27 Aug. was 129,024 tons.
70 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 185.
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centrally directed policy for transportation that took account of the myriad 
questions of coordination, resourcing, staffing and expansion which arose 
in the management of a modern army’s supply arrangements.71 As Geddes 
concluded in his private letter to Lloyd George on 15 September 1916:
It is beyond argument that there is today no one who controls the continuous 
transit from this country to the front. There is no one who can tell you 
throughout where his weak places are, or coordinate the policy and resources, 
present and future, of the various means of transit. It is not possible for the 
C-in-C or QMG in France to do it; it is alone a big job for the best man you 
can find. If the C-in-C is not satisfied with his transport arrangements and 
desires someone to go into them in anticipation of the spring, he must, I think, 
appoint a man for the job, put him in charge of it, and back him strongly.72
The BEF’s existing organizational structure was incapable of producing, 
analysing and interpreting the data streams required to maintain the 
efficiency – and increase the capacity – of the transport network upon which 
a vast force was dependent. As far as Geddes was concerned, the mass of 
special reports and memoranda originally requested by Lloyd George were 
no longer the priority were the BEF to be capable of successful offensive 
71 Grieves, ‘The transportation mission’, p. 65.
72 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916, p. 9.
Table 6.1. Estimate of probable daily requirements 
for the British Expeditionary Force, 1917.
Item Daily tonnage required
R.E. stores and material
 – General 1,129
 – Timber, bricks and gravel 3,782
 – Stone 12,000
 – Railway 1,500
Total 18,411
Supplies 10,425
Ammunition 8,600
Ordnance 1,513
Miscellaneous 1,276
Total 40,225
Source: History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, ed. H. L. Pritchard (11 vols., Chatham, 1952), 
v. 561–2.
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operations in France in 1917. The secretary of state for war agreed. Crucially, 
so did Haig.
The common ground between the army’s political head and its senior 
field commander became a platform both for the restructuring of the BEF’s 
administrative organization and for the appointment of some of Britain’s 
leading transport experts into positions of seniority within the military 
hierarchy. In London, Lloyd George acted quickly upon Geddes’s plea 
for executive action. On 18 September, just three days after the latter had 
penned his ‘preliminary opinion’ on matters in France, the secretary of state 
for war established the directorate-general of military railways at the War 
Office. The new directorate was initially created ‘with a view to improving 
transport facilities at present existing in this country and France’, and the 
position of director-general conceived to act as a deputy to the QMG of 
the forces. However, the constitution of the new directorate also explicitly 
stated that the DGMR was to have ‘direct access’ to the secretary of state 
for war and would attend meetings of the Army Council at which matters 
of military transportation were under discussion.73
Reasons of both practicality and personality governed this decision. In 
terms of the former, access to the Army Council and the secretary of state 
permitted the DGMR to attend conferences with policy makers and argue 
the case for resources to be made available for military transport rather 
than other components of the war effort.74 Raw materials such as steel were 
vital to the production of military necessities as diverse as helmets and 
tanks, and also to the construction of the locomotives, ships and railway 
tracks necessary to transport supplies and maintain Britain’s connection 
with the world’s markets. As the DGMR was to ‘assume responsibility for 
the purchase of material for the construction, equipment, maintenance, 
repair and working of railways, light railways, canals, docks and roads’,75 
his success in the role was dependent upon his ability to acquire sufficient 
money, materials and manpower to fulfil these duties. The success of the 
wider allied war effort depended upon the successful balance of the many 
competing demands on the limited pool of resources available.
The personality considerations that influenced the directorate-general of 
military railways’ position within the military hierarchy centred upon the 
relationship between Lloyd George’s choice for DGMR and the incumbent 
officers in the QMG’s department. On 18 September the secretary of state 
for war offered Geddes the role of DGMR in a letter that made clear that 
73 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/62, Attachment A, Brade to Geddes, 18 Sept. 
1916.
74 Grieves, ‘The transportation mission’, p. 67.
75 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/62, Attachment A.
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the new directorate would take over responsibility for the directorate of 
movements from the QMG.76 Therefore, Geddes was scheduled to become 
Stuart-Wortley’s superior. The latter’s thoughts on the matter were gathered 
by Lord Derby in what was ‘rather a painful interview’:
He feels the position very strongly and I have great sympathy with him, for he 
has done his work well so far as it goes ... I explained to him that everything 
had been harmoniously settled in France and that the corollary for the new 
appointment that is to be made there was the appointment of somebody 
with a corresponding post in this Office, a man who would take in several 
departments, and at the same time would be on such terms of equality with the 
corresponding holder of the post in France as would enable him, with the help 
of Haig, to insist on his views being carried out.
Wortley took it very well from a personal POV. He told me that under no 
circumstances could he work under Geddes and that he should immediately 
resign.77
Lloyd George was prepared for the DOM’s threat, which was backed up 
by expressions of opposition to Geddes’s appointment from two members 
of the Army Council. The secretary of state’s response was to issue Geddes 
with the honorary rank of major-general, a manoeuvre that both reinforced 
the directorate’s status within the military hierarchy and solidified Geddes’s 
authority in the army’s command structure; below his nominal superior, 
Lieutenant-General Sir John Cowans, but above Brigadier-General Stuart-
Wortley. The latter reiterated to Lloyd George in a personal meeting that he 
could not work under Geddes, and a compromise was fashioned. Following 
Geddes’s acceptance, with ‘some misgiving’, of the post of DGMR on 21 
September, the civilian took over the railway supply and IWT branches 
while Stuart-Wortley and the rest of his staff remained under the QMG’s 
direct command.78 The separation of his command, Stuart-Wortley admitted 
privately to Henry Wilson, was a necessity – his ‘show had really got too 
big’ by September 1916.79
Geddes’s expertise was not just in demand in London following the 
transportation mission. One day after the civilian had accepted the post 
of DGMR, Haig informed Lloyd George that he wanted Geddes to head 
a directorate-general of transportation in France – created to manage 
the BEF’s supply lines on the western front. Upon accepting the post of 
76 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/62, Attachment A.
77 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/1/1/6, Derby to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916.
78 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/51, memorandum to Granet, p. 7; Grieves, 
‘The transportation mission’, p. 67.
79 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 2/84/34, Stuart-Wortley to Wilson, 7 Oct. 1916.
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DGT, Geddes became responsible for the provision and maintenance of 
the logistics network that sustained and equipped the largest military force 
Britain had ever assembled in the field alongside the acquisition and supply 
of all the resources required by the transportation services behind all the 
nation’s globally dispersed expeditionary forces.
The establishment of the two directorates, and the appointment of 
Geddes at their heads, resulted in a remarkable concentration of power 
over the army’s future in the hands of a civilian. His possession of a senior 
military rank was not enough to silence the ‘whispering staff officers’ who 
perceived Geddes’s appointments to be ‘evidence of the threat which Lloyd 
George posed to the autonomy of [the] military high command’.80 Cowans 
remarked to Haig after dinner on 14 October that the secretary of state 
for war had ‘imported an element of distrust into the W[ar] O[ffice] so 
that one wants “eyes in the back of one’s head” in London’, and stated his 
belief that Lloyd George sought to place ‘civilians into the military machine 
wherever he possibly can to replace soldiers’.81 The abolition of the post 
of IGC and Sir Frederick Clayton’s subsequent departure from France did 
nothing to alleviate similar fears among the soldiers on the western front, 
and his removal was later portrayed as a consequence of his opposition 
to Lloyd George’s desire to employ Chinese and African labour behind 
the lines.82 The truth was far more prosaic. In late September Haig had 
noted that Clayton was ‘anxious to retain control of the ports’ in the face 
of the impending restructure at GHQ.83 However, within a fortnight he 
had accepted that there was ‘not room for an IGC and QMG in France, 
and that the proposed amendments with the introduction of Geddes as 
DGT would work well, and that he would do all he could to assist with 
them prior to his return home. He was tired, his health was failing and he 
wanted/needed to go home’.84 The strain of active service had caught up 
with the sixty-one-year-old Clayton, and he returned to Britain to receive 
the recognition he felt he had earned earlier in the war in the 1917 New 
Year’s honours.
Haig, while acknowledging the unique nature of Geddes’s position, 
championed the civilian’s role from the outset. He recognized how important 
the application of expertise was to the solution of the complex problems the 
expanding war had generated, and met frequently with the railwayman to 
discuss transportation matters. Haig believed explicitly in the promotion 
80 Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes, p. 31.
81 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/108, diary entry, 14 Oct. 1916.
82 P. Fraser, Lord Esher: a Political Biography (London, 1973), pp. 332–3.
83 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/108, diary entry, 29 Sept. 1916.
84 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/108, diary entry, 10 Oct. 1916.
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of the best man for the job in the BEF, regardless of their background or 
previous military experience:
There is a good deal of criticism apparently being made at the appointment of 
a civilian like Geddes to an important post on the Headquarters of an Army 
in the Field. These critics seem to fail to realize the size of the Army, and the 
amount of work which the Army requires of a civilian nature. The working of 
the railways, the upkeep of the roads, even the baking of bread and 1,000 other 
industries go on in peace as well as in war. So with the whole nation at war, our 
object should be to employ men on the same work in war as they are accustomed 
to do in peace.85
In the context of an industrialized war that demanded the mobilization and 
coordination of the British empire’s human and material resources, Haig and 
Lloyd George both understood that the inefficient use of those resources to 
placate the sensibilities of the ‘military trade union’ was incompatible with 
the goal of securing victory over a determined and organized enemy. The 
employment of a ‘civilian who was unafraid of large-scale planning and had 
access to the necessary resources’ was far more logical than the continued 
use of soldiers who were handed transportation work ‘merely because they 
[were] generals and colonels’.86 The commander-in-chief ’s enlightened 
attitude, coupled with the political backing of the secretary of state for 
war in London, provided Geddes with the support he required to establish 
functioning directorates on both sides of the Channel.
However, the powerful support of the British war effort’s most prominent 
figures does not entirely explain the scale of Geddes’s achievement. The 
directorate-general of transportation’s organizational chart provided 
fourteen departmental heads – each with their own hierarchical management 
structure and units dispersed throughout the BEF’s rear areas – with direct 
access to the DGT. To coordinate the various forms of transport under his 
control, to balance the conflicting priorities and competing demands of 
these groups, and to direct them towards the realization of Haig’s strategic 
goals called for a man of exceptional organizing capacity. Geddes combined 
the fulfilment of these responsibilities in France with equally monumental 
duties in London, where he commanded the department charged with 
providing sufficient personnel and equipment to satisfy the seemingly 
insatiable demands of Britain’s global war. The tasks that confronted 
the DGT and DGMR in October 1916 were Herculean. Geddes was a 
85 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/108, diary entry, 27 Oct. 1916. Emphasis in original.
86 Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes, p. 32; NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/108, diary entry, 27 Oct. 
1916.
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‘Hercules’.87 But he did not undertake his labours alone. In the aftermath 
of the battle of the Somme, Geddes was able to draw the skills of Britain’s 
transport experts even more deeply into the prosecution of the First World 
War.
The population of the transport directorates
Geddes’s key appointments to the directorates in London and France 
demonstrate his appreciation of the need for civilian and military elements to 
exist in close harmony. Working relationships on both sides of the Channel 
heavily influenced his decision to install Ralph Wedgwood as director of 
docks. The responsibility for ships despatched from Britain remained with 
the DOM until the vessels arrived at their destination port. Therefore, 
the docks directorate on the western front received goods straight from 
the care of Stuart-Wortley’s department. The two directors had to work 
collaboratively to agree the composition of traffic to be moved across the 
Channel each month and to ensure the maintenance and improvement of 
communications either side of the sea.88 In October 1916 Geddes reported 
that telegraphic advices received in France contained incomplete details as 
to the cargo on board each ship, did not state the departure time of the 
vessel and often did not arrive at the relevant dock before the ship had 
crossed the Channel – a problem encountered by Francis Dent eighteen 
months earlier at the Bassin Loubet.89 To rectify such inefficiencies it was 
imperative that the working relationship between the principal officers 
involved in the operations of the docks was not hampered by the personal 
animosity that had characterized Geddes’s interactions with Stuart-Wortley.
In Wedgwood, Geddes identified a civilian with whom Stuart-Wortley 
had ‘always got on well’ and a man with the necessary professional 
experience to take on the job.90 He was the first graduate of the North-
Eastern Railway’s traffic apprenticeship scheme and had succeeded Geddes 
in the role of chief goods manager in 1912. He had been released for service 
with the railway transport establishment soon after the outbreak of war 
but,91 like Brigadier-General Philip Nash and Lieutenant-Colonel J. George 
Beharrell – who were issued with honorary military ranks and appointed 
deputy DGT and assistant DGT (statistics) respectively – Brigadier-General 
87 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 617–18.
88 S. Fay, The War Office at War (London, 1937), p. 23; ‘Directorate of inland waterways 
and docks’, Royal Engineers Journal, xxix (1919), 338–64, at p. 354.
89 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/102, memorandum by Geddes, p. 10.
90 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/51, memorandum to Granet, pp. 7–8.
91 R. Bell, Twenty-Five Years of the North Eastern Railway, 1898–1922 (London, 1951), p. 40. 
Wedgwood was recalled to Britain for service in the Ministry of Munitions in 1915.
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Wedgwood was yet another railwayman with scant military experience 
parachuted into a senior military position in the autumn of 1916. The trend 
led Lord Northcliffe to observe cynically that ‘we have brought to France a 
considerable portion of industrial England’.92
Northcliffe was not the only observer to be perturbed by the outflow 
of prominent railwaymen to France. The departure of Nash, Beharrell 
and Geddes from the Ministry of Munitions was felt keenly, if somewhat 
melodramatically, by Lloyd George’s successor as minister. As Edwin 
Montagu wrote to Lloyd George on 11 October 1916:
To meet your wishes, and with tears in my eyes, tears which have been flowing 
ever since, Geddes left the Ministry … When Geddes left this Ministry he 
took with him Nash and Beharrell, and since then I can hardly bear to look 
at War Office correspondence, for almost every day, if you will excuse a slight 
exaggeration, I receive a request for the service of some new man to be sent 
somewhere or other, sometimes China, sometimes France. By a curious 
coincidence they are nearly always NER men, and it looks as though we shall 
be left without a railway man anywhere about.93
Just two days later, and ‘despite the fact’ he found it ‘very difficult to spare 
him’, Montagu agreed to Wedgwood’s release.94
The ‘curious coincidence’ to which Montagu referred was a consequence 
of the North-Eastern’s progressive approach to management before the 
First World War. Geddes, Beharrell and Wedgwood were all graduates of 
the company’s managerial apprenticeship programme, and had proven 
themselves adaptable to the diverse challenges of wartime administration. 
The directorate-general of transportation’s establishment permitted these 
senior executives to refocus their energies from munitions production to 
a more recognizable challenge: the provision of a reliable and efficient 
transportation system. However, the North-Eastern was far from the 
only British railway company to contribute personnel to the new military 
transport hierarchies created in France and London.
The discussions that surrounded the appointment of Sir Guy Granet as 
Geddes’s deputy in London illustrate the delicate balance between civilian 
and military demands that the British war effort could not irrevocably 
upset. As Geddes anticipated that the scale of the task in France was likely 
to occupy most of his time, he sought out a highly qualified man to oversee 
affairs at the War Office. In Granet he doubtless saw many of his own 
qualities. Both had experience outside the railway industry – Granet having 
92 Quoted in Grieves, ‘The transportation mission’, p. 68.
93 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/2/19/8, Montagu to Lloyd George, 11 Oct. 1916.
94 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/2/19/9, Montagu to Lloyd George, 13 Oct. 1916.
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initially trained as a barrister – and both had experienced a rapid rise to 
positions of seniority. Just six years after entering the railway industry Granet 
took over as general manager of the Midland Railway, an ‘undertaking 
rather living on its past reputation’.95 The company had become known for 
the ‘easy-going regard to the virtue of punctuality’ embraced by its 66,000 
employees.96 However, assisted by a good team of senior managers – which 
from 1907 included the future ROD commanding officer, Cecil Paget, as 
chief operating officer – Granet rapidly cultivated a systemic change in 
the Midland’s organizational culture that was officially acknowledged with 
the award of a knighthood in 1911. His readiness to employ new methods, 
such as the train control system discussed below, and his high standing 
within the profession doubtless encouraged Geddes to choose Granet as 
his deputy in October 1916. Yet Granet was also already well known within 
the War Office thanks to his membership of the ERSC and REC, and Sir 
John Cowans offered his ‘hearty approval’ to Granet’s appointment.97 Even 
Stuart-Wortley found the Midland’s general manager to be a ‘nice fellow’,98 
a further demonstration that his animosity towards Geddes was fuelled by 
personal dislike more than professional jealousy.
The soldiers’ enthusiasm for Granet’s appointment was not shared by 
his employers. As the correspondence between Lloyd George and the 
Midland’s chairman demonstrates, Geddes’s request for Granet’s services 
created substantial difficulties for a company that had already endured 
serious privations thanks to the war’s incessant demands. In response to 
Lloyd George’s appeal for Granet to be released, George Murray Smith 
wrote:
I cannot refrain from telling you that the Directors were very reluctant to 
release Sir Guy Granet from his duties. Apart from the difficulties we are 
experiencing from the absence of so many of our chief and subordinate officers, 
who are either serving in the Munitions Department, or who are fighting, the 
Assistant General Manager is only just recovering from a serious breakdown 
caused by overwork during Sir Guy Granet’s absence at the Import Restrictions 
Department under the Board of Trade.99
95 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/10/1/40, ‘A maker of railway history’, Railway 
Gazette, 22 Oct. 1943 (press cutting).
96 C. Hamilton Ellis, The Midland Railway (London, 1953), p. 144.
97 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/4/2, Geddes to Cowans, 20 Oct. 1916.
98 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 2/84/68, Stuart-Wortley to Wilson, 25 Oct. 1916.
99 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/4/9, Murray Smith to Lloyd George, 19 Oct. 
1916. The Midland had placed Granet at the Board of Trade’s disposal in March 1916.
227
The civilians take over? 
Lloyd George’s appreciation of the company’s ‘patriotic action’ and his 
‘regret’ at the Midland’s ‘inconvenience’ did nothing to ameliorate the 
pressures under which the railway operated during the war.100
The Midland, like many of its colleagues, found it difficult to replace 
highly skilled officials such as Granet easily during the war. The absence 
of his experience and ability while on governmental duties created further 
discomfort for the railway servants who remained in post as the demands 
on the British network grew in line with the expanding war effort. In 
the heaviest year of the war, the Midland carried eighteen million more 
passengers and 3,220,000 tons more goods than it had in 1913, despite 
having lost 29 per cent of its male staff to the armed forces.101 Under such 
testing conditions, the Midland’s decision to permit Granet’s release for 
service in the directorate-general of military railways underlines the 
continued existence of the cooperative spirit fostered between the railways, 
government and armed forces prior to the outbreak of the war.
The accommodating responses to governmental requests from railway 
companies such as the Midland and the North-Eastern were not matched 
by all of Britain’s transport enterprises. For the Port of London, domestic 
requirements prevailed over the demands of the western front. Geddes 
sought to employ a man with ‘practical knowledge’, particularly of 
the mechanical engineering aspects of dock work, to act as a deputy to 
Wedgwood in France and help improve the Channel ports’ throughput 
rates.102 He considered Cyril Kirkpatrick, the Port of London’s chief 
engineer – and a future president of ICE – to be the perfect candidate as 
he was ‘a very strong man and a pusher’. Kirkpatrick and Wedgwood knew 
one another from the former’s tenure as city engineer and town surveyor 
in Newcastle upon Tyne before the war, and Geddes believed Kirkpatrick 
to be ‘quite glad’ of the opportunity to go to France. However, the Port 
of London refused to release him, as he was engaged on the construction 
of what became the King George V Dock on the Thames. Undeterred, 
Geddes wrote to Lloyd George that ‘if the ports over here are to be worked 
satisfactorily it is essential that we should have not the third or fourth class 
men from the British ports but the best’. The port continued to resist, even 
after the secretary of state for war despatched a letter to its chairman that 
stressed the ‘national importance’ of Kirkpatrick’s proposed role ‘to help 
forward to a satisfactory solution the vital question of transportation in 
100 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/4/7, Lloyd George to Murray Smith, 20 Oct. 
1916.
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102 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/1/5/16, Geddes to Lloyd George, 19 Nov. 1916.
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France’.103 Clearly then, the later assertions of the official historian – that 
Geddes received everything he desired following his appointment – were 
misguided. The ongoing requirements of the domestic transport industry 
limited Geddes’s access to the best men that civilian enterprise could 
provide.
From the winter of 1916–17 onwards the higher organization of the 
BEF’s transport requirements was administered by a synthesis of civilian 
and military expertise. The influx of civilians into military roles did not 
lead to the wholesale replacement of soldiers. Where the incumbent – 
whether a general, colonel or otherwise – had proven themselves capable of 
discharging their duties, Geddes understood the benefits of retaining their 
services. Following Mance’s performance on the transportation mission he 
returned to the War Office, was rewarded with a promotion to brigadier-
general, and handed responsibility for sourcing the material and personnel 
required for the army’s enlarged road, railway and light railway departments. 
Colonel Collard, who had acquired responsibility for the provision of men 
and material for the army’s IWT services in January 1915, also kept his job.104
The explanation given to Granet for the two soldiers’ retention 
demonstrates Geddes’s appreciation of the crucial role to be played by 
military experience within the directorate-general of military railways. 
‘Our chief difficulty’, he wrote, ‘will be to get things “through” the War 
Office’. Mance and Collard understood the army’s bureaucracy and were 
‘very wise’ to the ‘minor tricks of the trade’ that had to be deployed in aid 
of the directorate’s goals. According to Geddes, once a paper reached the 
War Office it passed beyond ‘the wit of man to get it out again’. It was ‘only 
by knowing the ropes and knowing where the snags’ were, ‘and how either 
to get round them or knock them out of the way’, that Geddes believed 
anyone could ‘get anything done at all’.105 In addition, in recognition of 
the multitude of concerns with which both he and Granet were likely to 
be bombarded as the directorate evolved, Geddes stressed that Mance and 
Collard were able to run their own departments and work confidently 
without the need for close supervision from above.106 Mance remained in 
post for the rest of the war and ultimately became a highly respected author 
on international transportation matters, while Collard was taken to the 
Admiralty by Geddes in May 1917 and appointed as deputy controller of 
auxiliary shipbuilding. Geddes was not alone in admiring Collard’s talents. 
Sir Sam Fay recalled in his memoirs that Collard was ‘an extraordinary 
103 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/1/5/18(B), Lloyd George to Devonport, 27 Nov. 1916.
104 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/51, memorandum to Granet, pp. 1–3.
105 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/49, Geddes to Granet, 19 Oct. 1916.
106 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/51, memorandum to Granet, p. 5.
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man, full of energy, very able, and prepared to take on anything from the 
construction of a battleship to the manufacture of a watch’.107
Geddes was also keen to retain Stuart-Wortley, at least in the short-term. 
Regardless of the obvious disdain the DOM had shown towards him, 
three factors combined to persuade Geddes not to immediately seek the 
replacement of Stuart-Wortley with a more compliant personality. First, 
over the summer of 1916 comments that questioned the veracity of placing 
civilians in key positions of authority began to appear in the pages of the 
Northcliffe press. Lord Northcliffe and Lloyd George had ‘mysteriously 
drifted apart’ earlier in the year,108 and the former argued in articles for The 
Times that civilians should ‘leave it to the service chiefs to decide strategy 
and the soldiers to die in battle’. As Lloyd George was facilitating Geddes’s 
mission to France in August, Northcliffe warned that ‘we must make changes 
[to the command structure of the army] with caution’.109 On a related note, 
in order to ensure the smoothness of operations while the directorate-
general of military railways was bedded in, Geddes was keenly aware of 
the need to maintain the good will of the professional soldiers in the War 
Office – many of whom were longstanding colleagues of Stuart-Wortley’s. 
The king was ‘glad to hear’ that Stuart-Wortley remained as DOM in early 
October 1916, ‘and that he and Sir Eric Geddes [were] working in complete 
harmony’ despite their personal animosity.110 At a more practical level, the 
backing of Sir John Cowans – Stuart-Wortley’s most fervent supporter – was 
critical to the project’s overall success. As Fay discovered when he eventually 
took over as DOM in early 1917, the removal of Cowans’s friend elicited an 
emotional response from the QMG:
When I saw General Cowans … he was angry and called me a damn fool. He 
said I could not carry on the job, that it was a military post, that the tentacles 
of the Director of Movements were all over the War Office and could not be 
moved from the building, although they were overcrowded … He reminded 
me that he had held the position ten years before Stuart-Wortley, and knew 
something about it.111
Cowans’s outburst was highly uncharitable towards one of the pre-war 
British railway industry’s most respected figures. But it also demonstrated 
the second reason why Geddes was loath to dispense with Stuart-Wortley’s 
107 Fay, The War Office at War, p. 167.
108 J. M. McEwen, ‘Northcliffe and Lloyd George at war, 1914–1918’, Hist. Jour., xxiv 
(1981), 651–72, at p. 657.
109 ‘The army behind the army’, The Times, 7 Aug. 1916, p. 7.
110 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/2/16/3, Stamfordham to Lloyd George, 5 Oct. 1916.
111 Fay, The War Office at War, p. 26.
230
Civilian Specialists at War: Britain’s Transport Experts and the First World War
services straight away. Put simply, the latter’s experience and understanding 
of his role made him temporarily indispensable. The process of replacing 
him threatened the directorate’s efficiency, and had to be handled carefully. 
As Fay himself acknowledged after shadowing Stuart-Wortley for a week 
before he took over, nobody could have ‘run the show’ as well as the 
outgoing DOM had to that point.112
Finally, Geddes was more interested in the creation of efficient, functional 
departments than the settling of any personal scores. Stuart-Wortley was 
not removed because of the animosity between him and Geddes, but as 
a result of a decision made by Lloyd George’s replacement as secretary of 
state for war. Had the organizational fudge created to accommodate Stuart-
Wortley’s desire not to serve under Geddes worked then it would doubtless 
have remained in place for the remainder of the war. However, Lord Derby 
was convinced that the pseudo-subordination had not been a success. He 
announced to Haig that Geddes recognized how Stuart-Wortley ‘had played 
the game … and nobody could have behaved better’, but the separation 
of the directorate of movements had ‘prevented things going smoothly’.113 
Stuart-Wortley’s sustained refusal to serve under Geddes saw him replaced 
as DOM by Sir Sam Fay in early January 1917. Following an unsuccessful 
stint on the western front, where he served briefly in command of a brigade 
and even more briefly as a divisional commander, Stuart-Wortley ended the 
war as deputy QMG in Mesopotamia.
Alongside friction in London, Geddes’s appointment as DGT and the 
corresponding restructure of the BEF’s organization generated passionate 
opposition in France. Sir Ronald Maxwell, Haig’s QMG, failed to reach 
agreement on the relationship between his department and Geddes’s new 
directorate, and threatened to resign if the new organization was ‘forced’ 
on him.114 On 30 October 1916 Haig made a personal intervention in an 
attempt both to assuage Maxwell’s fears that Geddes had been sent to France 
by Lloyd George to replace him and to establish a ‘workable scheme … 
suitable to the personalities who had to work it’. The commander-in-chief 
held a conference with his senior staff officers, which included Maxwell and 
Geddes at separate times, ‘in order to try and ascertain what [the QMG’s] 
objections to the scheme really were’. To Haig it was soon evident ‘that 
there was [sic] no solid grounds for disagreement’ between the two men, 
and the chief of the general staff sketched out the boundaries between 
the QMG’s and DGT’s responsibilities that evening. Haig’s support for 
112 Fay, The War Office at War, pp. 26–8.
113 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/109, Derby to Haig, 27 Dec. 1916.
114 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/108, diary entry, 30 Oct. 1916. Unless otherwise stated, all 
quotations in this passage are taken from this source.
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Geddes’s position, alongside his affirmation that the civilian had not been 
imposed upon the BEF by Lloyd George, were sufficient to convince 
Maxwell to withdraw his resignation. In addition, he ‘said that he would 
tell his Directors to stop their criticism’ of Geddes’s appointment as DGT. 
That such an action was required illustrates the depth of military hostility 
towards the British war effort’s new direction in the winter of 1916–17.
However, the existence of military apprehension with regards to the 
structural and personnel changes within the BEF and the War Office 
should not be taken as evidence of a concerted attempt to assert civilian 
dominance over the army. Geddes, with the full support of both Haig and 
Lloyd George, sought to merge the talents of Britain’s transport experts with 
the bespoke knowledge acquired by soldiers through two years’ practical 
experience of industrial war. His correspondence on the subject of Colonel 
M. C. Rowland, whose name was forwarded to Geddes for consideration 
in December 1916, illustrates the qualities he demanded from candidates 
for employment in the directorate-general of transportation. Upon the 
document outlining Rowland’s skills and aptitudes, Geddes underlined the 
following: control of mechanical transport, rail and sea transport; record 
work; and recruiting.115 Where professional soldiers had demonstrated their 
possession of such qualities they were retained. Where they fell short of 
the competencies necessary to discharge their duties – as in the case of 
the DRT, Brigadier-General John Twiss – they were swiftly removed. In 
November 1916 Geddes complained to Haig that Twiss had failed to pursue 
orders that had been placed for the railway equipment necessary to prepare 
the BEF for its intended offensive operations in early 1917. Furthermore, 
the DRT had relied upon ‘one of Geddes’s men’ to identify the correct 
estimates for the force’s requirements in terms of locomotives and miles of 
track. Twiss, Haig recorded, ought to either have argued against Geddes’s 
projections or resigned. He had done neither, nor demonstrated sufficient 
mastery of the details of his brief to retain the confidence of his superiors.116
With two entirely new departments to populate and the majority of 
the army’s most skilled administrators already employed either at home or 
abroad, Britain’s transport companies were the most logical source of talent 
for Geddes to exploit in 1916–17. Suitably skilled civilians were identified, 
appointed and applied to the challenges of wartime transportation at both 
senior executive and junior management levels following his appointments 
as DGT and DGMR. Approximately one half of the technical officers 
115 TNA, ADM 116/1805, Sir Eric Geddes – private correspondence, Colonel M. C. 
Rowland: QMG: Union Defence Forces. statement of colonial service, 24 Dec. 1916.
116 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/109, diary entry, 9 Nov. 1916.
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under the DGT’s control ‘were furnished by the British railway companies 
or on recommendation of the Railway Executive Committee, and the other 
half were men from overseas employed on Colonial or foreign railways who 
offered their services’.117 Brigadier-General Geoffry Harrisson, who oversaw 
light railway operations from February 1918 onwards, exemplified the latter. 
Harrisson served with the Royal Engineers in South Africa between 1901 
and 1902, but had abandoned a civil engineering post with the LNWR 
to work in Argentina before the war. From 1907 onwards he had worked 
for the Argentine North-East Railway at Concordia, and the outbreak of 
the conflict occurred when he was building a railway in Brazil. Harrisson’s 
experience of railway construction and military discipline made him an 
obvious candidate for service within the upper echelons of the transport 
directorate.118
Yet expertise was required throughout the organization, not just at 
managerial levels of the command hierarchy. The large-scale transport 
challenges that confronted the BEF from 1917 onwards necessitated the 
enlistment of huge numbers of men with the practical skills to undertake 
and supervise varied construction and operation duties effectively. Where 
Geddes lacked personal familiarity with the requirements of a role, he 
followed the template provided by the Ministry of Munitions earlier in 
the war and employed men who possessed the requisite skills and contacts. 
When Henry Maybury, the chief engineer of the road board, was appointed 
director of roads in France he was provided with a free hand to recruit suitable 
officers for the technical work of road construction. Around 2,600 men 
were selected from lists that comprised both serving officers and civilians, 
while a further 400 men were offered temporary commissions as officers 
in the Labour Corps. Maybury used his peacetime position to convene 
conferences of the chief officials of the local road authorities immediately 
after his appointment, and raised a number of complete companies of 
250 men drawn from the same local area – a lines-of-communications-
equivalent of the front-line ‘Pals battalions’.119 Already by 1 December 1916 
Haig could record in his diary that 1,200 over-age men had been made 
available for road-related duties, and 1,800 ‘expert road men’ were in the 
process of being enlisted.120
117 ‘Organisation and work of the transportation directorate’, Railway Gazette: Special War 
Transportation Number, 21 Sept. 1920, pp. 14–20, at p. 18.
118 S. Damus, Who was Who in Argentine Railways, 1860–1960 (Ottawa, ON, 2008), pp. 
236–7  <http://www.diaagency.ca/railways/WWW_sample.pdf> [accessed 13 Nov. 2014].
119 ‘Organisation and work’, pp. 18–19; The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 
1914–19: the Organization and Expansion of the Corps, 1914–18 (Uckfield, 2006), p. 31.
120 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/109, diary entry, 1 Dec. 1916.
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The commander-in-chief ’s diary entry that day also emphasized the scale 
of the railway recruitment process that took place after the creation of the 
directorate-general of transportation. Geddes had secured 12,000 railwaymen 
from the British railways ‘to improve the BEF’s capacity on the mainline 
railways’ ahead of the 1917 campaigning season.121 The wartime career of 
Company Sergeant Major L. W. Conibear provides just one example of the 
skills sets that ordinary railway servants contributed to the BEF’s transport 
services in the second half of the war. An employee of the Great Western 
Railway at Bristol, Conibear joined the ROD in January 1917 and was in France 
by 4 February. Over the next five months he undertook a range of duties on 
board trains, including those of brakesman, guardsman and signalman, and 
was employed on clerical tasks such as organizing traffic and maintaining the 
orderly room. By July 1917, just six months after he had enlisted in the army, 
Conibear took over responsibility for all the administrative work in the Fifth 
Army’s light railways department. He dealt with
all personnel questions affecting eight Light Railway Operating Companies 
(over 2,000 men), leave, sickness, promotions, casualties, examinations and 
general routine. Traffic policy, new construction, signalling arrangements, pay, 
accounts … numerous telephonic and telegraphic enquiries in the absence of 
the Superintendent of the Line. [Collating] statistics appertaining to the general 
working of light railways as required by the Director of Light Railways.122
Conibear occupied this role until, following the dislocation and confusion 
caused by the German spring offensive in March 1918, his versatility proved 
invaluable to the BEF in the conflict’s final months. After a period of 
‘considerable roaming’ when the Fifth Army disintegrated, Conibear was 
placed in charge of sixty men attached to the Canadian Railway Troops 
and tasked with broad gauge reconstruction. He was responsible for the 
building of lines until the Fifth Army was reconstituted at the end of June, 
when he took on the job of central traffic controller. For the remainder of 
the war Conibear oversaw the ‘movement of all power, wagons and traffic’ 
in the Fifth Army, under the direction of the superintendent of the line.123
Conclusion
‘Warfare’, Haig wrote to Geddes in September 1916, ‘consists of men, 
munitions and movement. We have got the men and the munitions, 
121 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/109, diary entry, 1 Dec. 1916p
122 BLSC, Liddle collection, papers of Major L. W. Conibear, LIDDLE/WW1/GS0346, 
particulars of service with the colours, 23 July 1917.
123 BLSC, Conibear papers, LIDDLE/WW1/GS0346, particulars of service.
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but we seem to have forgotten the movement’.124 The BEF had increased 
tenfold from the small, professional force that had left Southampton in the 
summer of 1914, while the firepower amassed behind the front line dwarfed 
that collected together in any previous British conflict. The quantity 
of shells, supplies and myriad stores consumed by the BEF in 1916 were 
insufficient to overcome the German resistance on the Somme. However, 
they were sufficient to illuminate the profound weaknesses in the transport 
infrastructure upon which any allied advance depended. As one corps’ 
chief engineer (the future DGT, Major-General Sir Sydney Crookshank) 
admitted after the war, ‘on the Somme the British Army was practically 
immobile’.125 Had Haig’s much desired break through occurred, the BEF 
was in no position to take advantage for much of the battle.
The army’s largest military engagement in history to that point emphasized 
the need for a holistic examination of the BEF’s road, rail and waterborne 
resources. Sir Eric Geddes undertook that investigation, and the character 
of the British war effort for the remainder of the war was shaped by his 
response to the unfolding crisis in Picardy. He argued for the centralization 
of transport policy on the western front, and accepted responsibility for the 
creation, population and direction of entirely new organizations in France 
and London. Upon his appointment as DGT and DGMR, the civilian 
railway expert obtained ‘a position of most unusual authority and power’. 
The concentration of such remarkable control in the hands of a non-
military actor engendered jealousy from professional soldiers on both sides 
of the Channel, emotions that coloured post-war interpretations of what 
took place after Geddes’s transportation mission had been completed. As 
the Royal Engineers’ history of the war observed, ‘no QMG or Brigadier-
General of Railways in France would ever have been allowed the power and 
the resources’ showered upon Geddes in the autumn of 1916.126
Auckland Geddes provided a retort on his brother’s behalf. He asserted 
that ‘until experts, with experience of the transport problems – both rail 
and road – of crowded industrial England, were on the spot in charge of 
supply movement, fully adequate provision for the fighting men had proved 
impossible’.127 This conclusion misrepresents the civil–military dynamic 
within the transport directorates created by his brother in France and 
London. From the very outset the directorate-generals of military railways 
124 Haig to Geddes, quoted in W. J. K. Davies, Light Railways of the First World War: a 
History of Tactical Rail Communications on the British Fronts, 1914–18 (Newton Abbot, 1967), 
p. 27.
125 Crookshank, ‘Transportation with the B.E.F.’, p. 194.
126 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 614.
127 Geddes, The Forging of a Family, p. 238.
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and transportation were conceived and staffed in a way that took advantage 
of both military and civilian transport expertise. Geddes’s recognition of 
the importance of technical and administrative experience was as manifest 
in his retention of talented soldiers like Collard and Mance as it was in 
his appointment of civilian railway managers such as Granet and Fay to 
responsible positions in the War Office.
The successful integration of civilian and military elements owed 
much to Haig’s unequivocal support for Geddes. The motivations behind 
the commander-in-chief ’s backing of the civilian were twofold. First, 
as Keith Grieves identified, Geddes’s employment symbolized Haig’s 
acknowledgement of the ‘forgotten interrelationship of strategy and 
transport’ on the western front.128 Second, Geddes’s appointment was viewed 
as an opportunity for the BEF’s senior field commander to influence the 
higher direction of the war. As Haig recorded in his diary after a conference 
with Lloyd George on the subject of light railway materials:
LG promised to help me to the utmost of his power. The total cost will be 
under three million pounds, not much in comparison with our other expenses. 
The difficulty of provision is due to the present lack of steel, and in obtaining 
the material by next March. It is interesting to note how I have been striving 
to get a L[ight] R[ailway] organization ever since January 1915 when the First 
Army was formed. But it requires a civilian railway expert … to come on the 
scene and make a report to convince our government and War Office that such 
an organization is necessary.129
Haig’s comment carries more than a hint of post-war observations about 
the government’s willingness to act upon the advice of businessmen rather 
than soldiers. It also demonstrates his recognition that a war for human and 
material resources took place within the British war effort as well as between 
the belligerents on either side of no man’s land. And for the remainder 
of the conflict, a union of military and industrial experience provided the 
means and methods by which the British army employed those resources to 
prosecute warfare on a truly industrial scale.
128 Grieves, ‘The transportation mission’, p. 67.
129 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/108, diary entry, 12 Sept. 1916.
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7. ‘By similar methods as adopted by the English 
railway companies’: materials and working practices 
on the western front, 1916–18
Prior to wielding the spending ‘axe’ that bore his name in the early 1920s, Sir 
Eric Geddes had gained a reputation for being an ‘improvident spender’ of 
public money.1 His approach was contrasted to the policies hitherto pursued 
in the War Office by Brigadier-General Richard Montagu Stuart-Wortley just 
a week after the directorate-general of military railways had been established. 
In a letter to Henry Wilson, the DOM emphasized that the civilianization of 
the War Office had been accompanied by pledges of financial support that had 
never been extended to the soldiers. Departments that had previously been 
staffed by small groups of officers were ‘largely increased’ and the incumbent 
departmental heads promoted to higher grades to reflect their expanding 
responsibilities. ‘The way they waste money’, Stuart-Wortley observed, 
‘is awful’.2 Drawing upon his experiences of GHQ when the directorate-
general of transportation was created, Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds 
took much the same line after the war. In the official history’s volume on 
transportation, he recorded that Geddes employed a ‘very large staff of 
civilian engineers and officials’ at the directorate’s headquarters. Edmonds’s 
observation was followed immediately by an unattributed quotation, which 
claimed that ‘“It has been said that at the outset the D.G.T. employed double 
the staff really needed for the work to be done, but that he did so in order 
to obtain 30 per cent increased output”, and in this he was successful’.3 Even 
soldiers with whom Geddes had fostered a strong working relationship 
before and during the conflict, such as Henry Mance, acknowledged that 
the civilians had operated with a liberty that had not been extended to the 
professional soldier. In the discussion that followed a lecture delivered at the 
Royal United Services Institution in 1921, Mance described how Sir Henry 
1 P. K. Cline, ‘Eric Geddes and the “experiment” with businessmen in government, 1915–
22’, in Essays in Anti-Labour History, ed. K. D. Brown (London, 1974), pp. 74–104, at pp. 
80, 99.
2 IWM, Wilson papers, HHW 2/84/68, Stuart-Wortley to Wilson, 25 Oct. 1916.
3 Edmonds’s introduction in A. M. Henniker, History of the Great War: Transportation on 
the Western Front, 1914–1918 (London, 1937), p. xiv.
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Maybury had ‘ransacked England and [taken] away all the skilled men and 
rollers and everything else connected with the roads and quarries that he 
could lay his hands on’ upon becoming the BEF’s director of roads.4
That a vast expansion in the size and capacity of the BEF’s transportation 
services occurred in the second half of the war is beyond doubt. Prior to 
the establishment of the directorate-general of transportation, the existing 
railway and IWT units in France comprised 17,500 men of all ranks. 
Geddes’s initial estimate of the personnel required to man his new light 
railways organization alone numbered 25,000, and by 1 January 1917 the 
DGT had his sights set on the deployment of 66,000 men (including those 
already in France) on transport duties behind the western front. Fresh 
proposals, which increased the paper strength of the directorate-general by 
a further 42 per cent, had been submitted to the War Office for sanction 
within four months.5
The composition of the human and material resources ‘ransacked’ from 
Britain and the empire, and the methods by which they were applied to 
the challenges of industrial warfare, are the subjects of this chapter. The 
acquisition of the resources necessary to increase the BEF’s transport 
capacity from 1917 onwards owed much to Geddes’s dual position, his 
contacts within the British government and the railway industry, and an 
acknowledgement among French and British leaders of the inapplicability 
of the pre-war arrangements made between the coalition partners. The 
transportation crisis of 1916–17 provided the catalyst for manpower and 
materials provided by Britain to become a far more integral component of 
the infrastructure and services operated in France than had been the case 
earlier in the war. The effective use of those resources drew upon the methods 
and expertise latent within the operations of an industrial economy. The 
provision of men and materials in quantities far above what had been made 
available to the military previously may have bred a resentment among 
officers that pervaded the post-war analysis of Britain’s war effort. However, 
it also laid the foundations for the material-intensive warfare that helped 
bring the conflict to a successful conclusion.
The provision of British resources on the western front
The directorate-general of transportation acquired responsibility for the 
coordination of all aspects of the BEF’s transport infrastructure over a vast 
4 Quoted in M. G. Taylor, ‘Land transportation in the late war’, Royal United Services 
Institution. Journal, lxvi (1921), 699–722, at p. 715.
5 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 222. The directorate-general’s ultimate strength 
of 94,000 men was not achieved before the armistice.
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area. Geddes took over the roads, railways and waterways from the Channel 
ports up to a point – known as the DGT line – that was ‘roughly defined as 
the rear of the area under fire of the enemy’s medium artillery’, and beyond 
which authority devolved upon the armies and corps occupying the space.6 
The impact of industrial warfare upon the extant communications in 
France was stark on both sides of the DGT line in 1916. The munitions that 
Britain’s transport experts had helped to produce in time for the battle of 
the Somme created a ‘destroyed zone’ of some three to six miles, which had 
to be traversed by the troops responsible for supplying their colleagues in 
the attack.7 As the offensive ground on into autumn, the destructive power 
of the artillery was augmented by the deteriorating weather to produce a 
quagmire on the roads either side of the front line. Already by 5 October 
1916, Haig recorded that the road between Montauban-de-Picardie and 
Guillemont had been closed ‘owing to its breaking up … The rain of the 
last few days has been very hard on the roads’.8 A month later the ‘soft 
state of the roads’ made it impossible for lorries to carry the 1,400-pound 
shells fired by the 15-inch howitzers, leading Haig to observe that the BEF 
was ‘fighting under the same conditions as in October 1914, i.e., with rifle 
and machine-gun only, because bombs and mortar ammunition cannot be 
carried forward as the roads are so bad’.9
Matters were no better on the roads maintained by the French army 
during the battle. During the entire Somme campaign over two million men 
and 371,000 tons of goods passed along the Amiens–Proyart road through 
Villers-Bretonneux on their way to the front. The road was essential to the 
supply of the French Sixth and Tenth armies in the vicinity of the Somme, 
and on 30 September alone it carried 38,000 men and 3,700 tons of material 
eastbound – twice as much as had passed along the fabled voie sacrée that 
sustained the defenders of Verdun. As the Somme drew to an inconclusive 
end, the smaller roads that branched off the Amiens–Proyart road lay 
broken up by the constant pounding of the ceaseless traffic. As winter set in 
both the French and British lacked the manpower and resources necessary 
to maintain all but the major traffic arteries behind their armies.10 By 
November 1916 the Reserve Army’s chief engineer admitted to Geddes that 
‘with three successive wet days motor lorry traffic must be discontinued’.11
6 History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, ed. H. L. Pritchard (11 vols., Chatham, 1952), v. 
616.
7 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916, p. 5.
8 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/108, diary entry, 5 Oct. 1916.
9 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/109, diary entries, 7 and 8 Nov. 1916.
10 W. Philpott, Bloody Victory: the Sacrifice on the Somme (London, 2009), pp. 389–90.
11 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/102, memorandum by Geddes, p. 21.
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Following his investigations in the summer, Geddes doubted the BEF’s 
ability to successfully maintain the road network during active operations, 
regardless of the weather. He told Lloyd George that the labour detailed to 
road repairs was inefficiently handled and the equipment available to the 
engineers was ‘not the most suitable’ for the task.12 Maybury, as director 
of roads, was charged with rectifying these deficiencies. As he ‘ransacked’ 
England of vast quantities of road plant following his appointment (see 
Table 7.1), he became responsible for the upkeep of ‘all roads of any military 
importance on the lines of communication’.13 Progress was swift. By the 
end of April 1917 Haig felt assured enough by Maybury’s efforts to record 
in his diary that the ‘10,000 workmen, road engineers, quarry men’ and 
modern equipment procured by the director of roads meant he ‘need have 
no further anxiety as regards roads on the western front’.14
Maybury’s accumulation of manpower and equipment was a response 
to the BEF’s progressive increase in responsibilities for road maintenance 
as the war continued. As with the pre-war agreement regarding the 
provision of stevedores to unload British vessels at the ports, the Franco-
British arrangements for road maintenance collapsed under the pressures of 
12 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916, p. 5.
13 ‘Railways and roads on the western front’, Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation 
Number, 21 Sept. 1920, pp. 21–9, at p. 26.
14 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/112, diary entry, 28 Apr. 1917.
Table 7.1. Principal road plant available in France, 1916–17.
Item of equipment
Number in France
Percentage increase
1916 1917
Steam rollers 85 170 100.00
Steam wagons 11 395 3490.91
Petrol rollers — 35 —
Sweeping machines 57 175 207.02
Petrol lorries — 235 —
Tarring machines — 54 —
Water carts 72 132 83.33
Dump carts 91 930 921.98
Mud tumbler carts 16 132 725.00
Source: ‘Railways and roads on the western front’, Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation 
Number, 21 Sept. 1920, p. 27. 
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industrial warfare. Throughout 1917 Maybury’s directorate was immersed 
in a vast programme of road-building and upkeep that saw it construct, 
reconstruct or resurface almost thirteen million square yards of ‘cours’ by 
the end of the year – across a network that grew to comprise 3,267 miles 
of French roads.15 However, despite the use of 2,340,000 tons of road stone 
in 1917 alone, ‘demands for additional roads continue[d] to be received’ at 
GHQ over the winter of 1917–18 as the BEF sought to solidify its position 
ahead of an anticipated German offensive in the spring. In January 1918 Haig 
was forced to issue a memorandum to his armies, warning that ‘the available 
road stone is barely sufficient to maintain existing roads, and the present 
output cannot be increased to any considerable extent’.16 GHQ’s solution to 
the challenges of the war’s final winter will be discussed further in chapter 
nine, but it is striking at this point to highlight that – just as Geddes had 
noted in September 1916 – limited quantities of crucial resources continued 
to constrain the development of the BEF’s transport infrastructure in early 
1918.
Attempts to relieve the pressure on the road network by the use of 
other means of transport were at an immature stage when Geddes had 
undertaken his mission to France. The DGT believed that a combination 
of ‘intelligent organization, labour saving devices, and light railway’ were 
required to economize labour on the road network and increase the speed 
with which the supply services maintained links to the troops on the far 
side of the ‘destroyed zone’. He wrote to Lloyd George that ‘plant must be 
secured from this country and the organization [to operate light railways] 
has to be created. We have little enough time to do it if it is to be ready 
by the spring and I am of the opinion that the matter should be taken in 
hand promptly and efficiently with executive authority, without one day’s 
delay’.17 Geddes was not the first man to recognize the potential value of 
light railways to the BEF. A policy for the operation of the isolated and 
disconnected systems behind the front line was first advanced in December 
1915 by the QMG, Sir Ronald Maxwell, and a month later Haig mused in 
his diary that light railways could be used to ‘save the roads’ from excess 
wear over the winter months.18 As British units had taken over portions of 
the front line from French troops over the spring of 1916 the ‘usefulness’ 
of the light railway systems constructed by the French ‘quickly became 
15 TNA, WO 107/296, report of British armies, p. 26.
16 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 344.
17 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916, pp. 
5–6.
18 TNA, WO 107/69, work of the QMG’s branch, p. 20; NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/104, 
diary entry, 4 Jan. 1916.
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apparent’.19 In August Haig decided to ‘inaugurate a complete system of 
light railways, and combine the systems already in existence under definite 
policy and control’.20 However, discussions with individual armies over the 
form that policy should take led nowhere before Geddes arrived on the 
western front as DGT.
A lack of strong central coordination of the discussions from GHQ – 
Haig placed the DRT, Brigadier-General John Twiss, in charge – and the fact 
that the backdrop of the Somme overshadowed the light railways question 
led to stagnation. For individual army commanders the consideration of 
light railways was yet another intrusion upon the day-to-day business of 
running their armies. A month after he had received Haig’s instructions, 
Twiss was unable to report any progress on the development of a universal 
policy for the employment of light railways on the western front.21 Time, as 
both Geddes and the deputy QMG recognized, was not on the BEF’s side. 
It was ‘necessary’, Colonel Woodroffe asserted, ‘to apply all our efforts to 
developing a 60-centimetre system at the greatest possible speed in order 
to ensure that as much of the front area as possible is served by this means 
before the winter sets in’.22
Thanks to his involvement in the procurement of materials and the 
establishment of the directorate that oversaw its operations, the light 
railway network that emerged on the western front has come to represent 
Geddes’s work as DGT. After both hearing Haig’s views on the subject 
and inspecting the French light railways, the civilian recommended ‘the 
purchase of a considerable mileage of track, viz. 1,000 miles; some 800 
steam locomotives, 200 electric tractors, and some 3,000 wagons’. He 
stressed that ‘no further time should be lost’ in the procurement of the 
materials, and the equipment had been ordered even before he accepted the 
post of DGT.23 However, light railway locomotives and tractors had a long 
lead time – which had combined with the lack of priority afforded to the 
medium by the BEF to retard the development of a coherent, widespread 
light railway policy in France. The records of Robert Hudson (a light 
railway equipment supplier in Leeds) from October 1914 to May 1916 show 
that nine of the eighteen engines built by the firm during the first half of 
the war were despatched to Mesopotamia, while the War Office discovered 
that other British manufacturers were fulfilling orders for French artillery 
19 W. J. K. Davies, Light Railways of the First World War: a History of Tactical Rail 
Communications on the British Fronts, 1914–18 (Newton Abbot, 1967), p. 25.
20 TNA, WO 107/69, work of the QMG’s branch, p. 20.
21 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916, p. 3.
22 IWM, Woodroffe papers, 3/38/1/2, 60 cm railways, 9 Sept. 1916.
23 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916, p. 3.
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railways. In September 1915 an indent for ten locomotives and 200 wagons 
had been sent home from GHQ, for equipment that was expected to form 
a useful reserve but not considered urgent – an order based on the indent 
was not placed until January 1916. Two months later the original order was 
supplemented by a request for fifty more locomotives, 1,200 wagons and fifty 
miles of track, and the War Office decreed that British army orders should 
take precedence over any other orders placed with British manufacturers. 
However, deliveries of the materials requested before Geddes arrived in 
France were not completed until June 1917.24 Consequently, when Sapper 
W. J. Hill, in peacetime an employee of the LNWR, arrived at Marœuil 
with the 19th Light Railway Operating Company early in 1917 he and his 
comrades found ‘no motive power of any description, and only a few bogie 
wagons of French design’.25
Units like Hill’s, formed to oversee the operation and maintenance of 
the network, witnessed a remarkable growth in motive power, carrying 
capacity and track mileage over the course of the year. Geddes’s decision to 
order 1,000 miles of track and abundant quantities of locomotives, tractors 
and rolling stock in September 1916 – coupled with his ability to ensure 
sufficient attention was afforded to their provision – permitted the rapid 
expansion of the BEF’s light railways organization. Before Geddes’s arrival 
the BEF possessed just eighty miles of operable light railways. By April 1917 
this had risen to over 200 miles, and before the end of 1917 the British had 
constructed over 1,000 miles of light railway track behind the front (see 
Table 7.2). Before the end of 1917, Hill reflected, the depot at Fosseux where 
he was employed on wagon repairs resembled ‘an English railway yard … 
24 Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 68–9; Davies, Light Railways of the First World 
War, pp. 29–30.
25 BLSC, Liddle collection, papers of Sapper W. J. Hill, LIDDLE/WW1/GS0767, 
recollections of France and the LRs during the Great War, 1914–1919, p. 10.
Table 7.2. Light railway construction in France and Flanders, 1917–18.
Quarter-year period Miles constructed, 1917 Miles constructed, 1918
January to March 135 214
April to June 364 202
July to September 328 297
October to December 195 73
Total 1,022 786
Source: History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, ed. H. L. Pritchard (11 vols., Chatham, 1952), 
v. 665.
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on, of course, a small scale’.26 The yard contained British-built locomotive 
and wagon sheds for the repair and maintenance of largely British-supplied 
equipment, and the drivers were detailed for duty through a time office run 
‘by similar methods as adopted by the English railway companies’.27
Without light railways the bombardments of unprecedented ferocity 
that characterized the BEF’s offensive operations in 1917 could not have 
been sustained at anything like the same intensity for the same duration. In 
September ‘no less than 7,000 tons of ammunition were being carried daily’ 
by light railways in support of the operations around Ypres,28 on a network 
that was almost exclusively conceived, constructed and operated by Britain’s 
transport experts. The BEF’s light railways relied upon skills developed 
on imperial and global engineering projects alongside working methods 
pioneered on some of the nation’s largest railways. However, in terms of 
one of its principal duties – that of providing relief to the overburdened 
French road network – the light railway organization created in 1917 was a 
failure.29 In fact, despite the vast increase in the tonnage conveyed by light 
railways as the year unfolded (see Figure 7.1), demands for stone to repair 
and construct roads continued to grow. In January 1917 General Hubert 
Gough’s Fifth Army received 405 lorry-loads of road stone. By July the same 
army required 1,000 lorry-loads, even though its light railways carried an 
average of 60,000 tons of stone (the equivalent of 1,350 lorries) each week.30 
Light railways, rather than removing the need for motorized transport 
entirely, merely shifted the traffic to new locations that – particularly in the 
form of marshalling yards and access roads – created their own considerable 
demands for new road-building. As will be seen, over the winter of 1917–
18 this development had significant implications for BEF’s transportation 
policies beyond the railhead.
Behind the railhead, British resources also became increasingly important 
in the second half of the war. Geddes’s arrival coincided with the final 
abandonment of the pre-war Franco-British arrangements regarding the 
BEF’s supply needs on the French main line railways. As the BEF had 
expanded in 1915 and 1916 the French authorities had ‘urged repeatedly 
that more rolling stock should be imported’ from Britain to help carry the 
growing volume of British traffic,31 and the twin pressures of Verdun and 
26 BLSC, Hill papers, LIDDLE/WW1/GS0767, recollections of France, p. 22.
27 BLSC, Hill papers, LIDDLE/WW1/GS0767, recollections of France, pp. 32–3.
28 Davies, Light Railways of the First World War, p. 72.
29 TNA, WO 158/852, director general of transport: history of light railways, 1916–1918, p. 
3.
30 Davies, Light Railways of the First World War, p. 68.
31 Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 170–1, 245. The first request for support from 
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the Somme encouraged further modifications of British responsibilities 
on the western front. As early as 2 March 1916 Maxwell wrote to Sir 
John Cowans to advise his counterpart at the War Office that broad-
gauge rolling stock ‘in large quantities [was] urgently required in France’. 
Alongside the immediate placing of further large orders in Canada and 
the United States, the BEF’s hosts ‘demanded wagons from England’ to 
ease the pressure on French resources.32 By April orders for 13,000 wagons 
had been placed, but inter-allied conferences over the summer failed to 
reach a mutually acceptable conclusion as to the quantity of rolling stock 
required from British sources to fulfil the coalition’s traffic requirements. 
In early October 1916 General Joffre submitted a formal request to GHQ 
for ‘a large measure of assistance’ in the maintenance and improvement of 
the Chemins de Fer du Nord.33 The pre-war agreement, which had been 
the French, made in March 1915, asked the British to supply between 2,000 and 3,000 
wagons towards the projected ultimate requirements for the BEF’s traffic of between 5,000 
and 6,000 wagons.
32 TNA, WO 107/15, IGC, general correspondence, Maxwell to Cowans, 2 March 1916.
33 Unless otherwise stated, all quotations in this passage are taken from Henniker, History 
Figure 7.1. Route miles operated and average tonnage conveyed per 
week by the British Expeditionary Force’s light railways, 1917–18.
Source: TNA, WO 158/852, director general of transport: history of light railways, 1916–1918, 
p. 19.
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tweaked and adapted in response to the changing conditions of the war, 
was ‘considered at an end’ by both armies following the receipt of Joffre’s 
letter. Consequently, in addition to the various materials and labour-saving 
devices that Geddes had identified as crucial to the efficient operation of 
the BEF’s transport services, the DGT also inherited responsibility for the 
provision of locomotives, rolling stock and personnel for the operation of 
trains on the French main lines. Furthermore, as ‘it soon transpired that the 
railway situation [in France] was worse than the British had understood it 
to be’, the French requested that the rolling stock delivery schedule agreed 
over the spring and summer of 1916 be expedited to sustain the network 
over the winter months.
The periodic nature of the French requests for British material support 
before October 1916 illustrate both the gradual erosion of the pre-war 
agreement in the wake of France’s hammering in the first half of the 
war and the creeping increase in Britain’s involvement in the transport 
infrastructure on the western front. The French had lost over 43,000 units 
of rolling stock during the initial German invasion – almost 12 per cent of 
the pre-war number of wagons in use on the French railways – while the 
withdrawal of railwaymen to replace losses in combat units had hindered 
the construction of replacements and maintenance of the remaining stock.34 
By November 1915 the British ambassador in Paris reported that a further 
9,000 wagons were unavailable for service due to the absence of sufficient 
labour to affect the necessary repairs.35 After the battles of Verdun and the 
Somme had taken a further toll on France’s human and material resources, 
the railway network ‘had fallen into very bad condition’.36 As with light 
railway equipment, orders placed for new standard gauge rolling stock had 
a long lead time; the first wagons from the orders placed in March 1915 
had taken thirteen months to arrive on the western front.37 Faced with an 
impending crisis over the winter of 1916–17, Geddes recognized that the 
transport infrastructure could not withstand a prolonged delay while new 
orders were placed with – and fulfilled by – companies in Britain and North 
America whose productive capacity was already full. In early 1915 the ROD 
had commenced work in France with just seven engines loaned from the 
of the Great War, pp. 246–7.
34 Les armées françaises dans la grande guerre: la direction de l’arrière (Paris, 1937), pp. 29–
30; J. H. F. Le Hénaff and H. Bornecque, Les chemins de fer français et la guerre (Paris, 1922), 
pp. 173–4.
35 E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War: Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and 
Achievements (2 vols., London, 1921), ii. 643.
36 TNA, WO 107/69, work of the QMG’s branch, p. 2.
37 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 598.
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SECR and ‘five or six machines which [Cecil Paget] had begged, borrowed 
or stolen’ from the Midland Railway.38 Eighteen months later the British 
railways were called upon to provide a far more substantial contribution to 
the BEF’s material requirements.
To facilitate the delivery of railway equipment Geddes called upon his 
most prominent military and industrial contacts. On 19 November 1916 
Sir Douglas Haig wrote to Sir Herbert Walker, the acting chairman of 
the REC, to request ‘very large supplies of railway material, rolling stock, 
locomotives and personnel’ from the British railways. Haig acknowledged 
the implications for the home railways of such an appeal, but felt that his 
demands could be 
more sympathetically met, and my needs more thoroughly appreciated, if you 
and the railway General Managers who form the Railway Executive Committee 
have had an opportunity of seeing for yourselves the difficulties which my 
Transportation Departments have to overcome. […] I feel sure that when you 
have seen the conditions for yourselves, and have heard from Sir Eric Geddes, 
who will explain the situation to you when you are out here, of the difficulties 
which confront us you will realise that no effort, sacrifice, or inconvenience is 
too great to enable the Armies under my Command to be adequately equipped 
with transportation facilities.39
Sir Guy Granet supplemented Haig’s statement at a REC meeting on 28 
November, where he impressed upon his colleagues the magnitude of 
the situation faced by the BEF. However, as he was unable to furnish the 
committee with details of the precise nature of the aid required in France,40 
a delegation of REC members crossed the Channel to explore the matter 
with the DGT. The party left London on Saturday 9 December, discussed 
Geddes’s estimates for the transport effort required to support the BEF’s 
planned offensives in 1917, and lunched with the commander-in-chief at 
GHQ prior to their return home.41 Over lunch, Haig took the opportunity 
38 TNA, WO 107/69, work of the QMG’s branch, p. 16; L. S. Simpson, ‘Railway operating 
in France’, Journal of the Institution of Locomotive Engineers, xii (1922), 697–728, at p. 699.
39 Haig to Walker, 19 Nov. 1916, quoted in Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 
652.
40 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/4/39, Butterworth to Geddes, 30 Nov. 1916.
41 A. J. Mullay, ‘Letter from the Somme: the Railway Executive Committee and the 
military in World War I’, BackTrack, xxii (2008), 220–3; Pratt, British Railways and the Great 
War, ii. 653–4. The delegation consisted of (general managers of their respective companies 
unless otherwise stated): John Aspinall, Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway; Sir Alexander 
Kaye Butterworth, North-Eastern Railway; Guy Calthrop, LNWR; Charles Dent, Great 
Northern Railway; Donald Matheson, Caledonian Railway; Henry Thornton, Great 
Eastern Railway; Sir Robert Turnbull, an LNWR director; Arthur Watson, superintendent 
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to reiterate ‘the very great importance of efficient railways in modern war 
and our need for locomotives, wagons, cranes and personnel’ to his guests. 
‘All agreed that they could help us and might do more for us than we had 
asked’, Haig recorded later in his diary, ‘the only thing required was an 
order from the government authorizing the railway companies to provide 
the material’.42
The combination of military and civilian expertise proved to be fruitful. 
Haig’s personal intervention, coupled with the support of Geddes and 
Granet, helped clear an impasse that had existed between the Ministry of 
Munitions and the REC since the summer. In June 1916 the War Office had 
notified the latter that the ROD could soon require ‘a considerable number of 
locomotives’ to be despatched from Britain for service on the continent. Yet 
at the same time the railway workshops’ focus on the production of warlike 
stores had reduced the output of locomotives in Britain, while the Ministry 
of Munitions was stressing the ‘vital importance’ of the companies being 
prepared to deal with increased volumes of traffic on the British railways. 
At a meeting between representatives of the ministry and the REC on 17 
August the government promised to obtain the raw materials necessary for 
the LNWR to construct seventy locomotives.43 However, by 11 November 
‘no tangible assistance whatever had been rendered to the companies’ to 
permit the supply of locomotives to the BEF. Following the receipt of Haig’s 
letter on 28 November the goods managers and superintendents of the line 
of Britain’s major railway companies took matters into their own hands. 
Rather than await an allocation of raw materials, they identified locations in 
Britain where services could be reduced to free up stock for service overseas, 
and by 1 December Geddes could report to Haig that the companies had 
agreed to send 350 locomotives, 20,000 wagons and 320,000 sleepers to the 
western front.44
Following the REC’s visit to France the export of British materials to the 
fighting fronts increased rapidly. Sixty-two locomotives from British sources 
were in traffic behind the western front by the end of 1916. A year later, 450 
locomotives lifted direct from British railways provided the majority of the 
total of 753 locomotives available to haul supplies for the BEF.45 By the end 
of the war the ROD possessed a fleet that was ‘representative of almost 
of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway; and Major Gilbert Szlumper, the REC’s secretary.
42 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/109, diary entry, 12 Dec. 1916.
43 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/69, Appendix D – Memorandum on transport 
facilities in the various theatres of war, 28 Oct. 1916, pp. 6–7.
44 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 643–46; NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/109, 
diary entry, 1 Dec. 1916.
45 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 621–2.
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every railway in England’, and of which over one-third had been received 
direct from service on the British railways.46 The supply capacities of the 
expeditionary forces further afield were also augmented by the receipt of 
British vehicles. The BSF had received nineteen locomotives from England 
by early 1918, and by March of that year the British advance in Egypt 
and Palestine was supplied by a pool of vehicles that included twenty-
six locomotives from the LSWR, twenty-five from the LNWR and three 
petrol engines from the Manning-Wardle Locomotive Company in Leeds.47 
According to The Times, the LSWR engines in Egypt operated ‘with loads 
as heavy as they would have hauled between Southampton Docks and Nine 
Elms’, and ran ‘without cessation night and day, week in, week out’.48
The British railways’ response to the army’s demands had a significant 
impact upon the domestic railways. The withdrawal of locomotives, over 
29,000 wagons and hundreds of miles of track engendered a series of 
measures designed to improve efficiency and reduce unnecessary travel in 
Britain as the material implications of industrial war became manifest in the 
second half of the war. Piecemeal actions that had been taken by individual 
railways before 1917 – such as the removal of dining cars, the slowing down 
of express services to conserve coal and the suspension of suburban services 
– were replaced by a comprehensive, nationwide effort to economize railway 
transport from 1 January 1917. Around 400 stations in Britain were closed, 
Sunday services were further reduced and fares were increased by 50 per 
cent to discourage non-essential journeys. In recognition of the pressures on 
precious raw materials the prime minister made a ‘personal appeal’ to the 
travelling public to ‘cut down unnecessary travelling’ in February, where he 
underlined that all the steel conserved by Britain’s railway passengers could 
be directed into shipbuilding to meet the German submarine menace.49 In 
the war’s final two years, much of the REC’s attentions were diverted into 
the question of reducing goods and passenger traffic not directly linked to 
the war effort.50
The import of railway equipment on a hitherto unprecedented scale 
after 1916 was mirrored by the improvement of transport facilities that took 
place at the BEF’s Channel ports. As the entry point to the western front 
46 TNA, WO 107/69, work of the QMG’s branch, p. 17; J. A. B. Hamilton, Britain’s 
Railways in World War I (London, 1947), p. 171.
47 ‘Railways and the Salonica campaign’, Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation 
Number, 21 Sept. 1920, pp. 110–18, at p. 117; ‘The Palestine campaign’, Railway Gazette: 
Special War Transportation Number, 21 Sept. 1920, pp. 119–28, at p. 126.
48 Quoted in Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, ii. 666.
49 ‘Premier’s appeal to the travelling public’, Railway Gazette, 9 Feb. 1917, p. 174.
50 On Britain’s railways during the First World War, see Hamilton, Britain’s Railways in 
World War I.
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for the majority of the BEF’s supplies, the effective operation of the ports 
was fundamental to the maintenance of fluidity in the force’s distribution 
network. Geddes’s initial enquiries ascertained that the ports had to deal 
with ‘roughly 190,000 tons per week’ to cover the BEF’s requirements, 
and needed additional space on the shore to deal with the disembarkation 
of personnel, animals and the usual accoutrements that accompanied 
divisional formations.51 On 14 September 1916 the IGC, Sir Frederick 
Clayton, had produced a statement that detailed how 198,000 tons per week 
could be handled by the ports. However, Clayton’s projections provided 
no contingency for unpredictable occurrences such as the irregular arrival 
of ships, the closure of the ports for naval reasons or even poor weather. 
‘Experience has shown’, Geddes wrote in November 1916, ‘that we ought to 
be able to deal with each week’s traffic in five days so as to provide a proper 
and safe margin, and in considering port capacity the average tonnage to be 
dealt with should not be more than 80 per cent of the maximum capacity’.52 
In Clayton’s statement only Boulogne had been allocated a tonnage that 
met Geddes’s criteria in its existing condition, while Dunkirk had been 
allocated a tonnage that exceeded the port’s maximum capacity by 43 per 
cent (see Table 7.3).
It was not until the nature of the war effort required to dislodge the 
German army from French soil had revealed itself, and Britain’s transport 
experts had taken a direct role in the organization necessary to sustain that 
effort, that the provision of equipment to boost the maximum capacity of 
the BEF’s ports substantially increased. Shortly after the establishment of 
the directorate-general of transportation, Geddes complained both that the 
directorate inherited ‘an insufficiency of shore gear, trays, skids, and other 
minor, but very essential equipment’ and that the cranes in situ at the ports 
appeared ‘to be somewhat below modern docks standards’.53 To meet the 
requirements of the docks programme finalized by Geddes in March 1917,54 
the BEF increased the number of onshore cranes available to discharge goods 
from arriving vessels from 121 to 314. Only seven of the additional units 
were provided by the French, the rest were obtained from British sources.55 
By December 1918 the BEF also possessed thirty-six floating cranes for light 
lifts, three large floating cranes operated by the Royal Navy, two floating 
51 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/69, Appendix D, p. 2. Geddes’s estimates from 
this period are reproduced in Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 187.
52 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/102, memorandum by Geddes, pp. 4–5.
53 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/102, memorandum by Geddes, pp. 7–8.
54 I. M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919 (London, 1998), p. 156.
55 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 236.
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electric power stations and six floating grain elevators.56 The introduction of 
new equipment contributed to the achievement of an average daily import 
figure during 1917 and 1918 of 25,000 deadweight tons per day. The docks 
directorate dealt with 4,178,000 tons of ammunition alone in the final two 
years of the war, providing the ingredients with which the BEF’s artillery 
commanders concocted the firepower mixtures unleashed upon the German 
lines in the pursuit of victory.57
However, the provision of modern equipment alone was not a panacea to 
the challenges of port operation during the First World War. As Commander 
Underwood noted in a report on the use of so-called labour-saving devices at 
Boulogne, mechanical contrivances were not always applicable to conditions 
on the Channel coast. Following an examination of the Bassin Loubet, he 
stated that the port was not well suited for the employment of an automatic 
discharge and stacking appliance for use on grain ships for three reasons. 
First, the Bassin Loubet was a ‘rather small dock’ in which to operate such a 
large piece of machinery. Second, the tidal and meteorological conditions at 
Boulogne militated against the use of a floating grain elevator. Underwood 
explained that ‘one of the disadvantages at this port for floating elevators is 
56 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 621.
57 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 664.
Table 7.3. Projected traffic allocations for the British 
Expeditionary Force’s Channel ports, November 1916.
Percentage that the tonnage allocated bears to the capacity of the port
With existing equipment With existing and additional equipment 
on order, November 1916
Dunkirk 143% 100%
Calais 100% 83%
Dieppe 100% 71%
Le Havre 100% 100%
Rouen 91% 87%
Boulogne 80% 80%
Le Treport 83% 83%
St Valery 100% 83%
Fecamp 125% 100%
Source: UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/102, memorandum by Sir Eric Geddes, 26 
November 1916, p. 5.
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the rise and fall of the tide, which at its maximum is 27 feet. The height of 
any floating elevators would have to be so great, that in the high winds of 
winter there would be danger of craft capsizing. The wind here at times is 
so great that the cranes have to stop working’. Finally, he concluded, ‘the 
length of time it would take to erect’ the appliance and ‘the inconvenience 
which would be caused during its erection’ would not be offset by the 
potential benefits of the equipment’s use.58
Underwood’s report demonstrates that the British army, even before 
Geddes’s arrival on the western front, considered the possibilities of 
mechanization behind the lines as well as at the front. The relative importance 
to the BEF’s combat methodology of innovations such as the tank, poison gas 
and sound-ranging equipment have been debated by historians throughout 
the post-war period. Discussions over the extent to which the First World 
War armies utilized these tools effectively has overshadowed considerations 
of the provision of adequate quantities of mundane, civilian technologies 
such as locomotives, wagons, steam rollers and cranes to service those 
armies’ demands. Geddes did not view such expansion as ‘extravagance’, 
but merely the logical corollary of the fact that the British were asked to 
take on a far larger share of the BEF’s transport burden from October 1916 
onwards. Without a sufficient transport infrastructure, founded upon the 
machinery that underpinned Europe’s industrial economies, the weapons 
of the industrial war could not have been transported across the continent 
in the quantities required to create the firestorm that took place between 
1914 and 1918. However, the provision of new equipment alone cannot 
explain the BEF’s increased ability to supply the material war that emerged 
on the western front. As Geddes himself acknowledged from the moment 
he arrived in France, alongside new tools the force’s fighting capabilities 
depended upon the efficiency with which those tools were utilized.59 Britain’s 
transport experts’ influence stretched beyond the provision of roads and 
rails to the organizational systems that sustained the conflict.
The application of business methods on the western front
During the summer of 1917 the BEF attained its peak strength of just 
over two million troops. From that moment until the conflict’s end the 
following autumn, the British contribution to the main European theatre 
of war gradually declined in numerical terms. That the BEF responded 
to this reduction in strength through the more effective deployment of 
58 TNA, WO 95/3970, IGC war diary, Underwood to Clayton, 12 Aug. 1916.
59 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916; 
IWM, Woodroffe papers, 3/38/1/2, notes and reports, 25 Aug. 1916.
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the available manpower, and a higher dependence upon the machines 
of war, has been central to the so-called learning curve theory of British 
military improvement after the nadir of 1 July 1916.60 Following the United 
States’ entry into the war in particular, Britain’s desire to win the war and 
the subsequent peace while incurring the lowest possible cost had to be 
reframed as a determination to secure victory before the costs became so 
great that Britain was unable to exert sufficient influence at the post-war 
bargaining table.61 To do so, the British government had to ensure that the 
nation’s dwindling manpower resources were employed – regardless of the 
character of their contribution – in the most efficient manner possible.62 
On the western front, Lloyd George emphasized in a meeting of civilian 
and military authorities in January 1918 that, ‘in view of the difficulties that 
were arising … in regard to the question of Man-Power, it was essential that 
there should be no idle men’.63
The effective coordination and supervision of men and equipment 
dispersed across a vast geographical area was critical to the economical 
use of the BEF’s resources during the First World War. The speed with 
which roads were repaired, railway tracks laid, trains moved from depot 
to railhead and wagons unloaded for return to depot directly affected the 
pace and intensity with which the fighting troops were able to concentrate 
their force against the enemy lines. The battle of the Somme illuminated 
the shortcomings in the BEF’s logistical foundations in the summer and 
autumn of 1916. As Ian M. Brown has demonstrated, the shortages of 
ammunition noted by commanders early in the battle were the result of 
longstanding tactical delivery problems rather than insufficient production 
levels – issues that were exacerbated by the voluminous increase in supplies 
from Britain once the offensive was under way.64 Three potential solutions 
existed to remove the supply bottleneck that reduced fluidity on the western 
front. The first option, proposed by the IGC in August 1916, was for ships 
to be sent from Britain at a slower rate, thereby synchronizing their arrivals 
with the discharge rates at the docks and the railway network’s ability to 
remove goods from the ports.65 The second, reported to Lloyd George by 
60 D. Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London, 2011), 
pp. 170–243; S. Bidwell and D. Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of 
War, 1904–1945 (Barnsley, 2004); G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory. The First World War: Myths 
and Realities (London, 2001).
61 D. French, The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916–1918 (Oxford, 1995), p. 291.
62 Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall, pp. 259–63.
63 TNA, CAB 24/39/101, Chinese labour in France. Report of meeting held, Friday 18 Jan. 
1918, p. 2.
64 Brown, British Logistics, pp. 123–4.
65 TNA, WO 95/3970, IGC war diary, Clayton to Lloyd George, 2 Aug. 1916. 
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Geddes the following month, was ‘that the factories must slow down!’ Both 
were impracticable. The scaling back of munitions production was a ‘moral 
and physical impossibility’ in a nation increasingly geared towards a more 
total form of warfare,66 while a reduction in the frequency of deliveries to 
France would simply shift the storage problem to Britain’s ports – where 
Geddes had already recognized pressure on the available space before the 
Somme offensive commenced.67
To permit the BEF to undertake offensive operations that consumed 
munitions at a greater rate than had proven possible at the Somme, but 
without overloading the capacity of the transport network, that network 
had to be operated more efficiently. The labour force attached to the 
directorate-general of transportation, employed on duties across France 
and Flanders – and numbering 89,000 men by November 1918 – played a 
key role in the maintenance and improvement of the BEF’s supply chain 
in the second half of the war. Yet the constant, direct visual observation of 
such a large-scale, dispersed workforce from the directorate’s headquarters 
was impossible. Therefore, the implementation of managerial tools that 
stimulated improvement and the application of operating procedures that 
promoted fluidity throughout the transport network became important 
facets of the British approach to material-intensive warfare.
To Britain’s transport experts the control of a large workforce employed on 
tasks beyond the direct oversight of senior managerial figures was a familiar 
challenge. The growth of large-scale businesses during the second half of 
the nineteenth century had created a series of unprecedented difficulties for 
the employers of labour to solve. By virtue of being executives of the first 
companies to experience such growth, railway managers were by necessity 
the forerunners in addressing the problems associated with handling ‘large 
amounts of men, money, and materials within a single business unit’.68 
Unlike even the largest factories of the day, which could be observed in 
their totality within a relatively brief period of time, the major railways were 
operated by units that were spread over hundreds of miles and engaged on 
a wide variety of activities.69 
Geddes appreciated from the outset that the efficiency of the human 
and material resources under the DGT’s command could be assessed and 
improved through the application of business methods deployed by civilian 
66 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 Sept. 1916, p. 9.
67 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/D/5/2/4, memorandum on filling for week ending 10 
June 1916, 17 June 1916, pp. 7–8.
68 A. D. Chandler, ‘The railroads: pioneers in modern corporate management’, Business 
History Review, xxxix (1965), 16–40, at p. 16.
69 Chandler, ‘The railroads’, p. 19.
257
‘By similar methods as adopted by the English railway companies’
industries to manage their peacetime endeavours. Nowhere was this more 
pronounced than in BEF’s light railway operations from 1917 onwards. 
Alongside the locomotives, wagons and personnel necessary to meet the 
BEF’s increased demands for transport capacity in the second half of the 
First World War, Britain’s transport experts provided the management 
tools designed to squeeze the maximum fluidity out of the network. As 
Figure 7.2 illustrates, during 1917 the component parts of the BEF’s light 
railway network – managed by individual operating companies – grew 
into a complex system. To ensure the maintenance of fluidity across the 
expanding network required the coordination of train movements, just 
as took place on the main line railways that connected the BEF to the 
Channel ports. However, unlike on the main lines – managed according 
to rules and regulations laid down by the French rail authorities – the light 
railway network presented the directorate-general of transportation with 
an opportunity to introduce working practices adapted from the latest 
innovations conceived by Britain’s transport experts.
Auckland Geddes later suggested that his brother had taken the inspiration 
for the BEF’s light railway operations from the Powayan Steam Tramway 
in India that Eric had helped run in the early 1900s.70 However, the origins 
of the BEF’s traffic management procedures could be found much closer to 
home. Before the outbreak of the First World War, operating methods were 
the subject of intense experimentation among Britain’s competitive railway 
companies. The maintenance of fluidity and efficiency upon individual 
companies’ networks demanded that traffic officers possessed a thorough 
understanding of the location and movements of the trains that circulated 
around the system, and major advances in the companies’ surveillance 
capacities had taken place before 1914.71 By the time Geddes became DGT 
both the Midland Railway and the Lancashire and Yorkshire had installed 
centralized control systems to help coordinate their main line operations,72 
and it was from the former that the BEF’s light railway directorate drew its 
inspiration.
70 A. C. Geddes, The Forging of a Family: a Family Story Studied in its Genetical, Cultural 
and Spiritual Aspects and a Testament of Personal Belief Founded Thereon (London, 1952), p. 
238.
71 R. Edwards, Instruments of Control, Measures of Output: Contending Approaches to 
the Practice of ‘Scientific’ Management on Britain’s Railways in the Early Twentieth Century 
(Southampton, 2000); C. A. Williams, Police Control Systems in Britain, 1775–1975: from 
Parish Constable to National Computer (Manchester, 2014), p. 153.
72 TNA, RAIL 491/815, train control office at Derby, 1914; J. A. F. Aspinall, Train Control 
Arrangements: a Survey of the Comprehensive Control System Operating on the Lancashire and 
Yorkshire Railway (Manchester, 1915).
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The primary motivations for the Midland Railway’s institution of 
a centralized train control system in 1909 – efficiency, flexibility, the 
economic use of rolling stock and the acquisition of timely information on 
the whereabouts of the company’s resources – mirrored the BEF’s priorities 
in 1917. The similarities between military and civilian railway operations did 
not stop there, either. The reliability of the Edwardian railway industry had 
created a logistical environment in Britain that encouraged firms to reduce 
their stock levels on-hand, confident that goods would be delivered swiftly 
by rail when required. This approach created concerns that any prolonged 
dislocation to railway services, whether the result of congestion or industrial 
action, would quickly starve manufacturers of raw materials and consumers 
of staples such as bread and milk. As Lloyd George, the then president of 
the Board of Trade, acknowledged in 1907, ‘there was hardly a country in 
the world … which depends so much upon the absolute promptitude with 
which goods are delivered’.73 The military practice during the First World 
War was to ensure that stores were placed far enough away from the front 
73 TNA, RAIL 1053/258, railway dispute: conference between David Lloyd George, 
president of the Board of Trade, and representatives of the railway companies, 25 Oct. 1907, 
p. 6.
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Figure 7.2. The growth of the light railway system operated by the 
5 New Zealand Light Railway Operating Company, 1917. 
Source: TNA, WO 95/4061/7, lines of communication troops. 5 New Zealand Light Railway 
Operating Company. Map drawn by Cath D’Alton.
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line to reduce their susceptibility either to hostile artillery or capture in the 
event of a surprise enemy advance. Therefore, the BEF’s customers at the 
front line were also wholly dependent upon an effective transport network 
that delivered the goods reliably and frequently. A cut in supply, whether by 
enemy action, mismanagement or the withdrawal of labour, would produce 
the same results.
Congestion, which had brought about the near paralysis of the BEF’s 
transportation network during the battle of the Somme, had been a 
significant problem for the Midland in the early part of the century. The use 
of railway sidings as makeshift depots had created difficulties for those tasked 
with unloading freight wagons on the Midland’s lines, which increased the 
time required to unload individual trains and led to widespread delays to 
traffic across the network. The unpredictable nature of the traffic meant 
that engine crews were frequently forced to work shifts of fifteen hours 
or more, as replacement crews were allotted according to the timetables 
rather than the actual locations of the trains. A Board of Trade enquiry 
into the working hours of 18,354 engine drivers in Britain uncovered that 
the majority worked for between sixty and sixty-two hours each week in 
1907, while 3,689 of those examined worked for more than sixty-six hours 
per week.74 On the Midland alone a total of 24,760 cases of extended duty 
were recorded in the first six months of 1907, a situation that contributed to 
numerous cases of illness-induced staff absences and inspired the company 
to amend its operating procedures.
The impressive results obtained by the Midland – coupled with the fact 
that its chief architect, Cecil Paget, was already in France at the head of the 
ROD – make Geddes’s decision to adopt the train control system developed 
after 1907 for the BEF’s light railway network unsurprising. The system 
involved the creation of district offices throughout the Midland’s network, 
each linked by telephone to a central control office in Derby. The central 
office received regular updates on the whereabouts and composition of the 
trains on the system, which allowed traffic controllers to identify stations 
where trains were detained for unnecessarily long periods in order to focus 
improvements on the area.75 Following successful trials on sections of the 
line, Paget, the railway’s general superintendent, authorized the extension of 
the train control system to cover the entire 1,400-mile network despite the 
reservations of many within the railway industry. ‘Quite a number of able 
74 Earnings and hours enquiry. Report of an enquiry by the Board of Trade into the earnings 
and hours of labour of workpeople of the United Kingdom. VII. Railway service in 1907 (Parl. 
Papers 1912 [Cd. 6053], cviii), pp. 188–9.
75 On the early development of train control systems on the British railways, see P. Burtt, 
Control on the Railways: a Study in Methods (London, 1926), pp. 95–101.
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railway men’, the company recalled, suggested that the existing methods 
of control in the industry could not be improved upon and expected the 
system – based upon the creation of a real-time record of all traffic on 
the network within a central control office – to fail.76 However, between 
1907 and 1913 Paget’s system proved remarkably successful. As Figure 7.3 
illustrates, the weekly average hours of traffic delays on the Midland fell by 
more than 64 per cent despite a 10 per cent increase in the tonnage of goods 
conveyed over the same period. From well in excess of 20,000 cases of men 
working for excessively long hours in early 1907, four years later there were 
none.77
As the BEF inherited relatively few operable light railways from the French 
the installation of a new operating procedure was relatively straightforward. 
The French practice of working a section of line – typically between 
twenty and thirty miles in length – using the box-to-box system, was not 
particularly well established among British troops. Under the box-to-box 
system orders for light railway were issued direct from the department 
that required the transport, rather than from a central office with access to 
the most up-to-date information on the army’s priorities.78 The retention 
of such uncoordinated methods was impracticable once the BEF’s light 
railways grew into an interconnected network. The threat of ‘friendly 
generals’ impairing the system’s efficiency through the forceful imposition 
of their personal priorities, without due appreciation of the wider army’s 
requirements, encouraged the creation of a centralized administration 
through which all transport requests could be filtered. Therefore, the new 
lines in the British areas were constructed with the central control system 
in place from the start, while extant lines were gradually converted from 
the box-to-box system. In August 1917 the 31st Light Railway Operating 
Company recorded that the central control system, to which they had been 
recently converted, was ‘working quite satisfactorily’.79 However, with the 
susceptibility of the telephone connections to artillery fire in mind, the box-
to-box equipment was retained in place to act as a back-up during periods 
when the telephone network was inoperable.80
As on the Midland Railway, the control offices became a fundamental 
component of the BEF’s light railway operations during the second half 
76 TNA, ZLIB 29/620, the train control system of the Midland Railway (reprinted from 
Railway Gazette), 1921.
77 C. Hamilton Ellis, The Midland Railway (London, 1953), pp. 150–2.
78 TNA, WO 158/852, history of light railways, p. 19.
79 TNA, WO 95/4056/2, lines of communication troops. 31 Light Railway Operating 
Company Royal Engineers, diary entry, 16 Aug. 1917.
80 BLSC, Hill papers, LIDDLE/WW1/GS0767, recollections, p. 51.
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of the war. Each of the BEF’s five armies were served by a self-contained 
central control office based upon the Midland’s template, at which requests 
for light railway transport from each corps were collated and prioritized. 
Large schematic diagrams were set up in each office, which displayed the 
army’s portion of the light railway network and indicated the location of all 
motive power and rolling stock under the army’s command. Information on 
the whereabouts of the army’s resources was frequently updated by reports 
telephoned from numerous district offices, situated at the marshalling yards 
from which individual trains were made up for their journeys to the front. 
Within each district several stations or dumping points also contained 
reporting facilities that permitted local officers to keep the district offices 
informed of events out on the lines.
The ‘ceaseless’ surveillance from the army’s central office produced an 
almost instant overview of the network’s assets, which ensured the light 
railways organization could respond quickly to the demands of industrial 
warfare and fostered a more efficient use of the BEF’s limited resources. 
Daily conferences among the technical staff allowed the officers responsible 
Figure 7.3. Delays to freight traffic on the Midland 
Railway, average weekly hours, 1907–13.
Source: R. Edwards, Instruments of Control, Measures of Output: Contending Approaches to 
the Practice of ‘Scientific’ Management on Britain’s Railways in the Early Twentieth Century 
(Southampton, 2000), p. 19.
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for allocating the available locomotives and rolling stock to do so according 
to the army’s most recent priorities, minimizing the prospect of a district 
being left with insufficient stock on hand to service its daily traffic. In 
addition, central control ordered the movement of wagons around the 
system as necessary. On 31 July 1917 such a transfer of resources took place on 
the portion of line worked by the 12th Light Railway Operating Company. 
Based in Romarin, near Armentières on the French-Belgian border, the 
company received orders to ‘transfer as many bogie wagons as could be 
put together quickly for ammunition work’ to assist colleagues engaged on 
supplying the third battle of Ypres further north.81
Alongside creating flexibility over the allocation of resources, the central 
control system provided the BEF’s light railways organization with the data 
to identify where rolling stock was being held under load for abnormally long 
periods. As on the peacetime railways, wagons left in sidings represented a 
reduction in the BEF’s overall transport capacity and indicated the presence 
of uneconomical working practices. Every day the central control office 
produced a wagon register, which recorded the location of every piece of 
rolling stock in the BEF’s possession and was drawn from the contents 
of train and engine shunting journals compiled in each district.82 The 
journals contained information on every train that passed over the light 
railway network, ‘often compiled in huts or dugouts under artillery fire’ and 
forwarded to the district offices by telephone.83 The data produced through 
this process became a core component of the comprehensive series of 
statistics used by the light railways directorate to improve working practices 
among the widely dispersed units under its command. The close observation 
of unloading methods between March and September 1917 brought about 
a reduction in the average turnaround time for a light railway wagon from 
1.7 days to around 0.7 days, which – combined with a 200 per cent increase 
in the number of wagons in traffic during the same period – vastly increased 
the light railways’ carrying capacity on the western front. From an average 
weekly traffic of 25,315 tons in March, by September the BEF’s light railways 
carried an average weekly traffic of 210,808 tons to the front.84
A comprehensive system of data capture and statistical analysis lay at 
81 TNA, WO 95/4056, lines of communication troops. 12 Light Railway Operating 
Company Royal Engineers, diary entry, 31 July 1917.
82 TNA, WO 158/852, history of light railways, p. 20.
83 J. G. Beharrell, ‘The value of full and accurate statistics: as shown under emergency 
conditions in the transportation service in France’, Railway Gazette: Special War 
Transportation Number, 21 Sept. 1920, pp. 37–9, at p. 39.
84 TNA, WO 158/852, history of light railways, p. 20; Davies, Light Railways of the First 
World War, pp. 73–4.
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the heart of the directorate-general of transportation’s supervisory practices, 
one similar to that described as an ‘information infrastructure’ by Lisa 
Bud-Frierman in her examination of business administration methods in 
the late nineteenth century.85 In an interview with the American journalist 
Isaac Marcosson following his appointment as First Lord of the Admiralty, 
Geddes emphasized his belief in the utility of statistics as a managerial tool. 
When Marcosson asked him ‘what single rule had been of most service to 
him’ during the war, Geddes responded: ‘The use of statistics. I statistise 
[sic] everything. Knowledge is power and statistics are the throttle valve of 
every business’.86
Geddes’s appreciation of statistics provides a further example of the 
North-Eastern Railway’s managerial culture’s influence on his approach to 
the war. Sir George Gibb’s progressive response to the challenging operating 
conditions in the turn-of-the-century railway industry inspired the business 
techniques that Geddes applied to the management of the directorate-
general of transportation. Following a month-long tour of the United States 
in 1900, Gibb was convinced that the extensive collection and examination 
of statistical data could greatly improve the efficiency of work undertaken 
on the British railways. Throughout the pre-war period, within the trade 
press, to parliamentary committees and even in the discussion of papers 
delivered before the Royal Statistical Society,87 Gibb passionately advocated 
the use of statistics for allowing
a railway manager to test the work done in carrying passengers and merchandise 
on any part of the railway, to measure the work performed in relation to many 
important items of cost incurred in performing it, to compare period with 
period and district with district, to supervise local staff with a full knowledge of 
results, to control train mileage, and to enforce economy in working.88
Statistical information, disseminated throughout the company, was used to 
‘found judgments, to make policy decisions and to establish standards which 
… enable[d] officials to watch and control the effects of the steps being taken 
to improve working methods’ on the North-Eastern.89 In collaboration with 
85 L. Bud-Frierman, ‘Information acumen’, in Information Acumen: the Understanding 
and Use of Knowledge in Modern Business, ed. L. Bud-Frierman (London, 1994), pp. 7–25, at 
pp. 7–8.
86 I. F. Marcosson, The Business of War (New York, 1918), p. 283.
87 W. M. Acworth, ‘English railway statistics’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, lxv 
(1902), 613–64, at pp. 652–4.
88 W. W. Tomlinson, The North Eastern Railway: its Rise and Development (Newcastle 
upon Tyne, 1915), p. 732.
89 R. J. Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company, 1870–1914: an Economic History 
(Leicester, 1976), pp. 218–19.
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the statistician George Paish, Gibb oversaw the establishment of a traffic 
statistics office in York in 1902 to ‘pioneer and promulgate the use of new 
statistical concepts for operational measurement, control and efficiency’.90
The data-gathering system used by the BEF’s transportation services 
was the brainchild of Geddes’s assistant from the North-Eastern, J. George 
Beharrell. Shortly after the war he explained his procedures in an address 
to the annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science. At the outset of the lecture Beharrell directly responded to claims 
that ‘the success of transportation in France was largely due to the fact that 
money was of no account and it was spent like water’.91 He pointed out 
that shortages of manpower and materials on the western front compelled 
the DGT to ruthlessly pursue efficiencies throughout the organization. 
Drawing upon his own professional career at the North-Eastern Railway 
– where Geddes had given his abilities to collect, prepare and disseminate 
information from a variety of sources ‘full play’ within the goods 
department – Beharrell created bespoke, elaborate reporting systems for 
each of the departments under the DGT’s command.92 The statistics that 
were generated, Beharrell explained, ‘told each responsible officer what he 
was doing, whether he was going back or forward, and how he compared 
with his opposite number in other places’.93 In the IWT directorate ‘the 
statistical and movements sections … [were] provided [with] an efficient 
system whereby the work being performed by both personnel and craft 
could be carefully gauged, and immediate steps taken when necessary 
to speed up the work in sections where the best results were not being 
obtained’.94 ‘Without statistics’, Beharrell claimed, it was ‘impossible to 
know with any certainty that there ha[d] been any improvement’ in the 
operations behind the front line upon which the fighting troops depended 
throughout the war. It was certainly impossible, he concluded, to accurately 
measure any such improvement.95
The constant flow of data from the DGT’s workshops to its boardroom 
played a vital role in permitting administrative officers to ascertain the 
output levels that could be expected from units assigned to each task, and 
assisted them in the identification of inefficiencies across the western front. 
90 R. J. Irving, ‘Gibb, Sir George Stegmann (1850–1925)’, in Dictionary of Business 
Biography: a Biographical Dictionary of Business Leaders Active in Britain in the Period 1860–
1980, ed. D. J. Jeremy (5 vols., London, 1984), ii. 543–5, at p. 545.
91 Beharrell, ‘The value of full and accurate statistics’, p. 37.
92 R. Bell, Twenty-Five Years of the North Eastern Railway, 1898–1922 (London, 1951), p. 39.
93 Beharrell, ‘The value of full and accurate statistics’, p. 37.
94 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 22.
95 Beharrell, ‘The value of full and accurate statistics’, p. 37.
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The potential value of metrics had been recognized within the railway 
industry before the war, as the major companies grappled with the challenge 
of supervising and maintaining the productivity of a dispersed workforce. 
As George Boag advised in his Manual of Railway Statistics, ‘by training the 
staff in the use of statistics an intelligent interest is aroused, and the figures 
will have already served their purpose if they have drawn the attention of 
the operating officers to the results of their own work’.96 The knowledge 
that senior officers were liable to closely investigate sustained periods of 
inadequate performance acted as a stimulus for supervising officers to take 
a close interest in their men’s working methods, to ensure that standards 
were rigorously maintained and improved, and to reflect upon their own 
contributions to the directorate’s progress. Major-General John W. Stewart 
– a Scottish-born railwayman who had made a career building railways 
in Canada prior to the war – became infamous among the light railway 
construction units behind the western front for his ‘unannounced and 
unexpected’ site visits in 1917, undertaken to encourage the troops and their 
supervisors to build new lines as swiftly as possible.97
The existence of a pool of numerate administrators was critical to the 
maintenance of the directorate’s programme. The ‘rapid expansion of the 
clerical workforce’ in Britain during the sixty years before the First World 
War provided the skilled labour required to convert Beharrell’s concept into 
a reality. By 1914 over 5 per cent of occupied males in the British workforce 
were clerks, a larger middle-class occupational group than any other aside 
from employers and proprietors.98 The complexities of administration in 
the twentieth century had been addressed by the state and a larger number 
of companies in Britain than in any other European nation before the 
war.99 The so-called ‘nation of shopkeepers’ was short neither of ‘numerical 
nous’ nor the tools with which to harness, manipulate and analyse complex 
operational data as a foundation for decision-making. The pre-war British 
96 G. L. Boag, Manual of Railway Statistics (London, 1912), p. 42.
97 G. W. Taylor, The Railway Contractors: the Story of John W. Stewart, His Enterprises and 
Associates (Victoria, BC, 1988), pp. 113–14.
98 P. Scott and J. T. Walker, ‘Demonstrating distinction at “the lowest edge of the black-
coated class”: the family expenditures of Edwardian railway clerks’, Centre for International 
Business History, 2014 <https://assets.henley.ac.uk/legacyUploads/pdf/research/papers-
publications/IBH-2014-04%20Scott%20and%20Walker.pdf?mtime=20170410170907> 
[accessed 8 Dec. 2014], p. 2.
99 E. Higgs, The Information State in England: the Central Collection of Information on 
Citizens since 1500 (Basingstoke, 2004), pp. 99–132; Y. Cassis, ‘Big business in Britain 
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at p. 216.
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economy had embraced the ‘quantifying spirit’,100 and the directorate-
general of transportation applied the same ethos to the BEF’s operations.
From 1917 onwards the BEF’s workforce was relentlessly subjected to 
measurement in the pursuit of efficiency and economy. At the docks ‘the 
rate of handling per man per hour was closely watched, each port being 
compared with its previous performance on similar cargoes’. Through a 
combination of ‘better supervision and equipment’, Beharrell recorded, in 
a year the tonnage handled per man per hour increased by 24 per cent 
across all the ports operated by the BEF. Behind the headline improvement 
lay a process of observation, measurement, comparison, adjustment and 
repetition – presented through an unambiguous, accessible comparison 
tool that helped identify ‘the most suitable form of work’ for each of the 
myriad units employed under the director of docks.101 The tool Beharrell 
chose was the graph, which had ‘exploded’ into widespread use in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century.102
Plotting units’ results alongside one another clearly illustrated the 
varied performance levels of individual groups within the category being 
measured, an activity that allowed busy commanders to distinguish at a 
glance where output was satisfactory and where causes for concern existed. 
Rather than pore over the raw data provided by each unit, senior officers 
received a visual depiction of the department’s progress that could also be 
disseminated throughout the organization to help companies chart their 
own development. As the author of a report on the Chinese Labour Corps’ 
work explained:
By that ingenious method of making statistics intelligible to those who have 
no mathematics in their souls, the whole situation can be seen at a glance. [I] 
was shown one graph which dealt with the comparative results produced by 
the different types of labour in France, and another which compared, month 
with month, the total output of each type of labour in all the great dumps and 
workshops. In the first line the little blue strip which denoted the Chinese was 
more than holding its own, in the second there was a steadily increasing blue 
strip everywhere. A terrific amount of toil had gone into the making of those 
little strips, and the tale they told was cheering indeed.103
100 J. Thompson, ‘Printed statistics and the public sphere: numeracy, electoral politics, and 
the visual culture of numbers, 1880–1914’, in Statistics and the Public Sphere: Numbers and 
the People in Modern Britain, c. 1800–2000, ed. T. Crook and G. O’Hara (Abingdon, 2011), 
pp. 121–43, at pp. 135–6.
101 Beharrell, ‘The value of full and accurate statistics’, pp. 37–8.
102 J. Thompson, ‘Printed statistics and the public sphere’, pp. 123–4.
103 TNA, WO 106/33, the Chinese Labour Corps – recruitment and organisation – history 
of the corps, Chinese labour in France, p. 15.
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This quote demonstrates how statistics were used to encourage workers as 
well as managers during the war. The tasks upon which those employed by 
the DGT laboured from 1917 onwards lacked a readily identifiable link to 
the BEF’s overall goal of victory, and the newly created units did not possess 
a folklore of regimental histories upon which to draw for the inspiration 
of new recruits. Furthermore, many of the units under the DGT’s charge 
were forced to accept the descriptor ‘unskilled’, a ‘negative qualification’ 
unlikely to engender a sense of pride and commitment within those to 
whom it was attached.104 When assigned to the unskilled labour of road-
making duties, Richard Smith has noted, ‘men of all ranks in the British 
West Indian Regiment were keen to shed the stigma attached with labour’ 
and stressed their commitment to martial customs.105
Through the concentration on targets, encouraged by the proliferation of 
easily understood graphs, the abstract notion that building a road or unloading 
lorries was fundamental to the prosecution of the war effort was superseded 
by the immediately recognizable, attainable benchmarks that were naturally 
created by daily, weekly and monthly records of achievement. The raw data 
have since been destroyed, but the surviving war diaries of units such as the 
12th Light Railway Operating Company illustrate the unit’s pride when it 
surpassed previous performances: ‘The ammunition tonnage handled today 
– highest on record – 2,250 tons. Every man doing splendidly and the system 
working perfectly’,106 the company’s diarist recorded on 11 June 1917. During 
the same week the diary noted several instances of German shelling, which 
caused damage to the company’s yard and camp. Clearly, the act of recording 
respectable statistics despite the enemy’s best efforts played a significant role 
in motivating the company’s troops.
Individual units created targets, both for the unit themselves to beat in 
subsequent periods and to demonstrate their abilities in comparison to 
neighbouring companies and departments. As John Starling and Ivor Lee 
discussed in their account of British military labour during the war:
It was found that the South African Native Labour Corps were most efficient 
when used as unskilled labour loading and unloading stores. In July 1917 ‘a 
party of the SANLC working on ammunition at Martainville created a record. 
Fifty natives, with 4 NCOs and 1 White NCO man-handled 700 tons of 
ammunition, loading it from dump to lorry and from lorry to [railway] truck 
in 345 man hours, an average of 2.03 tons per man hour.’107
104 TNA, WO 107/37, work of the labour force during the war: report, 1919, p. 6.
105 R. Smith, Jamaican Volunteers in the First World War: Race, Masculinity and the 
Development of National Consciousness (Manchester, 2004), pp. 87–8.
106 TNA, WO 95/4056/12, Light Railway Operating Company war diary, diary entry, 11 
June 1917.
107 J. Starling and I. Lee, No Labour, No Battle: Military Labour during the First World War 
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The diary extract quoted by Starling and Lee emphasizes the dual purpose 
of statistics as a management tool. First, the data provided senior officers 
located far from Martainville with quantitative evidence of the unit’s output. 
Second, the generation of numerical indicators of the unit’s work provided 
a stimulus for groups of men from diverse backgrounds to contribute to the 
war effort of a nation to whom many of the labourers possessed no patriotic 
attachment. For the different tribes represented within the South African 
Native Labour Corps, the war was less about defeating the German empire 
and more about proving their strength, fitness and stamina in a friendly 
competition with their fellow tribesmen.
However, competition created temptations to subvert the measurement 
process and distort the information collected by the directorate. As 
Brigadier-General John Charteris observed in early 1918:
There is much rivalry between the light railways and the standard gauge in 
the forward areas. Each seeks to justify its supremacy by graphs showing the 
number of men and tons carried every day. If rumour is to be believed, the light 
railways will stop any of their trains wherever a body of troops appears and 
almost beseech them to take a lift anywhere up and down the line, so that they 
can record them on their graph.108
Charteris’s somewhat light-hearted remark reveals the key limitation 
regarding the implementation of a data capture and performance monitoring 
system within the BEF during the First World War. The generation of 
accurate records relied upon accurate measurement, which was not always 
forthcoming. As the rumoured system-gaming activities of the light railway 
operating companies demonstrates, not all of those who participated in 
the BEF’s information-gathering network were entirely honest or willing 
contributors.
The competence and good faith of those who participated in Beharrell’s 
data-gathering system were fundamental to its success. However, examples 
of both incompetence and deception can be ascertained from the surviving 
records. In the first instance, even an educated man like the philosopher 
and academic Alexander Lindsay – who spent much of 1917 engaged in 
the accumulation of data and production of graphs – struggled to attain 
the precision required to submit accurate returns, and recorded his battles 
to master the intricacies of the process in a series of letters to his wife.109 
Elsewhere, among professional officers concerned with self-preservation 
and their future career prospects, the urge to ‘present the best aspect’ of a 
(Stroud, 2009), p. 231.
108 J. Charteris, At G.H.Q. (London, 1931), p. 283.
109 Keele University Special Collections and Archives (KUSCA), papers of A. D. Lindsay, 
LIN 149, Lindsay to Erica Lindsay, 22 Jan. 1917; 28 Feb. 1917; 5 and 14 March 1917.
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company’s work in the official records rather than an honest and accurate 
account of its performance was an ever present temptation.110 One unnamed 
‘old colonel’, described by Lindsay as ‘the bad sort of army man’, was more 
interested in ensuring that his back was covered in case things went wrong 
than in using statistics to guide improvements in his unit’s performance.111 
Furthermore, Beharrell’s system had to contend with the hostility of 
individuals unwilling to engage with the bureaucracy that it generated. 
While the conflict acted as what Lindsay referred to as a laboratory for an 
‘elaborate experiment in the organization of labour’,112 to many of those 
charged with accumulating the raw data for the ‘carefully planned … 
forms [and] graphs’, Beharrell’s time-consuming approach was considered 
an unnecessary additional burden in a war of unprecedented intensity.113 
Lieutenant-Colonel Bryan Fairfax, commander of the Chinese Labour 
Corps and ultimately responsible for a workforce of almost 100,000 men, 
was one such officer. A dugout who had been recalled from the reserve list 
in August 1914, Fairfax had served in China during the Boxer Uprising 
and as inspector of Chinese labourers in the Transvaal. Although a far cry 
from the ‘Oxford men’ like Lindsay who found themselves employed on 
administrative duties,114 Fairfax was by no means the stereotypically insular 
and obstinate soldier. In South Africa he was described as ‘an efficient and 
conscientious and trustworthy’ officer who possessed ‘in a high degree the 
quality of tact, so necessary in handling men’ by the superintendent of 
the foreign labour department in Johannesburg, while his application for 
the post of king’s messenger in 1914 was supported by a host of character 
references that underlined his aptitudes.115
For Fairfax, ‘the war … was not an exercise in scientific labour 
management, but a life and death struggle in which men must be exploited 
110 TNA, CAB 24/58/73, report upon an enquiry into the management of labour and the 
control of works in the British army zone in France, 12 June 1918, pp. 3–4.
111 KUSCA: Lindsay papers, LIN 149, Lindsay to Erica Lindsay, 15 Aug. 1917.
112 A. D. Lindsay, ‘The organisation of labour in the army in France during the war and its 
lessons’, Econ. Jour., xxxiv (1924), 69–82, at p. 69.
113 N. J. Griffin, ‘Scientific management in the direction of Britain’s military labour 
establishment during World War I’, Military Affairs, xlii (1978), 197–201, at p. 198.
114 ‘G.S.O.’, G.H.Q. (Montreuil-Sur-Mer) (London, 1920), p. 168.
115 BLSC, Yorkshire Archaeological and Historical Society collection, Personal file of 
Captain Bryan Fairfax, YAS/MD335/10/1, Jamieson to private secretary to H.E. The Lt. 
Governor, Pretoria, 25 Sept. 1905; Jamieson to the attorney general, 1 June 1908. The 
testimonies written in support of Fairfax’s application to the post of king’s messenger in 1914 
emphasized his ‘good character’, ‘judgment and tact’, ‘good manner’, ‘leadership qualities’, 
‘methodical’ approach, and ‘common sense’. See, e.g., testimonies written by Heath, 12 May 
1914; Lyttleton, 12 May 1914; McMahon, 12 May 1914; Paget, 13 May 1914; Pratt, 14 May 
1914; Scarborough, 15 May 1914.
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regardless in order to secure victory’. He was, according to Nicholas Griffin, 
‘a production-oriented traditionalist who preferred only to see the “bottom 
line” without dwelling on the means of reaching it’, and he condemned 
the ‘repeated requests for graphs demonstrating job performance’ that he 
received as ‘irksome’ and ‘futile’.116 So long as the work required ‘got done’, 
Fairfax argued, the accumulation and assessment of data that recorded 
the precise nature of his units’ performance were a waste of time. He was 
unwilling to countenance the potential benefits of attempts to coordinate 
and distribute the BEF’s resources in the most efficient and systematic 
manner, and instead was preoccupied by the ‘paper-mongering’ that 
Beharrell’s methods demanded. Even Lindsay, who was relatively open-
minded with regards to the benefits of constant measurement, admitted 
that the administrative requirements of the system were incredibly bloated 
and generated data that was not necessarily consulted by busy senior officers. 
He wrote in April 1917 that he was ‘waging a great war on unnecessary or 
rather meaningless forms but I am not sure that I shall win. Some people 
like returns as such even though they never mean to act on them’.117
However, others liked statistical returns so much that they became 
reluctant to engage with alternative sources of information on their 
working practices. In the directorate of docks, the plethora of quantitative 
data generated by the relentless measurement of the troops under Ralph 
Wedgwood’s command created an image of remarkable progress. The 
twin pressures of the German submarine campaign and, from mid 1917 
onwards, of the need to apportion shipping capacity for the transport of 
American troops exacerbated the need for the docks under Wedgwood’s 
control to be operated with the maximum efficiency. The returns compiled 
within the directorate indicated that it had responded to the challenge 
remarkably well. Between January and September 1917 the volumes 
discharged from vessels at the ports under the directorate’s authority rose 
from 12.5 tons per hour in port to 25.8 tons per hour. In the first half of 
1918 the figures ‘showed a continuous increase’, which reached a peak 
of 34.4 tons per hour in port in July. Over an eighteen-month period 
Wedgwood oversaw a 175.2 per cent increase in the docks directorate’s 
discharge rate, which contributed to a significant decrease in the number 
of ship-days lost by vessels awaiting a berth. From a peak of 100 days per 
week in February 1917, by March 1918 just 5.8 ship-days per week were lost 
at the Channel ports.118
116 Griffin, ‘Scientific management’, p. 199.
117 KUSCA: Lindsay papers, LIN 149, Lindsay to Erica Lindsay, 17 Apr. 1917.
118 TNA, WO 107/296, report of British armies, pp. 16–17.
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Behind the numbers a different story emerged, thanks to the investigative 
efforts of officers under the controller of labour, Colonel Edmund Wace.119 
As British manpower resources became increasingly stretched in the second 
half of the war – and the number of tasks devolved upon the British that 
had hitherto been the responsibility of the French grew – the demand 
for so-called ‘unskilled’ labour to dig, load, carry and build for the BEF 
outstripped supply. By November 1918 the labour controller’s office was 
responsible for administering 385,000 men on the western front, and a 
core component of Wace’s job was to flag up areas of the British war effort 
that were being run inefficiently. Under the terms of reference issued to 
the labour organization upon its establishment, Wace’s officers provided 
a consultancy role rather than an executive function. They were unable 
to directly intervene to address examples of what they considered to be 
inefficient working practices. Instead, they recorded their observations and 
submitted them to the department or directorate responsible for employing 
the labour under investigation.120 Over the summer of 1918 Wedgwood’s 
directorate was the subject of a series of scathing memoranda, written by 
men with ‘practical experience of dock labour in civil life’ who had been 
drafted into the Labour Corps thanks to their specialist knowledge.121 In 
July, when the directorate recorded its highest discharge rates of the war, 
the assistant controller of labour submitted the following observation of a 
morning’s work at the port of Boulogne:
On July 18th Docks assigned six Chinese [labourers] to each of 14 railway 
trucks in the rear of Transit Hangars L. & K. to accept from Horse Transport 
ammunition discharged from the steamship Hansa. At 11.00 a.m. [the] Chinese 
were ready in Trucks. At 11.20 a.m. the first load arrived at trucks; by 11.45 
a.m. six out of the fourteen had received a load; by 12.20 p.m. a load had been 
delivered to all but one of the trucks. In other words, one gang of six men had 
been waiting one hour without doing any work.122
Two days earlier an even more stark example of inefficiency had been 
recorded at the same port: roughly ninety Chinese labourers were 
discovered ‘lying asleep awaiting their turn to work’ by Labour Corps 
observers.123 The memoranda were forwarded to the QMG with the 
recommendation that labour control should be removed from the 
119 On the work of the various labour organizations established on the western front, see 
TNA, WO 107/37, labour force report; Starling and Lee, No Labour, No Battle, pp. 77–162.
120 TNA, WO 107/37, labour force report, pp. 96–7.
121 TNA, WO 107/37, labour force report, p. 99.
122 TNA, WO 107/37, labour force report, pp. 99–100.
123 TNA, WO 107/37, labour force report, p. 100.
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directorate of docks. However, Wedgwood categorically refused to accept 
a proposal that the allocation of labour at the ports should be transferred 
away from his jurisdiction.
The Labour Corps’ observations illuminated the key challenge of labour 
organization, which the BEF failed to adequately rectify over the course 
of the war. The actual labour needs of individual services, such as the 
directorate of docks, varied from day to day (and, indeed, from hour to 
hour). However, the various departments within which unskilled labour 
was employed ‘wanted as much labour as [they] could get’ throughout the 
conflict – ensuring that their individual requirements were met at all times 
was paramount, according to Lindsay. Therefore, even during periods where 
their own demands for labour were not so pronounced, the departments 
proved ‘very reluctant’ to release unskilled labour for employment elsewhere 
on the western front.124 Whereas in a civilian business during a period of 
slack the wage costs of unproductive workers compelled employers to lay 
off unnecessary employees to protect profit levels, the absence of a profit 
margin in the BEF gave individual officers little inclination to willingly 
surrender labourers for service in other departments. The fear that they 
would not receive ‘their’ labour back when required appeared to supersede 
all other considerations.
As demonstrated earlier in the war with regards to individual units’ 
reluctance to embrace canal transport to relieve pressure on the overburdened 
railway network, departmental desires to retain unskilled labour eclipsed 
considerations of the BEF’s priorities as a whole. Consequently, the acceptance 
of any downgrade – however temporary – in the allocation of manpower 
was something to be fiercely resisted and combatted by the submission of 
‘extravagant’ demands for labour. As Lindsay recalled after the war:
[hearing] a high official … say, ‘If no ships came into my ports for thirty days, I 
would whitewash all my buildings and relay all my track sooner than let another 
damned department have a single man of mine’. He was no doubt an extreme 
example, but there was a trace of that spirit in most administrative services.125
Individual departments essentially competed with one another for the finite 
resources available, rather than accepting a number of labourers allocated 
according to the BEF’s needs. There was, noted Brigadier-General Lawson 
in a report into the number of men employed behind the lines, ‘not one 
army but many armies’ – for whom mutual help was anathema.126
124 Lindsay, ‘The organisation of labour in the army’, p. 72.
125 Lindsay, ‘The organisation of labour in the army’, p. 72.
126 TNA, WO 106/362, physical categories and number of men employed out of the 
fighting area in France; Report by Lt. Gen. H. M. Lawson CB, 16 Jan. 1917, p. 19.
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Far from being alleviated by the influx of civilians into positions of 
authority, the entrenched attitudes of individual departments were heavily 
reinforced. Ralph Wedgwood had been specifically appointed as director 
of docks because of his working knowledge of port operations, honed by 
years of experience at the North-Eastern Railway. Unsurprisingly, he felt 
little compulsion to consult labour officers over the employment of men at 
the docks, and was unwilling to surrender control over the manpower that 
he considered integral to the continued functioning of his directorate. In 
October 1918 Wedgwood did agree to the constitution of a committee that 
comprised himself, the controller of labour (Wace), a representative of the 
QMG’s office and the principal naval transport officer, who was responsible 
for the naval aspects of operations at the docks. However, the committee’s 
terms of reference explicitly stated that no ‘fundamental changes’ to labour 
allocation at the ports were to be considered, which meant that Wedgwood 
would retain overall control of labour distribution within the docks 
regardless of the committee’s deliberations. Ultimately, the committee 
provided a platform for representatives of the various departments engaged 
at the docks to air their views and resulted in: the institution of weekly 
meetings at which issues could be discussed; an acceptance from the navy 
that labour could be released for service away from the ports in quiet 
periods; and an agreement that statistics compiled by each department 
would be made available to the others for consultation.127 The agreement, 
Wace acknowledged – particularly in terms of the establishment of weekly 
meetings – did ‘undoubted good’ in what remained of the war.128
Wedgwood’s protectionist attitude towards his authority over the 
directorate of docks’ work demonstrates that the introduction of Britain’s 
transport experts into positions of seniority within the BEF brought its 
own complications. The fact that there appears to have been a degree of 
confidentiality attached to the circulation of statistics between departments 
illustrates the continued existence of compartmentalized thinking within 
the BEF during the First World War. Lindsay ascribed this in part to the ‘bad 
competitive habits’ of the ‘capitalists’ drawn into the BEF following Geddes’s 
appointment as DGT.129 Wedgwood’s conception of his own duties and the 
extent of his own jurisdiction made him resistant to accepting criticism of 
the working practices for which he was ultimately responsible, particularly 
when those working practices had helped contribute to an unambiguously 
vast improvement in the discharge rates achieved at the ports under the 
127 TNA, WO 107/37, labour force report, Appendix Z, 2 Oct. 1918.
128 TNA, WO 107/37, labour force report, p. 104.
129 Lindsay, ‘The organisation of labour in the army’, pp. 78–9.
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BEF’s control. The result, Wace noted pointedly after the war, was that ‘the 
attitude assumed’ within Wedgwood’s directorate ‘appeared to be that so 
long as the quick turnaround of ships was secured, no other consideration 
had any weight’.130
Wedgwood’s actions in the latter part of the war undermined Lloyd 
George’s ‘rhetoric that the great feats of wartime organization were achieved 
by civilian experts’, unaided if not actively hindered by insular and self-
preserving soldiers.131 Civilianization was not a panacea to the organizational 
difficulties faced by the BEF that Lloyd George later proclaimed it to have 
been. The treatment of individual departments as personal fiefdoms was 
not an accusation that could be levelled solely at the military professionals. 
Both Fairfax and Wedgwood, the career soldier and the civilian specialist, 
pointed to their results to justify their approaches to the tasks for which 
they were responsible. Yet while the former saw the encroachment of 
civilian business methods as an unnecessary distraction from his duties, the 
latter drew upon the unequivocal message of progress that emerged from 
the quantitative analysis of his work to bolster his position and defend the 
utility of his methods.
Conclusion
Without access to the raw data it is impossible to assess the extent to which the 
directorate-general of transportation’s data-gathering and analysis methods 
provided the catalyst for the operational improvements charted over the 
course of 1917 and 1918. The surviving records certainly demonstrate that 
the esprit de corps generated by the achievement of strong results provided a 
boon to productivity among the units under the directorate’s control, while 
the unequivocal clarity of numerical representations of work done made the 
identification of inefficiencies easier. However, it is unclear how much of 
the increases made in, for example, the discharge rates at the ports were due 
to better working and supervisory practices enacted by Ralph Wedgwood 
and how much was the result of practice-based improvements and the 
introduction of new equipment to augment the existing capacity of the 
docks. As Theodore Stewart recognized after the war, men engaged on the 
tasks that underpinned the BEF’s transport infrastructure simply got better 
at their jobs the more they did them. Stewart noted that men for whom the 
duties of road making and repairing were ‘entirely new’ in July 1916 had, 
130 TNA, WO 107/37, labour force report, p. 99.
131 K. Grieves, ‘The transportation mission to GHQ, 1916’, in ‘Look to Your Front!’ Studies 
in the First World War by the British Commission for Military History, ed. B. Bond et al. 
(Staplehurst, 1999), pp. 63–78, at p. 74.
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through repetition and training, ‘gained quite a reputation’ for the work 
within six months.132 As the general principle within the BEF was to retain 
men on the same class of work to help improve their skills and efficiency, it 
is unsurprising to see that they became more efficient as the war progressed.
Eric Geddes’s powerful dual roles of DGT in France and DGMR in 
London, coupled with the unequivocal support he received from his 
superiors, insulated him from the constraints under which the BEF’s 
professional soldiers had operated before the battle of the Somme. As 
Henniker reflected in the official history:
The realisation of such great programmes for the provision of men and materials 
would have been impossible under the conditions existing during the first two 
years of the war. Under the earlier conditions demands from France to the War 
Office for transportation personnel and material were met with the answer 
‘the man-power situation does not permit’, ‘there is no labour available’, ‘the 
Ministry of Munitions will not allocate the steel’, ‘the Board of Trade say that 
the rolling stock cannot be spared’, ‘the Admiralty say they cannot find the 
shipping’.133
The evolving understanding among Britain’s military and political 
leadership of the character of industrial, material-intensive warfare – and of 
the implications for the transport infrastructure upon which the conduct 
of colossal operations depended – weakened the constraints that Henniker 
recalled bitterly after the war. Geddes operated outside the previously rigid 
hierarchies that had subordinated the BEF’s transport requirements on the 
western front to those of the artillery, the infantry and the needs of domestic 
industry. However, the freedom he and his colleagues enjoyed within the 
BEF was not limitless. Over the final two years of the war, Britain’s transport 
experts were exposed to the constraints and compromises necessary for the 
successful prosecution of a global, coalition war effort.
132 T. Stewart, ‘With the Labour Corps in France’, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 
lxxiv (1929), 567–71, at p. 567.
133 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 226.
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8. The balancing act: Britain’s transport experts, the 
global war effort and coalition warfare, 1916–18
Lawson Billinton had seen little of the world beyond southern England before 
18 March 1917 when, as a temporarily commissioned lieutenant-colonel in 
the Royal Engineers, he departed the country ‘for a destination unknown’.1 
By the time he set foot on British soil once again the following June, the 
LBSCR’s locomotive engineer had discussed the condition of Romania’s 
railways with King Ferdinand I; inspected the oil fields and refineries of 
Baku; drawn his revolver upon the stationmaster at Kharkov; diverted the 
journey of an American ship in the Sea of Japan; and circumnavigated the 
globe. Billinton’s wartime travels underline the First World War’s global 
dimensions, and illustrate how civilian expertise could be applied to the 
wider allied war effort. From late 1916 until the end of the war Britain’s 
transport experts were exposed to the peculiar demands of an international 
alliance.
This chapter investigates the manner in which Britain’s transport experts 
navigated the challenges of multifaceted coalition warfare following Sir 
Eric Geddes’s appointment as DGT and DGMR. Both on and beyond 
the western front Britain’s transport contribution to the allied war effort 
expanded as the relative strengths of its partners waxed and waned under 
the sustained pressure of the ongoing conflict. From working in relatively 
small-scale roles with limited, localized objectives during the first half 
of the war, the second half of the conflict saw Britain’s transport experts 
become immersed in the solution of international supply challenges 
that demonstrated the global interconnectivity of the various fronts and 
belligerents that contested the First World War.
The deployment of Britain’s transport experts, both to new theatres 
and to work alongside different allies, illustrates two things: that the 
transportation problems caused by modern, material-intensive warfare 
could not be tackled by nations working in isolation from one another; and 
that the complexities of alliance warfare stretched beyond the machinations 
of the political and military high commands. The continued difficulties 
of supplying a worldwide war effort, with a voracious appetite for finite 
1 K. Marx, Lawson Billinton: a Career Cut Short (Usk, 2007), p. 78.
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resources and raw materials, necessitated the consideration of supply 
and transportation questions at a supranational level. The war’s demands 
required the application of British technical expertise to the solution of 
inter-allied transport problems, within the delicate balance of a fragile 
partnership. In the final two years of the war, Geddes, Billinton, and their 
contemporaries from across the British empire faced fresh obstacles to the 
execution of their duties. Their experiences of coalition warfare illuminate 
the challenges – cultural, political and strategic – that were an ever-present 
feature of the conduct of modern warfare alongside sovereign states with 
their own priorities and national interests.
Defining the global requirements of the British war effort
In his initial memorandum to Sir Guy Granet about the nascent directorate-
general of military railways, Geddes acknowledged the distinctiveness of 
the directorate-general of transportation in France compared to the extant 
hierarchies in Britain’s other expeditionary forces. When the latter wrote to 
the former in October 1916 he was, as the ‘inspecting officer’ for transportation 
on the western front, in the process of preparing ‘a very definite statement 
of requirements in tons per week, working up to the maximum, together 
with the provision of locomotives, rolling stock, permanent way, personnel 
and so on, necessary to meet [the BEF’s] requirements. We have, however, 
no similar organization in the other theatres’.2 Before Geddes could be 
satisfied that the transport facilities behind Britain’s multiple forces were 
sufficient to support the demands of the troops in their respective theatres, 
he appreciated the need for the War Office to obtain ‘a very clear and 
definite statement from each theatre of war as to what is wanted, together 
with the date upon which it is required’.3
Geddes was reluctant to base his assessment of the needs of Britain’s 
various expeditionary forces upon the judgments hitherto put forward by 
soldiers. As he explained to Granet, ‘the soldier, as opposed to the civilian, 
asks for less than he really ought to have and – in my private opinion – this 
is due to the way in which he has been made to cheespare, and the fear he 
has of the Treasury, on account of the lean years before the war’. Geddes 
believed that Britain’s soldiers had ‘consistently put forward demands far 
below the real needs of the situation’ throughout the war – an activity that 
had contributed greatly to the deficiencies he had witnessed behind the 
western front. Consequently, he felt unable to accept that ‘the very modest 
demands’ from Salonika, Egypt, Mesopotamia and East Africa were an 
2 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/51, memorandum to Granet, pp. 3–4.
3 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/51, memorandum to Granet, p. 5.
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accurate reflection of those theatres’ resource requirements. The solution 
Geddes proposed was to replicate the transportation mission of August–
September 1916; he suggested that ‘we … carefully select the best man we 
can get and send him out, with a small secretarial staff, to consult with the 
Administrative directors and commander-in-chief, in Salonika and Egypt, 
and another man to do the same thing in Mesopotamia and East Africa’.4 
Sir Francis Dent’s investigations in the former, discussed in chapter four, 
represented the first of a series of investigations undertaken by civilian 
experts to identify the transport implications of Britain’s global war effort.
Dent’s assignment demonstrates Geddes’s recognition both of the 
interdependence of Britain’s myriad commitments to the fighting and 
the need to apportion resources on the basis of an overarching, long-term 
strategy. Railway wagons despatched to France could not be made available 
to serve General Murray’s troops in Egypt, while every yard of light railway 
track sent to the western front was a yard of track that could not be laid 
behind General Milne’s forces at Salonika. Ahead of Dent’s departure for the 
Mediterranean, the Army Council outlined the constraints that prolonged, 
material-intensive warfare had placed upon the British empire’s ability to 
provide for its armies in the field. In letters sent to both Murray and Milne 
the council emphasized
that it may be impossible to meet urgent demands from the various theatres 
of war, and to decide upon the relative urgency of these demands, unless 
the Army Council is provided with the fullest information on the subject 
as far as possible in advance of the date when the need becomes acute. 
The present situation is that the supply of raw materials and the industrial 
capacity available is over-taxed … The Army Council therefore has decided 
that it is more desirable that a complete survey of the requirements of the 
various theatres of war for transportation material should be made by experts 
who in consultation with the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief in the 
various theatres of war would consider the situation as a whole so that as far 
as possible provision may be made to meet the future demands of the various 
campaigns.5
For Murray in particular news of the ‘present situation’ came as no 
surprise. Arthur Webb, the Egyptian State Railways’ agent in England, had 
already reported his ‘great difficulty in obtaining ordinary stores for the 
maintenance of the Railway’ on 4 October – a challenge greatly exacerbated 
4 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/51, memorandum to Granet, p. 4.
5 TNA, MT 23/677/9, mission of Sir Francis Dent to Egypt and Salonika to investigate 
land transportation questions. Request to naval transport staffs to afford him all possible 
facilities, Cubitt to Milne, 24 Oct. 1916; Cubitt to Murray, 24 Oct. 1916.
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by the voluminous orders for railway materials placed by the BEF in the 
wake of Geddes’s mission to the western front.6
Whereas Sir Douglas Haig – as the field commander of the BEF 
– advocated strongly and consistently throughout his tenure for the 
concentration of British resources within his theatre of operations, his 
first DGT on the western front had to take account of his wider brief. As 
DGMR, Geddes was tasked both with the fulfilment of the British army’s 
global transportation needs and with coordinating the War Office’s policy 
to increase the exploitation of local resources within the extra-European 
campaigns to preserve British shipping capacity. The increasing success of 
German and Austrian U-boats in the Mediterranean during 1916 reached 
its peak in the last quarter of the year, as 248,018 tons of cargo were lost 
between October and December – the period in which Dent’s investigation 
took place.7 Following Dent’s advice that Britain – both for shipping and 
industrial capacity reasons – could not fulfil all of the EEF’s demands for 
the materials considered necessary to construct new strategic lines, Murray’s 
staff placed orders in India and the shipment of 822 miles of track from 
the sub-continent commenced on 1 January 1917.8 By July of that year, 
when Brigadier-General John Stewart undertook a second investigation of 
circumstances in Egypt, the main line behind the EEF had progressed some 
138 miles towards Palestine from its base on the Suez Canal.9
Stewart’s visit to Egypt reflected the EEF’s amended role following Lloyd 
George’s appointment as prime minister, rather than any deficiencies with 
Dent’s work the previous year. In early 1917 Murray was ordered to abandon 
his policy of aggressive defence in the desert to the east of the canal, and 
to use the summer months to prepare for ‘large scale operations’ later in 
the year. The single-line from the canal at Qantara, originally constructed 
to supply the troops engaged in forward defensive positions, became the 
principal supply artery for the EEF’s proposed advance into Gaza and 
beyond.10 Murray claimed in early May that the existing infrastructure 
was ‘barely sufficient’ to sustain the existing force, and predicted that the 
‘railway would be strained to its limit’ following the arrival of the 74th and 
6 TNA, WO 95/4379, branches and services. Deputy quarter-master general, diary entry, 
4 Oct. 1916.
7 K. C. Ulrichsen, The Logistics and Politics of the British Campaigns in the Middle East, 
1914–22 (Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 64–5.
8 TNA, WO 95/4389, DRT war diary, diary entries, 9 and 14 Nov. 1916; WO 95/4379, 
deputy QMG war diary, diary entry, 29 Dec. 1916.
9 TNA, WO 106/720, Stewart (railway) commission: precis of report, July 1917, p. 2.
10 M. Carver, The National Army Museum Book of the Turkish Front, 1914–1918: the 
Campaigns at Gallipoli, in Mesopotamia and in Palestine (London, 2004), pp. 94, 96.
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75th divisions.11 He had pressed for authorization to double-track the line 
in April but stressed to London that the Egyptian State Railways could 
not supply further material. However, as over two million tons of British, 
allied and neutral shipping had been sunk between February and April 
1917 – and a further 320,000 tons had been damaged by enemy action 
following Germany’s adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare – the 
effective allocation of the available shipping tonnage exercised British 
strategic planners even more thoroughly than had been the case earlier in 
the conflict.12 Consequently, London had to be satisfied that the requested 
materials were fundamental to the success of military operations.13
According to L. S. Simpson, who accompanied Stewart on the mission, 
such was the importance attached to the investigation that Geddes originally 
intended to lead it himself.14 However, in May 1917, Lloyd George appointed 
the latter as controller of the Royal Navy in response to ‘the mismanagement 
of resources, particularly of supply’, which the prime minister perceived to 
be rife within the Admiralty.15 Therefore, leadership of the mission passed 
on to the man said, according to Haig, ‘to be about the ablest builder of 
railways in the world’.16 Stewart was tasked to examine whether the EEF’s 
intended operations were feasible given the existing capacity of the railway 
line, and to identify the improvements and equipment required should the 
force advance to Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut, Tripoli, Homs and Aleppo (the latter 
being almost 600 miles from Qantara).17
Stewart’s report combined encouragement for the immediate future 
of operations in Palestine with forecasts of the theatre’s resource 
requirements should the EEF press the Ottomans into a significant retreat. 
He acknowledged that sea transport offered a ‘useful supplement to the 
railway’, but warned against further dependence being placed upon such 
11 History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, ed. H. L. Pritchard (11 vols., Chatham, 1952), vi. 
276–7.
12 D. Stevenson, 1917: War, Peace, and Revolution (Oxford, 2017), pp. 67–87; K. C. 
Ulrichsen, The First World War in the Middle East (London, 2014), pp. 44–5.
13 Ulrichsen, The Logistics and Politics of the British Campaigns, p. 56.
14 L. S. Simpson, ‘Railway operating in France’, Journal of the Institution of Locomotive 
Engineers, xii (1922), 697–728, at p. 711. Simpson and Stewart were accompanied on the 
mission by Colonel William McLellan, a Scottish electrical engineer and partner in the 
consultancy firm Merz and McLellan. Prior to the war the firm had worked alongside the 
North-Eastern Railway on the electrification of local lines in the Tyneside area.
15 K. Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace (Manchester, 
1989), p. 41.
16 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/110, diary entry, 17 Feb. 1917.
17 Simpson, ‘Railway operating in France’, p. 712.
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an ‘unsecure source of supply’.18 Consequently, he confirmed that – unlike 
in France, where the existence of roads, light railways and IWT provided 
the BEF with a range of transport options – the EEF had to rely almost 
exclusively upon the construction and operation of the railway line across 
the desert. Stewart concluded that the force’s seventy-seven locomotives 
and 1,300 wagons were ‘ample for present and sufficient for immediate 
prospective requirements’, and that the existing personnel in Egypt were 
capable of running sixteen trains per day over the line from Qantara to Jaffa 
once ongoing construction work was completed. Therefore, he considered 
it ‘unnecessary to double the track or to send out additional rolling stock’ 
provided the EEF was ‘not largely increased’ and halted at Jaffa. However, 
if the force advanced beyond the Jerusalem–Jaffa line, Stewart advised, the 
doubling of the line at least as far as Rafa would become necessary and he 
recommended that one hundred miles of track be made available to the 
Egyptian authorities to ‘meet unforeseen eventualities’.19
Alongside providing London with an unequivocal, independent statement 
of the theatre’s potential requirements, Stewart’s report illustrates that 
Britain’s transport experts did not always agree with each other’s methods 
and projections. Murray’s DRT in Egypt was the highly experienced 
Brigadier-General Sir George Macauley, who had become the Egyptian 
State Railways’ general manager after a career in the Royal Engineers that 
included active service in Kitchener’s Sudanese campaign. Stewart believed, 
regardless of Macauley’s knowledge of both civilian and military railway 
operations in the region, that the latter’s estimate of the rolling stock 
required to service the EEF’s advance into Palestine was excessive. Macauley 
had based his forecasts upon a prospective locomotive mileage per day of 
forty-three miles, which broadly equated to the extant figures recorded 
in France during April 1917.20 Stewart asserted that a locomotive mileage 
of ‘not less than’ sixty-six miles per day ‘should be assumed and worked 
on in all estimates of rolling stock requirements for any extensive railway 
developments in Palestine’.21 It is unclear whether Stewart drew his figures 
from the mileage that the directorate-general of transportation considered to 
be an achievable target on the French railways. If so, his projection proved to 
be somewhat unambitious, and Macauley’s figure remarkably conservative 
18 TNA, WO 106/720, Stewart commission report, p. 5.
19 TNA, WO 106/720, Stewart commission report, p. 4.
20 TNA, WO 106/720, Stewart commission report, p. 4; J. G. Beharrell, ‘The value of full 
and accurate statistics: as shown under emergency conditions in the transportation service 
in France’, Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation Number, 21 Sept. 1920, pp. 37–9, at 
p. 38.
21 TNA, WO 106/720, Stewart commission report, p. 4.
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for the Egyptian theatre. Whereas the highest figure for locomotive mileage 
recorded by the ROD in France was just over fifty-five miles per day, the 
average goods engine on the Egyptian front ‘ran at least 1,000 miles and 
sometimes 1,400 miles a week’ during March 1918.22
General Edmund Allenby’s appointment as commander-in-chief of the 
EEF on 27 June 1917 changed the EEF’s outlook once again, and forced the 
War Office to confront the hitherto hypothetical additional resources listed 
in Stewart and Macauley’s estimates. Before the new commander arrived 
in Cairo, Lloyd George ‘promised to deliver all the men and resources 
Allenby might consider necessary’ to realize the prime minister’s ambition 
of ‘Jerusalem by Christmas’. If the soldier ‘cheespared’ and the enterprise 
failed, Lloyd George warned, responsibility for the failure would fall upon 
Allenby alone.23 The latter took the prime minister’s advice seriously, and 
demanded another infantry division, five squadrons of aircraft, more 
artillery and additional engineer, signals and medical units to augment his 
forces for the assaults on Gaza and Beersheba.24 The demands of Third Ypres 
meant that Allenby’s requests were not met in full, but the War Cabinet 
insisted that he should ‘strike the Turks as hard as possible’ by the autumn.25 
On 21 July he received the authorization to double the line from Qantara 
to Rafa that Murray had requested in May, and the arrival of two more 
railway construction companies – which doubled the number attached to 
the EEF – permitted construction to proceed at a rate of one mile per day 
as preparations for the advance intensified.26
The railway behind the EEF was fundamental to the success of Allenby’s 
1917 and 1918 campaigns. The artillery support for the assault on Gaza 
from 31 October comprised a concentration of guns the equivalent of that 
assembled by the BEF on 1 July 1916, and it fired the heaviest bombardment 
to take place outside Europe in the entire war.27 As Rob Johnson has 
observed, Allenby resisted pressure from London to attack before his forces 
were at full strength and prepared.28 His methodical approach ensured the 
EEF achieved both numerical and material superiority over the defending 
Ottomans, which precipitated the latter’s abandonment of Gaza on 6 
22 Beharrell, ‘The value of full and accurate statistics’, p. 38; ‘The Palestine campaign’, 
Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation Number, 21 Sept. 1920, pp. 119–28, at p. 127.
23 L. James, Imperial Warrior: the Life and Times of Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby 1861–
1936 (London, 1993), p. 111.
24 Carver, The National Army Museum Book of the Turkish Front, pp. 207–8; James, 
Imperial Warrior, p. 118.
25 R. Johnson, The Great War and the Middle East: a Strategic Study (Oxford, 2016), p. 193.
26 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, vi. 277.
27 Ulrichsen, The Logistics and Politics of the British Campaigns, p. 73.
28 Johnson, The Great War and the Middle East, p. 199.
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November. By the middle of the month the force had advanced sixty miles, 
despite considerable logistical difficulties.29 ‘Appalling weather conditions’ 
rendered the tracks and roads in the Judean hills almost impassable. However, 
thanks to the ‘untiring work’ of the EEF’s labourers, the necessary repairs 
to the existing rail and road networks around Jerusalem were completed 
in time for Allenby to press on and deliver Lloyd George’s ‘Christmas 
present to the nation’ on 9 December.30 When the advance recommenced 
the following September the double-track to Rafa carried more than 2,000 
tons of supplies per day, while at its peak the 5,500-strong ROD in Egypt 
and Palestine operated 169 locomotives, 2,573 wagons, fifty passenger 
coaches and ninety-eight hospital coaches. While mechanical transport and 
coastal shipping took on an increased role after the EEF advanced beyond 
Damascus in October 1918, the 627 miles of standard-gauge track laid 
under Macauley’s direction ‘were probably the most important single factor 
in achieving the superiority in numbers and material resources which made 
the [EEF’s] final campaign so decisive’.31
Closer to home, an even longer railway line consumed the attentions 
of Britain’s transport experts from early 1917. The establishment of a 
1,460-mile-long overland route from the French Channel coast to the 
heel of Italy, conceived to improve communications between Britain and 
the eastern Mediterranean, exemplified the increased exposure of British 
expertise to transport operations in continental Europe after the battles of 
1916. Before 1914 the normal route for passengers travelling between Britain 
and India had involved an overland journey from the Channel to Marseille 
or Brindisi, and railway services had been synchronized with the departure 
and arrival times of ships at the two ports. As Britain’s war effort expanded 
around the globe – bringing with it demands for the movement of military 
personnel, government officials, nurses and civilian specialists to theatres 
outside western Europe – the French and Italian authorities began to 
complain about being ‘crowded out of their own trains’ by British travellers.32 
The British and French governments had agreed to the establishment of a 
new line of communications for the transport of troops from the western 
front to Salonika, via the Italian and Greek railways, at an inter-allied 
conference on 20 October 1916.33 However, activity only really began on 7 
29 Stevenson, 1917, p. 345.
30 Ulrichsen, The Logistics and Politics of the British Campaigns, pp. 44, 73.
31 D. Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London, 2011), p. 
235; Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, vi. 410.
32 A. M. Henniker, History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western Front, 1914–1918 
(London, 1937), p. 287.
33 TNA, CAB 28/1, papers I.C. 0–12, Conclusions of the Anglo-French conference held at 
Boulogne, 20 Oct. 1916, p. 3.
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January 1917, when delegates from Britain, France and Italy approved the 
development of an overland route with ‘the object[s] of diminishing the 
length of communications by sea, which are at present seriously threatened 
by submarine attack, and reducing the [allies’] dependence on sea 
transport’.34 The Italian minister of transport agreed to discuss the project 
with representatives from France and Britain, and the following day Lord 
Milner instructed Geddes to identify a suitable expert for the mission. The 
latter selected Guy Calthrop, the LNWR’s general manager, who pursued 
the task with great energy in the weeks that followed.
Geddes’s civil–military mission of the previous summer provided the 
blueprint for Calthrop’s. Alongside the LNWR’s superintendent, Calthrop 
was accompanied by the Royal Navy’s Commodore Irwin and army 
officers from the QMG’s department and the directorates of equipment 
and ordnance stores, medical services and railway traffic.35 The party left 
Charing Cross on 14 January, just a week after the allies had agreed to 
develop the line, and completed its work within three weeks. Calthrop’s 
final report was submitted on 7 February, exactly one month after the 
inter-allied conference in Rome had authorized the examination.36 In it, he 
looked favourably upon the overland route but acknowledged significant 
obstacles to the scheme’s realization. The available facilities at Cherbourg, 
the only port to which the cross-Channel voyage was short and that was 
not already in use ‘to its full extent for the BEF in France’, were limited. 
The French navy occupied the port’s dockyard, the pier had been pressed 
into constant action to replace berthing accommodation used by the 
BEF at other French ports and the railway connections from the small 
commercial port that remained ‘needed much alteration’.37 Given these 
deficiencies, Calthrop estimated the capacity of Cherbourg to be between 
1,200 and 1,400 tons per day. However, as with Francis Dent’s projections 
of the Bassin Loubet’s capacity two years earlier, Calthrop’s figures proved 
over ambitious. As Henniker noted after the war, ‘in actual practice only 
about 600 tons per day was attained’ from the Bassin du Commerce at 
Cherbourg in 1917–18.38
If Cherbourg provided the northern terminus of the overland route by 
default, several options for the Mediterranean terminus were considered 
34 TNA, CAB 28/2, papers I.C. 13–32, Conclusions of a conference, 5–7 Jan. 1917, p. 1.
35 TNA, CAB 24/7/11, proposed overland route to Salonica, Calthrop to Derby, 7 Feb. 
1917, p. 1.
36 TNA, CAB 24/7/11, proposed overland route to Salonica, Diary of the work of the War 
Office mission.
37 TNA, CAB 24/7/11, proposed overland route to Salonica, Calthrop to Derby, 7 Feb. 
1917, pp. 3–7; Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 289.
38 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 289 n. 2.
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before Taranto was selected. The commercial port at Taranto could only be 
reached through ‘a very congested station’, and Calthrop was ‘convinced 
that a very serious delay would take place’ if traffic for the allied forces at 
Salonika ran through Taranto to the commercial quay.39 To avoid the city 
the Italian naval commander at Taranto recommended the development 
of a location to the east, on the south side of the Mar Piccolo. An entirely 
new port had to be constructed on the site and a multinational force under 
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Langbridge Morgan, chief 
engineer of the LBSCR before 1914, commenced work that summer. By 
January 1918 they had created what Colonel Rhys Williams described as ‘a 
remarkable achievement’: 
A bare hill-side in July, 1917, had been transformed into the site of a camp capable 
of containing 15,000 men, most of whom are housed in stone or Nissen huts. 
One hundred and eighty-eight Nissen huts have already been erected. Hospitals 
containing 520 beds have been built. A stone-built quay with six wooden 
jetties, each of sufficient depth to load three barges at a time, is in working 
order. Alongside the warehouses six sidings each 700 yards in length have been 
completed, and the warehouses are connected with the quay by a Decauville line. 
The Triage is in working order with seven lines 1,000 yards long.40
The fact that sufficient materials to create the new port were redirected to 
Taranto underscores the importance attached to the development of the 
overland route during 1917, which the war policy committee hoped in June 
would eventually account for 36,000 of the 51,000 tons per month required 
by the British forces in Salonika and Egypt.41 The committee’s aspirations 
were never met. It took until early July for the labour and materials required 
to construct the terminus to be despatched to southern Italy and, although a 
passenger service commenced operations on 28 June, the first consignment 
of goods for Taranto did not leave Cherbourg until 8 August. A regular 
service of two trains per day from the Channel to the Mediterranean did 
not begin until the final week of October 1917.
At that point the war intervened to stymie the development of the 
Cherbourg–Taranto route. On 24 October, German and Austrian forces 
broke through in the upper Isonzo valley and sent the Italian army into a 
desperate retreat. Within a week Italian troops had fallen back as far as their 
39 TNA, CAB 24/7/11, proposed overland route to Salonica, Calthrop to Derby, 7 Feb. 
1917, pp. 7–8.
40 ‘The Mediterranean line of communication’, Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation 
Number, 21 Sept. 1920, pp. 101–7, at p. 103.
41 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/4/145, shipping allotted to overseas expeditions 
outside France. Interim report by General Smuts, 23 June 1917, p. 1.
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rearmost defensive positions on the River Tagliamento, some forty-five 
miles away from the Isonzo, and the French and British governments had 
resolved to bolster their ally with reinforcements drawn from the western 
front. The goods service between Cherbourg and Taranto was suspended on 
30 October, and the first British troops entrained for Mantua a week later.42 
Supply trains for Salonika and Egypt did not recommence until January 
1918 and, following another suspension in response to the German spring 
offensives in March and April, the Cherbourg–Taranto line recorded its 
highest traffic figures in June 1918.43 However, even the 725 tons per day 
carried on the line in the summer of 1918 fell well short of Calthrop’s initial 
estimates.
The root causes for these relatively low returns lay with the allies rather 
than the central powers. While the construction of the facilities required to 
transfer goods from shore to ship demonstrated that the allies could work 
collaboratively to solve the supply challenges raised by the First World War, the 
provision of railway equipment to operate between Cherbourg and Taranto 
highlighted the technical constraints that existed between sovereign states 
lacking in standardized infrastructure. In his February 1917 report Calthrop 
produced various calculations for the route’s locomotive, rolling stock and 
engine crew requirements (see Table 8.1). The Italians confirmed their ability 
to provide the locomotives required for four marches on their own soil, but 
warned that the engines for any additional marches had to be provided by the 
British. The French were similarly accommodating, and committed to supply 
the passenger coaches and locomotives for four marches on French soil. 
However, as Sir Guy Granet noted, this agreement stood ‘only on condition 
that they are immediately replaced by British coaches and locomotives of 
equal capacity’. The French minister of war accepted that French rolling stock 
should be employed along the entire route, but demanded that the British 
shipped replacement wagons to run on the French main lines as soon as the 
Cherbourg–Taranto service commenced. Granet acknowledged that the 
demand for 6,000 wagons was ‘a large number’, but believed that ‘the British 
railways might manage it at a pinch’.44
The outlook for motive power was far less positive. Before the war the 
British railways possessed approximately 23,000 locomotives. In peacetime 
roughly 600 of those locomotives were withdrawn from service and replaced 
with new stock each year. However, the outbreak of war had dislocated the 
locomotive building and overhauling processes in Britain, as materials and 
42 Stevenson, 1917, pp. 227–31.
43 Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 294–5.
44 TNA, CAB 24/7/11, proposed overland route to Salonica, Calthrop to Derby, 7 Feb. 
1917, pp. 9–10; memorandum by Sir Guy Granet, 22 Feb. 1917, p. 3.
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manpower were redirected into the fulfilment of the armed forces’ various 
requirements. The SECR built just two locomotives and reconstructed one 
engine during the war, while across the country as a whole just 803 new 
engines were put into traffic between August 1914 and April 1917. At the 
same time the British railway companies had despatched 420 locomotives 
overseas and received ‘urgent requests’ for another 150 engines. ‘Owing to 
a want of men and materials’, the REC advised the War Cabinet, Britain’s 
railways were ‘short of no less than 1,600 locomotives’ in May 1917. The 
REC complained that ‘when an undertaking was given to send … 380 
locomotives to France it was distinctly understood that the Companies 
would be put in a position to replace them at once and details of all materials 
required for the purpose were sent to the Ministry of Munitions’. The 
ministry, the committee claimed, had failed to supply the items requested 
by the railway companies or ensure that engines under manufacture with 
private locomotive builders were requisitioned and placed at the railway 
companies’ disposal.45
45 TNA, CAB 24/14/83, memorandum by the REC. Shortage of materials for repairs and 
renewal of permanent way, locomotives, carriages and wagons, 24 May 1917, pp. 3–4.
Table 8.1. The equipment and personnel required for operation 
of the overland route to Salonika, February 1917.
1 daily 
passenger 
train
1 daily 
passenger train 
and 3 daily 
goods trains 
(700–800 tons)
1 daily 
passenger train 
and 5 daily 
goods trains 
(1,100–1,300 
tons) †
1 daily 
passenger train 
and 9 daily 
goods trains 
(2,000–2,400 
tons) ‡
Passenger coaches 400 400 400 400
Wagons (10-ton 
capacity) 0 2,000 3,300 6,000
Locomotives 22 88 182 370
Drivers 22 88 132 220
Firemen 22 88 132 220
Notes: The figure of 2,000 wagons was arrived at as follows: each train was limited to 40 
wagons at 3 trains per day. Fifteen days were allowed for the round trip, and a 10 per cent 
allowance was made for spares.
† = Projected capacity of Cherbourg without additional harbour works.
‡ = Ultimate capacity considered.
Source: TNA, CAB 24/7/11, proposed overland route to Salonica via Cherbourg and Taranto. 
Brief summary of Mr. Calthrop’s report, memorandum on proposed overland route to Salonica 
by Sir Guy Granet, 22 Feb. 1917, p. 3.
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Britain’s transport experts were asked to do as much as required with as 
little as possible during the war, in conditions which exerted great strain on 
the domestic railway network. ‘The movement of traffic over the Railways 
at the moment’, the REC highlighted, ‘is greatly in excess of what it was in 
1913 which was the busiest year the Companies had experienced prior to the 
War. This greatly increased traffic is being operated with less locomotives, 
less wagons and a greatly reduced Staff of efficient Railwaymen’. Unless 
steps were taken to allocate materials to the railways for new construction, 
the committee warned, ‘there is the possibility and even the probability 
of the position in this Country becoming from the traffic working point 
of view as bad as it had been in the North of France’.46 Consequently, the 
REC rejected requests to supply the projected 370 locomotives required to 
fulfil Calthrop’s highest estimate for the Cherbourg–Taranto line, as it was 
‘impossible for the Railways to find these engines and at the same time to 
deal with the traffic in this country’.47 
However, the existing stocks of the British railway companies 
represented the only immediately available source of locomotives for the 
new route to the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, in the wake of the 
REC’s memorandum, a gathering of locomotive engineers, goods managers 
and railway company superintendents were tasked to revisit the decisions 
made in December 1916 and identify further restrictions to domestic 
traffic that could free up locomotives for service overseas. Holiday traffic 
was subjected to further controls, express services were withdrawn, lightly 
loaded goods trains run for government departments were curtailed, 
passenger services were cancelled and the committee restated its request 
for ‘all the material [the railway companies] may require for the repair of 
their locomotives, wagons and permanent way’. By early July agreement 
had been reached for the despatch of 175 locomotives to the European 
theatres by November, but by the end of the year only 155 engines had 
actually departed British shores – well short of the number required to 
operate five goods trains per day between Cherbourg and Taranto.48 Yet 
although the overland route did not achieve the ambitious targets set for 
it by Calthrop in February 1917, it did ‘justify its existence’ by permitting 
the redirection of shipping tonnage to other duties and offering respite 
for soldiers deployed in inhospitable theatres. By the end of the war it 
had removed roughly 500,000 shipping tons and 350,000 troops from 
the submarine-infested waters of the Mediterranean, and provided 
46 TNA, CAB 24/14/83, memorandum by the REC, 24 May 1917, pp. 6–7.
47 TNA, CAB 24/14/83, memorandum by the REC, 24 May 1917, pp. 4–5.
48 E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War: Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and 
Achievements (2 vols., London, 1921), ii. 656–60.
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British troops in the unhealthy Macedonian theatre with opportunities to 
undertake periods of home leave.49
Britain’s transport experts and the limits of inter-allied cooperation 
The difficulties the allies experienced in providing the resources necessary 
to operate the Cherbourg–Taranto route indicated the diminishing 
quality and quantity of materials available to the belligerents as the war 
ground on. Like those of France, Germany and the other belligerents 
engaged in the material-intensive combat of the First World War, British 
resources were limited and required careful management. Britain’s relative 
distance from the destructive effects of the fighting did not isolate it 
from the gradual processes of erosion, wear and eventual breakdown that 
afflicted the machinery of its partners and enemies over the course of 
the conflict. As David Stevenson has noted, ‘governments and public 
alike resigned themselves to fighting into 1919 or even 1920’ during the 
spring and summer of 1917 – unable to accurately predict an end date for 
the hostilities, both sides were forced to balance fulfilling the material 
requirements of the front line with the continued maintenance of an 
operable transportation network.50
The nature of the support that had hitherto been supplied to the British 
by its hosts lay at the heart of a bitter dispute between the coalition’s 
senior partners shortly after Geddes’s arrival in France. In mid November 
1916 a letter from Joffre to the French mission at GHQ stated that the 
number of wagons allotted to British traffic had risen from between five 
and six thousand in January 1915 to 19,350 at the conclusion of the Somme 
offensive.51 Consequently, the French demanded that the British provide 
19,350 wagons as soon as possible to cover the BEF’s transport requirements 
and asked that the British be ready to supply a total of 54,000 wagons by 
the time the allies reached the German frontier.52 Following a meeting 
between British and French transport authorities a few days later, in 
which Geddes was adjudged to be ‘very liberal in the way he proposed to 
meet the French difficulties in their transport’, the British military attaché 
described the French approach in a letter to Lloyd George:
49 Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 296–7; ‘Mediterranean line of communication’, 
p. 107.
50 D. Stevenson, 1914–1918: the History of the First World War (London, 2004), p. 298.
51 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/1/5/16, translated copy of a letter from Joffre to the 
French mission at GHQ, including handwritten notes from Geddes dated 19 Nov. 1916.
52 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/1/5/17, locomotives and rolling stock for the British 
armies in France and Belgium, 24 Nov. 1916, p. 2.
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They showed a huckstering spirit and I do not think had any intention of 
trying to help us in any way. I gave [Albert] Claveille a bit of my mind today, 
and told him quite frankly that if the French authorities did not show a more 
conciliatory spirit to us, than they had shown at the conference yesterday, it 
would no doubt be necessary to reduce the size of our Army in France.53
Geddes was not prepared to take the estimates of his coalition partners at 
face value,54 and expressed doubts as to the motives behind Joffre’s request. 
He wrote to Lloyd George that the French demands were ‘excessive’, and 
expressed his conviction that ‘they neither expect to have them met in 
full, nor believe that it is possible to meet them in full’.55 On 13 December 
Claveille and Geddes reached a preliminary agreement for the British to 
provide 29,000 wagons over the following year, and to be prepared to 
supply 42,000 wagons in the event of a general advance.56
The winter weather in 1916–17 exacerbated the poor condition of the 
French railways. A severe frost set in during January 1917, which increased 
congestion and reduced the circulation of rolling stock around the 
network. On 24 January the situation became so acute that the French 
authorities placed an embargo on all military traffic for the French army 
other than supplies, ammunition and railway material. On the same day 
Geddes ‘extracted’ a ‘candid confession’ from Brigadier-General Camille 
Ragueneau, director of the French rearward services, that the French could 
see ‘no hope’ of being able to deal with more than the 150,000 tons per week 
received by the BEF at that time.57 Geddes’s choice of language in this letter 
is indicative of the state of suspicion that existed between the two transport 
authorities. ‘Unless we can get 200,000 tons carried from the ports weekly’, 
Haig wrote in his diary on 28 January, ‘we cannot carry out our offensive as 
early as we wish’.58 The new French commander-in-chief, General Robert 
Nivelle, refused to be persuaded by his counterpart’s position, and rather 
condescendingly advised the British Field Marshal that if it was
53 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/3/14/29, Le-Roy Lewis to Lloyd George, 22 Nov. 1916. 
Albert Claveille, an engineer and former director of the French State Railways, became 
under-secretary of state for transport in the French government on 14 Dec. 1916.
54 The DGT’s figures stated that approximately 12,000 of the wagons used for the BEF’s 
supply needs in Nov. 1916 had been provided by the French. See PA, Lloyd George papers, 
LG/E/6/1/5(A), memorandum on the question of railway wagon supply for the British army 
in France, by W. Guy Granet, 7 Nov. 1916, p. 1.
55 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/1/5/16, Translated copy of a letter from Joffre; 
LG/E/1/5/17 Locomotives and rolling stock, p. 6.
56 Les armées françaises dans la grande guerre: la direction de l’arrière (Paris, 1937), pp. 601–2; 
Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 247.
57 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/4/47, Geddes to Granet, 24 Jan. 1917.
58 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/110, diary entry, 28 Jan. 1917.
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impossible to collect all the personnel and material necessary to carry out the 
whole of the contemplated work [to improve the BEF’s transport position], it 
is essential that the various works be carried out according to their urgency, and 
that those indispensable for the first operations be carried out first, that is to 
say, those which have reference to offensive operations near Arras.59
Four days later, Haig ‘discussed the state of the French railways and the effect 
on our preparations for the offensive’ with his deputy chief of staff, Major-
General Richard Butler and Geddes. They concluded that an improvement 
in the traffic position was improbable even if a ‘drastic curtailment of civil 
traffic’ took place, which was unlikely, and agreed that the condition of 
the railway network ought to influence the decision to launch the BEF’s 
offensive operations.60 After hearing Geddes’s views, the War Cabinet agreed 
with Haig’s recommendation that French and British ministers, senior 
commanders and transport experts should convene to discuss the ongoing 
‘crisis of transportation’.61 Consequently, a conference was arranged to take 
place in Calais on 26 and 27 February 1917.
Of all the inter-allied meetings to take place during the First World 
War, the Calais conference has proved the most controversial. The political 
machinations that led to Haig’s subordination to Nivelle for the duration of 
the spring campaign – described by William Philpott as ‘probably the most 
unfortunate episode’ in the coalition’s history – have become synonymous 
with the events that took place in Calais, and have dominated the published 
accounts of those who were present.62 The conference’s agenda contained six 
items for discussion, all of which related to the operation and development 
of the transport network rather than the existing command structure on the 
western front.63 However, Sir William Robertson, who had made Haig aware 
of his reservations about the presence of French and British government 
minsters at the conference, dedicated just one sentence of his autobiography 
to the transportation crisis.64 Lloyd George’s War Memoirs did acknowledge 
the ‘long delays over questions of transport and coordination’ that had 
determined the need for a meeting of allied political and military leaders. 
59 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/110, diary entry, 9 Feb. 1917.
60 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/110, diary entry, 13 Feb. 1917.
61 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 7/7/5, Robertson to Haig, 13 Feb. 1917; NLS, Haig papers, 
Acc. 3155/110, Robertson to Haig, 14 Feb. 1917; diary entry, 15 Feb. 1917; note on the present 
transportation situation, 16 Feb. 1917.
62 W. Philpott, ‘Haig and Britain’s European allies’, in Haig: a Reappraisal 80 Years On, ed. 
B. Bond and N. Cave (Barnsley, 2009), pp. 128–44, at p. 136.
63 TNA, WO 158/41, transportation: agenda and notes for the Calais conference, 26 Feb. 1917.
64 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 7/7/7, Robertson to Haig, 14 Feb. 1917; W. R. Robertson, 
From Private to Field-Marshal (London, 1921), p. 307.
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However, his account of those discussions – which he claimed had ‘occupied 
much of our time’ – comprises little more than an attempt to portray Haig 
as an obstructive figure who created ‘difficulties’ that contributed to the 
failure of Nivelle’s offensive.65 In his analysis of the prime minister’s account, 
Andrew Suttie comprehensively demolished Lloyd George’s version of events, 
arguing that the latter distorted the facts and omitted important material 
from his recollections of the conference.66 Lloyd George’s exploitation of the 
conference to subordinate Haig to Nivelle was an ‘ambush’, which led to ‘very 
little progress’ being made with respect to ‘the railway question’ in Calais.67
The internal power struggle between Britain’s political and military leaders 
that played out in the Hotel Terminus was mirrored by a vituperative inter-
allied disagreement between France’s and Britain’s transport experts. The 
French, as with their coalition partner, had centralized their transport services 
in the latter part of 1916 under a civilian – Albert Claveille.68 At Calais, 
Claveille and Geddes continued their discussions in an adversarial rather than 
conciliatory tone. The latter began by pressing the French for a date upon 
which the British could expect the railways to be able to handle 200,000 tons 
per week on the BEF’s behalf, the figure he considered necessary to service the 
force’s demands in preparation for an offensive. Ragueneau stated merely that 
he ‘hoped to reach’ a figure of 194,000 tons per week by the end of March, 
to which Lloyd George responded by explicitly linking the capacity of the 
transport network to the likely success of the BEF’s operations. If the tonnage 
demanded by the BEF could not be provided, the prime minister warned, 
‘either Sir Douglas Haig must make his attack insufficiently provided, or 
else he must postpone it’. He was, he said, ‘very anxious’ that Claveille and 
Ragueneau understood the connection between the provision of sufficient 
transport and the BEF’s participation in Nivelle’s campaign.69
The French representatives did not allow their guests to dictate 
proceedings. Claveille responded to British accusations that they had 
provided insufficient transport by directing the prime minister’s attention 
to the locomotives the British had promised to despatch to assuage the 
transportation crisis. Claveille argued that British deliveries of valuable 
65 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (2 vols., London, 1938), i. 891–3.
66 A. Suttie, Rewriting the First World War: Lloyd George, Politics and Strategy, 1914–1918 
(Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 116–19.
67 Stevenson, 1917, p. 126; LHCMA, Robertson papers, 7/7/8, Robertson to Haig, 28 Feb. 
1917; NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/110, Haig to George V, 28 Feb. 1917.
68 The reasons behind this decision, which revolved around the need to maintain a balance 
between military traffic in the battle zone and civilian traffic across the rest of France, are 
summarized in Direction de l’arrière, pp. 513–14.
69 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/183, notes of an Anglo-French conference held 
at the Hotel Terminus, Calais, 26–27 Feb. 1917, pp. 2–5.
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locomotives and rolling stock had fallen ‘behindhand’ during the first two 
months of 1917. Furthermore, Ragueneau added that the BEF used an 
unnecessarily large amount of rolling stock to service its requirements; while 
the French army requisitioned 2,800 wagons per day to supply its forces on 
the western front, the British demanded 8,000 per day for half the number 
of men.70 Geddes, as Robertson noted ruefully after the conference, did 
not choose to question the accuracy of Ragueneau’s figures or explain the 
reason why such a wide discrepancy between the two forces’ needs existed.71 
When Lloyd George asked Geddes to respond to Ragueneau’s charge, the 
DGT instead launched into a further attack on what he considered to be 
the French failure to properly manage the railways. Before considering the 
BEF’s demands for rolling stock he
stated that he first wished to reach an agreement about the question of tonnage 
and trains to railheads. He pointed out that the figure of 200,000 tons 
required in the ports has already been reduced from 250,000 by an abatement 
in Sir Douglas Haig’s demands made in consequence of the shortcomings of 
the railways. Having obtained the railway facilities to serve the ports, as well 
as the local traffic, which consisted of such matters as stone for metalling 
the roads, and timber, which was just as essential to military operations as 
ammunition, the next step was to get it to the front. He had arranged that 
200 trains a day should proceed to railhead. It was absolutely necessary to 
have these 200 trains. In this connection he reminded the conference that a 
good deal of railway traffic was required for the maintenance of stocks, and 
until you reached your total of 200 trains your forward dumps could not 
be realised. Today, however, we were only able to run 80 trains a day to the 
front.72
Following further disagreement between the French and British 
representatives – over the BEF’s requirements during the preparatory period 
before the offensive, during the phase of military operations and in the 
prospective advance following any success on the battlefield – Lloyd George 
moved to segregate the technical and strategic components of the conference. 
He observed that ‘the discussion might continue forever on these lines. The 
experts did not appear to agree on a single figure’. Therefore, the specialists 
were invited to ‘retire and discuss the question among themselves’.73 The 
debate on transportation, for which the conference had been scheduled, 
70 E. Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War 
(Cambridge, 2005), p. 141.
71 LHCMA, Robertson papers, 7/7/8, Robertson to Haig, 28 Feb. 1917.
72 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/183, notes of an Anglo-French conference, pp. 
5–6.
73 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/183, notes of an Anglo-French conference, p. 8.
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lasted less than two hours and achieved nothing more than an ill-tempered 
airing of grievances.74
Like Francis Dent and Gerald Holland before him, Geddes’s freedom of 
action in France and Flanders was constrained by the attitude and priorities 
of the coalition’s leading partner. The railway network behind the western 
front was a core component of the French army and state’s supply system 
as well as the BEF’s logistics chain. Therefore, the successful development, 
management and operation of this strategically vital artery required a constant 
process of negotiation, renegotiation, collaboration and compromise to ensure 
the sustenance of both nations’ war efforts. However, Geddes’s immediate 
response to events at Calais was to exclaim that the BEF was ‘practically being 
“rationed” in the matter of trains by the French’ and to question the utility of 
his remaining in France ‘if this state of affairs [was] to last’.75
The man dubbed ‘Napoleon’ and ‘Sir Hindenburg Geddes’ by some 
observers, because of his perceived absolute command over British 
transportation in early 1917, struggled to adapt to the requirements of 
diplomacy and conciliation upon which coalition warfare depended.76 
Claveille’s observation that the British had failed to deliver the agreed 
quantity of locomotives and wagons was accurate. By the time of the Calais 
conference the British had fallen over 30 per cent behind on the monthly 
schedule of wagon deliveries, while only fifty of the 100 locomotives Geddes 
had ‘hoped’ to despatch in the programme’s first month had arrived in 
France.77 Yet less than a week after the Calais conference, Geddes produced 
a letter for Haig that detailed ‘the history of the whole transaction with 
the French’. The document, in Haig’s words, showed ‘clearly’ how the 
French had ‘failed to keep their agreements’ – a response that suggests the 
British transport expert had either neglected or refused to countenance the 
possibility that Ragueneau and Claveille had raised legitimate concerns.78
74 TNA, CAB 28/2, papers I.C. 13–32, notes of an Anglo-French conference held at the 
Hotel Terminus, Calais, 26–27 Feb. 1917, pp. 1, 4. The first session, at which transportation 
was the central focus, began at 3:30 p.m. on the 26th. The railway experts withdrew, and the 
conference adjourned ‘for a short time’, before the second session commenced at 5:30 p.m.
75 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/111, diary entry, 3 March 1917; I. M. Brown, British Logistics 
on the Western Front, 1914–1919 (London, 1998), pp. 159–60.
76 P. K. Cline, ‘Eric Geddes and the “experiment” with businessmen in government, 1915–
22’, in Essays in Anti-Labour History, ed. K. D. Brown (London, 1974), pp. 74–104, at p. 
75; K. Grieves, ‘Improvising the British war effort: Eric Geddes and Lloyd George, 1915–18’, 
War & Society, vii (1989), 40–55, at p. 47.
77 TNA, CAB 24/7/11, proposed overland route to Salonica, memorandum by Granet, pp. 
3–4. On 17 March 1917, by which time the schedule called for the British to have despatched 
9,500 wagons to France, only 4,500 had arrived. See Direction de l’arrière, p. 602.
78 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/111, diary entry, 3 March 1917.
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Geddes’s attitude towards the French remained truculent. At the next 
gathering of French and British leaders on 12 March – at which neither 
Claveille nor Ragueneau was present – the French minister of finance, 
Alexandre Ribot, acknowledged that the Chemins de Fer du Nord ‘was in 
a terrible condition’, warned that the civil population served by the railway 
had raised complaints over the shortage of rail traffic, and emphasized that 
the will to provide for the BEF’s requirements was not matched by the 
possibility to do so. In the spirit of cooperation, the French minister of 
war, General Hubert Lyautey, proposed ‘the establishment of a permanent 
Anglo-French bureau’ to provide ‘a continuous reciprocal examination’ of the 
railway question ‘both from the point of view of our requirements and the 
means of execution’.79 Geddes ‘stated that … nothing would be gained by 
the establishment’ of such a bureau and reiterated his demand that the BEF 
be provided with 200 trains per day. For the French, Geddes’s intransigence 
proved exasperating. Albert Thomas explained in response that, even if the 
French were able to meet their ally’s request, ‘no doubt from time to time 
they would have to desist for days from supplying the full number of trains in 
order to meet particular emergencies’. The creation of a permanent Franco-
British organization for the exploration of transportation issues – as opposed 
to discussion at ‘intermittent conferences’ – offered a forum through which 
the traffic demands of the military and civilian users of the Chemins de Fer du 
Nord could be regularly examined, prioritised, and delivered according to the 
network’s capacity and the needs of the military situation. However, Geddes 
demurred. ‘So long as the French had the management of the Chemins de 
Fer du Nord’, he stated, ‘it was impossible for [the British] to share it or 
be responsible in any way for it’.80 The opportunity to create an inter-allied 
forum for the allocation of finite transport resources thereby lapsed until the 
arrival of American troops on French soil imposed further pressures on the 
heavily burdened railway network.81
The preservation of harmonious relations with an equal, and in many 
ways a senior, partner proved difficult for Geddes. His recognized gifts of 
intuition, rapid decision and force, which proved crucial in the development 
of the Ministry of Munitions and the creation of the directorate-general of 
transportation, could not be exercised so liberally when the needs of the 
French military and civil population had to be considered alongside the 
BEF’s requirements. The coalition environment effectively gloved the free 
79 TNA, CAB 28/2, papers I.C. 13–32, notes of an Anglo-French conference held at 10 
Downing Street, 12 and 13 March 1917, pp. 3–4.
80 TNA, CAB 28/2, papers I.C. 13–32, notes of an Anglo-French conference, 12 and 13 
March 1917, p. 5.
81 Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, p. 241.
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hand Geddes employed behind British lines with Haig’s and Lloyd George’s 
support, and may have contributed to Geddes’s withdrawal from direct 
involvement on the western front in May 1917. Lloyd George’s decision to 
transfer Geddes to the Admiralty has been presented in previous accounts 
as the logical appointment of ‘an organiser to carry out for the Admiralty 
the functions which the Ministry of Munitions had long operated for 
the army’. Certainly, the navy benefited from Geddes’s introduction 
of managerial methods that were ‘alien’ to the senior service’s ‘badly co-
ordinated existing administrative practices’.82 Yet the railwayman lacked 
specialist knowledge of the shipping industry, while the move further 
exposed his self-acknowledged weaknesses as a political operator. ‘I am a 
Political Chief among Naval Experts’, Geddes wrote to Lloyd George in 
December 1917: ‘I am essentially an executive man now employed in a non-
executive job … I am very conscious of the honour of being First Lord [of 
the Admiralty], but I am not a shipbuilder, Naval strategist, Speaker, or 
politician. I am a Transportation man, and I feel I can do my best work 
where my previous experience justifies my position’.83 However, as the scope 
of transportation by that point covered ‘the Allied world’ rather than the 
coordination of resources for Britain’s war effort alone, such a role required 
a collegiate approach. Lloyd George possibly suspected that Geddes, who 
less than a month earlier had told Lord Derby that the French were ‘quite 
hopeless at running their own railways’, was temperamentally unsuited to a 
task that demanded more conciliatory methods.84
Geddes’s dismissive attitude towards his French counterparts was by 
no means unique among the senior figures in Britain’s war effort. Sir Sam 
Fay reflected in his autobiography that ‘the French railway organization 
throughout the war’ had been ‘anything but good’,85 while William Philpott 
has outlined how the relationship between Haig and his allies was ‘beset 
by suspicion, antagonism and double-dealing’. Geddes displayed a similar 
jingoism to the commander-in-chief, with whom he had struck up an 
immediate and lasting friendship. Both perceived that their citizenship 
of the greatest empire on the planet possessed them with ‘an innate sense 
of superiority over the foreigner’, which contributed to the ‘indifferent 
management of the joint campaign’ on the western front.86
82 Grieves, ‘Improvising the British war effort’, pp. 47–9. On Geddes’s experiences at 
the Admiralty, see K. Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace 
(Manchester, 1989), pp. 40–68.
83 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/F/17/6/19, Geddes to Lloyd George, 20 Dec. 1917.
84 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/F/14/4/78, Derby to Lloyd George, 24 Nov. 1917. 
Geddes’s assessment of Italy’s railway officials was similarly derisive.
85 S. Fay, The War Office at War (London, 1937), p. 104.
86 Philpott, ‘Haig and Britain’s European allies’, pp. 129–30.
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Yet Britain’s transport experts were not merely exposed to the challenges of 
coalition warfare in France and Flanders during 1917. In the first half of the 
year, as Geddes became exasperated by the divergence of priorities between 
the British and French war efforts on the western front, a succession of 
civilians travelled east to undertake missions in conjunction with Britain’s 
allies in Russia and Romania. The efficient use of the transport infrastructure 
in eastern Europe was as critical to the sustenance of operations there as 
the French railway network was to the fighting on the western front. Yet 
Russia lacked both a dense system of railways and the option to thoroughly 
exploit alternative forms of transport. Three-quarters of Russian lines were 
single-track, its roads were primitive and its inland waterways were mostly 
impassable during the winter months as they froze over. Therefore, the 
effective operation of the comparatively sparse Russian railway network 
was fundamental both to the continuance of the eastern war effort and the 
maintenance of the domestic Russian economy.87
The profound differences between the Russian transport infrastructure 
and those in western Europe influenced the choice of expert despatched 
to investigate conditions in the east. When asked to suggest a suitable 
man to accompany Lord Milner’s mission to Russia in early 1917, Sir Sam 
Fay put forward the name of a Canadian. George Bury had worked for 
the Canadian Pacific Railway throughout his career, and had attained the 
position of vice president of the line prior to the outbreak of war. ‘When 
making this recommendation’, Fay recalled in his autobiography:
I had in mind the long stretches of single line in Russia for which there is no 
counterpart in [Britain]. The Canadian Pacific Railway on the other hand was 
mainly single line, reaching 3,000 miles from seaboard to seaboard. A Canadian 
railway man would, therefore, be more able to appreciate the position than an 
English railway manager. I knew Bury, and had seen him at work in Winnipeg, 
where he controlled all lines west of the city. His energy and cheery optimism 
had impressed me.88
Lloyd George acted upon Fay’s advice immediately. By 1 February, Bury 
had received the prime minister’s instructions, which were to ‘obtain all the 
information that you can and render every possible assistance, in regard to 
the working of the Russian railway system’.89
87 Stevenson, 1917, pp. 93–4.
88 Fay, The War Office at War, p. 29.
89 Lloyd George to Bury, 1 Feb. 1917, quoted in T. Murray Hunter, ‘Sir George Bury and 
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Within three weeks, Bury had submitted a memorandum to the 
cabinet in London, which outlined the parlous state of communications 
in Russia. The first sentence of his report, dated 20 February, stated 
baldly that ‘Russia has not sufficient railway lines and those she has are 
not equipped adequately with waggons and locomotives’.90 He estimated 
that the Russians had a backlog of locomotives and wagons awaiting and 
under repair that was 1,500 and 15,000 units respectively higher than it 
should have been given the circumstances – a consequence of inefficient 
working procedures, inadequate labour supplies and a lack of materials. 
These deficiencies were exacerbated by the retention of large numbers of 
wagons in the battle area for use as storehouses, living quarters and offices 
by the army (Bury gave a figure of ‘more than eight thousand units’ in his 
report). In addition, he asserted that ‘very unnecessary delays’ took place 
at the ports due to the continuance of lengthy customs practices and the 
inefficient deployment of labour tasked to discharge ships, and observed 
that the Russian railway officers lacked ‘the organizing genius to be found 
in some other countries’.91
Alongside his diagnosis of the problems that afflicted the Russian 
network, Bury’s memorandum contained a series of recommendations 
for their alleviation. His solutions to the transport problem included: the 
direction of ‘all the waggons and locomotives that can be delivered during 
this year’ into Russia; the introduction of operating practices designed 
to maximize the haulage capacity of individual trains and improve the 
circulation of rolling stock; the amendment of government regulations to 
permit higher levels of tyre wear; the establishment of a central authority 
to oversee the distribution of locomotives and rolling stock across Russia’s 
various districts; the provision both of additional passing loops and terminal 
facilities on existing lines; and the construction of a greatly improved line 
between the port at Murmansk and the interior. However, he stopped short 
of recommending that British and French officials be – like Geddes had been 
on the western front – parachuted into key positions in the Russian railway 
administration. Russia was a sovereign nation upon which its western allies 
could apply ‘a certain leverage’ but nothing more. As Bury acknowledged 
in his report, ‘to attempt to place British or French officers in charge of 
the more important positions on the Russian railways’ was a diplomatic 
impossibility. Instead, his recommendations centred upon ‘securing for [the 
Russians] all the waggons and locomotives it is possible to obtain even by 
90 Memorandum regarding transportation, prepared for the British war cabinet, 20 Feb. 
1917, p. 1. My thanks to Anthony Heywood for providing me with access to this document, 
and for his guidance on the complexities of Russia’s railways during the war more generally.
91 Memorandum regarding transportation, 20 Feb. 1917, pp. 2, 4–5, 6–7.
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paying premiums for prompt delivery … This is something the [British] 
Government should take in hand at once and vigorously’.92
As in France prior to the Somme offensive, a lack of rolling stock to 
remove supplies from the ports had created congestion at the docks – a 
situation compounded by the quantity of wagons retained in the battle 
area for use as storehouses and living quarters.93 Bury claimed that the 
accumulated stocks at Vladivostok in early 1917 had reached the port’s annual 
capacity, and projected that some nine months would be required to clear 
the existing material inland at the prevailing rate of movement. Therefore, 
to relieve congestion at the port, Bury recommended the increased use of 
the Japanese-controlled port of Dalniy (now the Chinese city of Dalian) 
on the South Manchurian Railway and advised that Vladivostok should be 
used solely for the import of railway materials into Russia.94 Even after such 
changes Bury warned that the paucity of rolling stock and the vast distances 
between the far-eastern ports and the eastern front meant that Russia would 
– in the continued absence of a southern sea route through the Dardanelles 
– have to rely upon its northern ports ‘for at least a year’.95
Conditions at the northern ports provided scant cause for cheery 
optimism. Archangel possessed fifty-two berths, each capable of discharging 
approximately 300 tons per day, with a further twenty berths scheduled 
to become operational over the summer of 1917. However, the port could 
only be used with any degree of certainty from June until November and 
the Archangel–Vologda railway line responsible for moving goods inland 
only carried three freight trains per day at that time.96 While the Russian 
authorities promised Bury that they could move 127,000 tons via Murmansk 
– the only ice-free port available in northern Russia – before May 1917, the 
Canadian expert advised the cabinet in London that ‘the best we should 
figure on … is four-fifths of the Russian expectations’.97 In a complaint 
familiar to investigators of the Channel ports the previous summer, Bury 
observed that the labour at Murmansk was ‘inefficient and inadequate’ and 
that additional storage was ‘urgently required … as there is almost certain 
to be congestion, and materials stacked in the snow on the shore are bound 
92 Memorandum regarding transportation, 20 Feb. 1917, pp. 7–8.
93 Memorandum regarding transportation, 20 Feb. 1917, p. 4.
94 Memorandum regarding transportation, 20 Feb. 1917, pp. 1–2; TNA, CAB 28/2, papers 
I.C. 13–32, Allied conference at Petrograd, January–February 1917, Report on mission to 
Russia, by Major David Davies, 10 March 1917, p. 5.
95 Memorandum regarding transportation, 20 Feb. 1917, p. 5.
96 TNA, CAB 28/2, papers I.C. 13–32, Allied conference at Petrograd, Report by Davies, 
p. 5; P. Gatrell, Russia’s First World War: a Social and Economic History (Harlow, 2005), p. 25.
97 Memorandum regarding transportation, 20 Feb. 1917, pp. 5–6.
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to deteriorate’.98 Yet whereas on the western front Geddes had stressed the 
‘moral and physical impossibility’ of scaling back on munitions imports for 
the BEF, Bury advocated that all shipments of munitions to Murmansk be 
suspended until congestion at the port had been cleared. ‘Otherwise’, he 
warned, ‘the place will become a second Vladivostock [sic] and munitions 
urgently needed elsewhere will be left to deteriorate in the snow’.99
Bury’s experience of operations on a single-track railway that stretched 
over long distances through extreme territory informed his recommendations 
for the improvement of the Russian railway infrastructure. He recognized 
that the line from Murmansk to the interior represented the ‘main artery 
for traffic’ to Russia during the winter months if Vladivostok was closed to 
imports, and argued it was essential that:
[t]he line between Port Murman and Kem be closed to traffic and every effort 
be put forth so that it may be in the best of condition by next winter. It means 
lifting sags, strengthening bridges, ballasting, building passing tracks every 
six miles, improving terminals, installing signals, etc., and the work is of such 
magnitude and so essential to the Russian Empire that it must be laid out and 
prosecuted on a very large scale indeed. The line from Kem to the Junction 
needs lesser improvements but the work on additional wharves, sheds and 
tracks at Port Murman must proceed day and night.100
The maximum capacity for each train on the extant Murman Railway 
between Kola and Petrograd (see Figure 8.1) was between 140 and 160 tons. 
However, Bury believed that the line was capable of handling trains of 
between 400 and 600 tons if it were ‘properly constructed’ and ‘the support 
of the [Russian] Government and especially the Minister of Ways and 
Communications’ for the scheme was enlisted.101 The latter, E. B. Kriger-
Voinovskii, was lauded by Bury as ‘undoubtedly the best administrator’ 
to have held the position during the war, and he instructed that it ‘should 
be the duty of [the British] Government to make every effort to have his 
hands strengthened and … [ensure that] he be given the freest rein [sic] to 
bring about changes that he will have to make if his administration is to be 
effective’.102
98 Memorandum regarding transportation, 20 Feb. 1917, pp. 6–7; TNA, CAB 28/2, papers 
I.C. 13–32, Allied conference at Petrograd, Report by Davies, pp. 5–6.
99 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/3/4, Geddes to Lloyd George, p. 9. Bury’s 
remarks reported in TNA, CAB 28/2, papers I.C. 13–32, Allied conference at Petrograd, 
Report by Davies, p. 6.
100 Memorandum regarding transportation, 20 Feb. 1917, p. 6.
101 Memorandum regarding transportation, 20 Feb. 1917, p. 8.
102 Memorandum regarding transportation, 20 Feb. 1917, pp. 8–9.
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Figure 8.1. Principal railways in north-western Russia, 1917–18. 
Source: Military Monograph Subsection M.I.2, Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, 
Russia, Route Zone A: Murman Railway and Kola Peninsula: Information and Route Notes, 
Murmansk to Petrograd (Washington, DC, 1918).. Map drawn by Cath D’Alton.
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However, Kriger-Voinovskii’s experience in 1917 underscored one of 
the two major limitations of Bury’s mission. A fortnight after the latter’s 
report was submitted the February Revolution broke out, and the Romanov 
dynasty – which had gratefully provided its Canadian visitor with a daily 
bottle of champagne to assist him in the production of his report – was 
overthrown.103 Bury’s desire that Kriger-Voinovskii’s hands be strengthened 
was eclipsed by the domestic concerns of the Provisional government in 
Petrograd. Kriger-Voinovskii was replaced at the Ministry of Ways and 
Communications by Nikolai Nekrasov, who commenced a ‘flurry of new 
railway appointments’ chosen for their political desirability rather than 
their professional qualifications during the spring and summer.104 While 
some improvements to the Murman Railway were made during 1917 – and 
orders for locomotives, rolling stock and other railway equipment were 
added to those placed with foreign suppliers earlier in the war – Bury’s 
recommendations for the development of the Russian railways were not 
pursued in full by the new authorities.105
Yet the outbreak of the revolution and subsequent turmoil within the 
Russian railway industry was not the sole reason why Bury’s report generated 
little activity behind the eastern front. The overall tone of his memorandum 
to the War Cabinet had been one of cautious positivity; Bury wrote with 
a belief that the Russian railways could be made effective through a 
combination of organizational changes, infrastructure improvements and 
material support. However, his diagnosis presented an overly optimistic 
image of Russia’s transport position after two-and-a-half years of war, and 
was built upon a far from comprehensive understanding of the situation 
across Russia. Many of the organizational changes Bury advocated had 
been in place throughout the war, or had been introduced as the situation 
demanded. Furthermore, his recommendations for the improvement of the 
line from Murmansk to the interior – while unquestionably desirable for 
the development of Russian railway capacity – were wholly impracticable 
given the prevailing conditions. The line was built in appalling conditions 
by a labour force that mostly comprised German prisoners of war, for whom 
103 Murray Hunter, ‘Sir George Bury and the Russian Revolution’, pp. 61–2.
104 On the ‘chaos’ within the Russian railway administration during the February 
Revolution, see A. Heywood, Engineer of Revolutionary Russia: Iurii V. Lomonosov (1876–
1952) and the Railways (Farnham, 2011), pp. 151–8.
105 Military Monograph Subsection M.I.2, Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, 
Russia, Route Zone A: Murman Railway and Kola Peninsula: Information and Route Notes, 
Murmansk to Petrograd (Washington, DC, 1918), p. 26; A. J. Heywood, ‘Russia’s foreign 
supply policy in World War I: imports of railway equipment’, Jour. European Econ. Hist., 
xxxii (2003), 77–108, at pp. 82–5; Heywood, Engineer of Revolutionary Russia, p. 157.
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the provision of building materials and food were incredibly difficult. As 
Anthony Heywood has demonstrated, in 1916 the Russian railways had 
carried over 20 per cent more freight than had been transported in 1913.106 
The demand for freight transport remained incessant over the challenging 
winter of 1916–17, and shortages of civilian supplies existed across the 
country as military traffic took precedence.
These difficulties were not sufficiently appreciated by British observers, 
who lacked thorough knowledge of the situation outside Petrograd. The 
military attaché, Alfred Knox, recorded on 7 February that ‘it had been 
suddenly discovered that many railways had only two to five days’ supply of 
coal’. Consequently, he added, the ‘railways were ordered to carry nothing 
but coal for a week. The week was extended till March 14th’.107 By early 
March the condition of the network was adjudged by Sir Henry Wilson 
to be ‘deplorable … Coal cannot be carried from the pit-mouths to the 
railways and the manufactories; food cannot be distributed to the towns 
nor collected from the countryside; troops and materiél cannot be carried 
from one place to another’.108 Yet over the same period, as Heywood has 
illustrated, the work performed on the Russian railways almost matched 
that achieved during the equivalent period of the previous year.109
Bury’s memorandum betrayed similar ignorance of wider Russian 
problems. The Canadian railway expert failed to appreciate the complexity 
of the traffic problems that existed in Russia during the First World War, 
particularly in the vast area of the country east of the Urals. Consequently, 
he advocated solutions that would have been profoundly difficult to 
implement even had the Russian political situation been stable in 1917. 
Like his political and military contemporaries, Bury struggled to come to 
terms with what Catherine Merridale has termed Russia’s ‘extraordinary 
foreignness’.110 The result was a report, researched and submitted in a period 
of little more than a fortnight, which failed to adequately appreciate the 
challenges that Tsarist Russia had faced in the sustenance of industrial war 
since August 1914.
106 A. Heywood, ‘Spark of revolution? Railway disorganisation, freight traffic and Tsarist 
Russia’s war effort, July 1914–March 1917’, Europe-Asia Studies, lxv (2013), 753–72, at p. 765. 
107 A. W. F. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917 (2 vols., London, 1921), ii. 525–6. 
Knox’s observations are almost certainly an exaggeration, as Russian authorities had been 
aware of the worsening fuel situation since the previous autumn.
108 TNA, CAB 28/2, papers I.C. 13–32, Allied conference at Petrograd, Report by 
Lieutenant-General Sir H. H. Wilson, 3 March 1917, p. 2.
109 Heywood, ‘Spark of revolution?’
110 C. Merridale, Lenin on the Train (London, 2017), p. 33.
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For Lawson Billinton, who only departed Britain for Romania via Russia 
on 18 March, the effects of the revolution greatly impeded his attempts to 
sustain the war effort in the east. Prior to Billinton’s arrival,Wilson had 
observed that:
Partly owing to difference of gauge [between the Russian and Romanian 
railways], partly to incompetent administration, partly to German activities 
and sympathies, the railway situation [in Romania] is very serious indeed, and 
competent judges think there will be a famine in four to six weeks from now, 
and that the Russian troops [manning most of the Romanian front] will starve 
or have to fall back.
The outlook on this front is bad … it may be necessary to retire the whole line 
in order to save the armies from destruction.111
After a three-day voyage and sixteen days in Petrograd, Billinton’s party 
made its way south to Iaşi – the Romanian government’s temporary home 
following the fall of Bucharest. He immediately noted the disorganized 
condition of the railways and, when his attempts to find breakfast on his 
first morning in Iaşi proved fruitless, how short of food the Romanians 
were. It took him very little time to diagnose the problems:
Very few trains were running and these were taking days instead of hours over a 
journey. The average speed from start to finish was in many cases as low as six or 
seven miles per hour. The locomotive side … was in a very bad state. Over 60% 
of the locomotive stock was awaiting or under repair and the remainder was in 
a very indifferent condition. The output from the shops was at an especially low 
figure, and generally there was every indication of a complete paralysis of the 
railroad unless material alterations took place.112
Rather than merely report and advise, as Bury had done in Russia, Billinton 
exchanged his uniform for overalls and transformed ‘from a military man 
into a jack-of-all-trades boilermaker, fitter, erector, etc., in order to carry 
out the work of reorganization’. He travelled across what remained of 
Romanian territory, visited all the available running sheds and repair depots, 
and gained a thorough knowledge of the ‘contour of the road and how 
the locomotives were operated’ by Romanian drivers. He remarked after 
the war that ‘by very careful application there was very great improvement 
effected, not only in the number of trains running but also in punctuality’ 
across the Romanian network.113
111 TNA, CAB 28/2, papers I.C. 13–32, Allied conference at Petrograd, Report by Wilson, 
pp. 3–4.
112 Marx, Lawson Billinton, pp. 80–1.
113 Marx, Lawson Billinton, p. 81.
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However, Billinton’s efforts had little impact on the Romanian war 
effort. Raymond de Candolle, the general manager of the Buenos Aires 
Great Southern Railway who led the mission to Romania, reported 
pessimistically to Sir William Robertson in May 1917 that ‘the working 
of Roumanian locomotive traffic departments still leaves much to be 
desired and is engaging our special attention although owing to [the] 
innate reluctance of [the] Roumanians to push through comprehensive 
programmes it will not be easy to bring about rapid improvement’.114 
By the summer of 1917, although the French still believed that a Russo-
Romanian offensive on the eastern front was indispensable to the allied 
campaign, the British government had lost faith in Romania’s ability 
to successfully conduct an offensive against the central powers. Arthur 
Balfour, the foreign secretary, suggested that the Romanians had been 
‘incompetent to the verge of a crime’, while Lloyd George categorized 
allied obligations to Romania as of the lowest importance in Britain’s 
evolving strategic calculations.115 Unable to provide further support to 
the Romanians, Billinton embarked for the Caucasus in October 1917 
to assist the Russian forces gathered at Rostov-on-Don under General 
Aleksei Kaledin. From there he embarked on the remarkable tour of the 
region that opened this chapter, and which ended the following summer 
with his return to Brighton.116
The wider military and political environments in which George Bury 
and Lawson Billinton operated worked against them in 1917. Events 
beyond their control overwhelmed their endeavours. Coordination of 
the Russian railway network largely disintegrated after the Russian state 
collapsed. The Provisional government’s removal of undesirable elements, 
and the Bolsheviks’ purge of ‘large numbers of experts and administrators’ 
from the railway industry, threw the work of governance into ‘near 
total dysfunction’ by the end of the year.117 The Romanian decision to 
accept the armistice of Focşani on 9 December 1917, and the Russian 
descent into civil war, decreased the eastern front’s prominence in British 
strategic plans and reduced its desire to divert precious human and 
material resources from the western front. However, as one set of allies in 
114 TNA, CAB 24/14/38, Roumanian communication. Tel. from Sir G. Barclay, dated 
18.5.17, conveying General de Candolles’s report, p. 3.
115 G. E. Torrey, ‘Romania in the First World War: the years of engagement, 1916–1918’, 
International History Review, xiv (1992), 462–79, at pp. 466–7.
116 Much of Billinton’s own account of this lively period is reproduced in Marx, Lawson 
Billinton, pp. 87–111.
117 E. Lohr and J. Sanborn, ‘1917: revolution as demobilization and state collapse’, Slavic 
Review, lxxvi (2017), 703–9, at p. 706.
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eastern Europe fell away, the constellation of nations assembled in France 
demanded reconsideration. The introduction of another sovereign army 
to the western front provided further challenges and opportunities for 
Britain’s transport experts in the final year of the war.
The Supreme War Council and the Inter-allied Transportation Council
The directorate-general of transportation, first under Sir Eric Geddes and 
then Philip Nash, became an integral, civilian-led component of Sir Douglas 
Haig’s military force. The organization created and fostered by successive 
DGTs provided the platform for talented transport administrators to apply 
their skills to the delivery of operational and infrastructural improvements 
in France. Their contributions raised the capacity and efficiency of the 
distribution network behind the BEF in the war’s most important theatre 
of operations in 1917. Furthermore, as larger numbers of British personnel, 
locomotives and other transport-related equipment arrived on the western 
front during the year, British units became increasingly concerned with 
the maintenance of the shared logistics systems behind the allied forces.118 
In January 1917 the French handed over responsibility for the repair and 
maintenance of the British-built ambulance trains that had gradually entered 
service in France over the previous two years, while the chief mechanical 
engineer took over ‘from the State Railway some partly-finished shops at St 
Etienne, near Rouen’ that were subsequently completed and equipped for 
the repair of locomotives.119
The British presence outside the repair shops of France also expanded. 
ROD crews, having previously been largely restricted to the running of 
trains behind the Ypres salient, were given instruction in French signalling 
methods and gradually permitted to operate services on the French main 
lines. Between March and November 1917 the number of trains driven 
by the ROD over French tracks grew from ten per day to 341 – not all 
of which were dedicated to the BEF’s maintenance.120 General François 
Anthoine’s French First Army, which arrived on the BEF’s northern flank 
in Flanders ahead of the third battle of Ypres, was served exclusively by 
the ROD throughout the offensive. Liaisons between Anthoine’s force and 
its British supply service were described as ‘smooth and efficient’ in the 
QMG’s post-war report, in stark contrast to the fractious relationship that 
118 TNA, WO 107/69, work of the QMG’s branch, p. 2.
119 Simpson, ‘Railway operating in France’, pp. 709–10. The chief mechanical engineer, 
Colonel George Tertius Glover, was another of Geddes’s civilian appointments. Glover had 
entered the North-Eastern Railway as a draughtsman in 1894, and was the Great Northern 
Railway of Ireland’s locomotive engineer from 1912 onwards.
120 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 622–3.
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existed between Geddes and those in charge of the French transportation 
services earlier that year.121
Lloyd George’s clumsy attempts to subordinate the BEF at Calais, 
Geddes’s reluctance to acknowledge French concerns over the efficient 
operation of the allies’ shared transport infrastructure and General Nivelle’s 
failure to realize his grandiose plans retarded rather than reversed the 
trend towards greater allied cooperation at a political and strategic level 
in the second half of the war. Events both on land and at sea drew the 
allies closer together in search of answers to the war’s evolving logistical 
and organizational complexities. At sea, the German decision to pursue 
unrestricted submarine warfare engendered a supranational consideration 
of shipping priorities, which resulted in the eventual formation of the 
Allied Maritime Council in November 1917 to ‘make the most economical 
use of tonnage under the control of all the Allies, to allot that tonnage … 
in such a way as to add most to the general war effort, and to adjust the 
programmes of requirements of the different Allies in such a way as to 
bring them within the scope of the possible carrying power of the tonnage 
available’.122 On land, the United States’ entry into the war as an associated 
power also ‘forced a degree of allied cooperation’ to meet the challenge of 
inserting another army into the crowded space behind the western front.123
America’s decision to send an expeditionary force to Europe reinforced 
the value of efficient railway use as the war intensified. In recognition of 
the railways’ importance, an American military railway mission comprising 
civilian and military railway experts was despatched to Europe on 14 May. 
After arriving in Britain the party conferred with Geddes and Sir Guy Granet, 
who provided their new partners with an insight into the creation of the 
directorates-general of transportation and military railways. The Americans 
then crossed to France, where they observed the French army’s lines of 
communications in action and met with Nash at GHQ.124 The mission 
confirmed to William John Wilgus, a retired civil engineer who served with 
the AEF’s transportation services for the duration of the war, the virtue of 
‘building up a new arm of the Service, headed by men from civil life who 
121 TNA, WO 107/69, work of the QMG’s branch, p. 17.
122 J. A. Salter, Allied Shipping Control: an Experiment in International Administration 
(Oxford, 1921), pp. 144–55. On the work of the Allied Maritime Council, see M. McCrae, 
Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: the Supreme War Council and War 
Planning, 1917–1918 (Cambridge, 2019), pp. 187–236; Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, 
pp. 129–32.
123 E. Greenhalgh, Foch in Command: the Forging of a First World War General (Cambridge, 
2011), p. 393.
124 W. J. Wilgus, Transporting the A.E.F. in Western Europe, 1917–1919 (New York, 1931), pp. 
3–7.
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had been trained in the art of transportation and, therefore, could most 
quickly glean the required knowledge and construct and operate a machine 
that would function with efficiency’.125 General Pershing concurred with 
the idea of replicating the British approach; the American commander-in-
chief ’s personal sympathy towards the unification of transport within the 
American force under a civilian expert was confirmed following a visit to 
Nash’s headquarters at Monthuis in July. William Wallace Atterbury, vice 
president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, was appointed the AEF’s DGT in 
October 1917 and held the position for the duration of the conflict.126 
The addition of an American army with its own requirements for port 
space, rolling stock, roads and vehicles introduced another thread to the 
patchwork of transport issues that occupied allied leaders. Franco-American 
discussions on the operation of the AEF’s lines of communications; Franco-
British conversations about the supply of rolling stock and personnel 
from the British empire to augment French resources; negotiations 
between French, British and Italian experts over the operation of overland 
communications to the eastern Mediterranean; and deliberations between 
British, French and Belgian representatives about the use of much-needed 
– but hitherto idle – Belgian locomotives were all ongoing when Pershing 
arrived in France. Furthermore, each topic was treated independently until 
July 1917, when a meeting of French, British, Italian, Belgian and American 
transport authorities took place and agreed to the organization of periodic 
conferences to discuss the common use of rolling stock, railway materials 
and technical labour. These conferences, at which Granet or a deputy from 
the War Office represented Britain’s interests, met on a dozen occasions 
before the end of the year and dealt with ‘numerous questions’ prior to the 
formation of the Supreme War Council (SWC) in November.127
Created when the Italian disaster at Caporetto made it ‘evident that a 
very much closer cooperation was necessary for a successful prosecution 
of the war by the Allied nations’, the SWC provided the catalyst for 
British transport expertise to become engaged on work at a supranational 
level.128 On 1 December the council recommended that a suitable expert be 
125 Wilgus, Transporting the A.E.F., p. 550.
126 J. G. Harbord, The American Army in France, 1917–1919 (Boston, Mass., 1936), p. 116.
127 TNA, CAB 25/110, inter-allied transportation council: organisation and functions, 
Nash to Storr, 4 May 1918; Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 197–8. Unfortunately, 
Henniker does not provide any examples of the discussions that took place at the conferences 
held during this period.
128 TNA, CAB 25/127, historical record of the SWC of the allied and associated nations 
from its inception on 7 Nov. 1917 to 12 Nov. 1918, the day after the signature of the armistice 
with Germany, together with a note as to its role and work subsequent to that date, p. 2.
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appointed to examine and report on the allies’ railway arrangements across 
the European theatre. Both the British and non-British representatives 
on the SWC identified Geddes as a suitable candidate for the task.129 
However, as noted above, Lloyd George refused to release his First Lord 
of the Admiralty for transportation duties. Consequently, Philip Nash was 
entrusted to conduct the investigation in January 1918.
The instructions issued to Nash, when compared to the parameters 
of Geddes’s transportation mission to GHQ in August 1916, emphasize 
the increased scope of Nash’s remit.130 Alongside investigating the allies’ 
transport resources and the capacity of the railways across France and Italy, 
Nash was tasked with the development of a framework for a formal, inter-
allied authority capable of studying the implications for transportation 
of the SWC’s strategic designs. The report he produced in February 1918 
underlined the interconnectivity of allied operations and demonstrated that 
the compartmentalization of transport questions within regional or even 
national boundaries clearly limited the efficiency with which the extant 
infrastructure was exploited.
The existing provision of railway facilities for both civilian and military 
traffic was evaluated within Nash’s report. On the former, he concluded 
that any further reductions in France – the volume of which Geddes had 
condemned bitterly at Calais twelve months earlier – on ‘a scale likely to 
affect the position materially’, were ‘impossible’. By the end of 1917 passenger 
traffic on the French rail network was 65 per cent lower than it had been 
in 1913, and Nash was confident that the suppression of unnecessary goods 
traffic had been ‘thoroughly dealt with by the French government’.131 On the 
latter, Nash’s investigations revealed the parlous state of the allies’ mobility 
within the war’s principal theatre of operations, and confirmed the extra 
layer of complexity that American involvement in the fighting had created 
for the coalition’s transport administrators. Predominantly based upon the 
ports on France’s Atlantic coast (see Figure 8.2), the AEF was served by 
‘a limited number of railways lines of communications of great length’. 
Provided the American forces remained deployed within the Champagne 
or Verdun regions, Nash wrote, the existing Franco-American arrangements 
for the improvement of lines and stations, the erection of storage depots 
and the provision of personnel and materials were likely to be sufficient. 
However, Nash warned:
129 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/F/17/6/19, Geddes to Lloyd George, 20 Dec. 1917.
130 Nash’s instructions are replicated in Appendix II.
131 TNA, CAB 24/43/19, report on general transportation situation on the western front, 
20 Feb. 1918, p. 6.
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If it were found expedient to move any considerable American force to operate 
on a more northerly front – say in prolongation of the British line southwards 
– the American line of communications would have to be altered, and all the 
traffic from American bases for the maintenance of this force would have to 
pass through the neighbourhood of Paris, or, to avoid this neighbourhood 
by a wide detour over lines of limited capacity. This would involve passing 
a considerable traffic over the Ceinture Railways, a system which is already 
much congested by military and other traffic, and it seems extremely doubtful 
whether any considerable addition to this traffic would be practicable.132
The accumulation of American manpower in France was, Nash 
demonstrated, both an aid to and an added complication for the country’s 
allies. Whereas the Germans could shift troops from east to west without 
the need to consult its allies,133 any prospective redeployment of the AEF 
in response to the anticipated German offensive on the western front 
in the spring required the identification of traffic priorities between the 
forces of three independent national railway organizations: the British 
directorate-general of transportation, the American directorate-general of 
transportation and the French ministry of public works (which exercised its 
control through the direction des transports militaires aux armées at GQG).134 
As the Franco-British discussions at Calais in February 1917 had illustrated, 
there was little guarantee that agreement on those priorities was likely to be 
arrived at between the coalition partners easily.
Yet if strategic movements within France were likely to demand the 
curtailment of industrial traffic, the dislocation of services to and from Paris 
and disruption to the supply trains that fed and maintained the armies at 
the front, transport between France and Italy presented ‘much more serious’ 
difficulties for the allies because of the relative paucity of connections 
between the two nations.135 Only two railway routes were available, one via 
the coast and the other through the Mont Cenis tunnel. Both presented 
considerable obstacles to the swift movement of men and goods; on the 
former route a section between Ventimiglia and Savona was single- rather 
than double-track, while on the latter a portion of the line between Modena 
and Bussoleno had been electrified. Consequently, the maximum capacity of 
the two lines was around forty trains per day, each restricted to a maximum 
132 TNA, CAB 24/43/19, report on general transportation situation, p. 7.
133 On the scale and significance of Germany’s movement of divisions to the western front 
during this period, see G. Fong, ‘The movement of German divisions to the western front, 
winter, 1917–1918’, War in History, vii (2000), 225–35.
134 TNA, CAB 24/43/19, report on general transportation situation, pp. 18–19.
135 TNA, CAB 24/43/19, report on general transportation situation, p. 8.
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Figure 8.2. Principal ports and routes used by the 
American Expeditionary Force, 1917–18. 
Source: W. J. Wilgus, Transporting the A.E.F. in Western Europe, 1917–1919 (New York, 1931). 
Map drawn by Cath D’Alton.
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of 260 tons per train.136 
The limitations of the land connections between France and Italy were 
recognized by the SWC even before Nash’s report had been completed. On 
21 January 1918 the council’s twelfth joint note stated that Italy was ‘safe’, 
but that ‘the power of rapid rail transport’ both within Italy and between 
Italy and France had to be increased in order to ‘secure strategic unity of 
action over the two theatres’.137 In the wake of Caporetto, troops had been 
sent to Italy at a rate of forty-two trains per day, but the achievement of 
such figures had necessitated the suspension of all other traffic on the lines. 
Alongside the Cherbourg–Taranto service the Mont Cenis route carried 
a mail and passenger train, a train of supplies for the French forces in 
Macedonia and fourteen trainloads of coal for Italy each day. By February 
1918, Nash reported, the nationwide reserves of coal within Italy – a nation 
that produced no coal of its own – had dropped to an average of twelve 
days’ supply.138 Any curtailment of coal imports to facilitate the movement 
of troops risked the further erosion of stocks upon which the continuance 
of Italy’s war effort depended. Therefore, any decision to move troops from 
France to Italy in 1918 could only be made after careful consideration of the 
relative priorities of the military situation in France and Italy, the available 
stocks of raw materials within Italy and the reserves of supplies accessible to 
the allied forces engaged in Macedonia and further afield.
Nash recognized that such decisions could not be taken unilaterally. 
‘Speaking broadly’, he stated, ‘each operating agency is, within its own 
province, carrying out the work allotted to it in an efficient manner. These 
investigations have, however, convinced me that by freer interchange of 
ideas and experiences drawn from the different agencies concerned, highly 
important results in the direction of expediting movement might be 
obtained’.139 To encourage the circulation and consideration of transportation 
issues across the coalition, Nash recommended the formation of an Inter-
allied Transportation Council (IATC), comprising representatives from the 
four principal allied nations and under the direction of the SWC rather than 
any national body. The IATC, Nash proposed, should advise the SWC of the 
transportation implications ‘of all plans of campaign’ under consideration 
on the western front; negotiate with the allied governments over the 
provision of extra railway facilities necessary to ‘give effect to any accepted 
plan of campaign’; prepare schemes for the movement of large bodies of 
troops when ordered to do so by the SWC, and liaise with the independent 
136 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 298.
137 TNA, CAB 25/120/2, nos. 1–150, joint note no. 12, 21 Jan. 1918, pp. 1–2.
138 TNA, CAB 24/43/19, report on general transportation situation, p. 17.
139 TNA, CAB 24/43/19, report on general transportation situation, p. 19.
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allied governments concerned with the prosecution of such movements; 
‘study the enemy position regarding transportation facilities of every kind’ 
and update the SWC on the enemy’s logistical capabilities; prepare schemes 
for the development of railway lines with the explicit purpose of relieving 
seaborne communications; and oversee the ‘performance of the different 
agencies operating on the lines of communication … bringing to the notice 
of the Governments or armies concerned cases in which the fullest use does 
not appear to be made of available resources, and suggesting remedies’.140
There was little need for discussion of Nash’s report in London. Even 
before the document had been submitted to the War Office the concept 
of an inter-allied committee working with the SWC at Versailles had been 
accepted by the allied prime ministers, while his proposed framework 
had received the backing of the French minister of public works, Albert 
Claveille, the Italian ministers of transport and war, Riccardo Bianchi and 
General Vittorio Alfieri respectively, and the American commander-in-
chief, General Pershing. Consequently, Nash was duly appointed as the 
British representative on the IATC by Lloyd George in mid March 1918.141
Superficially, upon his appointment to the IATC, Nash attained a position 
of higher authority over transportation in the First World War than that 
acquired by Geddes when the latter became DGT in October 1916. The 
IATC provided Nash and his colleagues with an administrative framework 
and the necessary international contacts to construct a wider understanding 
of allied transportation than had hitherto been possible. Geddes’s 
organizational changes had provided GHQ and the British government 
with the tools to consider the transport requirements of Britain’s global 
war effort, but in 1917 suspicions, disputes and disagreements took place at 
the intersections of British and non-British (principally French) authority. 
The IATC provided the allies with the bureaucratic machinery necessary 
to work collaboratively rather than in competition with one another, and 
permitted the SWC to treat the European theatre from Flanders to the 
Adriatic as one continuous front. As Meighan McCrae has noted, the allies’ 
subscription to the IATC – and the appointments of senior transportation 
figures such as Nash and Claveille to sit upon it – illustrates the importance 
the coalition placed on improving communications between the French 
and Italian fronts in the winter of 1917–18.142
140 TNA, CAB 24/43/19, report on general transportation situation, p. 20. Nash later 
advocated for a Belgian representative to join the council, to sit alongside representatives 
from France, Italy, Britain and the United States.
141 TNA, CAB 24/43/19, report on general transportation situation, p. 21; Henniker, 
History of the Great War, p. 199.
142 McCrae, Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War, pp. 104–5.
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However, the council’s lack of executive authority hampered its ability 
to make fundamental changes to the allies’ transportation facilities during 
the war’s final year. The IATC set to work immediately, and between March 
and November 1918 it considered topics ranging from the most effective 
distribution of personnel, tools and materials among the allied armies to 
how best to transport onions from Egypt to the western front.143 
The first task it was set provides an insight both into the organization’s 
strengths and limitations and the instability of the circumstances in which 
the IATC operated as the war entered a more dynamic phase. On 23 March 
the SWC directed the newly formed council to undertake an examination 
of railway movements, which bore striking similarities to the exercises 
issued by the War Office to the ERSC in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. The SWC responded to a warning from the Italian commander-in-
chief, General Diaz – which stated that ‘in the event of a powerful attack on 
[the Italian] front, he would demand the support of ’ eight divisions – with 
a request that the IATC ‘undertake immediately a study of the betterment 
to be made in the transport facilities between France and Italy’ to facilitate 
such a movement. Nash and his colleagues were tasked to examine whether 
the number of troop trains handled daily over the lines between the two 
countries could be more than doubled, and to identify what volumes of 
vital commodities such as coal had to be stockpiled in Italy to permit the 
temporary suspension of supply trains ‘for some days during the critical 
period’ when the troops were moved.144 The council’s report, submitted on 
10 April, provided the allies’ strategic planners with a response that took 
account of the difficulties involved in the supply of coal to Italy that could 
not be alleviated by further use of shipping; the impracticality and lengthy 
nature of all possible infrastructure improvements to the existing routes 
between France and Italy; the ongoing shortages of rolling stock across the 
western front; and the sustained, unavoidable demands for traffic ‘of high 
military importance’ from the allied forces located at Salonika and beyond. 
The IATC provided the SWC with a possible solution to the transport 
challenge – dependent upon the suppression of certain supply traffic, 
advantageous weather conditions and the availability of shipping tonnage – 
that required the exploitation of seven separate lines of communications.145
Nash was quick to emphasize that the scheme contained within the 
report was ‘merely a study … [that could not] be put into effect without 
143 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 200.
144 TNA, CAB 25/110, IATC, explanation of motives, 23 March 1918, p. 1; Joint 
questionnaire number 1, 27 March 1918, pp. 1–2.
145 TNA, CAB 25/53, transportation of troops between France and Italy, Nash to Storr, 10 
Apr. 1918.
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considerable preparation’. The council’s recommendations involved the 
exploitation of routes that comprised railways only, those that combined 
rail and road transport and those that used a combination of rail and 
sea transport to execute the required troop movements. Yet the council’s 
responsibilities did not extend to the identification of suitable entrainment 
and detraining points, to the collection of suitable rolling stock and 
locomotives, to the provision of additional engine crews and other personnel 
required to facilitate the moves, or even to the ‘clearing of the roads of 
snow’. Such questions remained the exclusive responsibility of the national 
governments and military authorities concerned with transport matters 
– the council merely acted as ‘an extremely useful organ of information 
and coordination’, which illustrated the decisions that needed to be 
made before a swift, successful movement of troops could take place.146 
Consequently, the ultimate decision over whether or not to act upon the 
IATC’s recommendations in the British case had to be taken by the War 
Office rather than by Nash. Over a month after the SWC issued their joint 
note number twenty-two, which recorded the IATC’s recommendations as 
‘certain precautionary measures’ deemed necessary to ensure the efficient 
transfer of manpower to Italy,147 Nash broached the subject with London. 
In a somewhat pathetic letter he begged ‘that I may be permitted to know 
if the necessary arrangements’ – which included the strengthening of the 
British army’s supply organization in Italy, the identification and allotment 
of tonnage for the transport of troops from Marseille and the accumulation 
of sufficient stockpiles both of supplies for the soldiers to be moved to Italy 
and of coal for the Italian economy – had been made.148 They had not.
In the spring and summer of 1918 British priorities lay elsewhere. Under 
the stresses engendered by the German advances in France the diversion of 
precious shipping tonnage, construction personnel and materials, alongside 
the arrangement of hypothetical programmes for the rapid movement of 
troops away from the western front, proved to be a low priority for those 
at GHQ and in London. The British government declined to approve joint 
note number twenty-two, much to the distress of the country’s allies, as 
‘present conditions’ made it impossible to spare the supplies required to 
build up stocks in Italy.149 As the surviving documents demonstrate, what 
146 TNA, CAB 25/53, transportation of troops, Nash to Storr, 11 Apr. 1918; Draft 
for collective note number 2, 15 Apr. 1918, p. 2. The French were also fully alive to the 
implications of the IATC’s absence of executive authority. See McCrae, Coalition Strategy 
and the End of the First World War, p. 105.
147 TNA, CAB 25/53, transportation of troops, joint note number 22, 19 Apr. 1918, pp. 1–2.
148 TNA, CAB 25/53, transportation of troops, Nash to Storr, 29 May 1918.
149 TNA, CAB 25/53, transportation of troops, telegram: War Office to Britcil, 6 June 1918.
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followed was a prolonged and sustained multilingual correspondence 
between the allies in response to the flow of events in France and Italy. 
The IATC continued to produce reports and investigate the material 
requirements of infrastructure improvements across the two nations for 
the remainder of the war. The council facilitated discussions between the 
Italian government and the British Ministry of Shipping, which led to an 
agreement on the establishment of a strategic coal reserve in Italy and the 
provision of extra cargo tonnage to reduce pressure on the cross-border 
railways. The French also agreed to provide 10,000 wagons to the Italians, 
which were replenished by additional imports of rolling stock from Britain 
for use on the French lines.150
Yet these successes were the result of agreements reached by the 
national governments of each allied partner rather than the outcomes 
of IATC-led discussions. The IATC’s memoranda and reports provided 
the foundations for inter-allied negotiations, in which the internal 
priorities and national interests of the individual members remained of 
foremost importance to the delegates, rather than the blueprint upon 
which truly collaborative actions were decided upon and implemented. 
Nash, the recognized transport expert with over twenty years’ experience 
in the railway industry, contributed little to the realization of projects 
that did not align with Britain’s strategic priorities as the war entered 
its final phase. As the tide turned on the western front and the allies 
launched what ultimately proved to be the war’s final offensive campaign, 
attitudes towards the provision of resources to Italy hardened among the 
British, French and Americans. While the Italians attempted to use the 
IATC’s reports to press for additional support from their allies, the rest 
of the coalition ‘increasingly expect[ed] the Italians to solve their own 
problems’.151 Nash, far from being considered an asset to the conduct of a 
war that could only be conducted in collaboration, was seen to be acting 
in a manner that did not complement British priorities. By mid October 
1918, Lord Milner, the secretary of state for war since April, had resolved 
to despatch Nash to the eastern theatres to report on the railway situation. 
‘His object’, recalled Sir Sam Fay, ‘was to get Nash away from Paris where, 
[Milner] said, he was a nuisance’.152 The armistice came into effect before 
Milner could implement any changes to the IATC’s composition.
150 McCrae, Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War, p. 117.
151 McCrae, Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War, pp. 122–3.
152 Fay, The War Office at War, pp. 205–6.
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Conclusion
The British government’s refusal to automatically comply with the IATC’s 
recommendations in 1918 exposes the limitations faced by an advisory body 
that wished to coordinate the war efforts of multiple sovereign nations. Sir 
Philip Nash and his colleagues from France, Italy, the United States and 
Belgium were provided with the bureaucratic machinery to identify and 
examine the transport implications of the evolving war effort, but their 
investigations were unable to break from the shackles of national insularity. 
Each of the coalition partners maintained their domestic priorities and 
interests in the second half of the war, which superseded the creation of a 
truly unified command structure even when the work of Britain’s transport 
experts demonstrated the interconnectivity and scale of the allies’ war 
efforts.
The move towards increasing cooperation between the allies came about in 
response to events rather than any innate desire for closer collaboration. The 
twin battles of Verdun and the Somme greatly accelerated the degradation 
of the French transport infrastructure in 1916, which recalibrated the 
relationship between host and ally on the western front. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the abandonment of the pre-war agreement provided the 
catalyst for British locomotives, wagons and other transport equipment to 
be despatched to France in hitherto unanticipated numbers. At the same 
time, Britain’s transport experts were tasked with ensuring that the resource 
requirements of the nation’s domestic industry and other expeditionary 
forces were secure – a challenge complicated by the war’s voracious appetite 
for finite raw materials and the continued absence of a realistic appraisal for 
when victory would be achieved.
British transport experts became an increasingly important component 
of the allied war effort within this constantly changing environment. In 
France, Italy, Egypt, Russia, Romania, Macedonia and at home, British 
civilians were liberally despatched to support and advise Britain’s coalition 
partners and to report upon developments across the nation’s own multiple 
theatres of operations. As George Bury’s examination of the Russian 
network and Lawson Billinton’s attempts to rehabilitate Romania’s railways 
demonstrate, they were not always successful, but in many instances British 
investigators were warmly received. Guy Calthrop recorded that it afforded 
him ‘the greatest pleasure to state that the French and Italian Authorities, 
from Ministers downwards, were most helpful’ to the mission charged with 
examining the feasibility of the overland route to the Mediterranean.153
153 TNA, CAB 24/7/11, proposed overland route to Salonica, Calthrop to Derby, 7 Feb. 
1917, p. 15.
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However, mistrust continued to dog the allies’ attempts to expel the 
Germans from occupied territory in the war’s principal theatre of operations. 
British materials were not sent to France and Flanders unquestioningly, 
while French demands for material and operational support were not 
accompanied by a willingness to relinquish control over the supply lines 
upon which allied troops depended in the second half of the war. Sir Eric 
Geddes’s adversarial approach to coalition warfare exacerbated rather than 
smoothed tensions between the French and British armies over the winter 
of 1916–17. The bullish attitude that dominated the North-Eastern Railway 
proved less applicable to the inter-allied conference room. In an arena where 
a collegiate, diplomatic approach was required, Geddes’s refusal to seek out 
a compromise with his coalition partners stymied the evolution of an inter-
allied forum for the discussion of transportation issues until early 1918. 
Geddes was kept away from a body that ultimately provided the allies with 
the technical advice required to consider the transportation requirements 
of movement on a global scale. The IATC’s deliberations and reports 
largely remained hypothetical exercises. Yet, on the western front, Geddes’s 
organizational and operational changes to the BEF’s transportation system 
were subjected to the ultimate practical test in the second half of the war. 
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9. The road to victory: transportation in the British 
Expeditionary Force, 1917–18
As DGT on the western front, Sir Eric Geddes was responsible for ensuring 
that the necessary transport arrangements were in place to support the 
BEF’s future military operations. In 1917 Haig’s force undertook four 
offensives – at Arras, Messines, Ypres and Cambrai – each of which dwarfed 
the battle of the Somme in 1916 in terms of the volume of ammunition fired 
in support of the infantry. As Ian M. Brown observed, in the second half of 
the conflict BEF ammunition expenditure was constrained by the working 
lives of the guns rather than the absence of sufficient reserves of shells.1 
In 1918 the dislocation caused to the BEF’s transport infrastructure by 
the German spring offensives was substantial, but insufficient to critically 
impair the fighting abilities of the British troops. Over the summer months 
a vast allied transportation effort provided the conduit through which the 
counter stroke was delivered and sustained through much – but not all – of 
the war’s final campaign. 
The results of Geddes’s reorganization of transport, maintained following 
his departure for the Admiralty in May 1917, were played out during the so-
called hundred days offensive. In the eight-day bombardment prior to the 
Somme, the BEF had fired 1,732,873 rounds. Eight weeks later the transport 
network behind the front line came perilously close to collapse under the 
pressure of sustaining an ammunition expenditure of 28,000 tons per week. 
In contrast, when British troops assaulted the Hindenburg Line eight weeks 
after the battle of Amiens they were supported by an artillery that was able 
to fire a staggering 943,847 rounds in just twenty-four hours. In the week 
ending 29 September 1918 the BEF expended 3,383,700 rounds, a total of 
83,170 tons. In the decisive period between 8 August and 11 November 1918 
the BEF poured a colossal 621,289 tons of artillery ammunition into the 
retreating Germans’ defences.2 The war was won on the western front, and 
the BEF played a key role in its delivery.
1 I. M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919 (London, 1998), p. 174.
2 The statistics in this passage are derived from J. Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire: Myths 
and Anti-Myths of War, 1861–1945 (London, 1980), pp. 118–19; D. Stevenson, With Our Backs 
to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London, 2011), p. 379; B. Bond, British Military Policy 
Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980), p. 5.
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The importance of those munitions being in a position from which they 
could be fired into the German lines cannot be overstated. Yet the role 
of the transportation units responsible for the movement of voluminous 
quantities of material during the summer and autumn of 1918 has been 
largely overlooked in histories of the First World War. Numerous authors 
have charted the technological and tactical improvements made by the 
BEF between the nadir of 1 July 1916 and the end of the war, but few have 
documented the modernizing or learning process within the context of the 
allies’ ability to apply those modifications effectively. The allies possessed 
superior access to both human and material resources than the central 
powers, especially following the United States’ entry into the war in April 
1917. However, ‘many of those resources were in the wrong place: far away 
in overseas empires or the US’.3 Colossal quantities of shells were of no 
use to artillery commanders at the front if the Channel ports could not 
process them from the ships, nor the trains, lorries, wagons or barges move 
them inland to the guns from which they were despatched on their final 
journey across no man’s land. The successes of the BEF’s supply services, 
in conjunction with myriad long- and short-term issues that combined 
to reduce the German army’s effectiveness, greatly contributed to General 
Ludendorff’s decision to seek an armistice in 1918.4
This chapter examines the BEF’s operations in the second half of the 
war, and tracks the evolution of the DGT’s role in France and Flanders. 
It underscores how important the transport factor was to the operational 
tempo of an army engaged in material-intensive warfare, and emphasizes 
the complexities experienced by those – soldier and civilian – tasked 
with the maintenance of an industrial army in both static and mobile 
environments. In 1917 the organizational structure conceived and 
implemented by Geddes delivered unprecedented volumes of firepower to 
the front, but proved incapable of responding swiftly to the consequences 
of its success. The devastation created in large part by the artillery supplied 
by Geddes’s light railways proved an insurmountable obstacle in the mud 
around Passchendaele. When mobility did return to the battlefield the 
following year, the prevailing conditions engendered passionate discussion 
over the subordination of the civilian-created directorate to the QMG’s 
department within the military hierarchy. Yet as the need for civilian 
input of a managerial, directorial nature declined in the latter stages of 
the war, the divide between recognizably civilian and military tasks became 
3 Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall, p. 223.
4 D. Stevenson, ‘1918 revisited’, Journal of Strategic Studies, xxviii (2005), 107–39, at pp. 
113–19.
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indistinguishable. The transport factor – exemplified in the universal tasks 
of road building, railway construction and the delivery of goods from 
distribution centres to consumers – exerted a powerful influence over the 
BEF’s war-making capacity until the very end of the war.
Making a new world: transporting the war of material in 1917
Negotiations over the BEF’s fair share of the allies’ finite transport resources, 
discussed in the previous chapter, were not the only claim on Geddes’s 
attentions during his tenure as DGT. He was also responsible for making 
the necessary transport arrangements to ensure that the BEF was adequately 
supported in its military operations. However, Geddes had no influence 
over the location of the BEF’s 1917 offensives or upon the nature of Britain’s 
contribution to those campaigns. On 15 November 1916 the allies’ military 
leaders met at Chantilly and agreed to continue the strategy of simultaneous 
offensives against the central powers on all fronts in 1917. Haig and Joffre 
confirmed the location for operations on the western front two weeks later. 
Haig, although desiring an offensive in Flanders to clear the Belgian coast, 
accepted Joffre’s plan for a British attack – to take place between Vimy and 
Bapaume – concurrent with a French assault launched between the Somme 
and Oise rivers.5 Therefore, Geddes’s concerns over the directorate-general 
of transportation’s first winter in existence were dominated by the need 
to provide a transport infrastructure capable of safeguarding Haig’s troops 
against the problems experienced during the Somme.
The effects of Geddes’s reorganization of British transportation on the 
western front became apparent almost immediately. The tonnage carried by 
the hitherto underutilized IWT fleet increased by a third in the month after 
Geddes’s appointment, as 94,073 tons were carried by canal and rivercraft 
in November 1916. The following month, as ‘every effort continued to be 
made to relieve the railways and ports by utilising as fully as possible the 
carrying powers’ developed by Gerald Holland over the previous years, 
IWT provided carriage for 108,000 tons of material that otherwise would 
have taken up space on the overburdened railway network.6 Barges were 
increasingly loaded direct from ships in port, a practice that allowed the 
BEF to avoid crippling shortages when the port of Boulogne was closed for 
a month following the accidental sinking of the SS Araby in late December.7 
5 W. Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18 
(Basingstoke, 1996), p. 129.
6 TNA, WO 95/56, director of IWT, war diary, memorandum 4, p. 1.
7 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/109, diary entries, 22 and 26 Dec. 1916; Brown, British 
Logistics, pp. 156–8.
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However, as on the railways, the winter weather of 1916–17 caused 
significant reductions in the circulation of waterborne traffic. ‘Towards the 
end of January’, Holland noted in his final memorandum as director of 
IWT, ‘the frost was so intense that vigorous measures had to be adopted 
to keep open the navigation sections of the Northern Waterways system’. 
On 27 January, ‘in spite of all efforts to keep the ice broken up, the canals 
became frozen to such an extent as to bring transport operations in many 
places to a standstill’. Activity continued near the coast at Calais and on the 
River Somme – where the strong current prevented the water from freezing 
entirely – but IWT was unable to continue its expansion until the thaw 
commenced on 15 February. By March 1917 the carriage figures achieved by 
IWT had not only bounced back to the levels recorded in December 1916 
but had surpassed them. 150,000 tons were carried by IWT in the month 
before the battle of Arras, and at both Calais and Dunkirk between 37 and 
39 per cent of imports were loaded direct from ship to barge – reducing the 
strain on the limited railway facilities at both ports.8
The cross-Channel barge service also contributed to the alleviation of 
rail and port congestion. In January 1917 cross-Channel barges carried 1,635 
tons per week to France. By September that figure had risen to 14,460 tons 
per week, and from May 1917 the service was entrusted with ammunition 
deliveries. The Royal Navy’s alleged resistance to, and eventual adoption of, 
the convoy system has dominated historical analyses of Britain’s response 
to the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917.9 Yet the 
humble barge also made a telling contribution to the maintenance of the 
allies’ cross-Channel communications, and helped facilitate materially 
intensive forms of warfare. Between January 1917 and the armistice 574,127 
tons of ammunition passed between the IWT depots at Richborough and 
Zeneghem; not a single barge was lost to enemy action in the English 
Channel during the war. Alongside ammunition, the service carried the 
IWT directorates’ stores and supplies, railway and engineering materials 
and even aircraft to the western front.10
The increased deployment of IWT exemplified the advantages that 
accrued from the centralization of transport. Geddes’s authority to choose 
the most suitable mode of transport for the various classes of supply 
demanded at the front replaced the self-interested actions of 1916 – when 
8 TNA, WO 95/56, director of IWT war diary, memorandum 4, pp. 2–4; A. M. Henniker, 
History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western Front, 1914–1918 (London, 1937), p. 
218.
9 D. Stevenson, 1917: War, Peace, and Revolution (Oxford, 2017), pp. 67–87.
10 TNA, WO 158/851, history of IWT, p. 58; E. A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great 
War: Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and Achievements (2 vols., London, 1921), ii. 1107–9.
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individual departments and services had competed with each other for the 
limited rail capacity available – with an organization that allocated transport 
according to a broader consideration of the BEF’s overall priorities. Goods 
for which there was a steady, largely predictable demand from the front 
could be sent forward by the comparatively slow barges, which freed up 
significant numbers of railway wagons for the carriage of more urgently 
required stores.11 The exploitation of canal transport permitted both a larger 
and more responsive war effort from 1917 onwards, with clear implications 
for the intensity of the operations the BEF was able to conduct.
However, the BEF’s offensive preparations in early 1917 demonstrated 
both the key role to be played by transportation in the conduct of modern 
warfare and the subordinate position still occupied by those responsible 
for the transport infrastructure’s maintenance within the BEF’s hierarchy. 
As on the Somme the previous year, the transport facilities in the area 
designated for what became known as the battle of Arras required significant 
improvement ahead of zero hour. The town of Arras was served by just two 
standard-gauge lines, both of which had to be doubled and provided with 
new railheads to satisfy the BEF’s needs. An additional sixty-five miles of 
track and sidings were laid in preparation for the offensive using rails lifted 
directly from the LNWR’s lines in England, and by mid February Haig 
appeared satisfied with Geddes’s progress. The former recorded in his diary 
that the ‘energy and knowledge’ demonstrated by ‘Geddes and his men’ 
deserved ‘very great credit’. The British railway outlook ahead of the 1917 
campaigning season, he stated, was ‘promising!’12
The winter frost, the German retirement to the Hindenburg Line, 
the sluggish arrival of the materials ordered by Geddes and Haig’s initial 
decision to concentrate British construction work around the Somme in 
anticipation of offensive operations in that area all retarded the development 
of the transport system around Arras.13 Yet for Cyril Falls, writing in the 
official history of the battle, the most significant challenge for the units 
charged with improving the transport infrastructure behind the front 
lay in the BEF’s continued prioritization of the supply of ammunition 
over engineering materials ahead of Arras. Artillery was, as Keith Jeffery 
acknowledged, ‘central to victory’ in the First World War and the cause 
11 M. G. Taylor, ‘Land transportation in the late war’, Royal United Services Institution. 
Journal, lxvi (1921), 699–722, at p. 710. Adrian Hodgkin recorded that three fully loaded 
barges carried the equivalent of 100 wagons of 10-tons’ capacity. See IWM, Hodgkin papers, 
diary entry, 28 June 1916.
12 History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, ed. H. L. Pritchard (11 vols., Chatham, 1952), v. 
630; NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/110, diary entry, 17 Feb. 1917.
13 TNA, WO 158/852, history of light railways, pp. 5–6.
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of around two-thirds of the conflict’s casualties.14 With this in mind, Ian 
M. Brown’s pioneering work on British logistics considered available 
ammunition stocks to be a ‘useful gauge of the BEF’s supply state’ during the 
war and a valuable tool for understanding the force’s logistical operations.15 
Between 17 March and the opening of the battle on 9 April, all but one 
of the ammunition trains requested by BEF commanders were received at 
railheads. ‘When going round the batteries in action’, Geddes told Falls 
after the war, ‘artillery officers begged him to stop bringing up ammunition 
because they had all they wanted and their men were too tired to offload 
more’. ‘This was indeed a happy state of affairs’, Falls wrote, ‘but it is certain 
that no engineer officer said as much respecting engineer stores’.16 During 
the same period only 125 out of 206 stone trains and thirty-five of the fifty-
six requested trains of engineering stores ran.17
The corollary of the BEF’s focus upon the maintenance of ammunition 
deliveries over other supply traffic was that Geddes’s light railway policy 
– which had originally been conceived to relieve road transport, assist the 
advance across shell-torn ground and to forward stone and equipment for 
road repairs – had yet to bear fruit before the battle of Arras began.18 The 
Third Army had requested fifty miles of light railway for new construction, 
and a further fifty miles for repairs and extensions to connect the British 
system to captured German lines in November 1916. In addition, a light 
railway system inherited from the French by XVII Corps, in an area north 
of Arras ‘where roads to the front line were almost non-existent, had been 
developed into a ‘complete supply system’ comprising around thirty-two 
miles by April 1917.19 However, the slow arrival of rails and engines rendered 
the light railway operating companies unable to provide significant respite 
to the overburdened road network during the battle. Across the Third 
Army’s zone of operations, teams of mules and drivers from the Royal Field 
Artillery provided the motive power required to haul trains of six wagons 
over lines caked with mud, which were highly susceptible to derailments 
and consequent delays. Such a poorly equipped light railway system could 
only contribute a very small amount to the Third Army’s supply needs at 
14 K. Jeffery, 1916: a Global History (London, 2015), pp. 257–8.
15 I. M. Brown, ‘The evolution of the British army’s logistical and administrative 
infrastructure and its influence on GHQ’s operational and strategic decision-making on the 
western front, 1914–1918’ (unpublished University of London PhD thesis, 1996), p. 218 n. 13.
16 C. Falls, History of the Great War. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917 (3 vols., 
London, 1940), i. 546.
17 Falls, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, i. 191 n. 2.
18 TNA, WO 107/69, work of the QMG’s branch, pp. 20–1.
19 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 296.
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Arras, with the inevitable consequence that the inadequately supported 
road network suffered greatly in the inclement weather that accompanied 
the offensive.20 Falls was left in no doubt as to the consequences of the 
BEF’s prioritization of firepower over transportation before Arras:
Had the roads behind the Third Army’s front been in a better condition at the 
start and had the supply of stone and timber been more plentiful, it is probable 
that the long pause of nine days between the attacks of the 14th and 23rd April 
could have been considerably diminished. And every hour of this period was 
valuable to the enemy in his feverish preparation of new positions of defence.21
Sufficient stocks of artillery were undoubtedly a key component of the 
war-winning, combined-arms strategy deployed by the BEF in the latter 
stages of the First World War. However, the subordination of supplies for 
the upkeep and extension of the BEF’s transport infrastructure drastically 
impaired the force’s ability to maintain its operational tempo and advance 
in strength before the Germans could regroup at Arras.
The light railway network’s rapid expansion over the spring and summer 
of 1917 permitted the British guns’ unprecedented consumption of 
ammunition, which contributed greatly to the BEF’s initial successes in 
Flanders. The transport infrastructure in the area tasked with supplying 
the operations that became known as Messines and Third Ypres contrasted 
favourably with the road and rail facilities available around the Somme 
the previous year. A double line from Hazebrouck to Steenwerck had been 
supplemented by the doubling of the line between Hazebrouck and Ypres 
in 1915, and the ROD had been responsible for traffic on the latter from 
November of that year. A further line between Bergues and Proven was 
laid in 1916 and doubled in 1917, which gave the BEF a total capacity of 
180 trains per day in the battle area. A highly developed forward delivery 
system, which utilized both light railway and road transport in roughly equal 
volumes, provided the Second Army with facilities capable of removing 
around 300,000 tons of material from the railheads in the month preceding 
Messines.22 For the first time in the war light railways were deployed to carry 
ammunition right up to the heavy batteries before the assault on Messines, 
which allowed General Herbert Plumer’s force to accumulate a stockpile 
20 W. J. K. Davies, Light Railways of the First World War: a History of Tactical Rail 
Communications on the British Fronts, 1914–18 (Newton Abbot, 1967), pp. 61–2; Pritchard, 
History of the Royal Engineers, v, pp. 293–4.
21 Falls, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, i. 547.
22 J. E. Edmonds, History of the Great War. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917 
(3 vols., London, 1948), ii. 39–40; Davies, Light Railways of the First World War, pp. 67–8.
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of 144,000 tons of shells prior to the battle.23 Geddes may have departed 
for the Admiralty by the time the attack took place, but he bequeathed 
to his successor as DGT, Sir Philip Nash, an organization able to supply 
the Second Army’s artillery with each of the 3,561,530 rounds it fired into 
the German defences between 26 May and 6 June 1917.24 Designed from 
the outset as a limited operation to clear the ridge, and described by Nick 
Lloyd as ‘perhaps the finest example of a “bite-and-hold” operation ever 
conducted’,25 all of Haig’s objectives for Messines were in British hands 
within a week and the battle was closed down as attentions shifted north 
towards Ypres.
As the third battle of Ypres unfolded over the summer and into 
autumn, the limited applicability of Geddes’s industrial supply system to 
the conditions of the industrial battlefield – and its considerable effects 
upon the landscape of the western front – were gradually and graphically 
exposed. Events at Messines had demonstrated what was possible with 
a ‘massive accumulation of guns and shells, the unrelenting preliminary 
bombardment of trenches and strongpoints’, and the employment of new 
techniques designed to protect the advancing infantry and suppress the 
German artillery.26 The brief duration and comparatively restrained aims 
of the offensive concealed the outcome of such colossal expenditures of 
firepower. At Third Ypres the BEF assembled an even larger collection of 
artillery pieces to support an offensive with far more ambitious objectives, 
both in strategic and geographical terms. Haig had extended the distance 
of Plumer’s prospective advance at Messines to between three and four 
thousand yards, but he demanded far more from the troops employed at 
Ypres.27 The commander-in-chief ’s sights were set on the capture of Roulers, 
twelve miles beyond the front line on 31 July, and he emphasized on an early 
plan for the operation that ‘there must be no halt on reaching Roulers’.28 
To prepare the way for the prospective advance, the BEF’s artillery fired 
4,283,550 rounds during the preliminary bombardment – an increase of 147 
per cent over the number that had been hurled towards enemy lines ahead 
of the Somme.29
However, the early gains at Third Ypres – eighteen square miles of enemy 
territory were captured on the first day, against 3.5 square kilometres on 1 July 
23 R. Prior and T. Wilson, Passchendaele: the Untold Story (New Haven, Conn., 1996), p. 59.
24 Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, ii. 49.
25 N. Lloyd, Passchendaele: a New History (London, 2017), pp. 56–7.
26 Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele, p. 65.
27 Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele, p. 58.
28 Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, ii. 18.
29 Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, ii. 138. 
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1916 – were superficial. As had occurred in Picardy, the exertions in Flanders 
failed to definitively break the German lines and the battle descended into 
a series of piecemeal assaults undertaken in appalling weather.30 On the 
lines of communications towards the rear the rain had little influence. On 
7 August, Nash reported to Haig that ‘everything has gone extremely well. 
The number of trains to rail-head has increased to an excessive number: 30 
more per diem than we had calculated for, and told the French we would 
want!’31 However, beyond the railheads the weather conditions proved a 
considerable handicap to the BEF’s advance. Haig complained as early 
as 1 August about ‘a terrible day of rain’ that had left the ground ‘like a 
bog in this low lying [sic] country!’ The light railways and roads necessary 
for the sustenance of the troops were ‘steadily … pushed forward’ despite 
the ‘terrible wet’,32 but within a week troops could only reach the front 
line ‘via a thin network of duckboard tracks that had been laid across the 
sodden landscape’.33 Conditions around the 18th Division’s artillery made 
the movement of guns even more arduous. The ooze and slime were so 
thick that it took the men of one battery over six hours to move a single 
18-pounder gun just 250 yards.34 The German gunners, whose arsenal had 
been increased from 389 to 1,162 pieces before the battle, targeted the 
main roads and added to the devastation.35 On 1 September X Corps’s area 
commandant complained that ‘there [was] considerable difficulty in getting 
the traffic through owing to the constant shelling and bombing and the 
Labour Corps are always repairing shell holes in the roads which block the 
traffic’.36 
With the road network increasingly congested and impassable, the time 
had come for light railways to fulfil the role Geddes had conceived for 
them during his transportation mission the previous summer. As the battle 
continued, an increasing quantity of the goods unloaded from the 220 trains 
that arrived at railheads each day were sent forward on the ever-expanding 
light railway network. By September 1917 the BEF’s light railway system 
comprised 623 miles of track, almost double the mileage available during 
the operations at Messines (see Table 9.1). The tonnage conveyed by light 
30 J. Hussey, ‘The Flanders battleground and the weather in 1917’, in Passchendaele in 
Perspective: the Third Battle of Ypres, ed. P. H. Liddle (London, 1997), pp. 140–58.
31 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/116, diary entry, 7 Aug. 1917.
32 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/116, diary entry, 1 Aug. 1917.
33 Lloyd, Passchendaele, p. 123.
34 Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele, p. 98.
35 Stevenson, 1917, p. 198.
36 BLSC, Liddle collection, papers of Brigadier-General W. R. Ludlow, LIDDLE/WW1/
GS0984, diary entry, 1 Sept. 1918. 
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railways increased by an even larger proportion over the same period, rising 
from an average of 95,180 tons per week in June to 210,808 tons per week 
in September. Light railways carried over 227,000 tons in the final week of 
September, which included 47,724 tons of ammunition both in support of 
the successful attack at Polygon Wood and in anticipation of the assault on 
Broodseinde.37
The operations at Polygon Wood and Broodseinde represented the second 
and third steps in a sequence of assaults designed by Plumer to replace the 
more ambitious and costly approach that had been followed by Gough’s 
Fifth Army in August and September.38 Plumer’s designs drew upon his 
experiences at Messines in that they called for a succession of assaults, each 
of roughly 1,500 yards, which aimed for strictly limited objectives until the 
high ground of the Gheluvelt Plateau lay in British hands. Each offensive 
in the sequence was accompanied by concentrations of artillery fire that 
far exceeded even that which had accompanied Gough’s initial attack on 
31 July.39 The principal result of the focused, intense bombardments that 
took place in late September and early October 1917 was the annihilation 
37 TNA, WO 158/852, history of light railways, p. 7; Davies, Light Railways of the First 
World War, pp. 74–5.
38 For a discussion of Gough’s attacks in the opening phase of the battle, see Prior and 
Wilson, Passchendaele, pp. 98–110.
39 Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele, pp. 115, 128.
Table 9.1. Selected weekly averages on the light 
railway network for typical months, 1917.
January March (pre-Arras)
June 
(Messines)
September 
(Third 
Ypres)
December
Locomotives 
in traffic Unknown 126 342 546 513
Tractors in 
traffic Unknown 68 230 335 434
Wagons in 
traffic Unknown 1,395 2,756 4,332 4,797
Miles 
operated 97 164 314 623 717
Tons 
conveyed 10,325 25,315 95,180 210,808 165,530
Source: W. J. K. Davies, Light Railways of the First World War: a History of Tactical Rail 
Communications on the British Fronts, 1914–18 (Newton Abbot, 1967), p. 74.
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of the Flanders landscape. The shallow nature of Plumer’s attacks meant 
that British troops always advanced over shattered ground, the undulating 
nature of which made light railway construction both increasingly difficult 
and material intensive. More than one-fifth of all traffic on the light railway 
network comprised materials for the repair and maintenance of the railways, 
and between fifteen and twenty men per mile were required to ensure that 
the system remained operable.40
The light railway network developed and operated by Britain’s transport 
experts was, through its facilitation of the limited and sequential advances 
of September and October 1917, the architect of its own breakdown. The 
shells delivered to the guns by light railway created ground that was wholly 
unsuitable for the forward projection of railway lines as the Ypres offensive 
crept forward. In his memoirs Gough recorded a vivid account of the 
prospect that faced the British troops in Flanders in late 1917:
Imagine [the] countryside battered, beaten, and torn by a torrent of shell and 
explosive – a torrent which had lasted without intermission for nearly three 
years. And then, following this merciless scourging, this same earth was blasted 
by a storm of steel such as no land in the world had yet witnessed – the soil 
shaken and reshaken, fields tossed into new and fantastic shapes, roads blotted 
out from the landscape, houses and hamlets pounded into dust so thoroughly 
that no man could point to where they had stood, and the intensive and 
essential drainage system utterly and irretrievably destroyed. This alone presents 
a battle-ground of tremendous difficulty. But then came the incessant rain. 
The broken earth became a fluid clay; the little brooks and tiny canals became 
formidable obstacles, and every shell-hole a dismal pond; hills and valleys alike 
were but waves and troughs of a gigantic sea of mud. Still the guns churned 
this treacherous slime. Every day conditions grew worse. What had once been 
difficult now became impossible.41
At Third Ypres the transport system behind the front line collapsed. 
Nash reported to Haig on 13 October that ‘he [had] light engines on the 
60-centimetre railways sunk halfway up the boilers in the mud! Track 
has disappeared!’42 The conservative nature of Plumer’s objectives meant 
that the German guns lay beyond the reach of the attacking infantry and 
remained free to direct their fire upon the BEF’s forward communications, 
40 R. Thompson, ‘Mud, blood and wood: BEF operational combat and logistico-
engineering during the battle of Third Ypres, 1917’, in Fields of Battle: Terrain in Military 
History, ed. P. Doyle and M. R. Bennett (Dordrecht, 2002), pp. 237–55, at pp. 141–2; Davies, 
Light Railways of the First World War, pp. 72–3; TNA, WO 107/69, work of the QMG’s 
branch, p. 21.
41 H. Gough, The Fifth Army (London, 1931), pp. 214–15.
42 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/118, diary entry, 13 Oct. 1917.
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which exacerbated the difficulties faced by those tasked with getting 
urgently needed resources to the fighting troops. Cuts to the line became 
increasingly frequent, and ‘in certain sections it appeared to be the aim of 
the German command to paralyse our advance by denying the supplies 
requisite to enable it to be continued rather than by overwhelming the 
troops themselves’.43 The severance of British rail lines rendered any trains 
on them at the time sitting ducks – unable to move forward to deliver their 
goods nor backwards to safety. ‘Many a train load of ammunition or other 
vital supply’, recalled one commentator, ‘was … shot to pieces before the 
lines could be repaired’.44 The BEF’s extensive light railway network soon 
became ‘utterly unable to cope with the immense volume of ammunition, 
engineering stores, and supplies required by the troops’ at the front.45
Light railways were incompatible with the mud and German artillery 
tactics, while the lack of construction materials sent forward during the 
battle left the BEF reliant on a road network that was wholly inadequate 
for the task. At Poelcappelle on 9 October the advancing British troops 
were supported not by the 1,295 guns that had been assembled ahead of the 
Menin Road assault on 20 September but by a paltry twenty-five guns. Most 
of the artillery was ‘stuck uselessly on the blocked single-track roads further 
to the rear’.46 Brigadier-General Ludlow of X Corps rode through Ypres the 
following day, where he observed ‘an enormous amount of traffic’ along 
the Menin Road, to Hell Fire Corner – a ‘scene of utter devastation and 
appalling mud’.47 Under such conditions the achievement of an operational 
tempo of suitably rapidity to permanently destabilize the German army was 
impossible. In the words of the Royal Engineers’ history of the war:
The battle of Messines, and indeed the whole preceding three years’ experience 
of fighting around Ypres, had shown the need for a continually increasing 
effort to open up roads and tracks in order to maintain the supply of guns and 
ammunition. It became true to say that the more shells fired in the Ypres salient 
the more work had to be done to restore the ground over which the assaulting 
infantry must pass. Thus, the R. E. problems became principally a matter of 
labour and materials for roads and tracks … The roads had to be planned 
for the service of the batteries and ammunition dumps; the infantry had to 
use narrow duck-board tracks, and the pack animals the so-called dry-weather 
tracks, maintained by a continuous filling of shell-holes by rubble from the 
43 Taylor, ‘Land transportation’, p. 707.
44 Taylor, ‘Land transportation’, p. 707.
45 TNA, WO 107/296, report of British armies, p. 24.
46 Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, ii. 238; Thompson, ‘Mud, 
blood and wood’, p. 246.
47 BLSC, Ludlow papers, LIDDLE/WW1/GS0984, diary entry, 10 Oct. 1917.
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shattered farmsteads. The task of the Chief Engineers was probably at its most 
difficult peak during the operations of ‘Third Ypres’.48
The industrial supply system devised, installed and operated by Britain’s 
transport experts played a key role in creating the horrific battlefield 
conditions experienced by those who participated in the third battle of 
Ypres. The transport network’s increasing efficiency may have permitted 
the BEF’s senior commanders to prosecute a ‘rich man’s war’ from 1917 
onwards.49 However, both Gough and Plumer chose to repeat the mistakes 
made the previous year: unprecedented volumes of firepower took priority 
over the provision of adequate supplies of human and material resources 
for the maintenance and development of the forward communications 
required to sustain the advance.50
The BEF’s obsession with firepower created a logistical imbalance on the 
western front that generated particularly appalling connotations in the last 
month of the battle. The haunting images of men, machines and animals 
submerged in the mud and slime around Passchendaele provide a far more 
poignant demonstration of the BEF’s failure to adequately comprehend the 
implications of artillery-intensive warfare than the eighteen-mile-long line 
of trains outside Amiens the previous summer. Yet both were symbolic of 
the emergence of a challenge hitherto underappreciated by those charged 
with directing the British war effort. The improved quantity, if not quality, 
of the Ministry of Munitions’ output in 1916 had exposed the inadequacy of 
the BEF’s transport infrastructure and engendered Geddes’s reorganizations. 
The quicker throughput of goods at the ports, the increased number of 
trains arriving at railheads and the greatly expanded capacity of the transport 
network between the railheads and the front had each aided the creation of a 
logistics system that was able to deliver unprecedented volumes of material 
to the terminal point of the DGT’s responsibilities. When the location of 
the front line shifted – an inevitability if the allies were to forcibly expel the 
Germans from occupied territory – the implications of that reorganization 
were revealed. 
Britain’s transport experts were not responsible for the provision of forward 
communications on the battlefield. Their role was confined to the supply of 
materials demanded by the army to the required place at the desired time. 
Ahead of the so-called DGT line it fell to the chief engineers of corps and 
divisions to carry out the construction and maintenance work necessary 
48 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 312.
49 G. Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army (London, 2011), pp. 101–2; 
Brown, British Logistics, pp. 173–4.
50 Thompson, ‘Mud, blood and wood’, p. 250.
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to move men, guns and supplies into position quickly enough to resume 
the offensive before the enemy recovered. Significantly, none of the senior 
engineers who participated in the battle of Third Ypres identified mud as 
the principal factor that influenced the outcome of the campaign. Instead, 
all were critical of the logistic, engineering, manpower and administrative 
components of the BEF’s approach to warfare in late 1917. The most lucid 
observations came from the chief engineer of the Canadian Corps, Brigadier-
General William Bethune Lindsay. The Canadians had taken over from 
II Anzac Corps on 17 October and Lindsay had immediately abandoned 
construction on light railways in order to focus on road and tramway 
building projects. The corps demanded that both the time and manpower 
to ensure sufficient communications were in place before it attacked, that 
adequate pauses were made between assaults to allow the road network to 
be advanced and repaired, and that the objectives selected for successive 
operations took account of the deteriorating conditions.51 Between 26 
October and 10 November the Canadians struggled through the morass 
and took the Passchendaele ridge at a cost of almost 16,000 casualties.52 
Their material requirements – in terms of ammunition, engineering stores, 
road stone, planks and pit props – employed 960 lorries and countless 
thousands of wagons and pack animals per day,53 all of which had to travel 
forward over a landscape obliterated by the munitions furnished by Britain’s 
transport experts.
The BEF’s experience at Ypres in 1917 amplifies recent calls from historians 
of the First World War to ‘look beyond the British army’s struggles to master 
the technical battlefield’, and to acknowledge the multiple practices of 
adaptation that occurred on both sides of no man’s land during the conflict.54 
On the western front alone the belligerent armies applied new methods and 
technologies proactively, and were forced to respond to the innovations of 
their opponents. The BEF’s material-intensive form of warfare depended 
heavily upon the maintenance of a dependable supply link to the front 
line. Light railways, a response to the problems of forward communications 
encountered during the Somme in 1916, represented a civilian-led attempt 
51 Thompson, ‘Mud, blood and wood’, p. 248. Thorough records of the work undertaken 
by the Canadian engineers in support of the Passchendaele offensives can be found in TNA, 
WO 95/1063, Canadian Corps. Chief engineer war diary, Aug. to Dec. 1917.
52 Lloyd, Passchendaele, pp. 266–86.
53 TNA, WO 95/1063, Canadian Corps. Headquarters branches and services: chief 
engineer, Methods of distribution employed for ammunition, 10 Nov. 1917, pp. 1–2.
54 W. Philpott, ‘Beyond the “learning curve”: the British army’s military transformation 
in the First World War’, RUSI, 2009 <https://rusi.org/commentary/beyond-learning-curve-
british-armys-military-transformation-first-world-war> [accessed 16 Dec. 2017].
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to improve both the capacity and flexibility of the connection between the 
front line and the BEF’s ever-expanding supply of munitions. However, 
the Germans’ redirection of artillery fire towards the disruption of British 
supply operations, the British army’s ongoing sacrifice of engineering and 
transport materials on the altar of firepower, and the horrendous weather 
conditions severely eroded the BEF’s ability to advance in the autumn of 
1917. As Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson noted, Third Ypres ‘did not cease 
because it had reached some meaningful culmination. It simply came to a 
halt’.55 When British troops began to move again the following year, they 
did so in the opposite direction.
A diminished role? Britain’s transport experts and the return to mobility
The organization responsible for the supply of those troops underwent a 
number of personnel changes between the suspension of Third Ypres and the 
start of the German spring offensives. In London, Sir Sam Fay ‘reluctantly’ 
accepted the post of DGMR following Sir Guy Granet’s decision to leave 
for America and take up the post of food controller. Fay was replaced as 
DOM by the soldier who had previously acted as his deputy, Colonel 
Herbert Delano Osborne.56 In France, Sir Philip Nash was also replaced by 
a soldier rather than a civilian when he left the post of DGT to undertake 
his examination of allied transport resources on the western front. Major-
General Sydney D’Aguilar Crookshank, a Royal Engineers officer whose 
pre-war experience had predominantly been acquired in India, became the 
BEF’s first non-civilian DGT.
However, the promotion of these professional soldiers to roles previously 
held by civilians was not the result of a resurgent military voice within 
the British war effort. Instead, the turnover of personnel within the upper 
echelons of the BEF’s transport services between the campaigning seasons 
of 1917 and 1918 was instigated by the prime minister and Sir Eric Geddes. 
Crookshank was first recommended as a suitable DGT by Geddes when 
the latter attempted to acquire Nash’s services for the Admiralty in October 
1917.57 Haig was content to see Nash leave at the time on the proviso that 
the change was not made until after the planned operations at Cambrai 
had been concluded.58 The German-Austrian breakthrough at Caporetto 
scuppered Haig and Geddes’s arrangement. Nash took on the duty of 
55 Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele, p. 194.
56 S. Fay, The War Office at War (London, 1937), pp. 141–4.
57 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/118, diary entry, 5 Oct. 1917. Unfortunately, Haig’s diary 
does not elaborate upon Geddes’s justification for the recommendation.
58 UWMRC, Granet papers, MSS. 191/3/4/160, Haig to Geddes, 21 Oct. 1917.
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coordinating the emergency movement of troops from the western front 
to Italy and then, in January 1918, embarked upon his examination of 
communications between the English Channel and the Adriatic that led to 
the creation of the IATC.59
A further casualty of the ‘increasingly irate’ Lloyd George’s rejuvenation 
of GHQ in the winter of 1917–18 had profound implications for the 
directorate-general of transportation.60 The QMG, Sir Ronald Maxwell, left 
France at the end of the year, his poor health offered as an excuse to remove 
him from active duties. Following what Haig dubbed ‘the decision of the 
Army Council to replace him with a younger man’,61 the forty-six-year-
old Major-General Sir Travers Clarke took up Maxwell’s post and acted as 
QMG throughout the final year of the war. His appointment was described 
later by Sir Frank Fox as ‘a daring experiment on Lord Haig’s part; for he 
was a comparative youngster to be put into a post which was then the 
most anxious and onerous in the Army’.62 By the summer, Clarke’s onerous 
responsibilities had expanded to include authority over the directorate-
general of transportation.
Viewed through the surviving observations of those indirectly involved, the 
machinations that brought the directorate-general of transportation under 
Clarke’s control give the appearance of a naked power grab by the new QMG. 
As early as January 1918 Brigadier-General John Charteris noted the existence 
of a ‘permanent feud’ between Crookshank and Clarke, while in April Fay 
recorded the appearance of ‘a set against Crookshank’ who wanted ‘to get 
the transportation business under the Q.M.G. again, same as it was before 
Geddes’s appointment’.63 Haig became aware of the ill feeling between the 
two men during the same week, when a delegation of senior officers – with 
whom Clarke was in accord – openly questioned Crookshank’s abilities and 
recommended his replacement. Haig thought it a ‘serious matter to change 
a highly placed Administrative Officer’ at such a critical period of the war, 
and attempted to diffuse the situation by reducing the direct personal contact 
between the DGT and QMG to weekly rather than daily conferences.64
59 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/F/17/6/14, Geddes to Derby, 17 Nov. 1917; Fay, The War 
Office at War, pp. 101, 107.
60 For a brief overview of the prominent changes to Haig’s senior staff in 1917–1918, 
see I. Beckett, T. Bowman and M. Connelly, The British Army and the First World War 
(Cambridge, 2016), pp. 346–8.
61 NLS Haig papers, Acc. 3155/120, diary entry, 16 Dec. 1917. Brown, British Logistics, pp. 
180–1 suggests that Sir John Cowans, the QMG at the War Office, orchestrated Maxwell’s 
removal from GHQ.
62 ‘G.S.O.’, G.H.Q. (Montreuil-Sur-Mer) (London, 1920), p. 226.
63 J. Charteris, At G.H.Q. (London, 1931), pp. 282–3; Fay, The War Office at War, p. 160.
64 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/126, diary entries, 21–23 Apr. 1918. Crookshank, Haig 
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Haig’s careful man-management temporarily reduced tensions in France, 
but the question of Crookshank’s position remained open in London. On 
his first day as secretary of state for war, Lord Milner told Fay that ‘he 
had had conversations with General Staff G.H.Q. on [the] appointment 
of Crookshank, [and] thought he was not good enough as Director-
General of Transportation’. Consequently, Fay was ordered not to confirm 
Crookshank’s permanent appointment as DGT despite the latter having 
performed the role ever since Nash had departed for the IATC.65 At a 
tense meeting in Milner’s office on 25 May, attended by most of the Army 
Council, Clarke attempted to circumvent Haig’s support for Crookshank 
and advocated the elimination of the post of DGT altogether. He stated 
that he ‘wanted to split everything up into separate directorates’ and return 
to the extant organization of 1914–16.66
There were sound operational reasons underpinning Clarke’s suggestion, 
even though it appeared to augur a return to the watertight organizational 
structure that had retarded the development of a coherent transport 
policy before Geddes’s arrival in France. Clarke argued that the return 
of a more mobile form of warfare ‘made it clear … that the separation 
of the Transportation services from the Q.M.G. was a serious defect of 
organization and a possible source of danger. The Q.M.G. was responsible 
for supplies but he was not in a position to co-ordinate and control all 
the means of supply’.67 As the BEF retreated into a more circumscribed 
area under the pressure of successive German attacks, the uninterrupted 
daily provision to the fighting troops of 1,934 tons of supplies per mile of 
front became ‘the whole question’ of the war.68 However, with Crookshank’s 
status officially on a par with Clarke’s, any divergence in policy between 
the two men required referral to the commander-in-chief for a decision. 
Any delays in the decision-making process courted disaster in the fluid 
conditions not experienced on the western front since 1914, and were made 
more likely by the changed character of battlefield supply. Based at GHQ, 
Clarke’s direct access to the latest intelligence and the immediacy with 
which he received Haig’s operational priorities contrasted favourably with 
the location of Crookshank’s offices at the so-called ‘Geddesburg’ a few 
miles away – although the distance between GHQ at Montreuil-sur-Mer 
discovered, resented what he perceived as Clarke’s use of the daily interdepartmental 
meetings as an opportunity to criticize the work of the DGT’s office.
65 Fay, The War Office at War, pp. 189–90.
66 Fay, The War Office at War, p. 193.
67 TNA, WO 95/38, branches and services: quarter-master general, an explanatory review 
of the work of Apr. 1918, p. 2.
68 Nash, quoted in Fay, The War Office at War, p. 190.
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and the DGT’s headquarters at Monthuis was far less pronounced than that 
between GHQ and the IGC’s offices had been earlier in the war.
GHQ’s comparative responsiveness had profound implications for the 
BEF’s ability to meet the challenging mobile conditions of 1918. For Clarke 
the major lesson of Third Ypres had been the light railways’ inadequacy 
to cope with heavy and accurate German artillery fire. Consequently, he 
observed, ‘upon the roads and mechanical transport fell the bulk of the 
maintenance work of the armies’. Between the campaigning seasons of 
1917 and 1918 Clarke implemented a complete reorganization of the BEF’s 
mechanical transport, under the principle that lorries were for common use 
rather than to be dedicated to specialist units. As he explained in his post-
war report:
By this means considerable reductions in the number of mechanical transport 
vehicles allowed by existing War Establishments were made both in vehicles 
and man-power. The economy involved in this re-organization placed a large 
balance of vehicles at the disposal of the Quartermaster General. These were put 
into a general reserve, part of which was used to provide replacement vehicles 
for Mechanical Transport Companies, and the residue formed into G.H.Q. 
Reserve Mechanical Transport Companies.69
Clarke’s new mechanical transport policy came into force on 13 March.70 
The German army’s final offensive push began just over a week later.
The progress of the German operations over the following weeks and 
months appeared to confirm Clarke’s beliefs both in the comparative 
advantage of road transport over light railways and of the desirability 
of centralized control over transportation from GHQ rather than the 
separation of duties between the QMG and a DGT. By 21 March – thanks 
to what David Stevenson has described as a ‘masterpiece of staff work’ – 
the Germans outnumbered their opponents at the junction of the British 
Third and Fifth armies by ratios of 2.6:1 in men and 2.5:1 in guns, and 
had accumulated 1,079 aircraft in the sector against the allies’ 579.71 The 
assembled German forces commenced a preliminary bombardment of 
unrivalled ferocity before dawn, which focused principally upon paralysing 
the BEF’s rearward communications and silencing the British artillery.72 
69 TNA, WO 107/69, work of the QMG’s branch, pp. 2–3.
70 TNA, WO 95/37, branches and services: Quarter-master general, Circular to all 
armies, 28 Feb. 1918. The necessary work of reconditioning lorries for service in the GHQ 
reserve companies ‘was perhaps sixty per cent’ complete by 21 March. See Taylor, ‘Land 
transportation’, p. 708.
71 Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall, p. 42.
72 Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall, pp. 53–4.
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Both road and rail networks suffered badly at the hands of intense German 
fire. ‘Practically every road’ was swept with 5.9-inch shrapnel and gas, while 
the area surrounding the railhead at Roisel, east of Péronne, received a 
combination of gas, high explosive and shrapnel shells at a rate of seven or 
eight rounds per minute. In the rear of the Fifth Army the bombardment 
destroyed the track, cut telephone lines and rendered the forward section of 
the light railway system unworkable.73 By nightfall, the troops of the Third 
and Fifth armies had been driven back distances of up to eight miles.
The German advance continued at pace in the days that followed, and 
rapidly disorganized the network upon which Geddes’s resupply system 
depended.74 As light railway lines became untenable, British attentions 
swiftly turned to the evacuation of rolling stock or otherwise denial of its use 
to the enemy. Most of the equipment in the northern part of the battle zone 
was evacuated through Fosseux; over 300 locomotives and tractors were 
disabled by the removal of essential parts, and nearly 2,000 wagons were 
burnt by the BEF in the days after 21 March.75 By the end of the following 
month the route mileage operated by light railways had been reduced from 
920 to just under 360 miles, while the demands of the fighting had led to 
a rapid decrease in the personnel available for the network’s operation and 
maintenance. From a peak figure of 262,000 tons per week just before the 
German spring offensives were launched, the tonnage carried by the BEF’s 
light railways fell by over 50 per cent in the three months that followed.76 
Further back, the standard-gauge railways also presented severe 
complications for the BEF’s logisticians during the spring. By 29 March the 
Germans held Bapaume, Albert and Péronne, and within a week they were 
able to shell the railways around Amiens from positions on the outskirts 
of Villers-Bretonneux. Almost all of the Third and Fifth Army’s railheads 
of a fortnight before the battle had been captured, along with many miles 
of valuable track.77 As the German advance continued into April the 
surrender of important main lines, or their proximity to the enemy, made 
it increasingly difficult for Clarke and Crookshank to maintain fluidity 
throughout the rail network (see Figure 9.1). The loss of engine depots, 
73 R. H. Beadon, The Royal Army Service Corps: a History of Transport and Supply in the 
British Army (2 vols., Cambridge, 1931), ii. 132; Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 371.
74 J. Boff, Haig’s Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany’s War on the Western Front 
(Oxford, 2018), pp. 211–14.
75 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 372; Davies, Light Railways of the First World War, 
pp. 90–1.
76 TNA, WO 158/852, history of light railways, p. 22; Davies, Light Railways of the First 
World War, p. 92.
77 Brown, British Logistics, p. 189.
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the effects of German pressure on the crucial Amiens–Hazebrouck forward 
lateral line and the increased demands for railway traffic as troops from 
the Portuguese, French and American armies were rushed into the fray 
all increased the traffic on the remaining unmolested railways behind the 
British forces. During April alone the BEF ran as many ammunition trains 
as had been run in the entirety of the Somme campaign of July–November 
1916, while the loss to the allies of the Amiens–Arras line reduced the 
available return routes for empty rolling stock and increased congestion 
across the network.78 ‘Good circulation’, Clarke explained, ‘is the essence of 
economical railway working; and a block at any point has an affect similar 
to that of an aneurism on a human artery’.79 By May even the coastal lateral 
route had become seriously clogged with human and material traffic, and 
the continued forward progress of the German troops forced Clarke to 
utilize railheads far back from the fighting to sustain the BEF. However, the 
British forces continued to receive food, supplies and even a regular mail 
service despite the disruption.80
A coastal barge service between the northern waterways and the 
Seine was rapidly implemented as a temporary improvisation to aid the 
overburdened railways in the rear, but the road network provided the 
crucial, widely accessible connection between the railheads and troops 
engaged in fierce combat during the spring. Consequently, mechanical 
transport – the deployment of which lay outside the DGT’s purview – 
became a progressively more valuable component of the BEF’s umbilical 
cord as the German offensives unfolded. As Clarke emphasized in his 
review of May 1918, effective ‘man power depend[ed], in the final result, 
on road power’.81 The QMG-controlled reserve mechanical transport 
companies were allotted to formations according to the demands of the 
situation, ‘kept untasked until the last possible moment’, and withdrawn 
into reserve – or recalled for service elsewhere – as soon as their specific task 
had been completed.82 The latter was far more common in 1918. In some 
cases, Clarke noted in his review of the QMG department’s work in April 
1918, ‘M[echanical] T[ransport] drivers were on duty almost continuously 
for five days at a stretch’ during the month. ‘Under conditions of stress and 
78 TNA, WO 95/38, QMG war diary, explanatory review of the work of April 1918, p. 
1; WO 107/296, report of British armies, pp. 8–9; Brown, British Logistics, p. 189; W. G. 
Lindsell, ‘Administrative lessons of the Great War’, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 
lxxi (1926), 712–20, at pp. 715–16.
79 TNA, WO 95/38, QMG war diary, explanatory review – May 1918, pp. 3–4.
80 Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall, pp. 66–7.
81 TNA, WO 95/38, QMG war diary, explanatory review – May 1918, p. 1.
82 M. Young, Army Service Corps, 1902–1918 (London, 2000), p. 121.
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Figure 9.1. The British Expeditionary Force’s rail network, April 1918. 
Source: D. T. Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives: a Case Study in the Operational Level of 
War (Abingdon, 2006), p. 87. Map drawn by Cath D’Alton.
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danger’, he continued, ‘they had kept their vehicles on the road and assisted 
greatly to relieve the situation’.83 ‘Not only did the new organization prove 
its value’ during the spring offensives, wrote Major Wilfrid Lindsell in a 
post-war article for the RUSI Journal, ‘but unmistakable proof was also 
afforded of the necessity for centralised control of all transportation services 
under the Quartermaster-General’.84 
The provision of separate but interlinked administrations for the 
operation and maintenance of an interconnected transport network had 
proven incompatible with the requirements of modern warfare in 1916. The 
directorate-general of transportation provided the BEF with an organization 
better equipped to service the material requirements of an industrial army, 
but the experiences of 1917 and early 1918 had confirmed that they were 
predominantly suited to the development and sustenance of a stationary 
army. The German spring offensives created conditions not experienced 
in France since the autumn of 1914, when the then QMG, Sir William 
Robertson, had accepted overall responsibility for the coordination of 
traffic on the western front. By mid April 1918 Sir John Cowans, the QMG 
of the forces, was explicit in his belief that the 1914 decision to subordinate 
the IGC had to be replicated. He wrote to Clarke that ‘the introduction 
of the D.G.T. was all very fine when we were in a stationary period, but 
now either he or his representative ought to be in your office to take your 
orders’.85 Fay, in the Army Council meeting held on 25 May, managed to 
convince his colleagues to retain the directorate-general of transportation as 
a distinct body, but was unable to protect the department’s independence. 
The council advised Haig of their decision to subordinate Crookshank to 
Clarke in early June and by the end of the month the matter had been 
decisively settled in Clarke’s favour.86
The status and identity of the directorate-general of transportation 
elicited strong reactions from Britain’s transport experts. Fay predicted 
gloomily in April 1918 that the organizational changes advocated by Clarke 
and Cowans would ‘certainly mean the importation of a great deal of feeling, 
with a probable loss of efficiency or interest’ among the civilians embedded 
within the military machine.87 He returned to the theme in Milner’s office, 
where he urged the Army Council ‘that great tact must be exercised or 
83 TNA, WO 95/38, QMG war diary, explanatory review of the work of April 1918, p. 6.
84 Lindsell, ‘Administrative lessons’, p. 716. Lindsell later reinforced the message in an 
instruction manual on the subject of military administration published in 1933. See W. G. 
Lindsell, A. and Q.: or Military Administration in War (Aldershot, 1933), pp. 127–38.
85 TNA, WO 107/16, IGC, general correspondence, Cowans to Clarke, 16 Apr. 1918.
86 Brown, British Logistics, pp. 194–5.
87 Fay, The War Office at War, p. 191.
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the railway men who were volunteers in the organization of Geddes, both 
officers and men, might become mulish and difficult to handle’.88 Fay’s 
warning implied that the patriotic good will provided to the army by 
Britain’s transport experts was far from an inexhaustible commodity, and 
suggests that civil–military relations within the British war effort remained 
fragile. Two civilian responses to the events of 25 May seemed to confirm 
Fay’s assessment. Geddes, from his vantage point at the Admiralty, labelled 
the decision to subordinate Crookshank to Clarke a ‘military conspiracy’. 
In France, Ralph Wedgwood’s stance indicated that his patience with the 
army had worn thin by the summer of 1918. As confidence in the DGT’s 
ability remained low among the professional soldiers at GHQ and in the 
War Office, Fay – who later told Milner that ‘nothing would induce’ him 
to take the post if it was under the direct command of a QMG rather 
than Haig – suggested Wedgwood as a potential successor to Crookshank.89 
Wedgwood, the director of docks, was eminently suitable for the role. He 
had considerable pre-war experience of handling freight traffic within the 
North-Eastern Railway’s goods department, had acted as a railway transport 
officer at the beginning of the war and had overseen a colossal expansion 
in output at the BEF’s docks since the directorate’s establishment in early 
1917. However, he had become embroiled in an increasingly acrimonious 
dispute with the Labour Corps over the employment of unskilled workers 
within the docks during 1918 and told Fay unequivocally that ‘he would 
have nothing to do with [the position of DGT]. “The army got into a mess 
before, and were going to get into another now, let them get out of it in 
their own way.” He was’, Fay reflected, ‘deaf to any argument’.90
Wedgwood’s emphatic refusal to take on the role of DGT, founded upon 
a belief that another transportation ‘mess’ was imminent, illustrates that 
self-interest retained a powerful influence over men’s actions throughout 
the conflict. His comments to Fay demonstrated that his motivations were 
born of a desire to avoid association with a project he anticipated would end 
in failure, rather than emerging from a sense of loyalty to the incumbent. 
Indeed, not all of Britain’s transport experts were inclined to support 
Crookshank as DGT. Henry Maybury, the director of roads, complained 
to Fay that ‘he could not get a definite decision out of Crookshank, and 
that things had never worked out well’ during the latter’s tenure as DGT. 
He implored Fay to ‘send us a boss’ in place of the vacillating soldier. 
George McLaren Brown was the ‘boss’ Fay identified, a man who had risen 
88 Fay, The War Office at War, p. 193.
89 Fay, The War Office at War, p. 205.
90 Fay, The War Office at War, pp. 193–4.
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from ticket agent for the Canadian Pacific Railway to head the company’s 
European operations before the outbreak of war. Control of the Canadian 
Pacific’s extensive fleet of ocean-going vessels lay within Brown’s remit, and 
he had been drawn into Fay’s directorate of movements to provide ‘general 
control of the movement of all war material and stores to France … [and 
the] working of ports in the United Kingdom’.91
The friction that accompanied Brown’s appearance in France to shadow 
Crookshank revealed the other strand of self-interest that attended 
personal relationships across the British war effort between 1914 and 
1918. Clarke, echoing the attitude taken by his predecessor when faced 
by Geddes in 1916, claimed that ‘some of the directors [in the QMG’s 
department] would not work’ alongside Brown. However, on this 
occasion the lack of cooperative spirit was not caused by tendencies 
towards self-preservation within the professional army. Indeed, the most 
vociferous critic of Brown’s possible appointment as DGT was a civilian, 
Brigadier-General John Stewart. Like Brown, Stewart’s background was 
in the railway industry and he had close associations with the Canadian 
Pacific. Unlike Brown, he had been heavily involved in the British army’s 
global war effort for much of the conflict. He had been fundamental to 
the organization of the Canadian Overseas Railway Construction Corps 
and the rapid construction of the BEF’s light railway network, had been 
entrusted with the investigation of railway facilities in Egypt, Palestine 
and Mesopotamia in 1917 and 1918 and had taken on the role of director 
of construction in the summer of 1918.92 Stewart dismissed Brown as ‘only 
a ticket agent’ who ‘knew nothing about railways’. Fay put the former’s 
comments down to a personal grudge and an ambition to secure the post 
of DGT for himself.93
Whether a valid assessment or not, the entire episode demonstrated 
the continued delicacy of interpersonal relationships within the diverse, 
pressurised environment of the wartime British army. Britain’s transport 
experts were human, and susceptible to the same inclinations towards 
self-preservation, ambition, jealousy, fatigue and obstinacy as their 
military counterparts. Ultimately, neither Brown nor Stewart succeeded 
the professional soldier as DGT. Circumstances on the battlefield rather 
91 W. Stewart Wallace, The Macmillan Dictionary of Canadian Biography (3rd edn.,Toronto, 
ON, 1963), p. 85; Fay, The War Office at War, p. 47.
92 ‘General’s death closes colourful saga of west’, Vancouver Sun, 24 Sept. 1938, p. 3. A 
partial account of Stewart’s wartime contributions is given in G. W. Taylor, The Railway 
Contractors: the Story of John W. Stewart, His Enterprises and Associates (Victoria, BC, 1988), 
pp. 106–20.
93 Fay, The War Office at War, pp. 202–3.
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than in council chambers or offices behind the lines ensured that the war 
was over before Crookshank could be replaced.
From Amiens to the armistice: the transport factor on paper and in 
practice, 1918
The town of Amiens has acquired a central position in considerations of 
the German and allied campaigns of 1918, one which stretches beyond 
the battle that bears its name. Like Ypres in 1914 and 1915, and Verdun in 
1916, the protection of Amiens in 1918 took on a symbolic role for General 
Ferdinand Foch in the wake of his appointment as allied commander-in-
chief in late March.94 Yet the town possessed a far more significant, practical 
importance to the BEF that spring. Amiens and Hazebrouck comprised the 
two principal bottlenecks in the BEF’s railway communications. Almost all 
of the traffic received by rail from the BEF’s northern ports passed through 
Hazebrouck en route to the front, while most of the traffic despatched 
from the southern Channel ports went via Amiens. Around 80 per cent 
of the allies’ north–south traffic – which in early 1918 averaged 140 trains 
per day, and was liable to comprise as many as 212 trains per day if a large-
scale strategic movement of troops took place – either went through or 
skirted the town.95 Construction of an avoiding line to improve rail capacity 
around Amiens had commenced in early March, but work on the nine-
and-a-half-mile-long deviation had not been completed when the German 
offensive began.96
The depth and pace of the German advance forced the allied high 
command to acknowledge the threat to Amiens in the opening week of the 
campaign. The relative distances from the front line of Hazebrouck and 
Amiens had led Haig to concentrate his defensive efforts on the former, the 
latter being located ‘at a greater depth than most … commanders would have 
believed to be vulnerable’ following the events of 1914–17.97 Within a few 
days of 21 March such beliefs had been overturned. In his diary entry for 26 
March Haig recorded that the attendees of a meeting at Doullens – which 
included, among others, the French president and premier, Foch, and Pétain 
– unanimously ‘decided that Amiens must be covered at all costs’ to prevent its 
loss to the enemy.98 The situation appeared precarious. Construction units 
94 Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall, p. 67; E. Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: 
Britain and France during the First World War (Cambridge, 2005), p. 198.
95 D. T. Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives: a Case Study in the Operational Level of War 
(Abingdon, 2006), pp. 85–6; Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 398–9.
96 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 636–37.
97 Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives, pp. 111–12.
98 NLS, Haig papers, Acc. 3155/124, diary entry, 26 March 1918. Emphasis in original.
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hitherto engaged on the avoiding line around the town were redeployed to 
construct defences under Stewart’s command, while Clarke began to prepare 
for the removal of personnel, animals and stores from the area between 
Amiens, Abbeville, Blargies and Dieppe. ‘Scheme X’ was ready on 31 March, 
and was accompanied shortly after by ‘scheme Y’ – evacuation plans that 
dealt with the area surrounding Calais and Dunkirk as well as that between 
Abbeville, Abancourt and Dieppe.99 Henry Rawlinson, when he replaced 
Hubert Gough as army commander in the area on 28 March, captured the 
town’s significance in a letter to Henry Wilson. He wrote that there could 
‘be no question but that the Amiens area is the only one in which the enemy 
can hope to gain such a success as to force the Allies to discuss terms of 
peace’.100 Consequently, he sent an urgent appeal to Foch for more troops. ‘I 
feel anxious for the safety of Amiens’, he wrote, confiding in his diary on the 
same day that ‘if the Bosche attack heavily tomorrow I fear he will break our 
last line of defence in front of Amiens and the place will fall’.101
The town did not fall on 29 March. After a week in which the front line 
had shifted almost forty miles, the German army’s advance slowed as the 
transport factor began to assert itself. By 24 March the German Eighteenth 
Army ‘was starting to feel the effects of fatigue and stretched supply lines’ as 
the gap between the assault troops and their railheads widened. By the time 
the Germans occupied Albert two days later they had left their railheads 
far behind, and the front-line units had been without fresh rations for two 
days.102 Between the tiring attackers and their supplies lay ground shattered 
by the fighting of 1916 and obliterated by the Germans in their retirement 
during 1917. On 29 March General Georg von der Marwitz, commander 
of the German Second Army, described the landscape through which his 
troops had progressed in a letter to his wife:
[T]he region in which we are engaged is appalling. It is the area of the earlier 
Somme Battle and is a giant desert. Villages are scarcely recognizable as such 
and topography resembles upland covered with brush and thicket. Our front 
lines reach to the edge of the undestroyed region, but it is not pretty there either, 
for the British have wasted no time in devastating everything. How they will 
ever make this land inhabitable again is anybody’s guess.103 
99 TNA, WO 107/35, Amiens–Abancourt–Dieppe–Abbeville area: Measures to be taken 
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The forward movement of heavy artillery, ammunition and food became 
increasingly difficult as the advance progressed. Under such circumstances 
the Germans were forced to follow a path familiar to the BEF from previous 
operations; the campaign paused so that guns, fresh troops and supplies 
could be dragged into position. By the time fourteen divisions were ready to 
attack on the morning of 4 April the allies had reinforced and fortified their 
defences ahead of the town. The German Second Army reached the outskirts 
of Villers-Bretonneux, around ten miles from the allies’ vital railway centre, 
but the town itself remained in allied hands. Ludendorff terminated the 
offensive the following day and redirected his energies towards operations 
further north.104
The German high command may have won ‘nothing of value’ from 
operation Michael,105 but their army’s failure to take Amiens did not ease 
allied anxieties as to the situation astride the Somme. Foch, Haig and 
Rawlinson all recognized the town’s psychological significance, but it was 
the task of civilian railway expert Philip Nash to articulate its practical 
importance to the allied transportation effort. On 2 April, two days before 
the final German push for the town began, the British section of the SWC 
asked Nash to examine the implications for the allies’ traffic capabilities 
should Amiens fall:
In the event of Amiens being no longer in Allied hands it is thought 
that considerable difficulty may be experienced in maintaining adequate 
communications between the Allied armies operating north and south of that 
place, while it is of the utmost importance that such communications should 
be fully maintained. A wedge driven in the Allied line with its point at Amiens 
would in fact result in all Allied communication north and south of the Somme 
having to be maintained through the comparatively narrow space between 
Amiens and St Valery which, taking into consideration the fact that a portion 
of this is certain to be under shell fire, is very limited indeed (some 60 kils.) and 
through this narrow trouée all movement would have to pass.106
Only three double-tracked routes for traffic across the Somme were available 
to the allies, two of which crossed the river around Amiens, while two single 
lines with a far lower capacity provided further options to the west.107
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The report Nash submitted a week later illustrated just how restricted 
the allies’ options were. If the crucial lines around Amiens were to be 
rendered unsafe for rail traffic, the remaining lateral routes between the 
town and the coast were ill-equipped to replace them. In March 1918 the 
allies had moved an average of 140 trains per day along the north–south 
routes over the Somme. However, Nash stated that the capacity of the only 
routes across the river to the west of Amiens – which ran Eu–Abbeville 
and Gamaches–Longpré – permitted just ninety train movements per day. 
Furthermore, as his projections did not include any contingency for bad 
weather or movements required for ‘railway exigencies’ such as the return 
of empty wagons, the actual capacity of the lines was likely to be at least 10 
per cent lower.108
Nash’s investigation emphasized how the movement of men and materials 
across the Somme would be constrained by the loss of Amiens. However, his 
report also warned of the ‘much more serious situation’ that would occur in 
the event of a German thrust towards Abancourt. The main line that headed 
west from Abancourt was the crucial link in Nash’s higher estimate of allied 
rail capacity (see Figure 9.2). If use of the line were denied by enemy action, 
‘the possibility of through movement between North and South would be 
limited by the capacity of the Dieppe–Eu section’ along the Channel coast. 
‘This is a single line section with heavy gradients and poor facilities’, Nash 
explained, ‘so that only eight daily train movements in each direction can be 
counted upon’. To make matters worse the country surrounding Serqueux, 
which fed Abancourt along a line that accommodated 100 movements per 
day, was ‘so hilly and broken that the construction of any new connection 
to the main line north of the latter was ‘impracticable’.109 In short, Nash’s 
examination highlighted that if the allies were unable to use Abancourt 
then they would lose access to almost their entire capacity for lateral rail 
movements across the River Somme – the coalition troops and French 
civilians located north of the river could not be supplied from the ports of 
Le Havre and Rouen, while the French munitions factories around Paris 
could not be fuelled by coal delivered direct from the Bruay-Béthune mines.
The precarious situation outlined in Nash’s report was further 
complicated by events that began on the day it was submitted. The next 
phase of the German attack forced the allies to consider the parlous state 
of transportation across the western front, not just in the area immediately 
jeopardized by the fighting. Following the launch of operation Georgette 
on 9 April the Germans achieved more spectacular tactical successes, and by 
108 TNA, CAB 25/111, German possession of Amiens, Nash to Storr, 9 Apr. 1918, pp. 1–2.
109 TNA, CAB 25/111, German possession of Amiens, Nash to Storr, 9 Apr. 1918, p. 6.
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Figure 9.2. The Somme crossings west of Amiens, March 1918. 
Source: A. M. Henniker, History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western Front, 1914–
1918 (London, 1937), p. 399. Map drawn by Cath D’Alton.
nightfall on 11 April the leading German units occupied territory around six 
miles from the outskirts of Hazebrouck. By the following day the Germans 
were within artillery range both of the key junction on the BEF’s northern 
line of communications – which connected the ports of Calais, Boulogne 
and Dunkirk to the front line – and the Bruay-Béthune coalfield from 
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which 70 per cent of the French munitions industry’s coal was mined.110 As 
the advance developed Nash informed the British section of the SWC that
instructions ha[d] been given by the French Authorities to suspend all imports 
of coal and raw materials, which are not for use in the adjacent areas, through 
the ports of Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne and Treport. Arrangements are in hand 
for diverting the supply of locomotive coal for British engines in the North 
to Dieppe or Rouen. The total tonnage thus diverted from North to South is 
about 50,000 tons per week. 111
This traffic represented an additional pressure on the communications 
across the Somme at a time when the presence of active German artillery 
had severely curtailed movement in the vicinity of Amiens.
The depth of the German penetration in Flanders compelled the allies 
into action. Within the BEF, Clarke’s hitherto localized plans for the 
evacuation of personnel and stores evolved into a sophisticated and detailed 
scheme, designated ‘Z’, for the complete abandonment of the area north of 
the Somme. As Ian M. Brown has noted, the BEF ‘had spent the better part 
of three years building this line of communication, along with its attendant 
infrastructure – rail improvements, depots, bases, port improvements, road 
improvements, light railways, ammunition depots’.112 All were scheduled 
to be removed, destroyed or otherwise rendered inoperable to the enemy. 
Scheme ‘Z’ ultimately provided the QMG with a timetable for the 
evacuation of 250,000 men, their attendant equipment and 600,000 tons 
of stores from northern France in just twenty-eight days.113 While many 
of the preparations remained hypothetical, on 11 April the units of the 
locomotive repair shop at Borre near Hazebrouck – established in April 
1917 with the capacity to undertake 200 heavy and 120 light repairs per 
year – were ordered to dismantle its machinery and remove the contents 
from the enemy’s grasp. ‘The lads worked so well’, recalled Colonel L. S. 
Simpson, ‘that in three days and nights they had got out, loaded up, and 
dispatched to Audruicq practically everything except the big wheel lathes 
and an engine or two that were not down on their wheels – this under 
shell fire most of the time – and I am glad to say three hundred of them 
110 Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall, pp. 71–2; Boff, Haig’s Enemy, pp. 220–2; Watson, 
Ring of Steel, p. 521. Dunkirk itself was also under shell-fire, ‘and in consequence could be 
little used’. See ‘G.S.O.’, G.H.Q., p. 255.
111 TNA, CAB 25/111, German possession of Amiens, Nash to Storr, 10 Apr. 1918, p. 1.
112 Brown, ‘Feeding victory’, p. 137.
113 TNA, WO 107/34, programme of railways: memorandum forecast of trains and 
railheads, 1918. For a detailed account of the wider administrative responsibilities demarcated 
in scheme Z, see Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 402–11.
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turned up at Audruicq safe and sound on the 13th, followed the next day 
by the remainder’. The evacuation did not halt work for long. Within a 
week the ROD had opened up a repair shop at Rang-du-Fliers, to the south 
of Étaples, which was ‘turning out three to five engines a week, besides 
repairing metre gauge stock and making ballast ploughs, telegraph post 
slotting machines, and a hundred and one other things’ for the remainder 
of the war.114
The German advance also created immediate concerns for the BEF’s 
allies. On 12 April Haig received warning from the French president, 
Georges Clemenceau, that only five days’ reserves of coal existed in France.115 
Without access to continuous supplies of coal the French munitions industry 
could not function. However, Nash was emphatic in his belief that it was 
‘absolutely necessary, from the purely military point of view, to immediately 
free the single North and South lateral in Allied hands from all but military 
traffic. This means that the whole of the Coal traffic from the Pas de Calais 
to the area South of the Somme must immediately be shut down’.116
The manner in which the allies solved this dilemma illustrates the extent 
to which the French and British war efforts had become intertwined by 
April 1918. On 19 April, when Nash was emphasizing to the British section 
of the SWC that traffic from the Bruay-Béthune coalfield had to be 
suspended, the French minister of armaments informed him that ‘in order 
to make good the loss of the Pas de Calais mines’ the French would require 
600,000 tons of coal per month from England.117 Consequently, an inter-
allied meeting took place at the Ministry of Armaments in Paris on 23 April, 
during which experts from both nations – taking into account the higher 
calorific content of British coal in comparison to French coal – thrashed 
out an agreement for Britain to import 450,000 tons of coal per month 
into ports south of the Somme in the event that the Germans rendered the 
northern coalfields inoperable.118
114 L. S. Simpson, ‘Railway operating in France’, Journal of the Institution of Locomotive 
Engineers, xii (1922), 697–728, at pp. 717–18.
115 Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall, p. 72.
116 TNA, CAB 25/111, German possession of Amiens, transport position in France. 
Memorandum by Major-General Sir P. A. M. Nash, 19 Apr. 1918, p. 1.
117 TNA, CAB 25/111, German possession of Amiens, transport position in France, 19 Apr. 
1918.
118 TNA, CAB 25/111, German possession of Amiens, summary of a meeting held at the 
Ministry of Armaments, Paris, on 23rd Apr. 1918, to consider the requirements for the export 
of coal from the United Kingdom to France in certain eventualities. Sir Richard Redmayne, 
the chief inspector of mines and former chair of mining engineering at the University of 
Birmingham, led the British delegation.
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Nash’s experiences of coalition warfare during the German spring 
offensives provide a startling contrast both to the terse and suspicious 
atmosphere that surrounded Sir Eric Geddes’s negotiations with the French 
in 1917 and Nash’s own attempts to coordinate transportation matters on 
the Italian front in 1918. The speed and depth with which the German army 
advanced after 21 March compelled the French and British to subordinate 
their insular domestic objectives for the benefit of the alliance’s survival as 
an effective fighting force. By late April, thanks to the energies of transport 
experts from both nations and a commitment to the maintenance of 
communications between them, the allies had managed to reduce north–
south coal traffic by one-third and had taken steps to ensure the continued 
supply of fuel for the French economy should events at the front compel 
the abandonment of the Bruay-Béthune mines.119 
However, the reduction of traffic flows across the Somme in spring 1918 
was ‘merely a palliative’ and comprised only half of the parameters for 
Nash’s examinations.120 Alongside his instructions to identify the potential 
economies available on the north–south routes behind the allied front, the 
SWC requested that he assess the ‘desirability and practicability’ of railway 
improvements that ‘would materially improve the general transportation 
situation’ were Amiens to be captured.121 By 9 April he was able to report 
that ‘certain works’ that could ‘immediately give some relief ’ to the allies’ 
transport constraints were already ‘in hand’, while further construction 
efforts to increase the routes available for northsouth traffic were being 
contemplated.122
A fortnight later that contemplation had resulted in an action plan 
agreed by both the British and French railway authorities.123 As coalition 
troops continued to frustrate successive German assaults over the following 
months, allied engineers undertook an extensive scheme of railway 
construction that greatly increased the allies’ capacity to move men and 
materials within the truncated space between the front line and the Channel 
coast. British engineers improved stations on the Gamaches–Longpré line 
to provide the Fourth Army with more railheads, doubled the thirteen-
119 TNA, CAB 25/111, German possession of Amiens, Nash to Storr, 13 Apr. 1918; telegram: 
G.H.Q. to Britcil, 13 Apr. 1918; note on the organisation of supply of the Allied forces 
operating in the area north of the Somme, 15 Apr. 1918, p. 2; extract from War Cabinet, 395, 
dated 19th Apr., 1918; Belin to Sackville-West, 24 Apr. 1918.
120 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 400.
121 TNA, CAB 25/111, German possession of Amiens, Storr to IATC secretary, 2 Apr. 1918.
122 TNA, CAB 25/111, German possession of Amiens, Nash to Storr, 9 Apr. 1918, p. 2.
123 TNA, CAB 25/111, German possession of Amiens, Nash to Storr, 27 Apr. 1918, pp. 2–3; 
Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 645.
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mile-long line between Longpré and Martainville and the twenty-seven 
miles of line between Abbeville and Frévent, contributed to the duplication 
of the line south from Étaples to Port-le-Grand, and engaged in a range of 
improvement works behind the Flanders front.124 In May 1918 alone the 
British built or reconstructed 148.74 miles of broad-gauge track.125 Yet their 
efforts were dwarfed by those of the French, whose principal achievement 
was to survey, prepare and construct an entirely new double-line some fifty-
five miles long from a position south-east of Abancourt to a new connection 
across the Somme.126 The line, which had only been set out on the ground 
on 30 April, was linked through from end to end by 15 July and ready for 
traffic a month later (see Figure 9.3). As Henniker noted admiringly in 
the British official history, ‘a trunk line complete with engine sheds, water 
supplies, signalling, telephones, station buildings, etc., had been constructed 
in … 106 days from the date on which work started’.127 It was, concurred 
the Royal Engineers’ history of the war, a ‘very remarkable feat’.128 Upon 
completion the new line, combined with the other construction undertaken 
that summer, reduced the proportion of north–south traffic that had to pass 
through Amiens: three double-lines, with a capacity of 144 trains per day 
in each direction, provided the allies with more lateral rail options than 
they had possessed before the Germans had attacked. In short, by the late 
summer of 1918 the BEF’s railway communications were in better shape 
than they had been before 21 March.129
Yet despite the comparative reduction in the town’s importance to the 
allies’ lines of communications, Amiens still represented the perfect location 
from which they could exploit their freshly installed transport options. Haig 
had already raised the idea of pushing the Germans beyond artillery range 
of the town before 18 July, when a counterattack on the Marne by troops 
of the French Tenth Army indicated that Ludendorff had lost the initiative 
on the western front.130 The German troops who occupied the sector ‘were 
124 Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 400–2; J. H. F. Le Hénaff and H. Bornecque, 
Les chemins de fer français et la guerre (Paris, 1922), pp. 237–8; D. Lyell, ‘The work done by 
railway troops in France during 1914–19’, Minutes of the Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers, ccx (1920), 94–147, at pp. 109–12.
125 TNA, WO 95/40, QMG war diary, statistical summary, Oct. 1918, p. 5.
126 Further details of the railway construction work completed in the Somme region 
during this period are given in TNA, CAB 25/111, German possession of Amiens, Le Hénaff 
to Nash, 18 July 1918; Les armées françaises dans la grande guerre: la direction de l’arrière (Paris, 
1937), pp. 669–71.
127 Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 400–1.
128 Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, v. 645.
129 Brown, British Logistics, p. 194; Brown, ‘Feeding victory’, p. 139.
130 W. Philpott, Bloody Victory: the Sacrifice on the Somme (London, 2009), pp. 517–18, 520.
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Figure 9.3. The Somme crossings west of Amiens, August 1918.
 Source: A. M. Henniker, History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western Front, 1914–
1918 (London, 1937), p. 400. Map drawn by Cath D’Alton.
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not the formidable fighters of the March offensive’; their defences were 
‘inadequate’, their morale was poor, and the difficulties of supply across 
the devastated landscape were such that their rations were deemed ‘very 
bad and scarce’.131 Between March and the end of July the German army 
had suffered 977,555 casualties, which it had found increasingly difficult to 
replace.132
By contrast, the transport infrastructure behind the allies facilitated the 
accumulation of significant human and material resources in the sector ahead 
of the battle of Amiens. Between 27 July and 10 August Rawlinson’s Fourth 
Army expanded greatly; the number of men attached to the army rose from 
257,567 to 441,538, and the number of horses from 54,323 to 98,716.133 The 
BEF drew together three cavalry and seventeen infantry divisions for the 
offensive, with each battalion of the latter equipped with thirty Lewis guns, 
eight light trench mortars and at least sixteen rifle-grenadiers. They were 
supported by 534 tanks, 800 aeroplanes and over 2,000 lavishly stocked 
guns – each 60-pounder possessed sufficient shells to fire four rounds per 
minute for four hours on zero day. Alongside them the French First Army 
comprised fifteen infantry divisions, over 1,000 aeroplanes and 1,624 light 
and heavy guns. Across no man’s land sat eleven depleted German divisions, 
supported by fewer than 400 aircraft and inadequate numbers of artillery.134 
‘Given the relative strengths of the forces involved’, argued Rob Thompson, 
‘it was clear that this assault would be victorious’ for the allies.135
The scale and manner of the allied victory on 8 August has given the battle 
of Amiens a prominent position in the (especially Anglophile) revisionist 
history of the conflict.136 The results of the first day have provided ample 
evidence to support ‘the perception that the British applied sophisticated, 
fire-power-based combined arms methods to overcome German defences 
131 Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, pp. 289–90.
132 Watson, Ring of Steel, p. 524.
133 J. P. Harris, Amiens to the Armistice: the BEF in the Hundred Days’ Campaign, 8 August–11 
November 1918 (London, 1998), p. 73.
134 Philpott, Bloody Victory, pp. 520–1; Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, 
pp. 309–15.
135 R. Thompson, ‘“Delivering the goods”. Operation Landovery Castle: a logistical and 
administrative analysis of Canadian Corps preparations for the battle of Amiens, 8–11 
August, 1918’, in Changing War: the British Army, the Hundred Days Campaign and the Birth 
of the Royal Air Force, 1918, ed. G. Sheffield and P. Gray (London, 2013), pp. 37–54, at p. 40.
136 For a selection of accounts, see Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, pp. 116–17; G. Sheffield, 
Forgotten Victory. The First World War: Myths and Realities (London, 2001), pp. 237–41; C. 
Messenger, The Day We Won the War: Turning Point at Amiens, 8 August 1918 (London, 2008); 
N. Lloyd, Hundred Days: the End of the Great War (London, 2013), pp. 54–5.
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and restore mobility to the battlefield’.137 The BEF’s leading units had 
driven the Germans back some eight miles by nightfall on the first day, 
captured over 12,000 prisoners and 374 guns and cleared any lingering 
threat to the railway communications around the town. When operations 
were suspended after 11 August the British and French between them had 
inflicted 48,000 casualties and asserted the allies’ material, psychological 
and tactical superiority over their opponents – a predominance they did not 
relinquish for the remainder of the war.138 
Those advantages were entirely underpinned by, and their maintenance 
dependent upon, transportation. The allies’ material superiority over the 
Germans provided them with the means by which to prosecute a more 
intensive form of warfare in the second half of 1918. During the hundred 
days the BEF participated in a series of concentric operations, conceived 
by Foch as a ‘sequence of offensives, each one within the capabilities of a 
single army’s fighting power and logistics, … engaged at a pace that would 
exhaust Germany’s ability to sustain battle once and for all’.139 To sustain 
pressure on the retiring German forces, the BEF and its allies had to ensure 
that the tempo of their operations over the late summer and autumn of 
1918 were sufficient to prevent the enemy from preparing positions that 
could withstand the allied onslaught. Once the enemy had been compelled 
to fall back, a successful pursuit depended upon the timely movement 
of ammunition, supplies and materials across the battlefield in sufficient 
volume to render the Germans unable to prepare new defensive lines. 
Faced by a tenacious, determined opponent, the BEF could not abandon 
the industrial machinery upon which successful combined-arms operations 
relied. Therefore, as much as could be physically moved had to be shifted 
forward over the available roads, railway lines and waterways to maintain 
pressure on the enemy. Ultimately, the transport infrastructure in France 
and Flanders represented a fundamental component of the allies’ weapons 
system during the advance to victory – one that had to be exploited with 
greater success than the Germans had achieved in the spring.
The altered situation on the western front engendered a re-evaluation of 
the BEF’s transport organization. The conditions within which the BEF 
operated as a mobile fighting force differed significantly from those that had 
been in place when Sir Eric Geddes had created the directorate-general of 
137 J. Boff, ‘Combined arms during the hundred days campaign, August–November 1918’, 
War in History, xvii (2010), 459–78, at p. 461.
138 Boff, Haig’s Enemy, pp. 234–5; Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, pp. 103–4; Prior and 
Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 320.
139 W. Philpott, Attrition: Fighting the First World War (London, 2014), pp. 327–8. Emphasis 
added.
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transportation. Clarke was quick to perceive how the return of movement 
to the battlefield had changed his department’s task, and maintained his 
insistence that a military-led organization was better suited to provide 
transport for a mobile army than a civilian one:
A military organization to be efficient must at any time be prepared for either 
emergency – advance or retreat. This is a fact which there seemed a tendency to 
ignore sometimes in the past – the very great difference between the problems 
which the civilian expert has to meet under conditions of stability and those 
which confront the military leader under conditions of war.140
The QMG’s transport policy, issued as guidelines to the BEF’s individual 
armies on 27 August, reflected his attitude. He recommended that work on 
light railways, the medium most closely associated with Geddes’s reforms of 
the BEF’s transport system, was to cease unless conditions for their repair 
were ‘specially favourable’.141 A combination of mechanical and horse-drawn 
transport would ‘take up most of the load from railheads’ to the front line 
as the army pressed forward. In essence, Clarke recommended a return to 
the transport policy envisaged within the army’s pre-war – pre-civilianized 
– organization.142
There was more to Clarke’s new transport policy than his slight against 
the perceived blind spot of civilian specialists suggests. The QMG’s decision 
to recommend that the main line railways and roads received priority 
attention underlined both the BEF’s reliance on the former for the bulk 
movement of goods inland from the ports and the latter’s advantages in 
the fluid conditions of a mobile war. Put simply, light railways were poorly 
equipped to deal with the rigours of a general advance over a substantial 
distance. As Henniker explained in the official history:
The net train loads on the 60-cm. lines were very small – say 30 tons; each 
standard gauge train arriving at a railhead would need, say, 10 light railway 
trains to clear it; traffic on light railway trunk lines would therefore be ten 
times as intense as on the standard gauge; the line must therefore be solidly 
built and equipped like a first-class main line. To follow up a moving front and 
to maintain the lines behind it would require a continuous traffic of material, 
ballast, coal, etc.; beyond a limited distance a great part of the capacity of the 
line would be required for its own maintenance and extension. It was estimated 
140 TNA, WO 95/40, QMG war diary, explanatory review, Aug. 1918, p. 1.
141 TNA, WO 95/40, QMG war diary, diary entry, 27 Aug. 1918.
142 TNA, WO 95/40, QMG war diary, explanatory review, Aug. 1918, p. 1; G. R. Winton, 
‘The British army, mechanization and a new transport system, 1900–14’, Journal of the 
Society for Army Historical Research, lxxviii (2000), 197–212; Henniker, History of the Great 
War, p. 451.
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that it might be worth extending an existing light railway system for 12 to 15 
miles, but that the maintenance by light railways alone of an army advancing 
over a greater distance, even if practicable at all, would require an enormous 
equipment of locomotives and rolling stock, and a number of skilled personnel 
to maintain and operate it far in excess of what had been provided to enable it 
to fulfil its role during stationary warfare.143
Furthermore, the light railway organization that had been steadily developed 
over the course of 1917 had been severely dislocated by the German spring 
offensives. Some 560 miles of light railway had been destroyed or captured 
by the Germans, while the redeployment of light railway troops into broad 
gauge construction units meant that by August 1918 the BEF’s light railway 
directorate lacked the human and material resources that a comprehensive 
use of the medium required.144
However, despite the medium’s limitations and the contents of Clarke’s 
guidance, light railways were exploited whenever circumstances permitted 
during the hundred days. As has been previously demonstrated for the BEF’s 
devolved approach to battle planning, GHQ provided army and corps 
commands with considerable latitude to exercise initiative in the realm 
of transport improvements.145 In practice, Clarke requested that the BEF’s 
individual armies obtain permission for light railway construction during 
the hundred days only when the proposed projects required substantial 
resource commitments, affected the principal west–east trunk routes or 
demanded inter-army coordination.146 Early in the advance, when German 
systems were captured in good order or existing lines could be connected 
to the British network with relative ease, light railways provided valuable 
bulk distribution lines between the standard-gauge railheads and forward 
dumps. During August the BEF’s advance was supported by a light railway 
network that conveyed a weekly average of 157,651 tons – significantly lower 
than the figures recorded during the previous year’s operations at Third 
Ypres, but a substantial increase on the 109,172 tons carried each week 
143 Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 450–1.
144 Taylor, Railway Contractors, p. 118.
145 The extent to which Haig and GHQ successfully delegated authority during the 
hundred days has been subject to sustained examination. For a range of views, see T. Travers, 
How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 
1917–1918 (London, 1992), pp. 175–82; Sheffield, The Chief, pp. 293–339; W. Reid, Douglas 
Haig: Architect of Victory (Edinburgh, 2006), pp. 449–86; Prior and Wilson, Command on 
the Western Front, pp. 397–8; J. Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: the British 
Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 214–15; A. Simpson, 
Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914–18 (Stroud, 2006), 
pp. 156–76.
146 TNA, WO 95/39, QMG war diary, 12 Aug. 1918.
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during May 1918. Over the course of the hundred days the mileage of light 
railways operated by the BEF increased by 35 per cent,147 shaped into a series 
of ‘long antennae’ that ran west–east in pursuit of the advancing troops. 
The Third Army built up a particularly successful line, which crossed the 
St Quentin Canal and extended over thirty-five miles between Fosseux and 
Crèvecœur-sur-l’Escaut.148
Clarke’s observations on the difference between civilian and military 
leadership in the field of army transportation fixated on a distinction that 
had become increasingly blurred by August 1918. The QMG’s subordination 
of the directorate-general of transportation did not mean that Britain’s 
transport experts lacked influence over the BEF’s operations in the war’s 
final campaign. Rather, their principal contribution was felt on a practical 
rather than managerial level. Between late 1916 and the summer of 1918 
the directorate-general of transportation had been conceived, supplied with 
skilled personnel and industrial equipment and embedded within a military 
supply machine that stretched from the Channel coast to the front line; the 
organizational changes demanded by industrial warfare had been devised 
and implemented long before the battle of Amiens. After the battle, the 
directorate-general of transportation experienced its ‘severest test’ of the 
war:
The organization for the advance of practically the entire British army over 
the devastated zone from 30 to 50 miles deep (Arras to Mons) along the whole 
front, which had been scientifically and systematically demolished by an enemy 
who understood demolition and devastation to a nicety, and carried it out with 
the systematic practice and painstaking detail for which he had a justly high 
reputation. For the transportation troops this meant ceaseless work under high 
pressure and under great difficulties and discomfort.149
That ceaseless work – rather than entailing the creation and establishment of 
new organizational structures and using pioneering managerial techniques 
to monitor the performance of a dispersed workforce – primarily comprised 
unloading, loading, driving, navigating, building, repairing, and operating 
the BEF’s panoply of transport options in support of the fighting troops.
The predominantly civilian workforce within the directorate-general of 
transportation responded to the changed circumstances of the war with 
vigour. Their endeavours were prodigious across all areas of the BEF’s 
147 TNA, WO 95/40, QMG war diary, statistical summary, Oct. 1918, p. 4.
148 Davies, Light Railways of the First World War, pp. 98–102, 104; Boff, Winning and 
Losing, p. 88.
149 S. D’A. Crookshank, ‘Transportation with the B.E.F.’, Royal Engineers Journal, xxxii 
(1920), 193–208, at p. 194.
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transportation service in the final months of the war. At the six principal 
docks under the direction of Brigadier-General Ralph Wedgwood, the 
North-Eastern Railway’s chief goods manager, average weekly imports rose 
from 150,300 to 173,270 tons between August and October 1918.150 At an 
individual level, the tonnage handled per man per hour increased by 15 per 
cent over the same period. Improvements also took place within the IWT 
service commanded by Brigadier-General Cyril Luck – the ex-Royal Indian 
Marine successor to the LNWR’s Gerald Holland. In October the BEF’s 
fleet of tugs and barges conveyed an average of 66,368 tons per week across 
the navigable waterways of France and Flanders, an increase of 20 per cent 
over the figures recorded the previous June.
Substantial as these improvements were, the BEF’s operational tempo 
during the hundred days primarily depended upon the speed with which 
the railways and roads behind the front line could be extended. The railway 
construction troops’ initial progress was good. By 8 September the most 
easterly divisional railheads available to the Fourth Army were located 
around Bapaume, some thirty-two miles away from their position before 
the battle of Amiens, and the entire length of the Amiens–Albert–Arras 
line was handed over to the ROD for operation the following day.151 From 
the nadir of May, when the German spring offensives had left the BEF in 
possession of just 220.7 miles of operable railways, by the end of September 
the British portion of the rail network behind the western front comprised 
485.3 miles of track. In the first two months of the hundred days an average of 
153 trains per day arrived into the BEF’s railheads, loaded with ammunition 
and supplies for onward distribution to the advancing troops.152
The ROD, commanded by the Midland Railway’s superintendent of the 
line, Colonel Cecil Paget, played a critical role in facilitating the British 
contribution to the battles of the Hindenburg Line in late September. The 
BEF had fired a daily average of 4,748 tons the previous June, which had 
required the provision of sixteen daily ammunition trains by Paget’s division. 
Across September as a whole the ROD ran an average of twenty-four, and as 
many as thirty-three, ammunition trains per day as the force accumulated 
the firepower considered necessary to destroy the German army’s last major 
defensive system. Across August and September as a whole the BEF hurled 
a daily average of more than 8,000 tons of munitions across no man’s land, a 
period of artillery expenditure that peaked with the colossal bombardment 
150 Unless otherwise stated, all figures in this passage are taken from TNA, WO 95/40, 
QMG war diary, Statistical summary, Oct. 1918.
151 TNA, WO 95/40, QMG war diary, sketch map illustrating how the railways followed 
up our advancing troops, Sept. 1918; Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 435.
152 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 456.
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detailed at the beginning of this chapter.153 In the opening phase of the 
hundred days campaign, which climaxed when the 46th Division crossed 
the St Quentin Canal and pierced the Hindenburg Line, the requirements 
of Foch’s strategic plan rather than logistical constraints influenced the scale 
and timing of British military operations.154
However, the efforts and endeavours of Britain’s transport experts could 
only ameliorate rather than eliminate the transport factor in the weeks that 
followed. The prodigious weight of fire employed by the BEF’s artillery 
during August and September was not sustained in October, as the 
difficulties inherent in the supply of a large, moving army over the available 
railway and road networks steadily accumulated. First, the pace of railway 
construction behind the advancing force slowed considerably.155 During 
August and September 86.04 miles of new track were laid and 518.19 miles 
reconstructed. In early September Sir Sam Fay had secured agreement with 
the Ministry of Munitions to raise the reserve levels of track in France to 
500 miles by the end of October (an increase of 20 per cent). However, 
Clarke recorded on 5 October that shipments of track had not kept up 
with the programme and that consequently ‘the stock of rails [was] very 
much reduced’.156 Delay-action mines, lodged in railway embankments and 
bridges by retiring German engineers, added further complications for the 
railway construction troops – in the words of one commentator they ‘caused 
more transportation difficulties than the whole of the previous four years 
had produced’.157 On 19 October the QMG’s diary recorded that a supply 
train had run into a crater, while progress in the Cambrai–St Quentin area 
was particularly affected by ‘a large number of accidents and the explosion 
of delay-action mines’ over the course of the following week.158 When the 
Third Army successfully dislodged the Germans from defensive positions 
153 Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 456–7. As Henniker noted, the traffic figures 
given above only included ammunition trains from the main ammunition depots. Additional 
traffic from the advanced depots in army areas often demanded the running of as many as 12 
additional trains.
154 Boff, Winning and Losing, pp. 31–2, 89–90.
155 See TNA, WO 95/40, QMG war diary, sketch map, Sept. 1918. The distances between 
the most easterly railheads available to divisions on 8 Oct.lay on aggregate far closer to those 
available on 8 Sept. than those in use on 8 Aug.
156 Fay, The War Office at War, p. 213; TNA, WO 95/40, QMG war diary, diary entry, 5 
Oct. 1918. Fay’s concern was wholly justified. Between Aug. and Oct. 1918 the BEF’s railway 
construction troops laid 485 miles of new track. See Pritchard, History of the Royal Engineers, 
v. 659.
157 J. C. Harding-Newman, Modern Military Administration, Organization and Trans-
portation (Aldershot, 1933), p. 23.
158 TNA, WO 95/40, QMG war diary entries, 19 and 26 Oct. 1918.
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around the River Selle in a night attack on 20 October, it was ‘unable 
to exploit its success’ for three days due to the slow arrival of the force’s 
ammunition trains.159 Increased congestion on the rail network meant that 
a daily average of 133 trains ran into railheads during October, a decrease of 
twenty per day that contributed markedly to a decline of one-third in the 
BEF’s artillery use in October 1918.160
The reduced capacity and reliability of the BEF’s rail lines had profound 
implications for the rest of the force’s transport infrastructure. A reduction 
in the deliveries of stone slowed the construction of new railheads and roads 
closer to the front, which increased the distances to be covered by mechanical 
transport at the same time as it decreased the amount of material available 
for the upkeep of the road surface. Furthermore, when an undetected device 
exploded on 3 November and destroyed a bridge on the Cambrai–Busigny 
line that had only been repaired a fortnight earlier, it forced the divisions 
of IV and V Corps to draw their supplies from railheads ten miles further 
to the rear.161 At the same time the bulk of the Fourth Army’s railheads were 
located between twenty and twenty-five miles behind the front. Over the 
next week Rawlinson’s troops advanced a further twenty-five miles, but a 
combination of mines, destroyed bridges, and accidents ensured that few 
new railheads could be opened to traffic. ‘At the date of the Armistice’, 
Henniker recorded, ‘the only reliable railheads for the Fourth Army were 
50 miles behind the Armistice line; in the north even the most advanced 
railheads of the Fifth Army were 30 miles behind it’.162
The task of bridging the ever-widening gap fell chiefly upon the BEF’s 
fleet of lorry drivers, whose bodies and vehicles were subjected to punishing 
workloads as the hundred days progressed. The lorries of the 14th GHQ 
Reserve Mechanical Transport Company were on the road for around 
one hundred hours over the course of five days in late September, while 
Henniker recorded cases of ‘columns taking seventy-two hours to complete 
what should have been a daily round’. The combination of tired drivers, 
poor roads and long journeys – which reduced the time available for 
vehicles to be serviced – increased the number of accidents and breakdowns 
159 J. Boff, ‘Logistics during the hundred days campaign, 1918: British Third Army’, Journal 
of the Society for Army Historical Research, lxxxxiv (2011), 306–21, at p. 320. All classes of 
supply were affected by congestion on the railways in late Oct. The regular daily supply 
trains for 61st Division arrived a day late on four occasions, while the deliveries for 16 and 
19 Oct. did not get through at all.
160 TNA, WO 95/40, QMG war diary, statistical summary, Oct. 1918, pp. 4, 7.
161 Boff, ‘Logistics during the hundred days campaign’, p. 314.
162 Henniker, History of the Great War, pp. 460–61.
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among the BEF’s pool of lorries.163 At the end of October Clarke reported 
that ‘some 3,600 lorries were out of action (out of a total of about 20,000 
working in Army areas) chiefly due to broken springs’,164 which further 
degraded the supply situation at the front. Eighty lorries were required 
to carry ammunition for VI Corps’ heavy artillery. By 2 November only 
fifty-six were available to accumulate firepower ahead of the battle of the 
Sambre.165 
The BEF’s victory on the Sambre sent the German army into a general 
retreat. For the remainder of the war the ‘British trudged on through 
cold and wet across the sabotaged and booby-trapped landscape that the 
Germans had left behind them’. The ‘weather and logistical difficulties 
rather than the Germans were the main obstacle to the advance’ in the 
final phase of the hundred days.166 Since 8 August the BEF’s spearhead 
formations, the Third and Fourth armies, had advanced approximately 
sixty and 100 miles respectively.167 The repairs of mine craters in the roads 
could not keep pace with the advance, as congestion, delays, accidents, 
the demands of civilian populations in liberated territory and breakdowns 
across the transport network severely decreased the volume of material to 
reach the front. By the week ending 9 November the BEF’s transportation 
network echoed the paralysis experienced on the Somme two years earlier. 
Ten accidents and sixteen mine explosions – mostly on the critical Cambrai-
St Quentin line – reduced the speed with which trains arrived at railheads, 
were unloaded and returned to the bases for fresh loads. Consequently, a 
‘serious shortage of trucks’ existed at almost all of Wedgwood’s ports, which 
‘resulted in congestion of quays and very considerable delay in discharging 
ships’.168 Beyond the railheads, the belt of country only passable by low-
capacity animal transport rapidly widened. The roads directorate, under 
the road board’s Brigadier-General Henry Maybury, was responsible for 
the construction, repair and maintenance of a network comprising 4,412 
miles of road – he had, Fay reflected after the armistice, ‘left his mark all 
over the roads in Northern France’. However, like the majority of the men 
employed on supply and transportation duties in November 1918, Maybury 
163 TNA, WO 95/454, headquarters branches and services. Deputy Director Supplies and 
Transport, the Fourth Army, notes on conference, 4 Oct. 1918; WO 95/40, QMG war diary, 
Explanatory review, Oct. 1918, p. 3; Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 461.
164 TNA, WO 95/40, QMG war diary, explanatory review, Oct. 1918, p. 3.
165 Boff, Winning and Losing, pp. 86–7.
166 Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall, pp. 168–9.
167 Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 36; Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, p. 295.
168 TNA, WO 95/40, QMG war diary, diary entries, 2 and 9 Nov. 1918.
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was worn out.169 Men, mostly of advanced years and lower standards of 
physical fitness, had been tested to their physical and psychological limits; 
their lorries had been ‘knocked about’ and overworked.170
The demands of mobile warfare, waged by a mass army backed by the 
entire impedimenta that successful combined-arms operations required, 
could no longer be effectively met by the manpower and resources available 
for its supply. On the afternoon of 9 November the Third Army instructed IV, 
V and XVII Corps to consolidate their positions and echelon back in depth 
to reduce the army’s transport burden. VI Corps took over responsibility for 
the whole of the Third Army’s front, and was ordered to act as an advanced 
guard and keep in touch with the German retirement.171 To the Third Army’s 
right, responsibility for the Fourth Army’s pursuit was devolved upon Major-
General Hugh Keppel Bethell’s 66th Division on the same morning. The 
Fourth Army had deployed over half-a-million men and animals and 2,000 
guns at the battle of Amiens. Bethell’s force comprised only one infantry 
brigade, one cavalry brigade, seven armoured cars, a field gun battery, two 
sections of 4.5-inch howitzers, an anti-aircraft section, three field companies 
of engineers, a pioneer battalion and the division’s machine-gun battalion. 
It represented all that the available transport infrastructure could sustain 
just three months later.172 The heavy artillery, tanks, light railways, repair 
workshops and sundry units and services that had contributed to the 
successful operations conducted by Rawlinson’s forces throughout the 
course of the hundred days were abandoned. The transport factor made it 
impossible to feed a larger, hungrier force.173 Consequently, Bethell’s force 
was ordered to maintain contact with the Germans the following day, but 
to do no more.174 At 11 a.m. the next morning the war on the western front 
came to an end.
169 Fay called upon Maybury on 27 Dec., and recorded in his diary that the latter was ‘not 
at all well—has nerves and cannot sleep’. See Fay, The War Office at War, p. 208.
170 TNA, WO 95/454 Deputy Director Supplies and Transport, the Fourth Army, diary 
entries, 31 Oct. and 10 Nov. 1918; Crookshank, ‘Transportation with the B.E.F.’, p. 206.
171 Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 35.
172 A. Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battle of the Hundred Days, August 
8th to November 11th, 1918 (London, 1920), pp. 260–1; J. E. Edmonds and R. Maxwell-
Hyslop, History of the Great War. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918 (5 vols., 
London, 1947), v. 528.
173 J. C. Darling, 20th Hussars in the Great War (Lyndhurst, 1923), p. 127.
174 Edmonds and Maxwell-Hyslop, History of the Great War, v. 533.
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The BEF’s transport problems did not end when the guns fell silent. The 
reduced demand from the front for materials directly related to the conduct 
of military operations, such as ammunition, was counteracted by requests 
for the construction materials necessary to reconnect the pre-war rail links 
between France, Belgium and Germany. ‘There was’, recorded Clarke in his 
review of November 1918:
A tremendous extent of damage to be repaired all at once, our line having 
already advanced an abnormal distance beyond its railheads, while every mile of 
railway progress towards the German frontier meant an addition to the number 
of trucks required in order to maintain the supply service at the same number 
of trains per day. In practice it could not be done.175
The limited train capacity of the ‘hastily reconstructed lines in the forward 
areas, devoid of all ordinary facilities for working, remained; reconstruction 
across the [devastated area] only increased the length of line over which 
traffic was precarious and intensified the shortage of rolling stock’.176 The 
BEF could not advance to the German border in strength even when the 
military force opposing it had ceased to offer resistance.
However, the transport infrastructure that by November 1918 was 
inadequately equipped to move and supply an industrial army had proven 
itself good enough to facilitate the allied success on the western front over 
the previous two years. Britain’s transport experts played a key role in that 
success. The integrated transport directorate established by Sir Eric Geddes, 
populated with civilians, and embedded within the military hierarchy over 
the winter of 1916–17 facilitated the prosecution of a material-intensive war 
on a scale beyond the BEF’s capability during the battle of the Somme. 
The directorate-general of transportation created the circumstances in 
which British gunners could add significantly to the destruction wrought 
upon the French and Belgian landscape by the artillery of the First World 
War, not least at Third Ypres. What David Lloyd George referred to as ‘the 
campaign of the mud’ in his indictment of the BEF’s senior commanders 
was – at least in part – the responsibility of the prime minister’s desire to 
introduce civilian specialists to the administration of the British army.
The events of 1917 and 1918 demonstrate the inaccuracy of Lloyd George’s 
statements regarding the imposition of supposedly superior civilian 
methods upon a backward-looking, reactionary army. Geddes’s system 
was well suited to the task of supplying a stationary force, but it sank into 
175 TNA, WO 95/40 QMG war diary, explanatory review – Nov. 1918, p. 2.
176 Henniker, History of the Great War, p. 467.
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the quagmire it had created at Passchendaele and proved ill-equipped to 
service the requirements of a mobile force. The BEF’s ultimately successful 
transportation effort during the final year of the war came about through the 
amalgamation of civilian and military expertise; recognisably non-military 
technologies, methods, and personnel were applied to the identifiably 
military problem of sustaining a relentless offensive pressure against 
a retreating opponent. By the summer of 1918 the line between civilian 
and military existed more in the minds of the personalities at work in the 
BEF’s administrative hierarchy than it did in the directorate-general of 
transportation’s practical accomplishments. Sir Douglas Haig ‘could launch 
simultaneous offensives or sequential ones on widely separated fronts – 
something that had been unthinkable before 1918’.177 Those offensives were 
a crucial factor in the German decision to seek an armistice.
Yet neither Haig, nor Geddes, Travers Clarke, Sydney Crookshank, or 
any of the other individuals responsible for the supply of the BEF during 
the hundred days could entirely eliminate the realities of mobile, material-
intensive, modern warfare. The German spring offensives provided a graphic 
demonstration that the armies of the First World War could not tear loose 
from their railheads, penetrate deep into enemy territory, and maintain the 
intensity and tempo of their operations.178 The BEF’s advance could not 
have taken place without adequate, sustained access to supplies of food, 
ammunition, and myriad goods of both direct and indirect relationship to 
the conduct of military operations. Consequently, in the words of a staff 
officer who was responsible for XIII Corps’ supply arrangements throughout 
the hundred days, the final campaign of the war was ‘the most cumbrous 
steam-roller affair it [was] possible to conceive’.179 Britain’s transport experts 
had helped to keep it in motion for long enough.
177 Brown, British Logistics, p. 179.
178 M. Van Creveld, ‘World War I and the revolution in logistics’, in Great War, Total War: 
Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–18, ed. R. Chickering and S. Förster 
(Cambridge, 2005), pp. 57–72, at p. 67.
179 W. N. Nicholson, Behind the Lines: an Account of Administrative Staffwork in the British 
Army, 1914–18 (London, 1939), p. 215.
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10. Conclusion
Throughout the First World War, the British railway industry’s trade press 
acknowledged the magnitude of the conflict and detailed the railways’ 
ongoing support to the nation’s armed forces. In the war’s opening months, 
as men streamed into the recruiting stations, the numbers and proportions 
of each company’s workforce to have answered Kitchener’s call were 
recorded in frequently updated league tables of patriotic service.1 As the 
war expanded in scale and scope, the activities and increased prominence 
of railwaymen like Sir Eric Geddes and Sir Sam Fay were reported on with 
familial pride. After the fighting had ceased, the Railway Gazette marked the 
industry’s involvement with a special issue, which exclaimed in an editorial 
that although ‘transport has always been an important factor in war … never 
in the history of the world has it played such a great part as in the war now 
terminated’.2 The fundamental requirements of modern, industrial warfare 
had presented unprecedented challenges for the transportation services 
behind all of the belligerent armies during the war: the accumulation and 
sustenance of millions of men; the transport of thousands of machines; and 
the provision of innumerable combinations of goods and services among 
others. Without vast bureaucratic organizations and complex, integrated 
supply systems the First World War could not have taken on the course or 
the character that it did. Transportation was central to the conduct of the 
war, and cannot be divorced from the discussion of the military campaigns 
that took place between 1914 and 1918. However, the prediction made by 
the North-Eastern Railway Magazine in 1916 – that ‘when the history of 
the present war is written it would be found that our railways and our 
railwaymen had taken a very large share in operations’ – has not proven to 
be the case.3 This book has rectified this deficiency.
This volume opened with three questions, the answers to which challenge 
Lloyd George’s principal assertion about the wartime British army and shed 
new light on the military’s application of civilian specialists between 1914 
and 1918. It has demonstrated that Britain’s senior political and military 
1 ‘Railwaymen and the war’, Railway Gazette, 6 Nov. 1914, pp. 493–97.
2 ‘The organisation of war transportation’, Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation 
Number, 21 Sept. 1920, p. 1.
3 ‘The romance of the railways’, North-Eastern Railway Magazine, vi (1916), p. 38.
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figures acknowledged the value of industrial knowledge and technologies 
long before the outbreak of war in August 1914. The emergence and 
growth of the railway industry stimulated the development of an enduring 
professional association between the army, the government and Britain’s 
transport experts. This peacetime relationship manifested itself both in 
organizational and practical terms. The formation of the ERSC in 1865 
underlined the army’s respect for the expertise of, and methods applied by, 
those tasked with the construction and management of a global transport 
and distribution network. The establishment of the REC in November 
1912 represented a desire among both civilian and military figures to work 
harmoniously in the event of war. The army also benefited substantially 
from its pre-war interactions with Britain’s transport experts outside the 
committee’s deliberations. A new generation of officers received academic 
and vocational introductions to the operation of railways thanks to the 
contributions of British transport experts to the LSE’s administrative staff 
course and the Midland Railway’s engineering programme.
The importance of close collaboration between Britain’s transport 
experts, the army and the government was demonstrated graphically in the 
opening days and weeks of the war. The production of the WF scheme was 
a joint endeavour. The impressment of horses, the routing and rerouting of 
thousands of specially provided trains, the identification of infrastructural 
improvements that were required at the French Channel ports, the allocation 
of sufficient locomotives and rolling stock and myriad other tasks necessary 
for the mobilization and movement of the BEF to the continent could not 
have been accomplished by the military alone. A modern, industrial army 
equipped with weapons, vehicles, aeroplanes and other impedimenta could 
not have been despatched from Britain’s shores swiftly and effectively unless 
its transportation was properly coordinated. Henry Wilson’s principal 
contributions to the WF scheme was that he recognized how crucial the 
involvement of civilian specialists were to the formulation of a reliable, 
executable mobilization plan, and that he ensured the army’s preparations 
for war were supported by the companies that put them into practice.
The bonds forged before 1914 were thoroughly exploited over the years that 
followed. As the BEF grew exponentially, and the war’s insatiable demands 
for manpower and materials stretched into every corner of the empire (and 
beyond), Britain’s transport experts were called upon to play a multitude of 
roles in support of the military effort. They, and the private enterprises that 
employed them, were essential to the empire’s response to the demands of 
an industrial war. Within the first twelve months of hostilities the largest 
transport companies had placed their human and material resources at the 
War Office’s disposal, and they continued to do so throughout the war. 
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Men with British, imperial and wider experience of railway construction 
and operation became core components of the supply services that were 
established to support the army’s various expeditionary forces. A plethora 
of experts examined, reported upon and enhanced the BEF’s transportation 
services on the western front. The industrial capacity possessed by Britain’s 
largest railway companies was redirected from its peacetime applications 
towards the manufacture of items as diverse as drinking cups and six-
pounder Hotchkiss guns. Furthermore, when the demand for munitions 
necessitated the establishment of a dedicated organization in 1915, Britain’s 
transport experts were among the first technocrats to populate Lloyd 
George’s nascent Ministry of Munitions. Civilian specialists intensified 
British military power, and facilitated the colossal expenditures of 
ammunition that characterized the war on the western front.
The multiplicity of contributions recorded in this book – both collectively 
and, as in the case of Sir Francis Dent’s numerous responsibilities, 
individually – have stressed the extent to which civilian skills and expertise 
were applied to the prosecution of war-related duties during the First World 
War. Manufacturing, engineering and labour, engaged in dispersed but 
interlinked activities, were all vital to the continued capacity of an army 
engaged in a war of attrition. As Major Wilfred Lindsell acknowledged in 
his post-war textbook on military administration:
Modern wars … are no longer won by decisive battles, but by sustained and 
adequate maintenance arrangements. The army requires its fighting troops, its 
supply, transport, medical and repair organizations, etc., but behind all this 
military paraphernalia it requires the entire resources of the Empire, and it 
requires that these shall be organized to meet the needs of the Empire in arms.4
As senior managers within some of Britain’s largest companies, the pre-war 
railway industry provided figures such as Geddes, Fay and Sir Guy Granet 
with experience that made some of the challenges – if not the global scale – 
of wartime transport organization recognizable ones.
The recalibration of the Franco-British coalition, which took place 
concurrent with Geddes’s installation as DGT and DGMR, also increased 
the opportunities for Britain’s transport experts to play a larger role in the 
prosecution of the First World War. France and Britain entered the conflict 
without an adequate managerial framework to ensure that national priorities 
were subordinated to the shared aim of expelling German forces from 
occupied territory. During 1914 and 1915 both Dent and Gerald Holland 
4 See W. G. Lindsell, A. and Q.: or Military Administration in War (Aldershot, 1933), p. 
129.
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found their designs to improve the BEF’s logistical capabilities constrained 
by the French authorities. As hosts, senior partners and the suppliers of the 
vast majority of the machinery, personnel and infrastructure required to 
operate the shared transport network behind the allied forces, the French 
army and state’s desire to retain overall control of the apparatus upon which 
its national defence rested overrode all other considerations. Even after the 
BEF grew to number more than a million men, and the colossal battles of 
1916 had eroded France’s ability to honour its pre-war agreements, the latter 
proved reluctant to combine demands for further British support with a 
willingness to surrender executive control to Britain’s transport experts.
Geddes’s first real exposure to the Franco-British alliance underlined the 
inherent complexities of coalition warfare. The transportation discussions 
that opened proceedings at the Calais conference on 26 February 1917 have 
been overshadowed by the political machinations that followed, but the 
disagreements between Geddes and Albert Claveille emphasize the need for 
further studies on the mechanics of the allies’ partnership. This book has 
documented the accumulation of British manpower, machines and materials 
behind the western front that followed Geddes’s appointments as DGT 
and DGMR; it has raised doubts about the businessman’s temperamental 
suitability for a role that demanded a conciliatory and diplomatic approach; 
and it has illustrated how British transport expertise was disseminated 
throughout the global war effort with varying degrees of success after 1916.
However, further research is required to understand how the other 
belligerents’ military and railway authorities responded to the unprecedented 
challenges of industrial warfare. Elizabeth Greenhalgh, in a reference to 
‘conflict’ between Claveille and GQG, has provided a tantalising glimpse 
into the civil–military relations that shaped the French war effort.5 Yet 
the view from the other side of the conference table and the other side 
of the hill remains partial. More work is needed in this direction to 
produce a comprehensive account of transportation on the western front 
and beyond, one which covers topics such as: how the different pre-war 
transport arrangements developed by Britain and the continental powers 
affected the establishment of efficient supply organizations behind the front 
lines; how effectively the Franco-British partnership exploited the available 
transport infrastructure and supported its weaker allies; how efficiently the 
German railway authorities were able to utilize the rail capacity available 
in occupied territory to support their troops in a multi-front war; and 
how the continued presence of domestic concerns and post-war strategic 
5 E. Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War 
(Cambridge, 2005), p. 241.
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considerations manifested themselves in the evolving coalitions that fought 
the war. As Sir Philip Nash’s attempts to secure a British contribution 
to improve the transport connections between France and Italy in 1918 
demonstrate, internal calculations retained a powerful influence over 
individual belligerents’ actions throughout the war.
In highlighting the breadth and diversity of Britain’s transport experts’ 
contributions to the war effort, including Nash’s with the IATC, this book has 
demonstrated that Geddes’s transportation mission to GHQ in August 1916 
was far from unique in scale or scope. The foregoing discussion has argued 
that Geddes’s contribution must be considered as part of a wider narrative of 
civil–military relations, one which permits a more nuanced understanding 
of how Britain’s senior political and military leaders conceptualized the war 
as it unfolded. The full implications of industrial warfare’s material and 
organizational requirements revealed themselves only gradually. In 1914 
and 1915 the manpower and materials required to overburden the extant 
rail and road systems on the western front had yet to be accumulated in 
France and Flanders. The military inclination and political justification for 
a large-scale examination of the BEF’s transportation services lay dormant 
until 1916, when the unprecedented effort of the battle of the Somme 
illuminated the weaknesses of the infrastructure and organization upon 
which any substantial allied advance depended. Under such circumstances 
the use of civilian specialists was confined; the talents of men such as Dent 
and Holland were applied selectively in response to comparatively small-
scale conundrums, such as the increased throughput of goods at the Bassin 
Loubet or the development of an efficient IWT fleet. Prior to the Somme, 
when the true extent of the commitment required to defeat the Germans 
remained unclear, it was both militarily undesirable and politically 
impossible for large quantities of precious raw materials to be redirected 
from the ever-growing demand for munitions and weapons of destruction 
into the production of locomotives and rolling stock. Until the absolute 
necessity for substantial infrastructure improvements was made abundantly 
clear during the second half of 1916, there was insufficient compulsion 
for transportation to be considered a priority issue in the allocation of 
raw materials.6 Geddes’s most important contribution to the British war 
effort was that he produced the organizational systems, manpower and 
equipment required to conduct warfare on a hitherto unimaginable scale. 
That a civilian, rather than a professional soldier, was given the opportunity 
6 As Granet noted in a memorandum on the supply of wagons in late 1916, there already 
existed a ‘great shortage of steel owing to the large demands for big gun ammunition’. See 
PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/E/6/1/5(A), memorandum on the question of railway wagon 
supply, p. 3. 
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and the support to do so, has tinged many of the military’s histories of the 
conflict with a sense of resentment.
Yet by moving the consideration of Britain’s transport experts in the 
First World War beyond Geddes, this book has presented a more balanced 
interpretation of the relationship between civilians and soldiers than that 
which emerged from the post-war period. Lloyd George’s claims about 
the triumph of civilian ingenuity and innovation over a hidebound, 
conservative, obstructive military must be revised in light of this study’s 
findings. The reluctance of officers such as Frederick Clayton, Ronald 
Maxwell and Richard Montagu Stuart-Wortley to support the transportation 
mission has provided the bedrock for historical accounts of the so-called 
civilianization process that took place after August 1916. The foregrounding 
of insular, individualistic officers with self-preserving tendencies has created 
an imbalance in representations of the civil–military relationship at play 
within the British war effort. Haig proved able to work constructively with 
successive DGTs, while officers such as Henry Mance and Albert Collard 
were clearly highly respected members of the hybrid civil–military team 
assembled in the directorate-general of military railways.
Furthermore, this study has highlighted that the civilian specialists drawn 
into the military machine were not immune to engaging in boundary 
disputes, nor did they entirely embrace the army’s existing hierarchies. Ralph 
Wedgwood’s adversarial approach to those who pointed out inefficient 
practices at the docks under his control, while not directly increasing 
inefficiency, did nothing to alleviate the problems either. Furthermore, John 
Stewart’s designs on the role of DGT in the war’s final months demonstrate 
that not all civilians were driven by purely altruistic motivations during 
the conflict. The interactions between civilians and soldiers – and, indeed, 
between civilians and civilians or soldiers and soldiers – within the crucible 
of the First World War cannot be reduced to simplistic stereotypes. The 
relationships that developed during the conflict, whether friendly or 
unfriendly, depended upon such variables as personality, circumstances and 
timing.
This book has studied the interface between the British army and the 
empire for whose protection it was responsible. It has shown how the army 
came to reflect the society from which it came, argued that it was an industrial 
machine forged from an industrial population, and emphasized that it was 
sustained by many of the same techniques, methods and procedures that 
drove a world-leading economy. Between 1914 and 1918, and particularly 
after 1916, civilian specialists were redirected from the pursuit of profits 
towards the production of military power on a colossal scale. Britain’s 
transport experts, from within and without the army’s organizational 
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structure, permitted the empire to pursue a far more material-intensive 
form of warfare than had hitherto been possible.
The impact of the First World War on British society was profound 
and abiding. It has left a long shadow over the nation in the century since 
the guns fell silent. Yet the influence of British society over the conduct 
of the war was equally significant. From the very outset, and indeed for 
many years prior to the outbreak of war, Britain’s transport experts and 
the army conspired to ameliorate the logistical challenges to be addressed 
in the prosecution of a modern conflict. Between them they planned 
Britain’s response to the war, enlarged the scope and scale of the empire’s 
contribution to the fighting and sustained the full implications of modern, 
combined-arms warfare until victory had been secured.
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Appendix I: Information requested by the secretary 
of state for war from the transportation mission led 
by Sir Eric Geddes, August 19161
Requirement statistics: the following information to be obtained in 
quantities per week for each month up to 30 June 1917, in respect of the 
details set out below.
Tonnage and numbers to be conveyed, and number of railway, road and canal vehicles or 
craft of various kinds required:
From point of origin to home ports and vice versa.
From French ports, and vice versa.
From ports in other theatres of war, and vice versa, for:
• Officers and men • Sick, wounded and 
leave men
• Horses and mules
• Motor vehicles • Horse-drawn vehicles • Spare parts for vehicles 
and guns
• Numbers of guns and 
weights
• Gun ammunition • Machine-guns
• Rifles • Small-arms 
ammunition
• Bicycles
• Trench warfare 
ammunition (including 
gas cylinders)
• Salvage • Food supply
• Clothing, boots and 
other equipment
• Harness • Petrol
• Mails, parcels and 
private consignments
• General stores • Railway material
• Building material • Other RE stores • Medical supplies
1 TNA, WO 32/5164, Facilities and arrangements for Sir E. Geddes in conducting his 
investigation on transport arrangements in connection with the British Expeditionary Force 
at home and overseas, 9 Aug. 1916.
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• Munitions and raw 
materials for French 
government
• Fuel • Voluntary Aid 
Detachments
• Red Cross • YMCA • Blue Cross
• Church Army • Any other large traffics
Units of requirement of each item, e.g., per Corps, or per Division, per 1,000 men etc. 
where possible.
Provisions for strategic reasons and to meet requirements about today’s 
railhead:
Construction, repair etc. of:
• Railways • Docks • Canals or roads
Necessary in the event of an advance, for the movement of troops, ammunition, stores 
etc., or to feed civil population.
Provision of:
• Railway material • Girders • Dock equipment:
• Locomotives • Road material • Gates
• Carriages and wagons • Road transport vehicles • Power
• Barges • Material for repairs of 
canals
• Cranes
• Labour (repair, 
maintenance, operating 
and workshops)
• Fuel • Rails
• Stores • Dredgers
Special memoranda required on:
1 Existing organisation in this country.
2 Existing organisation in France.
3 French organisation and arrangements for working BEF traffic, including 
relationship with French government authorities and railway, dock or canal 
officials.
4 Relation of British military traffic to French traffic (military and/or civilian).
5 Relations with Belgian government qua Railways and ports in the future.
6 Present position of Belgian railways rolling stock.
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7 Repairing facilities for locomotives and rolling stock in France and Belgium, 
including supply of labour and material.
8 Proposals in hand or contemplated for provision of additional lines in France or 
arrangements with French railways.
9 Relations with REC, with any existing memorandum on the subject.
10 Relations and procedure with Admiralty in France, on the sea, in England, and in 
other theatres of war.
11 Relations with Admiralty, Army Medical Service, etc., as to the evacuation of sick 
and wounded.
12 Reports made or any special instructions issued during the period of the war:
a. Labour at home or abroad.
b. Dock facilities at home or abroad.
c. Rail facilities at home or abroad.
d. Canal facilities at home or abroad.
e. Road transport at home or abroad.
f. Evacuation of sick and wounded.
13 Position as regards:
a. Railways.
b. Sea Transport.
c. Docks.
d. Canals.
e. Roads in France.
With maps and plans where available. Memorandum to give details as to all difficulties 
which are being experienced: all probable tight places being specially marked on the maps 
and plans. Details of steps in progress or in contemplation to counteract the difficulties.
14 General flow of traffic at home and abroad, through various ports and by the 
different routes. Descriptions of traffic generally forwarded by rail, canal and road.
15 Storage depots in France and in this country so far as transport questions are 
affected.
16 Requirements of special capacity wagons and numbers available.
17 Armoured trains.
18 All special regulations as to despatch and storage or loading on railways of mixed 
cargoes, ammunition, guns, men. Any restrictions against bulk cargoes of any kind.
19 Memorandum with specimen forms of all traffic returns submitted to WO or IGC.
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20 Statement of all railway, dock or canal works, rolling stock, craft accommodation 
and equipment generally provided by the British government in France.
21 Extent to which railway telegraphs and telephone circuits are used for the business 
of other departments.
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Appendix II: Instructions issued to General Nash, 
10 January 19181
1. To investigate and report on the existing transportation facilities by 
railway of the Allies on the Western front as a whole, that is, between the 
North Sea and the Adriatic, involving enquiry as to: —
(a.)  The capacity and use of Trans-Continental main railway 
systems.
(b.)  The resources of the Allies on the Continent in locomotives, 
rolling stock, railway material generally, and railway personnel.
(c.)  The extent to which existing facilities can deal with movements 
of troops from one point to another on the Western front, and 
the manner in which they can be improved.
2. To make recommendations as to the constitution of an Inter-allied Co-
ordinating Authority to deal with questions of Military Transport by rail on 
the Western front, including the following functions: —
(a.)  To advise on the transportation aspect of any strategical 
proposals which are under consideration.
(b.)  To study in advance and prepare for the carrying out of 
movements which may be decided upon.
(c.)  To formulate special shipping requirements involved in any 
contemplated policy.
3. To indicate the extent to which the existing British organization for 
Transportation in the Field may require to be modified or altered in the 
event of the constitution of an Inter-allied Transport Authority.
1 TNA, CAB 24/43/19, Report on general transportation situation on the western front, 20 
Feb. 1918, p. 4.
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